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OFFICIAL DISCOURSE AND PUBLIC OPINION IN POST-COMMUNIST
SOCIETIES; THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT-AFFILIATED
INTELLECTUALS

Ekaterina M. Levintova, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2004
Post-Communist countries are unique in the sense that they are undergoing not
a single, but multiple transitions. The extent of social change underway in this region
is truly monumental and researchers are faced with the daunting task of studying the
extent of this transformation. Change is most evident when one studies formal
institutions. But lies beneath, on the level of value orientations? The answer to this
question helps us understand the real progress of post-Communist countries towards
the goals of their transitions.
What were the political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic
relations attitudes of the post-Communist Russian and Polish elites and publics, and
were there any changes? Were original liberal attitudes on both the elite and the
popular levels replaced by organic-statist/conservative orientations? What were the
areas of consensus and disjimction between the elites and the publics? The project
traces the relationship between the elite and publics’ attitudes along five issue
domains, cross-culturally and over the entire post-Communist period. This is the first
study of its kind.
This dissertation uses both quantitative (statistical analysis and an extensive
review o f public opinion data collected by Russian and Polish national polling
organizations) and qualitative (content analysis of public statements of Russian and
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Polish government-affiliated intellectuals) methods. Comparison between elite and
public attitudes shows values that are shared by both post-Commimist governments
and the general populations, and exposes motivations of post-Communist decision
makers.
I find that organic-statist evolution of the Russian elite’s value orientations is
incomplete; some original liberal elements survived. Likewise, the organic-statist
shift in public opinion was not absolute; there remains considerable popular support
for political democracy and pro-Western foreign policy. In Poland, both the elite and
the public consistently supported modified liberal values.
The Russian elite and the general population agree on organic-statist values, as
only

politically

authoritarian,

ideologically

conservative,

anti-Western,

and

nationalistic preferences are found on both the elite and the popular levels. In Poland,
inclusive democratic, ideologically mixed, moderately etatist, and pro-Western
attitudes (i.e., moderately liberal value orientations) are shared by both the elite and
the population at large.
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CHAPTER I
OFFICIAL DISCOURSE AND PUBLIC OPINION IN POST-COMMUNIST
SOCIETIES: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT-AFFILIATED INTELLECTUALS

Post-Communist Elite and Public Attitudes: Towards a New Research Agenda
Russia and East European countries are unique in the sense that they are
undergoing not a single, but multiple transitions. They simultaneously reform their
political, economic, social, constitutional, cultural, and national structures. The extent of
social change imder way in the region is truly monumental. But so is the challenge of
studying this change. How can researchers begin to approach the davmting task of
measuring the extent of contemporary transformations in the post-Communist societies?
The change, of course, is most evident when one studies formal institutions and objective
patterns of behavior. From this perspective, the countries of the region are not that
different - all now have regular elections, democratic constitutions, and market-based
economies. But what lies beneath, on the level of attitudes and value orientations?
Research of values and attitudes is difficult, but indispensable. It helps us imderstand why
Russia is increasingly moving in an authoritarian, statist, and nationalist direction and has
fractious relations with the West, while Poland is succeeding in building substantive
democracy and is moving towards the integration with the West as fast as it can. In other
words, the research of values and beliefs tells us more about the real progress of postCommunist countries towards the goals of their transitions. The significance of this
dissertation is in exploring the less obvious answers and in linking elite and public
attitudes, a project that is still in the formative stages in the post-Communist scholarship.
How does one study public and elite attitudes? Analysis of public attitudes is fairly

1
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straightforward. Most researchers look at the results of public opinion surveys. Assessing
the elite’s attitudes is more challenging. High-ranking government officials are unlikely
to grant researchers interviews; they also do not participate in regular surveys. In
exploring the elite’s attitudes, I examine the official discourse of government-affiliated
intellectuals.^
Early in their post-Commxmist transitions, former Soviet and East European
countries shared a very similar anti-Communist, pro-democratic set of value orientations
on both the elite and the popular levels. Yet, today the elites’ discourses of postCommunist countries vary dramatically. On the one hand, in countries such as Poland,
discourse has been consistently liberal, democratic, capitalist, ethnically tolerant, and proWestern (henceforth, “liberal”) - despite the almost cyclical rotation among liberal and
social-democratic political elites. On the other hand, in Russia, with its continuity of the
political elite,^ official discourse has recently shifted to emphasize a strong state, law and
order, revival of national values, and independent foreign policy (“organic-statist”
henceforth), after a long period in which it was decidedly liberal.
Although the shift in Russian official discourse was documented by both Western
and Russian media, its nature, political consequences, and the extent of popular support
still await systematic analysis. Similarly, the Polish elite’s continuing adherence to liberal
discourse requires comprehensive investigation. Analysis of official discourse articulated

‘ By official discourse, I mean government-affiliated intellectuals’ public statements produced for
domestic mass consumption that deal explicitly with values, norms and policies. I use the terms
“official discourse,” “elite discourse,” “statements/documents o f government-affiliated intellectuals,”
“discourse o f government-affiliated intellectuals,” and “elite value orientuations” interchangeably. For
more detailed elaboration o f these points, see the “Conceptual Framework” Section.
^ Putin, the current president o f Russia, is Yeltsin's hand-picked successor. He was elected to continue
the previous course and supported by the political elite on the basis o f his guarantees o f stability.
Putin’s team includes many familiar faces.
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by government-affiliated intellectuals is important because it shows patterns in the elite’s
value orientations and can be compared to both public attitudes and actions of the elite.
In this dissertation, I offer answers to three research questions: 1) What were
political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic relations value orientations of
the post-Communist Russian and Polish elites and the general publics and were there any
changes? 2) What were the areas of consensus between elites and public in the two
countries? and 3) Did changes/continuities in the elite’s value orientations translate into
policy outcomes?
My goals are to 1) explore the shifts and continuities in both Russian and Polish
official discourse (the elite’s value orientations) and public opinion; 2) determine the
values shared by both elites and publics in the two coimtries; 3) examine the role that
government-affiliated intellectuals play in post-Communist societies, 4) investigate the
political implications of the continuity or change in official discourse; and 5)
comparatively explore and isolate factors that stabilize liberal orientations on both the
elite and the popular levels.

Brief Comparative Assessment of Russian and Polish Case Studies
Russia and Poland, although not exactly identical, share important similarities.
These similarities make them particularly suitable for a comparative analysis. Both are
located in the same geographical region and have economic, historic, and cultural ties to
each other. They share a very comparable recent history and political experience. The

Commimist period in each country was characterized by the political monopoly of the
Communist parties, suppressed civil societies, the absence of meaningful political
competition, lack of alternative channels of interest articulation, intense indoctrination.
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and popular mobilization through numerous state and party channels facilitated by rapid
cadre replacement.
Both countries practiced a socialist model of economic development in which the
state not only steered the economy, but owned the means of production and engaged in
extensive macro- and micro-economic planning and distribution. Although attempting to
eliminate social inequality and class divisions, both countries had some degree of social
differentiation with the party nomenklatura and elite specialists on the top of the social
ladder and agrarian workers at the bottom. Despite economic shortcomings, Commimist
regimes in Russia and Poland achieved high levels of education, brought about at least
partial gender equality and created extensive social welfare programs. When the
Communist regimes fell, both states had to undertake multiple transitions from
authoritarianism to democracy, from command economy to free market, and from an
antagonism with the West to a pro-Western foreign policy. In both countries, the first
democratic elections in the late 1980s-early 1990s brought new elites to power.
Despite fundamental similarities, the two case studies do possess some finer
differences that are worth mentioning. Russia and Poland became Communist through
strikingly different processes. Communism was a product of indigenous development in
Russia, while in Poland it was imposed from the outside. The very duration of the
Communist period was different. Soviet Communism lasted for seventy-four years,
during which new political and economic institutions (including one-party rule, statecontrolled economy, and social protection net) took root and produced their own legacies.
Poland was Communist for approximately forty years. In contrast to the Soviet Union,
whose Communist course - with the exception of Khrushchev’s “Thaw” - was never
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seriously challenged, Poland experienced the first cycle of liberalization as early as the
late 1950s.
The role of nationalism in generating pressures for democratic reforms was very
significant in Poland, but virtually non-existent in Russia. The two countries had different
geopolitical positions and economic specialization. The Soviet Union was a military
superpower, whose economy was based on heavy industry at the expense of consumer
goods and the agrarian sector. Communist Poland, a predominantly agrarian country that
did not completely eliminate private ownership of land, never had superpower ambitions
and was in essence reduced to being a Soviet satellite.
In the late 1980s, the Communist regimes in both countries started to crumble.
Poland undertook a democratic transition in the Fall of 1989, when the first semidemocratic elections took place following a series of roundtable talks between the
Communist soft-liners and the opposition. Russia embarked on the democratic path in
1992, after a conservative coup d ’etat failed to stop the disintegration of the USSR. The
modes of transitions - negotiations in Poland and the failure of the hard-liners’ coup in
the Soviet Union —were undeniably different. Despite the differences in processes by
which democracy and capitalism were introduced, both countries faced a similar problem
- an urgent need to create new economic, legal, and political institutions. Their
immediate post-Communist agenda, however, had two important particularities.
First, Russia faced an additional problem —the problem of “stateness.”^ Shortly
after the failed coup of 1991, the former Union republics began to declare their

^Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's term. They claim that “without a sovereign state there can be no
democracy” and that “agreements about stateness are logically prior to the creation o f democratic
institutions.” Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
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independence and sovereignty. Russia had no choice but to start building its ovra
institutions. Ostensibly the most powerful republic within the Soviet Union, Russia did
not have the trappings of traditional statehood. Its capital was the capital of the Soviet
Union, and its governmental offices were home to the Soviet government, rather than the
Russian one. In contrast, Poland had clearly established state structures and its stateness
was not seriously contested either territorially or symbolically. Secondly, Poland had no
alternative to the democratic idea. During the Communist period’s cycles of
liberalization, democracy emerged as the only viable alternative to the existing
Communist structures and foreign domination. In Russia, however, the idea o f an
authoritarian path to reform was at least as prominent as the democratic agenda, even at
the time of the Communism’s collapse.'*
In the decade that passed since the initial transitions, the differences did not
disappear. Although both countries engaged in post-Commimist transformations almost
simultaneously, by the late 1990s, Poland enjoyed greater economic prosperity facilitated
by rapid economic transformation. Polish GNP per capita was $4,570 and GNP
calculated as purchasing power per capita stood at $10,130. The numbers for Russia were
lower “ $2,140 and $7,820 respectively. Poland’s annual economic growth between 1990
and 1999 was 4.7 percent, while the Russian economy declined by 6.1 percent per
annum. However, by the end o f the 1990s Polish economic growth slowed to 1.2 percent

Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1996), 26.
See Andronik Migranian, “For USSR Authoritarianism Is a Dream,” Telos 84 (1990), 125-131; the
famous interview that Migranian and Kliamkin gave Literaturnaia Gazeta (Igor’ Kliamkin and
Andronik Migranian, “An Interview,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, 01 June, 1990; and 1. M. Kliamkin,
“Kakoi avtoritarnyi rezhim vozmozhen segodnia v Rossii?” [“What Kind o f Authoritarian Regime Is
Possible in Today’s Russia?”], POLLS, no. 5 (1993): 50-78.
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per year, while Russia posted a respectable 5 percent average growth in 2000-2002. As a
result, Russian and Polish GDP/PPP almost converged ($8,377 and $9,051 respectively).^
In social terms, the Russian population’s living standards declined sharply. The
average life expectancy is decreasing (average life expectancy is sixty-one years for men
and seventy-three for women), crime and corruption are widespread, and social
differentiation is striking (the Gini index is approximately fifty percent). Almost seven
percent of the Russian population lives below the $1 a day extreme poverty line. At the
same time, although experiencing certain social problems (the rise of radicalism, neo
nazism, unemployment, and poverty), the Polish elite was more successful in guiding its
population through difficult economic transition. Social inequality in Poland is much
lower, with the Gini index being thirty-three percent. The average life expectancy is
seventy-four years (sixty-nine for men and seventy-seven for women). Only five percent
of the Polish population lives below the $1 a day extreme poverty line. The quality of life
index (a measure that includes GDP growth, life expectancy and infant mortality) is 2.67
out of 3 for Poland and 1.33 for Russia.^
The 1990s were a turbulent decade for the Russian state, not only in terms of
threats to territorial integrity, but also in terms of crime and corruption, failure to provide
personal safety, and inability to maintain its industrial infrastructure. The sudden retreat
of the state in Russia in the 1990s stands in contrast to the more activist and legitimate

^ World Bank, World Development Report 2003-2004: Making Services Workfo r Poor People,
http;//econ.worldbank.org/wdr/wdr2004/text-30023 and Freedom House, Freedom in the World,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings.
®World Bank, World Development Report 2000-2001: Attacking Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000); Freedom House, Freedom in the World. The higher the number, the better the quality o f
life. See Appendix B.
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Polish state. Although in the decade since the democratic transition Poland went through
serious economic and political tribulations, it did not experience a crisis of the state.
Although both coimtries pursued political democracy, Poland fared better than its
Eastern neighbor. Russia’s democratic future remains uncertain, if not downright
doubtful.’ The Polish political process is characterized by free, fair, and regular elections
on parliamentary, presidential, and local levels as well as multipartism and high voter
turnout. It has numerous active and independent NGOs and trade unions. The Polish mass
media are independent, uncensored and increasingly private. Russia scores lower on all
these issues. Its politics is characterized by hyper-presidentialism, electoral irregularities,
disproportional use of administrative resources, and predictability of voting results.*
Freedom of the press took a turn for the worse in Russia, with the state asserting its
control over the independent mass media and reversing their privatization. Russia is also
criticized for civil rights violations in Chechnya. Another unique feature of the Russian
political scene is the emergence of so called “political technologies” and “political
technologists” also known as “black PR.” These terms describe unorthodox campaign
practices, including frivolous and unsubstantiated reports in the media and dirty
campaign tricks (for instance, putting a candidate with the same last name as a ffont-

’ In 2003, Freedom House rated Poland’s political rights as 1 (the highest), and its civil liberties as 2.
Overall, Poland received a status o f “free country.” Russia scored 5, 5 and “partly free” respectively.
See Freedom House, Freedom in the World.
®According to Freedom House ratings, in 2003 Polish democratization score ~ combined score for
electoral process, civil society, independent media and governance - was 1.63 out o f 7, and its rule o f
law score - a number that combines constitutional, legislative and judicial framework and corruption
index - was 2.00 out o f 7. Russia was rated 4.88 out o f 7 on the democratic score and 5.13 on the rule
o f law score. Specifically, Poland’s civil society score was 1.50, while Russia scored 4.25; the
independent media score for Poland was 1.75 for Poland and 5.50 - for Russia. See Freedom House,
Nations in Transit. 2003: Democratization in East Central Europe and Eurasia,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm. In the Freedom House ratings, the lower the
number, the more democratic the country’s political process, the stronger its civil society, and the more
independent the country’s mass media are.
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runner on the ballot, or impersonating a candidate during campaign visits and meetings
with prospective voters).^
Finally, Russia is a multi-ethnic state with several nationalist and secessionist
conflicts, including the two Chechen wars. Poland is largely mono-ethnic and mono
religious state, with localized ethnic problems (anti-Semitic and anti-Roma attitudes and
practices as well as the issue of migrant workers/traders from the East).
The finer distinetions between Russia and Poland should not obscure the fact that
the similarities between the two cases by far outweigh the differences. In fact, Russia and
Poland are the most similar cases I could select for a comparative study. Even though the
cases differ in terms of intensity and complexity of Communist legacies (e.g., crisis of the
state and longer duration of the Communist period in the Russian case), and degree of
success in addressing these legacies, these are clearly differences of degree, not kind.
Thus, although not completely identical, the case studies are similar in enough relevant
respects to justify a meaningful comparison.

The Dissertation’s Relationship to Existing Theoretical and Empirical Debates
1. Problems of Post-Authoritarian Transitions
Theoretical Perspectives on Democratic Transition and Consolidation
Ultimately, my research falls under the rubric of democratic transition and
consolidation. I am more interested in the consolidation stage, i.e., what happens after the
first democratic elections. Democratic consolidation presupposes stabilization of
democratic rules and imiversal acceptance of democracy as “the only game in town.” But

®Yeltsin’s 1996 presidential election campaign marks the beginning o f these practices. They were an
undisputed part o f the 1999 parliamentary and 2000 presidential elections, in which previously
unknown candidates scored spectacular victories.
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how do we know that democracy is accepted by all? Unlike the more elitist transition
stage (of. elite pacts during transition), the consolidation phase highlights the significance
of social consensus on the desirability of democracy and requires a certain
“disaggregation.” Consolidation studies look at both the elite and the popular levels. This
dissertation also subscribes to the “disaggregated” perspective.

It documents the

evolution of both the elite’s value orientations and public opinion and looks at the area of
consensus between elites and general publics in post-Commimist societies. It also
suggests that democratic consolidation occurs only if there is congruency between prodemocratic public opinion and pro-democratic elite orientations.
Another dividing line in the democratization literature cuts across the issue of pre
conditions for democracy. One group of scholars believes that democracy requires
specific economic, cultural, political, and social conditions, while others see democracy
as adaptable to a variety of settings.*^ The later group also argues that effective

Encamacion (Omar G. Encarnacion, “Beyond Transitions: the Politics o f Democratic Consolidation,
A Review Article,” Comparative Politics 32, no. 4 (July 2000)) applied the term “disaggregation” to
the studies o f democratic consolidations. Such classic works as: Samuel J. Valenzuela, “Democratic
Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notions, Process, and Facilitating Conditions,” in Issues in
Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed.
Scot Mainwaring, Guillermo A. O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame: University o f
Notre Dame, 1992); Nancy Bermeo, “Democracy and the Lessons o f Dictatorship,” Comparative
Politics 24, no. 3 (April 1992): 273-92; Paul G. Buchanan, State, Labor, Capital: Democratic Class
Relations in the Southern Cone (Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1995); Scot Mainwaring
and Timothy Scully, eds.. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1995); Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg, eds.. Constructing Democracy:
Human Rights, Citizenship and Society in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Arend
Lijphart and Karlos H. Waisman, Institutional Design in New Democracies (Boulder: Westview Press,
1996); Linz and Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition: Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich Klaus
Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), belong to the “disaggregated” consolidology school.
'' Almond and Coleman (Gabriel Abraham Almond and James Scott Coleman, The Politics o f the
Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I960)), Almond and Verba (Gabriel
Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations (Princeton: Prineeton University Press, 1963)), Bendix and Lipset (Reinhard Bendix and
Seymour M. Lipset, Class, Status, and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966)), Dahl (Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and
Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971)), Huntington (Samuel P. Huntington, The Third

10
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institutional design can overcome the determinism of legacies. I argue that researchers of
democratic consolidation need to look at another important variable - the relationship
between the elite’s value orientations and public opinion.

Multiple Transitions and Their Particularities
Comparatively, East European and post-Soviet countries are unique. This
uniqueness comes from the number and character of post-Communist tasks that these
countries face. Unlike other former authoritarian regimes, countries of the region had to
imdertake not only political and ideological transitions but also transform their
economies. Multiple transitions present special practical and theoretical challenges. Linz
and Stepan identify five arenas whose transformation is required in order to successfully
complete multiple transitions.^^ These arenas include the constitutional, economic,
political, bureaucratic, and civil society spheres. Unlike former authoritarian coimtries in
Latin America, Southern Europe and East Asia, which already had market economies and
whose reforms involved only the political and constitutional arenas. East European and
Wave: Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1991)),
Putnam et al. (Robert Putman, Robert Leonardi, and RafFaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)), and Lipset (Seymour
M. Lipset, “The Social Requisites o f Democracy Revisited,” American Sociological Review 59, no. 1
(February 1994): 1-22)) represent the first camp. Elster et al. (Elster et al.. Institutional Design in PostCommunist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea), despite their institutional design roots, also
reluctantly acknowledge the almost deterministic role o f legacies, another term for pre-existing
conditions. Rustow (Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,”
Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (April 1970): 337-63), Di Palma (Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft
Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1990)),
Karl (Karl, “Dilemmas o f Democratization in Latin America”), O'Donnell and Schmitter (Guillermo
A. O ’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991)), Przeworski (Adam
Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin
America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)), Crawford and Lijphart (Beverly Craivford
and Arend Lijphart, “Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe:
Old Legacies, N ew Institutions, Hegemonic Norms, and International Pressures,” Comparative
Political Studies 28, no. 2 (1995): 171-200), Lijphart and Waisman (Lijphart and Waisman,
Institutional Design in New Democracies), Linz and Stepan (Linz and Stepan, Problems o f Democratic
Transition) belong to the second school.
'^Linz and Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition.
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post-Soviet countries had to transform their constitutional, political, economic, and civil
society arenas simultaneously. Lijphart and Waisman concur. According to them, the
least favorable sequence of transition is a simultaneous economic and political
transformation. There is an inherent conflict in such a transition, a conflict between the
competitive logic of the market and the logic of political and economic equality essential
for the consolidation of democracy.

Close to the problem of compatibility between

democracy and the market is the literature on “disembedded liberalism.”^"^ I capture the
conflict generated by multiple transitions on both the elite and the popular levels.

2. Political Socioloev of Intellectuals
This project focuses on government-affiliated intellectuals - actors who articulate
the discourse or the program of action of the elite. The literature is divided between those
who support functionalist, sociological and socio-economic definitions of intellectuals
and those who argue along humanist and socio-ethical lines. The first type of analysis
views intellectuals as one of the several social groups. Intellectuals simply perform a
particular function in a society (production or re-evaluation of ideas) or are characterized
by similar sociological characteristics (education or occupation).*^ The second type of

Lijphart and Waisman, Institutional Design in New Democracies, 235-236.
Although Ruggie (John Gerald Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D.
Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983)) coined the term, Polanyi (Karl Polanyi, The Great
Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins o f Our Time (Boston: Beacon Books, 1944)) was
the first to describe the actual “embeddedness.” Ruggie credits Polanyi with noticing the connection
between social structures and economic organization.
The following works exemplify the first paradigm: Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. 1936); Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation” and “Politics as a
Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mill
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946); Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1950); Lewis Coser, Men o f Ideas: A
Sociologist's View (New York: Free Press, 1970); Talcott Parsons, “The Intellectuals: A Social Role
Category,” in Theoretical Studies/Case Studies on Intellectuals, ed. Philip R eiff (Garden City:
Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1970); Ralph Dahrendorf, “The Intellectual and the Society: The Social
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analysis views intellectuals as a distinct and homogeneous group distinguishable by
unique ethical, moral, and romantic characteristics (civic consciousness, humanity,
compassion, belief in the “common people,” etc.).^^ The disagreement between the two
schools appears to lie mainly in assigning different functions to the intellectuals.
Secondly, there is a difference in assessing the relationship between intellectuals
and the political elite. The functionalist school,*^ new class developmental theorists,'*
conflict theorists,'^ and some contemporary Russian and East European authors^" see

Function o f the ’Fool’ in the Twentieth Century,” in Theoretical Studies/Case Studies on Intellectuals,
ed. Philip Reiff (Garden City: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1970); Edward Shils, “The Intellectuals and the
Powers,” in Theoretical Studies/Case Studies on Intellectuals, ed. Philip Reiff (Garden City:
Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1970); George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the R oad to
Class Power (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1978); George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, “Intellectuals and
Domination in Post-Communist Societies,” in Social Theory fo r Changing Society, ed. Pierre Bourdieu
and James S. Coleman (Boulder: Westview Press, I99I); Alvin W. Gouldner, The Future o f
Intellectuals and the Rise o f the New Class (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979); Seymour M. Lipset
and Robert Brym, Intellectuals and Politics (London: Gordon Allen and Unwin, 1980); Pierre
Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984); Vladimir Shlapentokh,
Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Marek
Ziolkowski, “Group Interests and Group Consciousness in the Process o f System Transformation: The
Case o f the Polish Intelligentsia,” The Centennial Review 37, no.l (Winter 1993): 115-34; Jerzy
Jedlicki, “What's the Use o f Intellectuals?” Polish Sociological Review 106, no. 2 (1994): 101- 10;
Jerome Karabel, “Towards a Theory o f Intellectuals and Politics,” Theory and Society 25 (1996): 20533; Marian Kempny, “Between Politics and Culture,” Polish Sociological Review 4 (1996): 297-307;
and Beata Barbara Czajkowska, From Tribunes to Citizens: Polish Intelligentsia During and After
Communism (Ph. D. diss.. University o f Maryland, College Park, 1999).
Among the most prominent representatives o f the second camp are: Martin Malia, “What is the
Intelligentsia?” Daedalus 89 (Summer 1960): 441-58; Alexander Gella, “Life and Death o f the Old
Polish Intelligentsia,” Slavic Review 30, no. I (1971): 5-6; Jerzy Szacki, Dylematy historiografii idei
{Dilemmas o f Historiography o f Ideas] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1991); Joanna
Kurczewska, “The Polish Intelligentsia: Retiring from the Stage,” Polish Sociological Bulletin 2
(1992); D. M. Likhachev, “0 russkoi intelligentsii: pis’mo v redaktsiiu” [“Concerning Russian
Intelligentsia: A Letter to the Editorial Board”], Novyi mir 2 (1993): 3-9; and Irina Sandomirskaia,
“Old Wives' Tales: Notes on the Rhetoric o f the Post-Soviet Intelligentsia,” in Intelligentsia in the
Interim: Recent Experiences from Central and Eastern Europe (Lund: Slavic Institute o f Lund
University, 1995).
Lipset and Brym, Intellectuals and Politics', Shils, “The Intellectuals and the Powers;” Parsons, “The
Intellectuals.”
Konrad and Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road', Gouldner, The Future o f Intellectual; Karabel,
“Towards a Theory o f Intellectuals and Politics.”
Dahrendorf, “The Intellectual and the Society.”
K. G. Barbakova and V. A. Mansurov, Intelligentsiia i vla st’ [Intelligentsia and Power] (Moscow:
Institute o f Sociology, RAN, 19 9 1); Szacki, Dilemmas o f Historiography', Kempny, “Between Politics
and Culture,” L. D. Gudkov and B. V. Dubin, Intelligentsiia: zametki o literaturno-politicheskikh
illiuziiakh [Intelligentsia: Notes about Literary and Political Illusions] (Moscow: Epitsentr, 1995);
Jozsef Borocz and Caleb Southworth, “Decomposing the Intellectuals' Class Power: Conversion o f
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intellectuals as part of the political elite. They contend that intellectuals and the political
elite either share similar political interests, or that the political elite depends on
intellectuals’ expertise. Conversely, socio-ethical theorists see intellectuals as bearers of
universal, as opposed to elite, interests and values.^* These authors stress the oppositional
stance of intellectuals vis-a-vis the state elite. My research is situated within the first,
sociological and socio-economic, camp. Even a causal glance at Russian and Polish
politics indicates that intellectuals do actively cooperate with the state and the political
elite. But the degree of this cooperation requires systematic investigation.

3. Meanings of Discourse
Broad Theoretical Discussions
There are two basic ways to view discourse. Postmodernists, following the
theoretical lead of Michel Foucault,^^ believe that discourse makes conventional and
socially constructed norms and practices appear natural. According to this view,
discourse is constructed to incorporate some elements of reality, but its main function is
to justify existing patterns of domination. Thus, discourse is always about power.
“Masses” or dominated groups contribute nothing to its construction or modification.^^ In
short, discourse is “superordinat[ed] over the practices on which [it is] based;” it is

Cultural Capital in Income, Hungary, 1986,” Social Forces 74, no. 3 (March 1996): 797-821; Andreas
Bozoki, “The Rhetoric o f Action: The Language o f Regime Change in Hungary,” in Intellectuals and
Politics in Central Europe, ed. Andreas Bozoki (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999).
Likhachev, “O russkoi intelligentsii;” Gella, “Life and Death o f the Old Polish Intelligentsia; and M.
L. Gasparov, “Intellektualy, intelligenty, intelligentnost’” [“Intellectuals, Intelligentsia, Intelligence”],
in Russkaia intelligentsiia: istoriia i sud'ba [Russian Intelligentsia: History and Fate] (Moscow:
Nauka, 1999).
“ Michel Foucault, Archeology o f Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1972).
John S. Dryzek, Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideas, Limits, and Struggles (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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“detached from contextual constraints and functional conditions, guiding the underlying
practices.

24

However, there is another, more objective, interpretation of discourse. Discourse
is an “interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the world outside.”^^ Such a
definition of discourse lacks the sinister and necessarily manipulative elements of
postmodernist accounts. It is a less politicized and a more instrumental view. Discourse is
the expressive equivalent of action; it has consequences and can be studied to gain
insights into the actors’ motivations, political and moral claims for stasis or change,
suggested remedies, relationships between actors, their self-placement on the political
continuum and larger ideological vision. In essence, it is a link between ideas and
instrumental action.^^ Discourse both guides the actors and constrains their choices, but
actors also use it to achieve their goals.^^ In both cases, discourse has important political
consequences. It influences action. I view discourse as a good approximation of actors’
value orientations and programs of action that are set against a larger cultural/ideological
landscape.^*
The new institutionalist literature dealing with the nature of collective action
helps identify several important characteristics of discourse. Discourse is stable; it has a

JUrgen Habermas, “Some Questions Concerning the Theory o f Power: Foucault Again,” in Critique
o f Power: Recasting Foucault/Habermas Debate, ed. Michael Kelly (Cambridge: The Massachusetts
Institute o f Technology Press, 1994), 80-81.
David A. Snow and Robert Benford, “Master Frames and Cycles o f Protests,” in Frontiers in Social
Movements Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McLurg Mueller (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1992), 137.
Marc W. Steinberg, “The Roar o f the Crowd: Repertoires o f Discourse and Collective Action
Among the Spitalfields Silk Weavers in Nineteenth-Century London,” in Repertoires and Cycles o f
Collective Action, ed. Mark Traugott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 61; Ann Shola
Orloff, “Motherhood, Work and Welfare in the United States, Britain, and Australia,” in State/Culture:
State Formation after Cultural Turn, ed. George Steinmetz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near-Abroad
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 589.
Please see “Conceptual Framework” section for more detailed discussion o f these points.
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“constraining influence ... over participants, as it shapes their activities in patterns that are
... self-consistent;” changes in discourse are usually incremental and done at the margins;
moments of dramatic change in discourse occur only during cataclysmic events.^^ My
project investigates both the changes and continuities of discourses.

Literature on Post-Communist Discourse
Sociological and socio-economic literature on intellectuals highlights an
important connection between the political elite and intellectuals, i.e., intellectuals’
involvement in the articulation of dominant ideas. Traditionally, authors examining the
elements of political discourse in post-Commimist countries limited their investigation to
the intellectuals’ involvement in discourse creation during the revolutionary periods.^®
Naturally, the role of intellectuals is the greatest during ideological breaks which enable
the creation of new symbols and terms. Several East European authors, however, look at
the role of intellectual elites in articulating discourse in a more static setting (postCommunist phase).^*

Steinberg, “The Roar o f the Crowd;” Sidney Tarrow, “Cycles o f Collective Action: Between
Moments o f Madness and the Repertoires o f Contention,” in Repertoires and Cycles o f Collective
Action, ed. Mark Traugott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); Charles Tilly, “Contentious
Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834,” in Repertoires and Cycles o f Collective Action, ed. Mark
Traugott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); and Mark Traugott, “Barricades as Repertoire:
Continuities and Discontinuities in the History o f French Contention,” in Repertoires and Cycles o f
Collective Action, ed. Mark Traugott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 44.
See for instance, A. V. Duka, “Perspektivy sotsiologicheskogo analiza vlastnych elit” [“Prospects for
Sociological Analysis o f Power Elites”], Zhurnal sotsiologii isotsialnoi antropologii [Journal o f
Sociology and Social Anthropology] III, no. 2 (2000): 64-82.
Dimitrijevich emphasizes the role o f independent Serbian intellectuals in creating post-Communist
nationalist discourse (Nenad Dimitrijevic, “Words and Death: Serbian Nationalist Intellectuals,” in
Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe, ed. Andreas Bozoki (Budapest: Central European
University Press, 1999)). Bozoki looks at the evolution o f Hungarian post-Communist official
discourse and the conflict between organic-statist and liberal factions o f the Hungarian elite (Bozoki,
“The Rhetoric o f Action”). Eyal et al. contend that there is an affinity between the discourses o f former
Hungarian dissident intellectuals and technocratic bureaucrats as they attempt to socially engineer
capitalism without capitalists (Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, and Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism
Without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Societies (London:
Verso, 1998)).
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Closer to my own investigation, several recent studies analyze the stages of
interpretation and reinterpretation of key elements of political discourse in postCommunist Russia and Poland (e.g., “freedom,” “power,” “accountability,” “national
interests,” “European integration,” “abortion,” “rights of minorities,” “meaning of
politics,” etc.).^^ Yet these works present discourse as static; they are concerned with
discrete categories of discourse without any attempt to see the constellation of attitudes.
The majority of authors (with the exception of Trutkowski), although discussing the
attitudes of various social actors (including the opposition), fail to investigate the
relationship between the communicators of discourse and their audiences.
Instead of a static analysis of a singular concept in the discourses of various social
actors, I trace the evolution of political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic
relations value orientations of one influential group (government-affiliated intellectuals)
in a cross-cultural setting and over time. I also compare a combination of the elite’s value
Czy^ewski, Mark, Kinga Dunin, and Andrzej Piotrowski, eds., Cudze problemy: o Watnosci tego, co
nie wazne [Someone E lse’s Problems. Importance o f the Issues Which Are Not Important] (Warsaw;
Osrodek Badan Spolecznych, 1991); Ireneusz Krzeminski, “Styles o f Political Thinking in Polish
Intellectual Elites,” Polish Sociological Review 110, no. 2 (1995): 125-37; Mark Czyiewski, Sergiusz
Kowalski, and Andrzej Piotrowski, eds., Rytualny chaos: studium dyskursu publicznego [Ritual Chaos:
Study o f Public Discourse] (Krakdw: Wydawnictwo Aureus, 1997); A. Baranov, et al., Rossiia v
poiskakh idei: analiz pressy [Russia in Search o f an Idea: Press Analysis] (Moscow: Consulting Group
o f The Administration o f the President o f the Russian Federation, 1997); A. Temkina and V.
Grigor’ev, “Dinamika interpretativnogo protsessa; transformatsiia v Rossii” [“Dynamics of
Interpretation Process: Russian Transformation”], in Sotsialnye issledovaniia v Rossii: samopoznaniie
obshchestva [Social Research in Russia: Self-Understanding o f Society] (Moscow: Polis, 1998); B.
Mezhuev, “Kontseptualizatsiia ‘natsionalnogo interesa’ v politicheskikh discussiiakh”
[“Conceptualization o f ‘National Interests’ in Political Discussions”], in Sotsialnye issledovaniia v
Rossii: samopoznaniie obshchestva [Social Research in Russia: Self-Understanding o f Society]
(Moscow: Polis, 1998); Grzegorz Poiarlik, “Polish Political Parties and Discourse on Polish Raison
D 'Etat on the Eve o f the European Union Membership,” in Between Animosity and Utility: Political
Parties and Their Matrix, ed. Hieronim Kubiak and Jerzy J. Wiatr (Krak6w: Wydawnictwo Naukowe
Scholar, 2000); Cezary Trutkowski, Spoleczne reprezentacje polityki [Social Representations o f
Politics] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2000); Richard D. Anderson, Jr., “Metaphors o f
Dictatorship and Democracy: Change in the Russian Political Lexicon and the Transformation o f
Russian Politics,” Slavic Review 60, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 312-35; and A. V. Kornienko,
“Tsennostnye prioritety sovremennoi rossiiskoi pressy i ikh smy^lovye dominanty” [“Value Priorities
o f Contemporary Russian Press and Their Dominant Meanings”], in Zhurnalistika i sotsiologiia:
Rossiia, 90-ye gody [Journalism and Sociology: Russia, the 1990s], ed. S. G. Korkonosenko (St.
Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press, 2001).
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orientations (measured through the analysis of government-affiliated intellectuals’ public
statements) to relevant public attitudes.

4. Public Opinion in Post-Communist Societies
In this project I attempt to answer two fundamental research questions posed in
the public opinion literature: 1). What were the public and the elite’s attitudes in postCommunist Russia and Poland and were there any changes? 2). Did the post-Communist
elite and the public’s attitudes move in the same direction? As such, my investigation
builds upon two important directions in the contemporary literature - an examination of
particular characteristics of public opinion (including rationality/irrationality and
stability/change debates) and the analysis of the relationship between public opinion and
the elite’s attitudes and policy initiatives. In investigating this relationship, my primary
goal is to show the areas of consensus and disjunction between official discourse (the
elite’s value orientations) and public opinion and to suggest the degree of congruence
between the two. I am not interested in proving a causal relationship between them. The
nature of the actual linkage and the process by which public opinion reaches the elite lie
outside the scope of this work.

Characteristics of Public Opinion
There are two concurrent debates on the nature of public opinion. Both go beyond
the mere description of public attitudes. At their heart lies the question of desirability of
the public’s political input - a cornerstone of contemporary empirical and normative
democratic theory. The first debate relates to the question of whether public opinion is
rational, informed, and structured or irrational, volatile, and devoid of structure and
substance. Realist skeptics claim that public opinion should not matter in the political
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processes, sinee public attitudes are short-lived, poorly artieulated, and ill-informed ”
Their revisionist opponents are perhaps unduly optimistic in assigning instrumental
rationality and fixed structure to public attitudes, while dovraplaying the public’s lack of
knowledge or the low salience of most foreign policy issues for the general population.^'*
Middle ground theorists contend that although public attitudes are unstruetured and
poorly informed, they are not random and do not amount to non-attitudes.^^
The second debate considers stability and ehange in publie opinion and is closely
related to the rationality debate. More recent scholarship^^ claims that, contrary to the
earlier, realist assertions, public opinion is stable and is subject to only minor changes. A
middle ground school emerged here as well. According to it, public opinion is stable, but

^^See, for instance, Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street: The Impact o f American Public Opinion
on Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1948); Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1949); Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York:
Hartcourt Brace, 1950); Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, George F. Kennan,
American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (New York: Mentor Books, 1951); Philip E. Converse, “The Nature
o f B elief Systems Among Mass Publics,” in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David A. Apter (New York:
Free Press, 1964); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5* ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1978); Yuri A. Levada, “Kompleksy obshchestvennogo mneniia” [“Public Opinion Constellations”], in
Ot mneniia k ponimaniiu [From Opinion to Understanding^ (Moscow: Moscow School o f Political
Studies, 2000).
Among the most important “revisionist” works are: William Caspary, “The Mood Theory: The Study
o f Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” American Political Science Review 64 (1970): 536-547; Ole
Holsti and James N. Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs (Boston: Allen and Unwin,
1984); Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical
Model,” American Political Science Review 81 (1987): 1099-1120; Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I.
Page, “Foreign Policy and Rational Public,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution 32:3 (1988): 211-247;
Benjamin Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years o f Trends in Americans ’
Policy Preferences (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992); Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M.
McCormick, “The Domestic Politics o f Contra Aid: Public Opinion, Congress and the President,” in
Public Opinion in US Foreign Policy, ed. Richard Sobel (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,
1993).
See John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins o f Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992); Michael Delli Karpini and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know About Politics and Why
It Matters? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Ole Holsti, Public Opinion and American
Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1996).
^^Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects o f Public Opinion on Policy," American Political
Science Review 77 (1983): 175-190; Hurwitz and Peffley, “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes
Structured?”; Shapiro and Page, “Foreign Policy and Rational Public;” Eugene R. Wittkopf, Faces o f
Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1990).
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is subject to rapid, and often substantial changes (even in western democracies, but,
especially in the post-Communist societies).^^

Does Public Opinion Matter to Decision-Makers?
Studies on the impact of public opinion compare public opinion to the policy
actions of the elite. Although early research^* questioned the desirability of public input
into political processes, later studies assigned a crucial role to public opinion as a
cornerstone of a democratic society. Yet several authors^^ found that the policy-makers
are motivated by misperceptions, rather than correct knowledge of public opinion, while
others'*® reported the absence of any substantial impact. Nonetheless, scholars
occasionally found that the elite uses public opinion as a basis for its actions.'** Current
scholarship supports the view that public opinion’s influence is not fixed; rather, it
fluctuates. Although some scholars report an absence of impact during their research

See Brigette L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia, eds, Decision-Making in Glass
House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21“ Century
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
^^Almond, The American People', Converse, “The Nature o f B elief Systems.”
^^Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976); Steven Kull and Clay Ramsey, “Elite Misperceptions o f US Public Opinion
and Foreign Policy,” in Decision-Making in Glass House: Mass, Media, Public Opinion, and
American and European Foreign Policy in the 21“ Century, ed. Brigette Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro,
and Pierangelo Isernia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
''“Warren W. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, “Constituency Influence on Congress,” American Political
Science Review 57 (1963): 45-56; Bernard C. Cohen, The P ublic’s Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1973); Richard C. Eichenberg, Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Richard Sobel, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene in
Bosnia: That Was the Question for the United States and Europe,” in Decision-Making in Glass
House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21“ Century,
ed. Brigette Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,
2000 ).
'"V.O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, I96I); Page and
Shapiro, “Effects o f Public Opinion on Policy;” Richard Sobel, ed. Public Opinion in US Foreign
Policy: the Controversy over Contra A id (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993); Ryan K.
Beasley et al., eds.. Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences
on State Behavior (CQ Press, 2001).
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timeframe and others document the strong influence of public opinion, historical data
give credence to both views.'*^
This dissertation takes the findings from the US and Western Europe and extends
them to Russia and Poland. Like Holsti, I see a “need for public opinion research in
which evidence about the United States is placed in a broader comparative context.”'*^ In
fact, my analysis follows the footsteps of the recent ground-breaking scholarship on postCommunist public opinion and its effect on elites.'^'* But, rather than analyzing a static
snapshot of public opinion in a single country, common in the scholarship on the
relationship between post-Communist public and elite attitudes, I examine public opinion
throughout the entire post-Communist period and add a comparative perspective by
''^Douglas C. Foyle, Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1999); and Richard Sobel, The Impact o f Public Opinion on US
Foreign Policy Since Vietnam: Constraining the Colossus (New York, Oxford; Oxford University
Press, 2001).
Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 204.
'''' Zimmerman’s comparative study o f the Russian elite and public’s attitudes prior to 2000 found the
elite to be more pro-Western, pro-democratic and pro-capitalist than the general population (William
Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 19932000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). Shiraev and Zubok concluded that public opinion
was behind Russia’s 1999 anti-Western foreign policy consensus (Erik Shiraev and Vlad Zubok,
“Public Opinion and Decision-Making in Russia: the Impact o f NATO Expansion and Air Strikes on
Serbia,” in Decision-Making in Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and
European Foreign Policy in the 2F' Century, ed. Briggete Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierrangelo
Insernia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000)). D ’Anieri’s discussion o f the anti-Western
shift during the 1996 Russian presidential elections, which he attributes to an increasingly anti-Western
public sentiment, is also useful in my overall investigation (Paul D ’Anieri, “Russian Foreign Policy:
Continuity, Revolution and the Search for Status,” in Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective:
Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior, ed. Beasley, et al. (CQ Press, 2001)). This
analysis also builds upon Miller and Klobucar’s examination o f the impact o f new Russian national
identity on the elite behavior. The scholars found the new identity to be more politically authoritarian,
but supportive o f economic reform and ethnic inclusiveness. They also discovered that the political
elite gets its clues from the new set o f public values (Arthur H. Miller, and Thomas F. Klobucar, “A
New Russian National Identity, Or Just Nostalgia for the Past?” (paper presented at the annual MidWest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL, April 2001)). Kurczewski’s treatise on the
meaning o f the parliamentary representation in post-Communist Poland compares various political,
economic, ideological attitudes o f the members o f the Polish Parliament and the general public.
Kurczewski discovered significant differences between the actual public attitudes and the
representatives’ perceptions o f them. More importantly, the author showed the extent to which public
opinion matters to the Polish political elite (Jacek Kurczewski, Poslowie a opinia publiczna. Z badan
nadprzedstawiecielstwem w Trzeciej RzeczypospoliteJ [Representatives and Public Opinion. Study o f
Parliamentary Representation in the Third Republic o f Poland] (Warsaw: Instytut Stosowanych Nauk
Spolecznych, 1999)).
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examining both Russian and Polish data. My dissertation also analyzes post-Communist
public opinion according to multiple issue domains (political, ideological, economic,
foreign policy and ethnic relations categories). Finally, I use more systematic data (results
of numerous public opinion surveys) and methods (extensive review of public opinion
data, multivariate regression and correlation analyses).

Conceptual Framework
1. Operationalizing Discourse As Measurement of Elite Value Orientations
Discourse is difficult to quantify or objectify. Techniques to measure and study
discourse abound. The formalist school of discourse analysis looks at texts as sources of
meaning independent of their authors or contexts (and their normative biases, intentions,
or conventions). Functionalists contend that texts are manifestations of collective and
individual ideologies. Finally, discourse measured as utterances is, in the words of
Bakhtin, “a link in the chain of speech communication, which carmot be broken off from
the preceding links that determine it both from within and without giving rise vsdthin it to
unmediated responsive reactions and dialogic reverberations.... The entire utterance is
constructed while taking into account possible responsive reactions for whose sake, in
essence, it is actually created.”'*^
I adopt a definition which is close to a functionalist approach. In my work,
discourse is understood as a verbal equivalent/representation of an ideology or a
comprehensive doctrine. This ideology is primary. The words simply reflect a particular
ideological system. The verbal articulation of beliefs, and not the belief systems

Mikhail Bakhtin, “The Problem o f Speech Genres,” in Speech Genre and Other Late Essays, ed.
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, trans. Vern W. McGee (Austin: University o f Texas Press,
1986), 94.
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themselves, is the focus of this dissertation’s analysis. A person may not share the
ideology that she/he verbalizes. Indeed, ideology may be appropriated for the sake of
political expediency. In both cases, what is important is the verbal actualization of
specific ideological postulates either genuinely held by a communicator or adopted for
political purposes.
Discourse is also social phenomenon. It requires both a communicator and an
audience. Trutkowski’s notion of the social representation of ideological and political
beliefs and Bakhtin’s characterization of discourse as utterance are similar to my
understanding of discourse.'*^ In other words, discourse is “a flow of verbal
commimication between actors which creates scenarios for relationships and events.”'*^ It
allows the listener to imderstand both the communicator’s interpretations of reality and
her/his intentions and implicit assumptions. When articulating discourse, communicators
not only express their own opinion, but also anticipate the audience’s reaction and repeat
or refer to notions co-produced with other members of the communication community.
Discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals, who are the subject of this
dissertation’s analysis, is also more than just a verbalized personal opinion. Governmentaffiliated intellectuals do not function in a vacuum, blissfully unaware of their audience’s
concerns or other intellectual alternatives. Their discourse is not a unidirectional
monologue; it is situated vis-a-vis the general public and the political elite. This position
makes government-affiliated intellectuals different from other important articulators of
comprehensive doctrines, for instance, political journalists. The latter are not required to
popularize the elite’s views among the general population and to inform the elite of the

Trutkowski, Social Representations o f Politics', Bakhtin, “The Problem o f Speech Genres.”
Steinberg, The Roar o f the Crowd ,7 8 , note 1.
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popular reaction and reception. The venues in which the works of government-affiliated
intellectuals appear have large readership (be it a leading newspaper or a book published
by a popular press) and are designed to reach and persuade the public. Governmentaffiliated intellectuals also position themselves vis-a-vis their intellectual rivals and show
how their views are different (mostly, better) than those of their opponents.
If, methodologically, analysis of ideology presupposes comparison between
individual viewpoints of an intellectual or a statesman and already known ideological
constants, discourse analysis is based on reconstructing general but a priori unknown
pattems from communicator’s oral or written statements. The best method to study these
statements is content analysis, i.e., making inferences from systematic and objective
identification of certain explicit characteristics of texts. Content analysis can use discrete
words or look at the words as a part of a larger text (phrases, sentences, paragraphs). I
look at the attitudes towards certain words (see Appendix A), which can only be inferred
from a wider textual frame. This method is close to relational content analysis.
The articulation of ideas and value orientations is oral and written. However, for
the retrospective analysis employed in this work, only written data were used, as people
tend to misreport their attitudes with the passage of time.'^* Discourse, as I define it, is
contained in a collection of published interviews, speeches, reports, memoirs, articles,
transcripts of press conferences, and books addressed to the domestic public. I was
interested in written statements designed for mass consumption, not for a specialized

I could have analyzed the interviews broadcast during my research stay in Russia and Poland. In
fact, such attempts were occasionally made. For instance, Yegor Gaidar, former Prime Minister, and
current director o f the Institute o f the Problems o f Transitional Period, gave several interviews to the
Echo o f Moscow radio station. Unfortunately, it was impossible to know about such interviews in
advance and therefore to engage in any kind o f systematic collection and analysis o f such data.
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audience or for private circulation. Importantly, it is also discourse designed for domestic
consumption, not for Western audiences.
Another clarification concerns my choice of the term official discourse. I make a
distinction between official discourse and oppositional discourse. Although Russian and
Polish elites are not monolithic and there are significant differences between intellectuals
directly affiliated with the state and the intellectuals who actively oppose the ruling
political elite, my emphasis is on the former. Official is a crucial word here. By official
discourse, I mean public discourse voiced by intellectuals who actively cooperate with
the state.
1 differentiate between liberal and organic-statist (conservative) official discourse.
Liberal discourse encompasses support for the principles of inclusive democracy, liberal
ideology, free market, pro-Western foreign policy, and ethnic tolerance. Organic-statist
(conservative) discourse, on the other hand, consists of positive references to
authoritarianism or managed democracy, conservative/statist ideology, govemed-market
economic system, anti-Western/independent foreign policy and ethnic nationalism. I am
aware that liberal and organic-statist discourses are not necessarily mutually exclusive
and elements of one can coexist within the framework of another. Moreover, liberal
categories may be justified by references to elements of organic-statist discourse.'*^ I
address these issues by looking at the balance of categories and coherence in discourse,
isolating predominant value orientations and employing qualitative content analysis.
One can, of course, study official discourse (and the elite’s value orientations) by
analyzing statements of the political elite. Yeltsin and Putin, Walesa and Kwasniewski as

49

For instance, appeals to the Russian pre-Revolutionary past to justify market reforms or civil liberties
are not uncommon.
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well as numerous Russian and Polish Prime Ministers addressed the Duma and the Sejm,
wrote memoirs and letters, delivered keynote speeches, gave interviews, and proposed
state toasts. But such statements are too infrequent and declarative and thus too crude to
allow one to make inferences about the evolution of official position. Politicians tend to
articulate slogan-like discourse and are not known for their elaboration of comprehensive
doctrines. A more complete picture emerges from the works of government-affiliated
intellectuals, whose social function is to articulate discourse and the elite’s beliefs to the
public. During the research period, government-affiliated intellectuals produced a
copious body of written documents that reflects fundamental political and ideological
values. Their works explain, rather than declare. They contain a publicly oriented and
systematic articulation of comprehensive political doctrines and reflect the official
governmental position.
I am not concerned with the question of who is the original source of official
discourse. I am well aware that government-affiliated intellectuals do not necessarily
create discourse independently. Frequently they serve the political elite or are themselves
part of the political elite. I approach the study of discourse from a different angle - by
reading the works of those who offer the best imderstanding of the official position and
the elite value orientations. The published documents of government-affiliated
intellectuals are also more easily accessible to both the general public and the researcher.
It follows that the works of government-affiliated intellectuals are more suitable for the
analysis of the official discourse.
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2. Defining Government-Affiliated Intellectuals as Discourse Communicators
In contrast to the socio-ethical literature that views intellectuals as a homogeneous
category of moral defenders of the people, this study approaches intelleetuals as a
differentiated socio-eeonomie group of professional ereators and disseminators of ideas.
It focuses on government-affiliated intellectuals, defined as socially active, highly
educated professionals (leading governmental economists, presidential advisers,
ideologists, members of government), residing in important political centers and
articulating value orientations and discourse of the post-Communist political elite.
1 am interested in the official, not the oppositional, intellectual elite. O f course,
representatives of the intellectual opposition may, and often do, influence the political
elite.^° But such a connection is unofficial, if not outright clandestine, and diffieult to
monitor. In short, my focus is on the people whose ideas can be openly requested and
used by the political elite. The degree of support that a particular intellectual renders to
the ruling regime is another sign of his/her elite status. Government-affiliated
intellectuals advise, reeommend, explain, and advoeate governmental actions. They do
not engage in systematic criticism of governmental policies.
The group of government-affiliated intellectuals is not homogeneous. It is
functionally differentiated. Members of the first sub-group, or “intelleetuals-politicians,”
combine primary political activities with intellectual undertakings, including the
artieulation of discourse and the elite’s value orientations. Intellectual activity is
secondary for this type of government-affiliated intellectuals. It is a continuation of their
political agenda. The rare disclosures of the motivations behind their actions are very

For instance, Dugin, the permanent contributor to the ultra-nationalist oppositional newspaper
Zavtra, is an important discourse communicator and an influential contemporary ideologue.
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important because they represent a crystallized official position. In Russia, Yegor Gaidar
(in his capacity as acting Prime Minister in 1992-1994), Anatolii Chubais (Deputy PrimeMinister in 1992-1997), German Gref (current Minister of Trade and Economic
Development), Aleksei Kudrin (current Minister of Finances) belong to the first sub
group. In Poland, Leszek Balcerowicz (during his tenure as Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Finances in 1989-1991 and 1997-2000), Bronislaw Geremek (Minister of
Foreign Affairs in 1997-2000), and Grzegorz Kolodko (current Minister of Finances and
member of the Cabinet in 1994-1997) represent the same sub-group.
Members of the second sub-group, or the “intellectual circle” of official
presidential, governmental, or parliamentary advisers, experts, consultants, and
ideologues, surround the political elite but do not strictly speaking belong to it. The main
function of the second sub-group is the creation of databases of ideas, recommendations,
and ideological justifications for the political elite’s decisions and actions. Members of
the “intellectual circle” are not public officials. Hence, they do not make political
decisions and are not accountable for the consequences of their recommendations. But
their statements are important, since they reflect value orientations and positions of the
elite. Gleb Pavlovskii (Putin’s adviser), Adam Michnik, (influential journalist and the
Polish political elite’s confidant), or Waldemar Kuczyhski (Walesa’s and Buzek’s
economic adviser) are the most typical representatives of this sub-group.
How does one become a government-affiliated intellectual? It usually occurs
when the views of a particular intellectual coincide with the views of the political elite;
the elite then either appoints intellectuals to official posts (i.e., members of government)
or employs them as advisers and ideologues. Being closely affiliated with the political
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elite, government-affiliated intellectuals can articulate official positions. In their capacity
as allies or members of the political elite, government-affiliated intellectuals have easy
access to the press. Their works are publishable as long as they occupy positions close to
the political elite. A change in their discourse, therefore, is not likely to be a fimction of
market pressures and literary fashion. In fact, it is an indicator of the transformation of
the political elite’s views and value orientations.^*
“Government-affiliated intellectual” is not a normative label. It does not assume a
qualitative difference between government-affiliated intellectuals and the rest of the
intellectual community. Indeed, many discourse communicators are conventionally
viewed as lacking sufficient intellectual capacity to be classified as “intellectual.”^^ I am
not, however, interested in the subjective judgment of the “intellectuality” of a particular
government-affiliated intellectual. In my work, “government-affiliated intellectual” is a
sociological and fimctionalist category.

A person who belongs to the group of

“politicians-intellectuals” or to the political elite’s “intellectual circle” is considered a
“government-affiliated intellectual.”
I use the term cultural entrepreneur as distinct from organic intellectual. The
former originates in the new institutionalist literature and the sociology of intellectuals.
The new institutionalist literature applies the term cultural entrepreneur predominantly to

This statement should not be confused with a claim o f a universal causality between the orders o f the
political elite and discourse o f government-afFiliated intellectuals. I simply assert that the value
orientations o f the political elite and government-affiliated intellectuals move in the same direction,
irrespective o f whose position, a politician’s or an intellectual’s, changed first. It is impossible for a
government-affiliated intellectual to dissent from the official line and to retain his/her position.
Government-affiliated intellectuals can either convince their political patrons and allies or comply with
the latter’s opinion.
For instance, in private conversations, some intellectuals, including Satarov, were characterized as mere
administrators. In other cases, my interlocutors doubted Kudrin’s or Uliukaev’s “intellectualism.”
For a more detailed discussion o f this contentious topic, see Chapter I.
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politicians or statesmen.^'' I add intellectuals to this list. The sociological literature on
intelleetuals, on the other hand, describes intellectuals’ position vis-a-vis society, but does
not always use the term itself.^^ Cultural entrepreneurship implies intelleetuals’ relative
independence from society and their leadership in initiating and disseminating ideas.
Closely related to the term cultural entrepreneurs is the notion of the elite’s ideologues. I
use these terms interchangeably. The term organic intellectuals (credited to Gramsci)^®
suggests that intellectuals are attached to a specific class or society in general, thereby
reflecting and articulating broader societal interests. Close to the term organic intellectual
is the idea of intelleetuals as social interpreters.^^

3. Measuring the Political Implications of Elite Value Orientations
This research does not presume that policies necessarily follow discourse.
Discourse can be used to legitimize policies ex post facto. But by looking at the degree of
congruence between discourse and policies, one can make inferences about political
implications of discourse. My interest lies not so much in the establishment of causality,
i.e., the discourses shaping policies or policies shaping discourses, but in the investigation
of the possible link between discourse and policy. Indeed, the relationship may be

Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: the Politics o f Growth in the Newly Industrializing
Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic
Theory and the Role o f Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1990); Ian Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria,
Israel and the West Bank-Gaza (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural
Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1996) etc.
Weber, “Science as a Vocation” and “Politics as a Vocation;” Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism
and Democracy, Shils, “The Intellectuals and the Powers;” Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations o f PostModernity (New York: Routledge, 1992); Jerome Karabel, “Towards a Theory o f Intellectuals and
Politics;” Joanna Kurczewska, “Party Leadership Facing Polish Past and Culture,” Polish Sociological
Survey 4 (1996): 365-80, etc.
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey N. Smith
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).
See Bauman, Intimations o f Post-Modernity and Kurczewska, Party Leadership.
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dialectical and mutually reinforcing. But I assume that there is a relationship and the
ehange in one may have an impact on the other.

4. Defining and Measuring Public Opinion
This study acknowledges that official discourse and publie opinion are organized
in different ways.^* While elite discourse tends to be characterized by ideological clarity
and relatively consistent articulation of political and economic categories, public opinion
may be vague, inconsistent, poorly articulated and short-lived. Thus, I use different
standards of evidence. I employ statistieal analysis of long-term trends in public opinion
and content analysis of government-affiliated intellectuals' official statements.
Conceptually, I measure and define public opinion through surveys. For the
purpose of my analysis, I assume that the political elite and government-affiliated
intellectuals monitor public opinion by analyzing survey results over time. The
significance attributed to public opinion is a fairly new phenomenon in both countries.^^
At least one author is skeptical about the reliability of surveys as a method of
measuring public opinion in Russia. Kagarlitskii (2001) contends that in Russia
respondents internalize desired responses and give an interviewer the “best” answer.
However, this potential problem is not a uniquely Russian phenomenon. Numerous
sources on American public opinion surveys also diseuss researcher-indueed biases and
other shortcomings of the survey method.^® There are various techniques to minimize

Converse, “The Nature o f B elief Systems.”
Although the Hungarian elite started to monitor public opinion through surveys long before the
breakdown o f Communist regimes, in Russia and Poland, the first surveys were not commissioned
until the mid- to late 1980s.
Beginning with Converse’s “The Nature o f B elief Systems,” many American political scientists and
sociologists pondered the validity o f public opinion surveys. For a useful summary o f different
problems and ways to correct them, see John Zaller and Stanley Feldman, “A Simple Theory o f the
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these drawbacks. Kagarlitskii himself proposes to measure public opinion by looking at
the results of elections or the number/nature of strikes.^’ These are valid points, and such
information can serve to confirm or disprove public opinion surveys. Unfortunately, such
data are not representative. Moreover, polling organizations’ pre-elections surveys give
an extremely accurate estimate of election results -- a testament to increasing
professionalism of Russian and Polish pollsters. It is, therefore, my contention that public
opinion surveys in Russia and Poland are as useful as their western equivalents.

Hypotheses
The following is my general hypothesis'. Prior to the democratic transition,
oppositional intellectuals in Russia and Poland articulated major principles of liberal
discourse. Although Russian public opinion initially supported liberal principles, after
1992 a dissonance emerged as the public started to support a more organic-statist
discourse.^^ Government-affiliated intellectuals, whose discourse reflected the elite’s
value orientations, continued to articulate a liberal discourse. After the 2000 presidential
elections, government-affiliated intellectuals also started to endorse more organic-statist
principles in their discourse. However, actual policies that followed the new organicstatist official discourse may be still inconsistent with the public opinion mandate. In
contrast, liberal discourse and public opinion in Poland were congruent and consistent.
Liberal policies in this coimtry were likewise stable and continuous.
More specifically, I operate from six hypotheses:

Survey Response: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences,” American Journal o f Political
Science 36, no. 3 (August 1992): 579-616.
Boris Kagarlitskii, “The Fight Has Come Full Circle,” The Moscow Times (May 11,2001).
*^The election o f pro-Communist and nationalist deputies during the 1993 parliamentary elections
indicates the beginning o f the process.
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Hypothesis 1: During the research period, both Russian public opinion and official
discourse (a proxy for the elite’s value orientations) changed from liberal to organicstatist categories. In Poland, both public opinion and official discourse remained liberal.
However, the liberalism in this country was never as extreme as in Russia; it was
tempered by the advocacy of social protection and nationalism.^^
Hypothesis 2\ In Russia, a basic societal consensus between the elite and the
general public emerged around organic-statist values, while in Poland, the elite and the
public found common ground in modified liberal orientations.
Hypothesis 3: In Russia, congruence between the elite and the popular attitudes
did not appear until the 2000 presidential elections. In Poland, official discourse and
public opinion were always congruent.
Hypothesis 4: The role of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals in
articulating official discourse and the elite’s value orientations changed from independent
cultural entrepreneurs who created and supported post-Communist liberal discourse to a
more organic role which incorporated public opinion. The dual (organic and
entrepreneurial) role of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals never changed.
Hypothesis 5: In Russia, the changes in official discourse (the elite’s value
orientations) and policies do not always correspond to one another, but on several
occasions, changes in discourse were a good indicator for changing policy direction. In
Poland, continuity in official discourse matched continuity of policies.

According to Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in
Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998,6) in Poland reliance on
nationalism, rather than liberalism, served as the “source o f political legitimacy” in the postCommunist period. My formulation is less dramatic. I claim only that liberalism was modified by
advocacy o f nationalism and social protection.
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Hypothesis 6: Based on my case studies, consistently liberal post-Communist
discourse occurs when a) it is tempered by advocacy of social protection and nationalism
and b) there is a liberal consensus between the elite and the public and governmentaffiliated intellectuals, who articulate official discourse, draw upon both the elite and the
public’s preferences, i.e., play a dual (organic and entrepreneurial) role.
All hypotheses are descriptive. I present relationships which are dialectical and
mutually reinforcing rather than linear and causal. I aim to explore shifts in public
opinion, official discourse, and policies as well as the changing role of governmentaffiliated intellectuals.

Data
This study utilizes 1) public opinion surveys®'* at the VTsIOM (Center for Study
of Public Opinion, Moscow), the CBOS (Center for Study of Public Opinion, Warsaw)
and the ISSWU (Institute for Social Studies at Warsaw University)®® archives; 2) publie
statements (speeches, interviews, books, articles, etc.) produced by government-affiliated
intelleetuals for domestic consumption between 1989/1992 and 2002®® available at the
Russian State Library, Russian National Library, the library of Institute of Scientific
Information for Social Sciences (INION), the Polish National Public Library, and the
libraries of Warsaw University and Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish
Academy of Sciences; 3) descriptions of actions by governmental officials dealing with
political system, relationship between the state and society/individual, economic system,

foreign policy, and ethnic relations contained in news compilations.
Attitudes towards political parties, media, democracy, market, economic reforms, welfare, tolerance,
the West, foreign policy, collapse o f the USSR, NATO, the EU, migrant workers, etc.
®^Bogdan Cichomski, Tomasz Jerzyhski, and Marcin Zielinski, Polish General Social Surveys 19921999: Cumulative Codebook (Warsaw: Institute for Social Studies, University o f Warsaw, 2001).
^ Documents representative o f the shift in official discourse.
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The timeframe for my research covers the period from 1992 to 2001 in Russia and
from 1989 to 2002 in Poland. In 1992, following the demise of the USSR, Russia became
de facto independent. In the Fall of 1989, the first semi-democratic elections took place in
Poland. These dates are generally accepted as starting points of the post-Communist
period in each country. 2001 and 2002 are the dates when I completed the Russian and
Polish phases of my field-work. I spent ten months in Russia and six months in Poland,
collecting original data on the value orientations of the elite and acquiring and classifying
secondary statistical and event-analytical data.

Methods and Procedures
This study used both objective and systematic quantitative methods (statistical
analysis, quantitative content analysis, event analysis) and interpretive and contextual
qualitative approaches (qualitative content analysis). In bringing together “story telling”
and “positivist quantification,” 1 follow the well-taken recommendations of the leading
political science methodologists.^’ It is the first study of its kind in post-Communist
scholarship.

1. Affiliation Sites
In Russia, I was formally affiliated with VTsIOM (Moscow), while in Poland, 1
received full affiliation at IFIS PAN (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish
Academy of Sciences) and CBOS (Warsaw).

Robert H. Bates, “Area Studies and The Discipline: A Useful Controversy,” PS: Political Science &
Politics 30, no. 2 (1997b): 166-70; Ian Lustick, “The Discipline o f Political Science and Studying the
Culture o f Rational Choice as a Case in Point,” PS: Political Science & Politics 30, no. 2 (1997): 175180; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference
in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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2. Content Analysis
To analyze official discourse (the elite’s value orientations) and to document
possible shifts and continuities, I traced evaluations of textual indicators in governmentaffiliated intellectuals’ public speeches. The list of intellectuals was based on my own
knowledge of the Russian and Polish case studies. It was later verified through external
sources. Results of content analysis of official discourse were then compared to results of
an extensive statistical review of public opinion. Basic congruence between public
opinion and official discourse indicated a consensual relationship in which governmentaffiliated intellectuals may be assumed to play a more organic role; an inconsistency
between the two signaled conflictive relationship in which government-affiliated
intellectuals play the role of cultural entrepreneurs.
3. Svstematic Review and Statistical Analvsis of Secondary Survev Data
To measure public opinion I utilized results of surveys conducted by Russian and
Polish national polling organizations and compared discrete elements of public opinion
(political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations) to appropriate
categories of official discourse (the elite’s value orientations) in the two countries. I
reviewed long-term trends in public attitudes and used conventional statistical methods to
explore social determinants of and possible relationships between various public
attitudes. Various Polish and Russian polling organizations, including my affiliation sites
(VTsIOM, CBOS, and ISSUW) routinely monitor changes in public opinion but such
monitoring largely uses one-dimensional and static parameters which are treated as
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unrelated.^* To obtain a multidimensional picture of public opinion I used multivariate
regression and correlation analyses.

4. Event Analysis
To assess actual policies, I utilized event analysis of actions of the ruling elite
along the five issue-areas (political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic
relations). Actions were classified according to a particular category (i.e., political,
ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations ones), coded (as reflecting
either liberal or conservative/organic-statist principles) and aggregated by category and
year. The evolution of actions of the political elite along the five issue domains was then
compared to the value orientations of the elite and to public preferences.
There are several suggested methods to measure the character of the relationship
between public opinion and the elite’s discourse and actions, including historical research
of the elite’s statements dealing with the importance of public opinion, interviews with
the elite, matching of policy changes with majority opinion, juxtaposition of legislative
policy votes with preferences of constituents, comparison between changes in public
opinion and changes in policy, and evaluation of trends in public opinion and policy over
time.^^ I compared trends in public opinion and the elite’s value orientations and actions
over time to see if both move in the same direction. However, imlike historical research

For instance, only specific attitudes are explored; no consideration is given to the analysis o f several
related parameters that comprise organic-statist or liberal constellations o f public attitudes.

® I use the points and examples outlined in Robert Y. Shapiro and Latvrence R. Jacobs, ’’Who Leads
and Who Follows? US Presidents, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” in Decision-Making in Glass
House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 2F ‘ Century,
ed. Brigette L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2000) and Natalie La Balme, “Constraint, Catalyst, or Political Tool? The French Public
and Foreign Policy,” in Decision-Making in Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American
and European Foreign Policy in the 21’“ Century, ed. Brigette L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and
Pierangelo Isernia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); see these chapters for a more
detailed discussion.
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of statements by the members of the elite or interviews with the elite, my methods do not
help to answer the more complex question of how public opinion reaches the elite. I offer
anecdotal evidence and personal observations from VTsIOM and CBOS, with which I
was affiliated during my field research.

Organization
Chapter II. The Russian Case: Unstable Liberal Discourse
The second chapter analyzes a specific case in which official discourse shifted
dramatically from a set of liberal orientations to organic-statist ones. I use content
analytic data extracted from government-affiliated intellectuals’ public statements to
show when and how the change took place.

Chapter III. The Russian Case: Elite-Public Consensus on Organic-Statist Values
This chapter analyzes results of statistical analysis and an extensive review of
Russian public opinion surveys and discusses event analysis of the actions of the Russian
political elite. Comparison between the long-term trends in public opinion and official
discourse is used to demonstrate areas of congruence and disjunction between the elite
and public’s attitudes.

Chapter IV. The Polish Case: Stability of Modified Liberal Discourse
I discuss data on the Polish elite’s political, ideological, economic, foreign policy
and ethnic relations attitudes. Based on content analytic data from the public statements
of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals, I demonstrate that official discourse of the
Polish government-affiliated intellectuals was mostly liberal and stable. Stability of
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discourse indicates that regardless of the composition of the Polish government, there are
basic common values shared by all factions of the Polish ruling elite.

Chapter V. The Polish Case: Elite-Publie Consensus on Modified Liberal Values
This chapter analyzes results of statistical analysis and an extensive review of
Polish public opinion surveys and discusses event analysis of the actions of the Polish
political elite. Juxtaposition of the long-term trends in public opinion with official
discourse and policies is used to show value orientations shared by both the Polish elite
and the population at large.

Chapter VI. The Elite’s Value Orientations and Public Opinion in Post-Communist
Societies: A Comparative Perspective
This chapter provides a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between the
Russian and Polish post-Communist elite’s value orientations, on the one hand, and
public opinion, on the other. I examine political implications of stability and instability of
the original liberal attitudes of the elite and the public. I also present the comparative
implications of my findings and isolate factors that lend stability to post-Commimist
liberal value orientations on both the elite and the popular levels.
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CHAPTER II
THE RUSSIAN CASE: UNSTABLE LIBERAL DISCOURSE
The Russian case was selected to illustrate the instability of both elite and public
liberal orientations. This chapter presents and analyzes Russian data on elite attitudes
towards politics, ideology, the economy, foreign policy, and ethnic relations. Based on
the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter, I expect to find a difference between the
discourse employed by government-affiliated intellectuals in the early 1990s and their
current discourse. This change can be gradual or abrupt. It can be total or partial.
More specifically, I hypothesized that discourse of Russian government-affiliated
intellectuals (a proxy for the elite’s value orientations) changed abruptly from supporting
liberal positions to upholding organic-statist ones in 1998/1999, i.e., after the economic
default and Putin’s appointment as Russian Prime Minister. I anticipated that around this
time references to democracy, liberal ideology, free market, pro-Western foreign policy,
and tolerant ethnic relations were replaced by discussion of organic-statist
(conservative^®) concerns of authoritarianism, conservative ideology, governed market,
anti-Western/independent foreign policy, and nationalism. In other words, during the
post-Communist period, discourse of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals and the
elite’s value orientations underwent a complete and radical transformation. The goal of
this chapter is to confirm or reject these hypotheses.

Here and henceforth, I use the term “conservative” to denote a uniquely European/Russian
phenomenon. Unlike contemporary American conservatism whose defining features include defense o f
laissez-faire capitalism, traditional social structures and values, minimal role o f the state, religious
revival, economic protectionism, and stricter immigration controls, its European counterpart is
organized around authoritarian, statist, etatist, isolationist, and nationalist principles.
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Procedures for Content Analysis of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals’
Discourse
1. Sample Selection
In contrast to other researchers of post-Communist diseourse, who use samples
derived from a specific journal, newspaper, or TV program for a specified period of
time,^* 1 used a sample of intellectual discourse communicators. 1 am not so much
interested in where discourse appeared, as in who articulated it and what was articulated.
Obviously, discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals in its original form is unlikely
to appear in the oppositional media outlets.’^ Seeondly, concentrating on a speeific
medium runs the risk of missing other published works (e.g., books or chapters in books).
When selecting a sample of communicators, 1 used my own knowledge of the
Russian case as well as external sources that detailed the relationship between the

See, for instance, Czyzewski, Mark, Kinga Dunin, and Andrzej Piotrowski, eds., Cudze problemy: o
Waznosci tego, co nie wazne [Someone E lse’s Problems. Importance o f the Issues Which Are Not
Important] (Warsaw: Osrodek BadaA Spolecznych, 1991); Mark Czyzewski, Sergiusz Kowalski, and
Andrzej Piotrowski, eds., Rytualny chaos: studium dyskursupublicznego [Ritual Chaos: Study o f
Public Discourse] (Krakdw: Wydawnictwo Aureus, 1997); A. Baranov, et al., Rossiia v poiskakh idei:
analiz pressy [Russia in Search o f an Idea: Press Analysis] (Moscow: Consulting Group o f The
Administration o f the President o f the Russian Federation, 1997); A. Temkina and V. Grigor’ev,
“Dinamika interpretativnogo protsessa: transformatsiia v Rossii” [“Dynamics o f Interpretation Process:
Russian Transformation”], in Sotsialnye issledovaniia v Rossii: samopoznaniie obshchestva [Social
Research in Russia: Self-Understanding o f Society] (Moscow: Polis, 1998); B. Mezhuev,
“Kontseptualizatsiia ‘natsionalnogo interesa’ v poiiticheskikh discussiiakh” [“Conceptualization o f
‘National Interests’ in Political Discussions”], in Sotsialnye issledovaniia v Rossii: samopoznaniie
obshchestva [Social Research in Russia: Self-Understanding o f Society] (Moscow: Polis, 1998);
Grzegorz Pozarlik, “Polish Political Parties and Discourse on Polish Raison D ’Etat on the Eve o f the
European Union Membership,” in Between Animosity and Utility: Political Parties and Their Matrix,
ed. Hieronim Kubiak and Jerzy J. Wiatr (Krak6w: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2000); Cezary
Trutkowski, Spoleczne reprezentacje polityki [Social Representations o f Politics] (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2000); and A. V. Kornienko, “Tsennostnye prioritety sovremennoi
rossiiskoi pressy i ikh smy^lovye dominanty” [“Value Priorities o f Contemporary Russian Press and
Their Dominant Meanings”], in Zhurnalistika i sotsiologiia: Rossiia, 90-ye gody [Journalism and
Sociology: Russia, the 1990s], ed. S. G. Korkonosenko (St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University
Press, 2001).
Even if political adversaries would publish the statements o f government-affiliated intellectuals,
such statements are likely to be abridged or distorted. The same “strawman” strategy, o f course,
applies to the governing elite itself. Certainly it is not above the manipulation o f the rivals’ views.
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political elite and government-affiliated intellectuals.^^ My sample included 40
intellectual communicators of official discourse (the elite’s value orientations).N ot all
of them were simultaneously included into the sample of post-Communist “governmentaffiliated intellectuals.” The group underwent substantial rotation.’^ But, collectively, the
works of these intellectuals represent the body of government-endorsing intellectual
discourse and reflect value orientations of the post-Communist governing elite during the
research period.’^
I analyzed 249 publications authored by 26 discourse communicators including

Igor’ Bunin, Director General of the Center fo r Political Technologies', Gennadii
Burbuiis, Yeltsin’s closest ally. State Secretary of RF and First Deputy Prime Minister in
1991-1992, subsequently President of Strategiia Foundation; Sergei Chernyshov,
conservative philosopher, important ideologue, director of Russian University, and close
friend and ally of Gleb Pavlovskii; Anatolii Chubais, Deputy Prime Minister in 19921998 in charge of privatization, Chief of Presidential Administration in 1996-1997,
Books by Yeltsin’s insiders Filatov (Sergei Filatov, Sovershenno ne sekretno [Absolutely Non- ‘TopSecret"] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000)) and Baturin (Yu. M. Baturin, et al., Epokha Yeltsina: ocherki
politicheskoi istorii [Yeltsin’s Epoch: Sketches o f Political History] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001))
provided additional information on the intellectuals recruited by the political elite during the postCommunist period. These sources also placed selected discourse communicators among the most
influential government-afFiliated intellectuals.
Although my original sample included about 120 people, many o f them did not fit pre-established
selection criteria. For instance, some intellectuals represented the political elite proper (e.g., Chernomyrdin,
Nemtsov, S. Ivanov, etc.), oppositional intellectual elite (e.g., lavlinskii, Glaz’ev, Kagarlitskii, etc.),
journalists (Kiselev, Svanidze, Leont’ev, Sokolov, Dorenko, Pozner, etc.), or speechwriters, secretaries,
referents o f the acting politicians (Pikhoiia, Baturin, Kostikov etc.).
For instance, Yegor Gaidar’s publications after his removal from the governing elite (after 1995)
and, especially, after his falling out with the current government-afFiliated intellectual circle (after

1999), were excluded. Likewise, works by Simon Kordonskii, published prior to 1999, i.e., before his
recruitment to the positions o f power, were not analyzed. For a more detailed discussion o f rotations
among Russian post-Communist intellectuals, see Table 1.
The validity o f the Russian sample was further confirmed through additional independent sources.
The website o f the Fond effektivnoi politiki [Foundation fo r Effective Politics]
(http://www/fep.ru/publications/pr) and internet publication strana.ru
(http://www.strana.ru/topics/201/) routinely compile lists o f the one hundred most influential Russian
intellectuals. Strana.ru also publishes a list o f the one hundred most influential Russian politicians
(http://www.strana.ru/publications/03/).
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currently a Chairman of the Board of Directors of RAO EES; Aleksandr Dugin, ultra
conservative philosopher, founder of “Eurasia” socio-political movement, adviser to
Gennadii Seleznev, Speaker of Duma and presently an important unofficial ideologue;

Yegor Gaidar, Acting Prime Minister in 1992-1994, subsequently a Director of the
Institute of the Problems of the Transitional Period; Yevgenii lasinj^ Minister of
Economy in 1994-1997, currently President of Economic Academy; Andrei Illarionov,
Director of the Institute of Economic Analysis, a member of the Governmental
Commission for Economic Reform since 1998, currently an Economic Adviser to the
president of RF; Aleksei Kara-Murza, professor. Director of Center for Philosophic
Analysis of Russian Reform Movements, co-President of Moscow Liberal Foundation,
important ideologue; Sergei Karaganov, Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe,
member of the Presidential Coimseling Board, and Chairman of the Committee for
Foreign and Defense Politics of RF; Sviatoslav Kaspe, Deputy Director of the Institute
for Development of Regional Education, chief analyst of Russian Public Politics Center,
and a close ally and co-author of Aleksei Salmin; Mikhail Krasnov, Presidential Aid
for legal issues in 1995-1998 and subsequently a Vice-President of INDEM; Simon

Kordonskii, Director General of the Center fo r Civil Society and Private Property in
1993-2000, consultant of the Foundation fo r Effective Politics, currently Head of
Presidential Counseling Board; Aleksandr Livshits, Yeltsin’s aid and assistant in 19941996, Minister of Finances in 1996-1997, currently professor of economics; Vladimir

Man, member of Gaidar’s team, currently a Director of the Working Center of the
Governmental Commission for Economic Reform and a member of the Scientific Board

One publication authored by Aleksashenko, lasin’s colleague and frequent co-author, was counted as
lasin’s publication.
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of the Center fo r Strategic Programs-, Vyacheslav Nikonov, President of Politika
Foundation, Vice-President of the Association o f Centers fo r Political Consulting
(president A. Salmin), member of the Presidential Political Board, and Foreign and
Defense Policy Board; Alexander Panarin, philosopher, professor of Moscow State
University, important ideologue; Gleb Pavlovskii, director of the Foundation fo r
Effective Politics, member of the Strategic Programs Center, and Adviser of Presidential
Administration; Aleksei Salmin, member of the Presidential Counseling Board in 1995-

199?, currently President of Russian Public Politics Center, President o f the Association
o f Centers fo r Political Consulting-, Georgii Satarov, Presidential Aid for Internal Issues
and Relations with Parliament in 1993-1997, subsequently a President of INDEM;

Sergei Shakhrai, Deputy Prime Minister in 1992-1994; Aleksandr Shokhin, Deputy
Prime Minister of RF, Minister of Labor and Economy in 1991-1994 and briefly in 1998;

Leonid Smirniagin, member of Presidential Counseling Board in 1993-1997; Anatolii
Sobchak, Mayor of St. Petersburg in 1991-1996, member of the Presidential Counseling
Board in 1993-?, Putin’s intellectual mentor; Aleksei Uliukaev, consultant for the
Government of RF in 1991-1994, deputy director of Gaidar’s Institute, currently Deputy
Minister of Finances; Sergei Vasil’ev, Director of the Working Center of the
Governmental Commission for Economic Reform in 1991-1994, currently Deputy
Minister of Economy.^*
Many prominent government-affiliated intellectuals whom I originally selected
for my sample, including Aleksei Kudrin, Minister of Finances in the Kas'ianov
Government; Emil’ Pain, Yeltsin’s adviser for ethnic policy; and German Gref, current
Minister of Trade and Development and author of the governmental economic program,
See Appendix C for the brief biographies o f Russian government-afFiliated intellectuals.
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did not leave publicly accessible statements. Although the sample is not exhaustive, it is
representative and sufficient for a valid analysis.^^
The unit of analysis was one publication. Its size or format did not matter. Only
the content of the statement was important. Regardless of whether the statement was a
newspaper interview, article, chapter in a book, or monograph, what mattered was the
articulation of relevant ideas.

2. Operationalization of Categories for Content Analvsis
Public statements of selected commimicators are a source from which content
analytic data can be extracted. In the course of Russian content analysis I used five liberal
and five organic-statist categories which were paired into five dichotomies/issue
domains. Each dichotomy contained a liberal and an organic-statist category*®: 1)
democracy-authoritarianism (political dichotomy); 2) liberalism-conservatism/statism
(ideological dichotomy); 3) free market-governed market (economic dichotomy); 4) proWestern foreign policy —anti-Western/independent foreign policy (foreign policy
dichotomy); 5) ethnic tolerance - nationalism (ethnic relations dichotomy).

Choice of Dichotomies
The choice of dichotomous (liberal - organic-statist) categories is essential.*' The
given database does not contain any other ideological divide. The categories of socialist
discourse*^ are missing, since in post-Communist Russia communicators of socialist

See Appendix E for the list o f sources analyzed during the content analytic part o f the Russian
research.
I do not attach any normative significance to the terms “liberal” and “conservative.” They are used
simply to delineate opposing positions.
For a detailed descriptions o f liberal and organic-statist dichotomous categories please see Chapter I.
Such categories would include people’s democracy (political issue domain), socialist ideology
(ideological issue domain), state regulation (economic domain), socialist integration (foreign policy

45

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

discourse were excluded firom the political elites. In other words, the post-Communist
Russian official discourse was a dialogue between liberals and their organic-statist
(conservative) counterparts, since only liberals and conservatives were included in the
intellectual elite, as I define it.
No extant work analyzes Russian discourse both longitudinally and according to
several dichotomies (ideological, political, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations).
This is the first attempt to study the body of written statements that comprise Russian
official discourse and the elite’s value orientations systematically i.e., not only
chronologically but also according to several categories along the liberal-organic-statist
divide. Certainly, chronological examination is valuable since it shows the evolution in
liberal and conservative attitudes. But analysis of different dichotomies/issue domains is
valuable since it exposes pattems within the overall discourse and reveals the relative
importance of specific dichotomies in the overall discourse.

Extracting Categories from the Text
Each category of discourse can be detected in a text by a set of specific textual
indicators and their synonyms (see Appendix D). The original textual indicators that I use
in this analysis were first drawn from the political science literature and then refined in
the course of the pilot reading of several selected works of government-affiliated
intellectuals. Having textual indicators helps highlight the meanings that communicators
attribute to specific categories.

domain) and socialist internationalism (ethnic policy issue domain). However, these categories, which
would transform my dichotomies into tripartite constellations, are visibly absent from the Russian postCommunist elite discourse.

46

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

In the political dichotomy the liberal category of democracy is measured through
references to “separation of power,” “checks and balances,” “parliamentarism,”
“federalism,” “elections,” “multiparty system,” “constitutionality,” “freedom of
information/press” and ‘Viable opposition,” while the conseryatiye category of
authoritarianism manifests itself in the textual indicators of “concentration of power,”
“presidential republic,” “unitary state,” “ideological control,” “elite-based decision
making,” “controlled opposition,” “one party system,” “political expediency.”
In the ideological dichotomy the category of liberalism is defined through
references to “natural human rights,” “negatiye freedoms,” “state’s accovmtability to an
indiyidual,” “respect for the conflict of interests,” “ciyilian control oyer state’s repressiye
apparatus,” whereas the category of statism/conseryatism is measured through the textual
indicators of “socially constructed human rights,” “positiye freedoms,” “state’s
superiority oyer citizens,” and “presence of imcontrolled force at state’s disposal.”
In the economic dichotomy, the liberal category of free market engenders beliefs
in “market as a dominant economic mode,” “priyate property,” “initiatiye and
competition,” “efficiency,” “economic justice,” “selectiye social support,” “liberalization
of foreign trade,” and “quick and radical reforms,” while the conseryatiye category of
goyemed market is measured through references to “state economic regulation and
preseryation of state sector,” “social justice and economic guarantees,” “price control,”
“uniyersal social support,” “collectiye forms of property,” “support for domestic
producers,” and “support for gradual and nationally-specific reforms.”
In the foreign policy dichotomy the liberal pro-Western category is defined
through the textual indicators of “the West is a partner,” “global yalues supersede
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national interests,” “support for international organizations,” “economic integration,”
whereas the conservative independent or anti-Western category manifests itself in the
textual indicators of “fluid alliances with all parties,” “national interests are more
important than international commitments,” “international organizations are for
protection of national interests,” “protection of Russians abroad,” and “imperial
restoration of the USSR.”
Finally, in the ethnic relations dichotomy the liberal categorv of ethnic tolerance
is defined as “equality of all ethnic groups,” “existence of universal values,” and
“peaceful solutions to ethnic conflicts,” while the conservative categorv of nationalism is
measured through references to “inequality of ethnic groups,” “uniquely Russian national
values and ideas,” and “military solutions to ethnic conflicts.”
As was showm in numerous content-analytic studies in general and in recent
Russian and Polish works*^ in particular, one cannot make meaningful inferences by
simply looking at predetermined or fixed textual indicators. The words “freedom,”
“democracy,” “stateness,” “law and order,” “market,” “national interests,” “European
integration” and many others may have significantly different meanings depending on the
context in which they are used.*'' My analysis is no exception. To alleviate this problem, I
used synonyms for textual indicators in each category (Appendix D). Synonyms emerged

See for instance, Czyzewski, et al., Someone E lse’s Problems, and Ritual Chaos; K. S. Gadziev,
“Opyt wedeniia v politilogiiu” [“Introduction to Political Science”]. Polis 1-2 (1992): 96-116;
Baranov, et al., Russia in Search o f Idea: Analysis o f the Press; M. V. Il’in, Slova i smysly: opyt
opisania kluchevykh poiiticheskikh poniatii [Words and Meanings: Towards A Descriptive Analysis o f
Key Political Concepts] (Moscow: n.p., 1997); Mezhuev, “Conceptualization of'National Interests' in
Political Discussions;” Temkina and Grigor’ev, “Dynamics o f Interpretational Process: Transformation
in Russia;” PoZarlik, “Polish Political Parties and Discourse on Polish Raison D ’Etat;” Trutkowski,
Social Representations o f Politics and Kornienko, “Normative Priorities o f Contemporary Russian
Press.”
For instance, freedoms can be natural or socially constructed, positive or negative. Similarly,
national interests can mean interests o f the state, interests o f industrial complex, or interests o f civil
society.
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during the pilot reading of selected works. Their list expanded as I analyzed the
government-affiliated intellectuals’ actual public statements. Synonyms are particularly
important for two reasons. First, they help make the content analytic data more uniform
across time. Second, they make data more comparable across communicators. For
instance, the economic debate about the relative importance of shock vs. therapy in
“shock therapy” is in essence a debate about the imiversality or particularity of economic
reforms. It is also a debate whether Russia’s previous legacies are important and
deterministic necessitating the gradual, therapeutic, and socially responsive reform, or
whether economic laws are universal and, the initial shock notwithstanding, radical
transformation invariably leads to an assured success. Close to the first, gradualist,
position is the argument that the most suitable route for Russia is the
Scandinavian/Prussian economic path. The radical camp, on the other hand, usually
endorses the American economic model even though the circumstances of its inception
are the least similar to Russian conditions. Consequently, “universal neo-liberal
economic development” textual indicator was synonymous with “shock therapy,”
“American model,” and “rapid reform.” The “specific economic development” textual
indicator was synonymous with “third economic path,” “Russian economic path,”
“Scandinavian/Prussian model,” and “gradual reforms.”

3 Coding Criteria
Each occurrence o f a textual indicator was coded according to evaluative criteria.

The number of mentions was not recorded, only the overall attitude toward a particular
textual indicator. The assigned values ranged from

“-1” (“negative assessment of
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textual indicator”) to “+1” (“positive assessment of textual indicator”). Value “0” was
assigned if a textual indicator was evaluated neutrally.
Positive evaluations (“+1”) were recorded if a textual indicator was associated
with: a. positive epithets (e.g., “desirable,” “necessary,” “appropriate,” “urgently
needed,” etc.); b. positive verbs used in connection with an indicator (“should be
promoted,” “should be included,” “must be adopted,” “need to be reached,” etc.); and c.
goals or instruments leading to positive outcomes (“partnership with the West leads to
investment and economic growth,” “our goal is to support domestic producers,” etc.).
Conversely, negative evaluations (“-1”) were given if a textual indicator was
associated with: a. negative epithets (e.g., “undesirable,” “baneful,” “terrible,” etc.); b.
negative verbs (“should be eliminated,” “have to be avoided,” “do not include,” etc.); and
c. negative outcomes or mechanisms leading to negative outcomes (“association with the
West brought nothing but disappointments for Russia,” “support of ineffective domestic
industries is the reason for Russian economic failures,” etc.).
A neutral evaluation (“0”) is a cumulative evaluation that is based on the presence
of both positive and negative attitudes toward a particular indicator. For instance, phrases
“social protection of the population is ineffective, but unavoidable,” “liberal market
theory is correct, but was applied erroneously,” “although current political system is
excessively authoritarian, it reflects objective distribution of power” contain both positive
and negative assessments of the textual indicators. The overall evaluations of such
indicators were recorded as neutral. Even if a textual indicator was predominantly
assessed as positive or negative, the mere existence of the opposite evaluation made the
overall value neutral.
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4. Examples of Evaluations
The following citations, taken from the database, illustrate the coding of textual
indicators:
Political Dichotomy. In the phrase '^Restoration o f a unitary state obviously leads
to the final destruction o f Russia and its disappearance from the world’s political map”,
textual indicator "unitary state” (conservative category of authoritarianism! is valued as
“- 1 ” (case c, association with negative outcomes). The phrase "Federalization sometimes
assumes irrational and destructive forms... Nonetheless, in general, federalization is a
healthy and objective process" contains textual indicator "federalism” (liberal category of
democracv!. It was assigned a value of zero (neutral meaning), since it is associated with
both positive and negative epithets.
Ideological Dichotomy. In the fragment "Only authority o f the state in Russia is
extremely serious, progressive, and definite. Spiritually-intense, culturally-powerful,
creative, and superhuman Russian state does not require human freedoms” textual
indicator "dominance o f the state interests over personal ones” (category conservatism!
is represented by its synonym (“superhuman state that does not require human rights”),
which is evaluated positively (case a, association with positive epithets). In the citation
"Vulgar cliches o f ‘open society’ and human rights,” textual indicator "human rights”
(category liberalism! is valued negatively (case a, association with negative epithets).
Economic Dichotomy: The phrase "Undoubtedly, the market, with predominantly
state control, excessive and constantly changing tax system, and strong tradition o f
bureaucratic corruption continues to re-create illegal shadowy relations” contains a
negative evaluation of textual indicator "state enhances market performance”
(conservative category of governed market! (case c - assoeiation with negative
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outcomes). '"Market moralizes society to a certain degree" is an example of a positive
value assigned to textual indicator "market is a principal agent o f economic
development" (liberal category of free market) (case c - association with mechanisms
leading to positive outcomes).
Foreign Policy Dichotomy: The phrase "Today practically the whole non-Western
world, which historically experienced Western pressure, feels itself a victim offorced
history. Pressures from the West push the rest o f the world into West’s Promethean
adventure, while the West rejects out o f hand any attempt to re-examine historical
processes from other points o f view ” contains a negative evaluation of the textual
indicator "partnership with the West" (liberal category of pro-Western foreign policv')
(case c - association with a negative outcome). The phrase "Russia should not join the
‘Third World’. Her place is in the ‘First’" contains synonyms of two textual indicators "partnership with East and South" (“Third World”) (conservative category of antiWestern/independent foreign policv') and "partnership with the West" (“First World”)
(liberal discourse). The first indicator is assigned negative value (case b - association
with negative verbs). The second one is valued positively (case b - association with
positive verbs).
Dichotomy o f Ethnic Relations: The phrase “We must give an impulse to the idea
of history, i.e., idea of Russia” contains the textual indicator “need to promote national
values, national ideas” (conservative category of nationalism^). This textual indicator is
valued positively (case b - association with positive verbs).
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5. Stages of Quantitative Content Analysis
The Russian content analytic phase of my research consisted of four steps. First, I
selected a group of government-affiliated intellectuals based on publications detailing
intellectuals’ biographies and the degree of their cooperation with the political elite as
well as on my own expertise in the Russian politics. Next, I isolated three distinct phases
within the post-Commimist period that roughly corresponded to three presidencies Yeltsin’s first and second terms and Putin’s current tenure. Subsequently, the group of
government-affiliated intellectuals was divided into three subgroups: 1) intellectual
communicators of official discourse during the early Yeltsin period; 2) discourse
articulators of the late Yeltsin period; and 3) communicators of official discourse during
the Putin era (see Table 1). Doing so ensured that I analyzed works of intellectuals who
were actively cooperating with the government. Then, I located all publicly accessible
statements produced by these intellectuals during the last ten years. Finally, I performed a
content analysis of these public documents and recorded results in coding tables (see
Appendix D).
Finally, the values of individual textual indicators were aggregated
chronologically (by year) and thematically (by category) (see Tables 2 and 3). For each
year I calculated the mean for every textual indicator and for every category (sum of
values divided by the number of mentions of a given textual indicator/category). Figures
1-5 depict the results of the content analysis in the most general way. They trace the
evolution of the government-affiliated intellectuals’ discourse and the elite’s value
orientations during the last ten years.
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Table 1
Subgroups of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals*^

Government-Affiliated
Intellectuals During the
Early Yeltsin Period
(1992-1994)__________
Gennadii Burbulis*, Yegor
Gaidar*, Yevgenii lasin*,
Anatolii Chubais*, Andrei
Illarionov*, Aleksandr
Livshits*, Vladimir Mau*,
Georgii Satarov*, Sergei
Shakhrai, Aleksandr
Shokhin*, Leonid
Smimiagin*, Anatolii
Sobchak, Aleksei
Uliukaev*, Sergei
Vasil’ev*

Government-Affiliated
Intelleetuals During the
Late Yeltsin Period
(1995-1998/1999)
Igor’ Bunin*, Germadii
Burbulis, Anatolii
Chubais, Yegor Gaidar,
Yevgenii lasin, Andrei
Illarionov, Vladimir Mau,
Aleksei Kara-Murza,
Sergei Karaganov*,
Sviatoslav Kaspe*,
Mikhail Krasnov,
Aleksandr Livshits,
Vyacheslav Nikonov*,
Aleksandr Panarin*, Gleb
Pavlovskii*, Aleksei
Salmin*, Georgii Satarov,
Aleksandr Shokhin,
Leonid Smimiagin,
Anatolii Sobchak, Aleksei
Uliukaev

Government-Affiliated
Intelleetuals During the
Putin Era (1999/2000present)_____________
Igor’ Bunin, Anatolii
Chubais, Aleksandr Dugin,
Andrei Illarionov, Sergei
Chemyshov, Sergei
Karaganov, Sviatoslav
Kaspe, Simon Kordonskii,
Aleksandr Livshits,
Vladimir Mau, Vyacheslav
Nikonov, Aleksandr
Panarin, Gleb Pavlovskii,
Aleksei Salmin, Aleksei
Uliukaev, Sergei Vasil’ev

’ Asterisk denotes presence in more than one sub-period.
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Table 2
Summary of the Evaluations of Categories and Textual Indicators of Russian Liberal
Discourse
Categories:
Textual Indicators

Years:
Separation of
Powers, System of
Checks and
Balances
Parliamentarism
Free and Fair
Elections
Multipartism
Constitutionality
Civil Society
Independent
Media
Federalism
Accoimtability of
Government
Mean for
Category
Rights are natural
and Inalienable
Negative Rights
and Freedoms
Liberal Values
State is for
Citizens, Rights of
Individual are
Supreme

Means (sum of evaluations divided by the number of mentions)

1

1

94
95
96
Democracy:
1
1
1

1
1

-1
0.5

1
1

0.2
0.8

-0.3
1

0.3
0.7

0
1

0
0.8

0.5
0.3

1
1

1

1
1
0.7
1

0.6
1
0.7
1

1
1
0

0.2
0.7
1
1

0.7
1
1

1
0.7

-1

0

0.5
1
1
-0.7

92

93

97

98

99

00

1

1

0

1

01

1
-0.7

1
1

1
0.7

1
0.7

1
1

0

1

0.3

-0.7

-0.4

-1

1

0.5

0.9

0.8

0.6

0.8

0.7

0.2

0.4

-0.4

1

0.5

-0.5

Liberal Ideology:
1
1
1

1
1

1

1

0.7

1

1

1

-1

0

1

1
1

1
0.3

0
1

0
0.5

1
1

0.3
0.6

0.4
0.4

-0.3
-0.7

-0.5
-0.1

-1
-0.6
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Table 2 continued
Small and
Effective
State/Minimal
State
Respect for the
Conflict of
Interests
Rule of Law
Mean for
Category
Market is the
Principal Agent of
Economic
Development
Weak Social
Protection/Address
Social Protection
Economic Justice
Low Taxes
Balanced Budget
Voucher
Privatization,
Private Property
Strict Monetary
Policy
Liberalization of
Foreign Trade
Price
Liberalization
Competition
Universal NeoLiberal
Development
Mean for
Category

1

1
1

0.8

0

1

0.7

1

1

1

-0.3

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

0.6

0

1

1
0.7

1
0.9

1
0.7

1
1

1
0.8

1
0.7

1
-0.3

1
0.4

1
0.1

Free Market Economie Model:
1
0.9
1
1
0.5
0.7

-0.2

-0.3

0.5

1

0.5

0.5

1

1

1

-1

0.5

1

0.7
1
1
1

0.8
1
1
0.8

0.7
1
0
0.7

0.7
1
1
0.1

1
0.8
1
0.6

1
0.8
1
0.8

0.3
1
0.7
0

0.3
1
1
0

1
1

1

0.7

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

1

0.6

1

1

1

0.7

1

0

0

1

0.5

1

0.6

1

1

1

1

1

1
0

0.8
0.5

0.8
0.6

0.6
0

1
1

0.7
0.3

1
-0.6

0
0.5

1
0

0.9

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.9

0.8

0.4

0.5

0.6

1
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1

0.8

Table 2 continued

West is a Partner
Unipolarity
Idealistic Foreign
Relations
Reduction of
Defense Spending
Russians Abroad
Are on Their Own
Economic
Integration with
Former Soviet
Republics
Mean for
Category
Equality of Ethnic
Groups
Peaceful Solutions
of Ethnic
Problems
Universal Values
Mean for
Category

1
1

Pro-Western Foreign Policy:
1
0
-0.1
0.6
-1
-1
0.8
0.7
1
0.6

1

0.3

1
1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.3

0.5

1

1

1

1

0

-0.3

1

0.8

0.4

1

0.3

0

0.6

0.6

0.1

-1

1

1

0

1

To erant Ethnic Policy:
1
0.3
1
1
1

1

-0.4
-1
-0.6

0
-0.8
0

1

1

-0.3

1

0.3

1

1

0

0.5
0.6

0
0.4

1
1

0.3
0.8

0.1
0.1

0.3

-0.3
-0.7

1
0.8
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-1
0

Table 3
Summary of the Evaluations of Categories and Textual Indicators of Russian
Conservative (Organic-Statist) Discourse

Categories:
Textual Indicators
Years:

Means (sum of evaluations divided by the number of mentions)
92

93

94
95
96
Authoritarianism
-1
-0.5 0

97

98

-1
Monopoly of
-1
-1
-9.5
Power
Presidential
0
-0.5 0.5 0.3
0
-0.5 0.5
Republic
Nominal
-1
-1
-1
-0.6
Elections/Altemati
ves to Elections
One-Party System,
1
1
0.5 -1
0
-0.5
Controlled
Opposition
-1
-1
-0.4 0
Unconstitutionality
-0.6
-0.5
, Political
Expediency as a
Substitute to
Constitutionality
Inequality of
-1
-0.3
0
Citizens in
Political Process
-1
-1
-1
-1
Ideological
Control Over Mass
Media
Unitary State
-I
1
-1
1
0
-1
-1
-1
-1
Absence of
Accountability of
Government
Mean for
-0.8 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3
-0.4 -0.2
Category
Liberal Ideology: Statist/Conservative Ideology:
1
-0.6 -1
1
0
Rights Are
Socially
Constructed/Given
by Community

99

00

-0.2

-0.3

0.3

0

0.5

1

0

0.3

-0.5

-1

-1

0.3

0

0.3

1

-0.6

0.5
0

1

-0.2

0.1

1

1

1
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01

1
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Table 3 continued
Positive Rights and
Freedoms
Conservative
Values
State Interests Are
More Important
Than Individual
Rights
Strong Repressive
State Apparatus
Unity of Interest,
Social Harmony
Lawlessness
Mean for Category
State Enhances
Market
Performance
Strong Social
ProtectionAJnivers
al Social
Protection
Social Justice
High Taxes
Possibility of
Budget Deficit
Alternatives to
Voucher
Privatization:
Privatization by
Workers,
Nationalization
(Collective and
State Property)
Soft Monetary
Policy, Special
Credits
Protectionism
Control And
Regulation of
Prices

-1

1

1

1

1

1

1

-1

0

0.2

-0.4

-1

0.5

0.3

1

1

-1

-1

-0.8

-0.2

0.3

1

0.7

1

0.7

0.9

0

-1

0.3

-0.1

-0.1

0.7

1

1

0.4

0.8

-1

0

0.2

0.1

-1

1

0.5

1

-1
-0.9 -1
-0.5 -1
-0.8 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.4
Governed Market Economic
0
-0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3

-1
-1
0.2
0.6
Model:
-0.3
0

1

-1
0.7

-1
0.5

0.9

-0.3

0.5

1

0.5

-0.3

0.5

-0.3

0

0

0.5

0.8

1

-0.6
-1
-1

-1
-0.7
-1

-0.7
-1
0.5

-0.3
-1
-1

0.3
-1
-1

-0.4
-0.6
-1

0.6
0
-0.7

0
-1
-1

-1

0

0

0

-1

-0.3

0.3

-0.7

-1

-1

-1

-0.9

-1

-1

-1

-1

-0.3

-1

-0.5
-0.5

-0.7
-0.8

-0.3
-1

-1
-1

-0.7
-1

-0.5
-0.5

0
-1

0
0
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-1

1

-1

Table 3 continued
Selective Support
of Priority
Industries
National Economie
Model
Mean for
Category
South or East is a
Partner
Multipolarity
Realistic Foreign
Policy
Increase in
Defense Spending
Protection of
Russians Abroad
Imperial
Restoration of
USSR
Mean for
Category
Inequality of
Ethnic Groups
Military Solutions
to Ethnic Conflicts
National Values,
National Ideas
Mean for
Category

0

-0.4

-0.4

-1

-0.2

-0.5

-0.1

-1

0.7

-0.2

I

1

0.7

-1

0.5

1

0.5

0

-0.4

-0.5

-0.2

-0.7

-0.6

-0.4

-0.1

-0.4

0

0

1

0.5

0

1
0.6

0.3

1
1

-1

1
1

Independent or Anti-Western Foreign Policy;
1
1
0
0.3
1
0.3

-0.3

1
-0.2

0.5

-1

-1

0.3

1

1

1

1

-0.3

1

0.8

1

1

0

0

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.6

-1

Nationalistic Et inic Policy:
-1
-1
-0.9 -1
-0.3

-1

1

-1

-1

0.3

1

1

-1

1

0.3

1
1
-1

-1

1

0.3

0.8

0.5

-0.5

-0.8

-1

-1

0.3

0.4

1

0.3

0.7

0.5

0.7

1
0.2

-1

-0.3

-O.I -0.3

-0.3

-0.3

-0.4

0.8

0.3
0.3

Quantitative Content Analysis of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals’
Discourse
Evaluation of every dichotomy went through specific periods characterized by
the domination of either liberal or organic-statist value orientations. Depending on the
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principal mode of evaluation, I distinguish between liberal or organic-statist periods
in the evolution of a particular dichotomy. A transitional period describes a situation
in which neither liberal nor organic-statist orientations prevail.

Evolution of Political Dichotomv
Figure 1 can be divided into three parts. During the first period (1992-1994),
democracy is an absolute preference of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals,
while authoritarianism is soundly rejected. In 1993,*® there is a slight decline in
democracy’s attractiveness and simultaneous modest advance of authoritarianism.
During the second, transitional,*^ period (1995-1999) democracy’s attractiveness
gradually erodes, while authoritarianism enjoys growing support from elites. Both
democratic and authoritarian lines approach zero. This suggests a period of acute
conflict in which neither alternative is able to gamer unambiguous support. During
the third period (2000-to present), authoritarianism wins as the most desirable
Russian political model.** In other words, democracy, a preferred political system of
the first period, increasingly loses intellectuals’ support and is finally replaced by
authoritarianism. Government-affiliated intellectuals’ increasing fascination with
authoritarian political options may be a sign of group interests. I will return to this
issue in the next chapter when I compare political preferences of the elite and the
public.

In the Fall o f 1993 Russian democracy experienced one o f the most serious challenges to date.
Yeltsin disbanded the acting parliament and political violence spilled out onto the streets.
” Henceforth, the term transitional is used to describe a period which combines both organic-statist
and liberal elements.
A. A. Galkin and Yu. A. Krasin, Rossiia na perepu t’e: Avtoritarizm Hi demokratiia. Varianty
razvitiia [Russia at the Crossroads: Authoritarianism or Democracy. Variants o f Development^
(Moscow: Vies' mir, 1998) come to the same conclusion based solely on personal observations. My
findings confirm their findings with empirical data.
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Figure 1. Dynamics of Political Systems' Evaluations by the Russian Elite

Evolution of Ideological Dichotomv
Figure 2 can also be divided into three periods. During the first period (19921996), liberal values are consistently preferred to the statist orientations. In 1996,
after the first democratic presidential elections and Yeltsin’s call to search for the new
ideology, liberalism becomes seriously challenged by conservatism*^ (statism). The
uncertainty lasts until 1999 when the statist ideas become dominant. The ideology of
Putin’s government-affiliated intellectuals is an unambiguous statism. Although
government-affiliated intellectuals no longer support the liberal ideology, liberalism
is not completely discredited. It is noteworthy that ideological liberalism, under
favorable circumstances (i.e., more liberal public opinion), can still be resurrected,
while the complete discrediting of democracy in political discourse all but precludes
its easy rehabilitation.
Here, as previously, I use the term “conservative” in its European/Russian sense. In addition to
support for tradition, family values, and law and order, characteristic o f American conservatism, a
European version incorporates strong statist elements.
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‘ Attitudes to Liberal
Ideology
1992 1993

-

0.2

-

-

0.4

-

1996 1997 1998 11

2000 2001

Attitudes to Statist
(Conservative) Ideology

years

Figure 2. Dynamics of Ideological Evaluations by the Russian Elite

Evolution of Economic Dichotomv
Figure 3 reveals that Russian government-affiliated intellectuals consistently
favor the free market model. Only the 1998 default casts doubt on this economic course.
After a brief debate, the free market model prevails. In contrast to ideological liberalism
and democracy, evaluation of economic institutions, created during the reforms of 19921993, remains stable. Economic liberalism (belief in free market) appears to be a core
belief of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals. At the same time, the governed
market model is not completely discredited. Hypothetically, under favorable
circumstances, it may become attractive.
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Figure 3. Dynamics of Economic Models' Evaluations by the Russian Elite
Evaluation of Foreign Policy Dichotomy
Figure 4 is the most complex to interpret. However, it too can he divided into
three periods. The first, moderately pro-Western, period (1992-1996) contains neutral
or positive attitudes towards the West. The elite’s support for anti-Western course
steadily weakens. During the second period (1996-1999) a series of confrontations
between Russia and the West contributes to an increasingly negative evaluation of the
West. Simultaneously, there is a growing interest in the restoration of Russia’s
superpower status. The peak of these attitudes occurs in 1999 (Kosovo and NATO
expansion to the East). The current, moderately anti-Western, period (1999-present)
is characterized by neutral attitudes toward the West and persistent interest in
Russia’s superpower status as one of the poles in the multipolar international system.
Such dynamics correspond well to the major international events of the last decade.^®

During the first period, there were no open confrontations between Russia and the W est, while the
second period included the K osovo air strikes, tensions in regards to Iraq, announcements o f plans to
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The elite’s foreign poliey views are unstable. A future return to a pro-Western
position cannot be ruled out.

Evolution of Ethnic Relations Dichotomy
Figure 5 shows that since 1992 ethnic tolerance and respect for the rights of ethnic
minorities have declined considerably. Not surprisingly, the nationalistic attitudes peak in
1994-1995 (the first Chechen war). Around the 1996 presidential elections, governmentaffiliated intellectuals temporarily return to ethnic tolerance. In 1999 (the second
Chechen War), however, the attractiveness of the nationalist approaches increases
dramatically. Simultaneously, ethnic tolerance and principles of ethnic peaceful
coexistence lose supporters among government-affiliated intellectuals. In general, the
current period can be labeled as moderately nationalistic. Today, neutral attitudes towards
ethnic tolerance coexist with moderately positive evaluation of nationalist principles.
Nationalist ideas do not dominate absolutely and ethnic tolerance is not excluded from
the range of options. The Russian elite still does not have a clear vision of its own
preference for ethnic policy.
During the first period, government-affiliated intellectuals preferred a
democratic and ethnically tolerant state with a liberal ideology, free market economy,
and moderately independent foreign policy. Currently, their ideal polity is an
authoritarian and a moderately nationalist state with a statist ideology, a free market
economy, and an independent or anti-Western foreign policy (see Table 4).

include Baltic states into NATO. Today, Russia and the W est have both common interests (e.g., anti
terrorist operation in Afghanistan) and points o f dispute (e.g., Chechnya, SDI).
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Figure 4. Dynamics of the Foreign Policy Alternatives' Evaluations by the Russian Elite
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Figure 5. Dynamics of Ethnic Relations Alternatives' Evaluations by the Russian Elite
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Table 4
Five Most Preferred Categories in the Beginning (1992-1994) and at the End (19992001) of the Post-Communist Period in Russia
Categories of
Diseourse with the
Most Positive
Evaluations During
the First Three
Years (1992-1994)

Sum of Positive
Evaluations for
Three First Years
of Research Period
(1992-1994)
(maximum 3.0)

Ethnic Tolerance

2.61

Liberal Ideology

2.58

Demoeracy
Free Market

2.46
2.35

Independent or
Anti—Western
Foreign Poliey®^

2.03

Categories of
Diseourse with the
Most Positive
Evaluations During
the Last Three
Years of Research
Period (1999-2001)
State
(Conservative)
Ideology
Independent or
Anti-Western
Foreign Policy
Free Market
Nationalistie
Ethnic Relations
Authoritarianism

Sum of Positive
Evaluations for
Three Last Years
of Research Period
(1999-2002)
(maximum 3.0)*'
2.09

1.90

1.85
0.80
0.66

Analysis of the Relative Importance of Individual Dichotomies in the Overall Discourse
and Periodization of Discourse According to Dominant Dichotomies
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the relative importance of each dichotomy,
measured as the prevalence of its elements in overall discourse. It shows that
economic dichotomy predominates. Nonetheless, it becomes less prominent over
time, although there are certain exceptions to this tendency (1993 - start of mass
privatization, 1998 —default). The relative importance of the ideological dichotomy
in the overall discourse increases slightly. Its peak occurs in 1996 (the presidential

A s follow s from the table, the last period lacks the consensus o f the first one. A s mentioned in the
text, there is less agreement on contemporary ideology, foreign policy, or ethnic relations.
Pro-western foreign policy orientation was also quite popular - 1.77.
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elections). The dynamics of the political dichotomy has a weak positive trend. Its
relative importance peaks in 2000 (the second presidential elections). The foreign
policy dichotomy is relatively stable. Its visibility increases in 1999 and 2001
(Kosovo, the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan), while in 1993,1996, and 2000
(major internal political events) its importance declines. The dichotomy of ethnic
relations (the least important dichotomy) is chronologically the most stable. Its
relative importance increases only in 1994 (the first Chechen war), 1996, and 2000
(the presidential elections). In these years it ranks fourth among the five dichotomies.
All dichotomies, except the economy, have a tendency to increase their prominence in
the overall discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals.

80
60 H
40
20
0

□ Economy
B Ideology
■ Politics
□ Foreign Policy

Shba.

O Ethnic Policy

years

Figure 6. Frequencies With Which Individual Dichotomies Are Mentioned in Discourse
of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals
The changes in relative importance assigned to particular dichotomies reveal
the structural shift that occurred in the overall discourse. The first, economy-centric

period took place in 1992-1993. In the next, heterogeneous, period (1994-1998), the
economy ceased to dominate the discourse agenda, while other dichotomies grew in
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importance. The contemporary period (1999-present) is clearly more ideology- and
politics-centric.
The structural changes in discourse, to a great extept, are consequences of the
rotation within the intellectual elite. Until 1994, governmental economists articulated
the economy-centric discourse (Gaidar, S. Vasil’ev, etc.). The economists were
prevalent (nine out of fourteen communicators) among selected articulated of
discourse (see Table 1). Their main goal was to popularize economic reforms and
their discourse largely omitted ideological and political references. The post-1994
heterogenic discourse was articulated by both governmental economists (Shokhin,
lasin, Livshits) and intellectual ideologues (Satarov, Salmin, Nikonov, etc.). Indeed,
according to Table 1, among twenty discourse communicators of this period, eight
were economists. After Putin’s election, the role of active politicians as discourse
articulators approached zero. Out of sixteen selected communicators only four were
economists (see Table 1). They were replaced by professional ideologues (Pavlovskii,
Kordonskii) who concentrated on the articulation of ideology- and politics-oriented
discourse.

Qualitative Content Analysis of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals’
Discourse
A fuller understanding of the changes in official discourse and the elite’s
value orientations can be achieved through a qualitative presentation.
1. Discourse of the First Period: Qualitative Presentation
The quantitative content analysis presents the discourse of the first period
(1992-1993/1994) as democratic, ideologically and economically liberal, pro-Western
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and ethnically tolerant (i.e., containing liberal orientations). Qualitative content
analytic presentation supports the previous findings:
“Scenario of the restoration of the unitary state ... will most likely lead to the
total breakdown of Russia and its vanishing from the political map of the world”
(Aleksashenko et al. 1992,17). “The process of federalization has a healthy and
objective character” (lasin et al. 1993a, 34). “A country can only be strong and rich if
its citizens are strong and rich.... National security is, first and foremost, not the
security of the state, but the security of society, i.e., security of citizens. This is
primary. The security of the state structures and institutions is, at best, secondary”
(Uliukaev 1995^^, 74). “Undoubtedly, economy, where the state dominates, with
hyper and inconsistent tax system, with strong tradition of bureaucratic corruption,
continues to reproduce illegal, shadowy economic relations.... The market to a great
degree moralizes the society” (Bunin 1994, 368-369). ’’Russia should not join the
‘Third World’. Her place is in the ‘First’ one” (lasin et al. 1993c, 39). “The authors
do not consider that the Russian society has some particular traits that would force it
to live under autocracy or dictatorship” (lasin et al. 1993a, 10).

2. Discourse of the Second Period: Qualitative Presentation
Quotations from the qualitative content analysis confirm the previous
conclusions about the discourse of the second, transitional period (1995-

1998/1999). According to the earlier quantitative content analysis, the discourse o f
the second period contains both liberal and conservative categories.

The first period for the ideological dichotomy extends to 1996.
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In contrast to the first period, which placed the most attention on economic
components of discourse, communicators of the second period are more comfortable
with using political and ideological categories. The new interest in non-economic
explanations is understandable considering that government-affiliated intellectuals of
the second period include not only neo-liberal economists (who tend to view politics
through the prism of economic determinism), but also conservative legal scholars,
sociologists, philosophers, and political scientists (see Table 1). “In the last analysis,
dysfunctions of the modem polity emerge not as a consequence of technical, or
economic dead-ends and contradictions of development, in a narrow, abstract sense.
Originating in the sphere of spirit and culture, dysfunctions become denser ...
assuming their forms and partially following their logic and partially giving them
their own energy. Consequently, the correction of these dysfunctions is not only
technical or social, but also a spiritual and cultural task” (Salmin 1997,426).
Liberal authors of the second period continue to think in binary oppositions.
This appears to be a defense mechanism against encroaching conservative agenda.
“Today, there are two simple altemati ves: either democratic open society, based on
private property and equality of all before the law, where the state is only one of the
social institutions, or the state which has all the power and all the property, which
looms over the society as a demiurge. Such state is not a pure ideal, not an ‘end in
itself.’ It materializes in bureaucratic institutions, in bureaucratic oligarchy. In such a
state, there is a state corporatist type of property, which is controlled by the closed
social stratum of new nomenklatura. Society becomes a colony of the state. This is
where a real altemative lies. It is a choice between two options. First option
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presupposes that the state will again tower over the society, that the ‘heavy but
tender’ hands of the state will break the skeleton of civil society. The second one calls
for final and radical reform of the state, which will become one of the elements of
society. I am convinced that today the first path is a guarantee for a ‘special’ (‘our
own way’ if you will) road to the ‘Third World’ and to the national catastrophe. The
second path leads towards the developed countries, with their modem social and
economic stmctures” (Gaidar 1995a, 86-87). “On the one hand, there is a closed,
highly monopolized, national economy, which is protected from the world market by
customs and legal barriers (including state monopoly over foreign trade). On the other
hand, there is a modem, open market economy, which leads to the growth of
efficiency based on intemational competition” (Mau 1995, 54).
Politically, the authors of the second period no longer hurry to reject
authoritarian ideas. “Enlightened dictatorship,” “controlled opposition,” and “imitary
state” become a staple of discourse. “Today, I must admit, I do not categorically
reject this idea. Speaking abstractly, at certain times dictatorship would be, perhaps, a
blessing for Russia. Particularly, if one takes into account our national specifics, our
psychology and history, economic conditions in the country, legal nihilism” (Krasnov
August 9,1996). “There are too many parties ... this confusion is a consequence of
growth” (Shokhin November 10-16,1997). “Federalism in Russia occurs from the
top, while the regional public opinion is very passive and the regional elite is
occasionally resistant to the idea. Contemporary leadership of the country is indeed
sharing the power leverages purely voluntarily” (Smimiagin 1998, 58).
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During the second, transitional period, there is a noticeable shift away from
the liberal ideology and its respect for human life. Instead, tradition, law and order
and family values are extolled. “The spiritual revival of Russian people is only
possible through the return to its century-old traditions of spirituality, industiy,
patriotism, faith, family values ... life of society will become really stable only when
it will be built on the traditional morals and ethics. On the positive pole of this
continuum, we, undoubtedly, see family values, values of spirituality, virtue, faith,
Russian patriotism, discipline, law and order” (Nikonov 1994 in 1999,12,19-20).^'*
In the economic sphere, defense of the free market coexists with a belief in
desirability of stronger state structures, social support, support for domestic producers
(through selective support in form of state investment) and more pro-active and
independent foreign trade.
Outspoken liberals (Mau, Illarionov) continue to criticize state economic
regulation while defending pro-market positions. “Such significant size of state
expenditures obstructs economic growth” (Illarionov 1995, 23). “Gaidar’s resignation
and his replacement by V. Chernomyrdin led to the triumph of irresponsibility of
monetary authorities” (Illarionov 1995, 59). “There is a need to decrease the budget
deficit to the minimum. There is a need to practically liberalize the fuel and energy
sector and foreign trade. Another task is the radical reform of the social sphere based
on private insurance and savings and elimination of discrimination of the private
sector in social sphere, transformation of universal benefits towards selective [meanstested] support of the most needy” (Illarionov 1995,137-138). “And although we can

This quotation is taken from an essay which first appeared in 1994 and was reprinted in 1999 as part
o f a compilation (see Appendix E).
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curse the dominance of imports, it is the imports that keep the prices low” (Mau 1995,
82).
“Social democrats” (Shokhin, Krasnov, and Livshits), a weaker but
noticeable group, introduce the new, governed market ideas. “I think that the problem
of our market, of the present period in the development of market economy, is in the
weak presence of the state” (Shokhin September 11,1997). “For some unexplainable
reason, the first government of reformers was not ready to deal with the state
regulation, a regulation that is completely natural and appropriate for the market
economy. Why was it not initiated?” (Livshits 1994,119-120). “The state should be
responsible for proteetion of basic social rights of an individual, be an arbiter in
solving social conflicts” (Livshits 1994, 151). “In contrast to other countries, our state
should assume a dual responsibility: first, it should play a social function assigned to
it by the market, and second, play a role that is not envisioned by the market canon,
i.e., care for irmoeent and, in essenee, helpless victims of totalitarian regime. The
state should care for them imtil the end of their lives. The private sector is unable to
do this. The state sector can. We need relatively strong state sector....” (Livshits
1994,178). “The time of ‘wild capitalism,’ the time of state as a ‘night watchman’ is
gone” (Krasnov 27 January, 1995).
In the category offoreign relations, there is a growing support for
independent or even anti-Western foreign policy: “Russia should finally stop
underestimating the states located to the south of CIS borders. While maintaining the
capabilities to prevent potential threats to its security emanating from this unstable
region, Russia should not share the Western biases in regards to Islamic world and
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should be open to cooperation with Islamic countries. Hopes to establish non-polar
world, community of universal harmony and cooperation, to integrate Russia into the
community of civilized nations, united imder the label ‘West’, which were the basis
for the concept of ‘European house’, as well as initiatives to disband military and
political blocks, came out to be illusions. The West is increasingly suspicious towards
Russia; it is losing its interest in it, and is visibly disrespectful towards Russia’s
interests. Only by preventing the weakening of its defense potential, Russia can
maintain freedom of maneuver and independence in international politics, without
being concerned about pressure and blackmailing or desires to threaten its security
and vital interests” (Nikonov 1994 in 1999,26,28).^^

3. Discourse of the Third Period: Qualitative Presentation
Data from the quantitative content analysis presents contemporary official
discourse as promoting stronger and more centralized state structures, a statist
relationship between individuals and the state, independent or moderately antiWestern foreign policy, and revival of Russian national values. Yet, the free market
model continues to be popular among contemporary discourse commimicators.
Unlike the second period, the current discourse is not a simple reassessment of the
previous course. It operates with entirely new vocabulary. Qualitative content analytic
data from the third period’s discourse illustrate its most typical traits.
While during the second period the liberals were moving towards more

moderate positions, their conservative^® critics penned a programmatic opus titled
Inoe (which can be translated as Different, Other, Alternative, Alien, or Opposite). It
See previous footnote.
^ See footnote 70 in this chapter.
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appeared in 1995, but its authors (Kordonskii, Pavlovskii,^’ Shchedrovitskii,
Chernyshov, Panarin) became the intellectual elite of the Putin period. Its
problematique is also indicative of the third period’s agenda. United by the rejection
of Western liberalism, its authors promote the Russian idea in economic, foreign
policy, ideological, political, and national spheres. Interestingly, conservatives
employ argumentation and evidentiary bases that are dramatically different from the
liberal reasoning. If liberals use inductive and empirical analysis,^* conservatives rely
on deductive and philosophical reasoning. Inoe provides important insights into the
intellectual roots of contemporary discourse. The following discussion of Inoe is
intended as a brief historical expose of contemporary conservatism and should not be
confused with discussion of the discourse of the third period itself.
Inoe is predominantly an ideological argument. It propagandizes conservatism
as the third way, an alternative to both communism and liberalism. In fact, however,
Inoe is an alternative only to liberalism, since communism is no longer a popular
option. Liberalism, which Inoe’s authors charge with having a simplified world view
(i.e., ideal vs. material, body vs. soul, particular vs. universal, progress vs. regress,
etc.), rampant individualism, misguided rationality, and the faulty idea of progress, is
rejected in favor of the organic vision of society, dominance of state over society,
conservative values, and return to tradition.
A scathing critique of liberalism permeates Inoe: “All major actors of the
‘reform process’ were traveling abroad for ten years and still continue to travel using
Pavlovskii was affiliated with the government as early as 1996 when he became an adviser to the
Presidential Administration.
For instance, Uliukaev (1996) cites econom ic indexes for Chile as proof o f the free market’s superior
performance, w hile Illarionov (1995) and Gaidar (1997) operate with real budgetary numbers to show
the negative effects o f “excessive” taxation.
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not their own, but a sponsor’s, money. And the path of Russian reforms is naturally
transformed into a ‘shopping tour’” (Pavlovskii 1995, 378-379). “They [liberals]
simply changed their faith. Instead of fanatic adoration of one great doctrine, they
found (on a side, as usual) another doctrine (Chicago school of economics) and are
ready to revise the whole national history according to its recipes, even if the
‘irrational’ majority does not support them” (Panarin 1995,139) “One should admit
one thing: the contemporary ruling elite is not suitable for the role of ruling elite. Its
creative potential is not adequate.... The present elite’s econometric way of thinking
is based on social and cultural ignorance, i. e., inability to recognize hidden energy of
big goals (national and civilizational self-affirmation of people who being challenged
by history were able to mobilize for the appropriate response), in post-war economic
miracles of West Germany, Japan, and Europe” (Panarin 1995,137).
In place of “relativistic” and “positivist” liberalism, conservatives offer new
statist ideology and organic visions of society. “The people are not the mere
aggregation of now living people, but a commimity that keeps the national spirit and
legacy of the past generations” (Panarin 1995,141). Inoe contains a startling, almost
Hegelian, raison d ’etat. “Without the state the ideology cannot be elaborated and the
geographical space will become desolate.... The Russian state is an end in itself’
(Kordonskii 1995,211-212). “Only authority of the state in Russia is extremely
serious, progressive, and definite (including the notion of power/authority of the state
as national identification, as our collective identity).... Simultaneously, it is the most
advanced, the most globally competitive product that we have.... 1 call it the Russian
type of power.... The state is not abstract. It solves problems. It is extremely effective
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form of control of big territories where there is a lack of communications or they do
not function effectively.... Spiritually-intense, culturally-powerful, creative, and
superhuman Russian state does not require human freedoms” (Pavlovskii 1995, 387389).
Inoe’s contributors are dissatisfied with the homogenizing effects of Western
values on Russia. “Deprived of real national attributes, [the ruling regime] grasps at
words that are simply souvenirs from afar....” (Pavlovskii 1995, 368). “Russia sits in
the western sandbox, where puppy dogs and kids are playing with the deflated ball of
modernization” (Pavlovskii 1995,256). “Russia by its very definition is the other, the
third, something in between. As a result, when we use these ... imported terms, all the
questions about Russia that can be asked using these terms are useless” (Chernyshov
1995,260). “Perhaps, one conclusion (which was reached by modernization theory a
long time ago) can be made: any attempt to mechanically transport Western values
and examples leads to very negative consequences” (Panarin 1995,145). “National
self-identification carmot be borrowed. It does not come from the outside. It does not
follow from some objective criteria. It is a range of decisions, part of which is
irrevocable. The problem of the new state is a problem of the idea for the new state.
There is no such an idea in Russia” (Pavlovskii 1995, 372).
Equipped with a national idea, however, Russia has a chance of revival. “We
need to initiate the movement for the idea of history, the idea of Russia” (Chernyshov
1995a, 374). One proposal is the idea of the state, because “the state in Russia is
preferable to current reality” (Pavlovskii 1995, 353). Another is the idea of "Russia
as the Third Rome.” “The inspiring idea of Eurasianism consists of the idea that the
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fate of post-industrial epoch depends largely on the fate of Russia. If Russia restores
its status as the 'Third Rome', then the chances of post-industrial society to become an
alternative to the global industrial ghetto (which is antithetical to nature and culture)
will increase.... The Russian mission is to promote such poly-centrism by creating a
balance to the mono-centric model forced by the US” (Panarin 1995,148).
/noe’s neo-conservative agenda also includes a national model of economic
development. It is another blow to the liberals’ core beliefs. “But the market and
money even in their crudest representations happened to be compatible neither with
social structure, nor with customary relations between the center and regions, nor
with industrial structure, i.e., they were not compatible with the state” (Kordonskii
1995,169). “The major question is how to successfully modernize Russia using
national model” (Kara-Murza 1995a, 167).
Inoe provides the first glimpses into conservative rhetoric of the third period.
By 2000, Inoe's conservative phraseology, however, is no longer marginal. It enters
the mainstream discourse. During the third period the new conservatives and
reformed (and by now also quite conservative) liberals converge around the ideas of a
strong authoritarian state, an independent or anti-Western foreign policy, and a
Russian revival. These ideas, nonetheless, coexist with surviving and even
strengthening free market (liberal) economic beliefs.
The discourse of the third period is clearly a discourse of the new era. Gleb
Pavlovskii, the most important ideologue of the Putin’s era, is quick to point this out:
“We are at the breaking point. The old epoch ended and the new one began”
(Pavlovskii 01.14.2000). “These are fragments of the old political system. We need to
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move into the new political state” (Pavlovskii 16 June.2000). “For Putin’s majority,
Putin is a leader of the opposition to the old regime” (Pavlovskii 4 July 2000). “Putin
is totally revising the previous type of foreign policy (which was developed in the
1990s)” (Pavlovskii 22 March 2001). “On the eve of the new epoch, society has a
different mood” (Pavlovskii 26 March.2001). “It was necessary to avoid the situation
in which the major actors of the previous epoch were still functioning. These actors
were stopped. Some of them have disintegrated” (Pavlovskii 13 April 2001). “Current
moment in the life of a state and society is transformational and implicitly critical”
(Pavlovskii 19 November 2001).
Politically, there is a convergence of liberals and conservatives as both justify
authoritarianism. Conservatives bluntly call for imdemocratic measures. “If it is
ineffective for solving the problems of the state, then there is no need for the free
press” (Pavlovskii, 2 February 2000). “Acceptance of imperial nature of Russia - not
the Russian Federation (as one of its possible institutional forms), but Russia as a
political body, is inevitable.... Imperial power structure works more effectively than
shoddily constructed substitutions that we have today, precisely because it does not
end at the level of rulers, but goes above them [to values].... Recently, even some
liberals started to admit that within the imperial legacy there are components
conducive to the liberal value system. For example, Uliukaev, one of the premier
liberals, writes in his programmatie artiele, ‘Pravyi povorot’ [‘Right Turn’]; ‘The
preeise differenee between an empire and eolonial or despotic state is that the former
gives representatives of all people equal opportxmities for participating in public and
political life of their eountry’. We need not only to project federation on empire
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(which, at the end, always remains a speculative action), but to construct federation as
an empire” (Kaspe 2000, 61, 63, 65, 68).
Contemporary liberals endorse authoritarianism because of its ability to
preserve liberal economic values. The authoritarian state that does not threaten private
property and the market should not be categorically opposed. “The weakness of the
state cannot be overcome based on democratic procedures, because democratic power
institutions are unable to form and maintain stable popular support” (Mau, 1999,
179). “Of course, political authoritarianism is not the most favorable factor for the
renaissance of liberal values. However, political authoritarianism and the market can
easily coexist (and did historically) and even complement each other” (Mau 1999,
185-186). Only “the state [which] has a powerful reason to increase its interference
into ... economic life of a country, which violates fundamental freedom of business”
(Mau 1999,186), would alarm liberals.
The third period’s ideology vigorously rejects liberalism. “Cliches of ‘open
society’ and ‘human rights’ are vulgar” (Dugin 1999a, 660). “Contemporary
liberalism ... was transformed ... into intolerably authoritarian dogmatism” (Panarin
1999,21). “They consider themselves representatives of Progress in the foreign and
alien environment. Therefore they are not ashamed to profess periodically that the
major enemy is in one’s own country, and they are not ashamed to label the majority
of the people who oppose them as either an anti-socialist, petty-bourgeois crowd or a
red-brown anti-democratic mass” (Panarin 1999,47). “Today they are ‘Europeans
and liberals’, and tomorrow they will sell the whole Europe for five cents. All they
need is to ensure safe travel to the inauguration of the US presidents. This ideology
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includes the crumbs of the Western liberal project, which is castrated and devoid of
real European roots, i.e., Christianity” (Pavlovskii 8 May 2001).
An alternative to “rootless” liberalism is seen in traditions and spirituality.
“Perhaps, the imperative of preservation of cultural legacy is no less important today
than the imperative of environmental protection” (Panarin 1999, 80). “An important
spiritual dimension is vanishing. This leads to the monstrous degradation of spiritual
and moral life. The sin does not even mask now, it loudly announces its rights. It is
clear that this threatens to erode the very foundation of the civilized existence,
threatens to push us into social Darwinism. Therefore, society will have to restore the
status of spiritual power as a mobilizing power which creates norms and corrects the
action of other social forces” (Panarin 1999, 56).
Another alternative is the strengthening of the state - the only capable actor.
This option is the most consistently articulated by Pavlovskii: “In R ussia,... society
is more corrupt than the state” (Pavlovskii 12 July 2000). “The place where society is
supposed to be is empty. This allows the actors who have nothing to do with the
society, i.e., our parties and TV chaimels, to represent society” (Pavlovskii 13 April
2001). “Society in Russia exists only within the state and as a function of the state”
(Pavlovskii 28 June 2000). In other words, “strong Russia must have strong state”
(Pavlovskii 21 December 2000). “He [Putin] faces a real task - a need to transform
the state apparatus into his own, obedient tool. Putin needs to know when to say
‘Heel’” (Pavlovskii 20 July 2000). “1 always thought that the simple existence of the
state is the giant benefit for a society. You can do whatever, but, please, preserve the
state” (Pavlovskii 2 February 2000).
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Liberalism, however, was not totally defeated. Liberals continue to defend
economic liberalism as the foundation of the post-industrial epoch. “Preservation of
liberal principles of the market economy is preferable for the future development of
the country from the economic and political standpoints” (Mau, 1999,185). Although
conservatives emphasize the statist and/or national model of economic development
and social protection, their voice is mostly peripheral and has little effect on the
overall balance of economic discourse. “Today the apologia for ‘market selection’
assumes sinister proportions of social Darwinism. Today it means decisive revision of
tradition of Christian compassion and new pagan cult of force. Not surprisingly, the
current onslaught of liberalism and libertarian ideology is accompanied by a retreat of
social civilization, by minimizing social programs and mechanisms of social
protection of population defeated by aggressive and greedy economic environment. It
creates an atmosphere of a cult of limitless force, a philosophy of success at any cost”
(Panarin 1999,19).
In the foreign policy sphere there is a heightened anti-American sentiment.
The US is described as an unambiguous enemy. Even Europe is seen as an alternative
to US hegemony in the international relations: “In no other place of the planet has the
conflict between the culture and civilization reached such a degree as in the
contemporary US. American global expansion in some respect represents a squeezing
of culture by technical civilization, where the technical advances aggressively
compensate for its innate cultural defects” (Panarin 1999,10). “Today practically the
whole non-Westem world, which historically experienced Western pressure, feels
itself a victim of forced history. Pressures from the West push the rest of the world
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into West’s Promethean adventure, while the West rejeets out of hand any attempt to
re-examine historical processes from other points of view” (Panarin 1999,48). “And
only now, in the context of the most painful defeat by the West, Russia gets rid of its
Western ideals. It starts to understand the West not based on its liberal propaganda,
but in its naked imperialist form. This imperialist force steadily realizes the old
program of a Faustian individual who desired to make the whole world the object of
his will” (Panarin 1999, 84).
The anti-American rhetoric of the third period finds its logical conclusion in
the words of Eurasionist philosopher Dugin, one of the important ideologues of
Putin’s period:®^ “[the US] is an alarming and sinister country on the other side of the
ocean, without history, customs, roots. It represents an artificial, aggressive, obtrusive
reality, deprived of spirit and focused only on the material world and technical
efficiency. It is cold, insensitive, shining with neon of advertisements and senseless
luxury, which contrasts sharply with pathological poverty, genetic degradation, and
conflicts of all sorts between people, material things, nature, and culture.... Today it
claims its planetary dominance. It claims the triumph of its way of life, its
civilizational model over all other people of the Earth. It triumphs over us. It sees
‘progress’ and ‘norms of civilization’ only in itself and denies all others the right to
their own path, culture, and value system” (Dugin 1999a, 657-658).
As a leader of the non-Westem World, Russia can play a leading role in the
new world order if it recognizes its uniqueness and plays its cards right. “The nonWestem world today is more complex than the West, not only due to its ancient
spiritual tradition and deeper memory, but also because its intemal stmcture is
See footnote 72 in this chapter.
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dualistic: it includes both its own and foreign elements, which are reworked to suit
local context” (Panarin 1999, 67-68). “The East is the mysterious birthplace of great
civilizations, religions, mystical intuitions, and revelations” (Panarin 1999, 72). “It is
not accidental that the old Russian allies in the Arab world, on the Indian
subcontinent, and in the Pacific rim region still count more on Russia’s return as a
superpower than on the possibilities of already existing or fast-growing economic
giants (like Japan or China)” (Panarin 1999,13). According to Karaganov (2000,
101), “A certain mutual distancing between US and Russia will be necessary for a
certain period.... As usual, development and deepening of cooperation and friendship
with China are both quite desirable and mutually advantageous.”
Contemporary discourse is increasingly nationalistic. “Mystical Russia is
imdoubtedly a profound reality of national psychology. It is the intemal continent. It
synthesizes in itself the ideology of a giant nation.... Russian people are the godly
imperial people” (Dugin 1999a, 576, 577). “The mystery of Russian people lies in the
fact that it is spiritually and culturally cemented. These people form (like the ancient
Jewish people before) a theocratic phenomenon in history” (Panarin 1999, 98).*°°

Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals on the Relationship Between Public
Opinion and Policies
Although this chapter is predominantly concerned with presenting the
evolution of the post-Communist elite’s value orientations, it also touches upon
another important research question: What is the relationship between elite discourse

It is noteworthy that the authors o f Inoe and contemporary conservatives resist the use o f the world
“Rossiiane” (Russians in the civic sense), and use “Russkiie” (Russians in the ethnic sense) instead.
Pavlovskii claims that “Rossiiane” is a mere substitution o f the Soviet people.
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and public opinion? Content analysis of government-affiliated intelleetuals’ publie
statements outlines the first contours of this relationship.
The first shift in elite discourse chronologically occurs after the 1993 Duma
elections which are commonly viewed as a serious blow to the contemporaneous
political elite and its course. The changes in the intellectual elite’s discourse that
follow the results of the Duma elections (a possible measurement of public
dissatisfaction with elite’s agenda) suggest that public opinion played a significant
role in the evolution of government-affiliated intellectuals’ discourse. If this is
correct, changing public opinion affected intellectual discourse in two ways. First,
public dissatisfaction could have contributed to the ruling elite’s increasing reliance
on conservative intellectuals (see Table 1) who, in turn, introduced new conservative
elements to the discomse. Second, it may have caused a conservative shift in the
discourse of remaining liberal intellectuals. In either case, the sequence of events is
noteworthy. Changes in public opinion preceded changes in intellectual discourse. I
will return to this question in the next chapter.
There is at least some evidence that government-affiliated intellectuals were
sensitive to public opinion and media coverage of their actions. According to Krasnov
(legal adviser to Yeltsin and author of numerous Yeltsin decrees), he paid attention to
“ the reaction of the press and the public” (Krasnov November 29, 1995). “The
majority of the population, despite the apparent polarization, is nonetheless visibly
more in favor of a moderate and balanced [economic] course” (lasin et al. 1993b, 52).
Interestingly, public opinion receives the most coverage in the intellectual
discourse of the third period. Contemporary communicators constantly cite the public
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as their reference group. “This problem is reflected in the public opinion surveys,
when the stable majority of population prefers Brezhnev’s period as the most stable
and prosperous” (Mau 1999,117). Similar evidence can be found in Salmin’s
recommendations to Putin after his election. Obviously, while developing a new
strategy for Russia, Salmin is aware of the opinion climate: “At the moment of
presidential change in Russia, its society reached an almost universal consensus about
the idea of desirability of law and order and strengthening, empowering the state and
making it healthier” (Salmin 2000,40). Similarly, Bunin (2000, 64) in his assessment
of Putin’s federal reform cites public opinion as a justification for laimching such an
innovation; “Recently, federal reform has become not just another project, but a
reality. Public opinion surveys show that the population supports strengthening of
‘presidential vertical axis’. The public supports it not carelessly but rather
pragmatically.” He also points out the weak appeal of liberal ideology for the mass
public: “Liberal ideas are extremely unpopular in Russian society” (Bunin 1999,
213). Pavlovskii, the main ideologue of Putin’s regime, constantly cites Putin’s
approval rating as the basis for Putin’s policies. His claims that the majority is behind
Putin are a clear reference to public opinion and its significance for the elite. “Our
foreign policy aims to achieve social consensus. Society must understand what type
of foreign policy we conduct. In this case, we will get public support. This is an
important moment. Before, foreign policy was often dictated by a particular group or
by ideological interests. This approach ended” (Pavlovskii 26 November 2001).
“Restoration of the state after ten years of disorder is the central expectation of the
majority” (Pavlovskii 28 June 2000). “Today President Putin is a leader of the mass
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movement for the restoration of the state” (Pavlovskii 2 June 2000). “There is a new,
mystical connection between Putin and the masses” (Pavlovskii 21 December 1999).

Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals on the Relationship Between
Intellectual and Political Elites
Finally, what is the nature of the relationship between government-affiliated
intellectuals and the political elite? Do the government-affiliated intellectuals simply
follow the orders of the political elite by explaining and justifying their actions? Or
do govemment-affiliated intellectuals act independently? The answer is both.
Usually, the intellectual elite simply rationalizes policies ex post facto. But it also
generates ideas for policy-makers. “I am an expert. My influence is purely that of an
expert” (Pavlovskii 11.24.2001). Another admission of intellectual leadership comes
from Karaganov: “Members of CIDP [Council for Intemal and Defense Policy expert group consisting of govemment-affiliated intellectuals] immodestly (but not
without pleasure) recalled that certain reports, forecasts and recommendations of
CIDP were translated directly into policies, almost to the la st‘t’” (Strategiia dla
Rossii... 2000, 7). Putin’s efforts to reform federal stmctures illustrate a specific case
of intellectual leadership. Putin started to employ the phrase "vertical axis of power"
in May 2000, well after its first use by Krasnov, Satarov and Shakhrai (2000,207,
213)*°^ who called for “the ‘vertical axis of power’ to be better spelled out in the
Constitution” as early as 1998.

According to the foreword to the chapter on the Constitutional reform (see Appendix E, Strategiia
dlia Rossii: povestka dnia dlia prezidenta-2000 [Strategy fo r Russia: Agenda fo r President-2000]
(M oscow: Vagrius, 2000, 57-104)), CIDP working groups discussed the Constitutional reform and
published its recommendations (including the strengthening o f ‘vertical axis o f power’) as early as
1998. Putin was appointed Prime Minister in August 1999. Obviously, the idea was first created by the
intellectuals and then borrowed by Putin.
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Conclusions
A priori, I hypothesized that official discourse changed abruptly from liberal
categories to organic-statist (conservative) ones in 1998/1999, i.e., after the economic
default and Putin’s appointment as Russian Prime Minister. I expected to find
changes along all five dichotomies. However, the data from content analysis of
Russian govemment-affiliated intellectuals’ public statements supports a slightly
different account.
The liberal discourse that dominated in 1991-1993/1994 (until the disbanding
of Parliament, adoption of new Russian Constitution, begirming of the first Chechen
war), gradually evolved towards organic-statist (conservative) categories, except in
the area of the economy. Simultaneously, organic-statist (conservative) discourse,
weak and peripheral in the begirming of the post-Communist period, started to grow
in importance. Coexistence of liberal and conservative discourses led to both the
gradual replacement of liberal discourse by its organic-statist counterpart and to the
evolution of liberal discourse in a conservative direction. Around 1998/1999, organicstatist (conservative) discourse and by then a more conservative liberal discourse
merged together.
Yet, the victory of organic-statist (conservative) discourse did not mean the
total eradication of liberal components. Some elements of liberalism, especially
support for the liberal economic model, a core category for liberals, continued to
exist. As a result, the contemporary discourse amalgamates the ultra-liberal economic
lexicon with a typically conservative political phraseology. This inconsistency is
attributable to the mixed composition of the contemporary Russian intellectual elite,
which, in turn, is a result of the longevity and adaptability of the original liberals.
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Putin’s government still draws on the remnants of liberal intellectuals, who by now
largely limit themselves to the defense of economic liberalism. However, liberals also
try to reconcile the cognitive dissonance embodied in a self-contradictory hybrid,
where the logic of the market with its belief in rationality, independence, and
responsibility of the individual clashes with a state-centric, authoritarian,
paternalistic, and nationalistic organic-statist model (see, for instance, Mau above).
They appear to argue that a free market and an authoritarian, statist, isolationist, and
nationalistic environment are not inherently incompatible but rather mutually
reinforcing. Whether liberals themselves believe that their position is consistent or
not, its contradictory nature is conspicuous to an outside observer.
Obviously, liberal discourse was much more seriously modified than its
conservative counterpart. After 1998/1999, the only difference between the current
liberal discourse and its conservative alternative is the greater emphasis that liberals
place on the role of the market in economy. The difference between liberal and
conservative assessments of political, ideological, and foreign policy directions is
rather nominal. It is a difference of degree, not kind. Neither liberals nor
conservatives exclude authoritarianism as a positive factor of Russian political
development. The difference is only in the duration of authoritarian stage. If liberals
view authoritarianism as a temporary and instrumental measure, able to eventually
bring democracy, conservatives consider authoritarianism an end in itself.
Ideologically, liberals favor strengthening the state and limiting personal freedoms
only as expedient measures. For conservatives, the state’s interests are sacred.
According to them, the state is a demiurge, or at the very least, a guardian, without
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whom society cannot exist. The strengthening of the state thus becomes a vital task.
In foreign policy, liberals’ desire to strengthen Russian positions vis-a-vis the West is
inspired by the hope that, as a superpower and strong partner, Russia will be in a
better position to strike an alliance with the West. Conservatives are skeptical about
the very idea of the partnership with the West. Although contemporary liberals admit
Russian uniqueness, they do not consider such an exceptionalism worthy of support
and promotion. Conservatives, on the contrary, insist on the development of unique
national idea. Thus, liberals differ from their conservative counterparts only in their
assessment of final (and quite remote) goals. The means to achieve these goals are
almost identical.
The European right-left division helps one understand the evolution of
Russian govemment-affiliated intellectuals’ discourse. Liberal discourse in the early
1990s contained leftist political, ideological, foreign policy, and ethnic elements (i.e.,
was democratic, rational, pro-Westem and tolerant). Beliefs in the free market and a
minimal economic role for the state were its only rightist components. Original
organic-statist discourse corresponded to leftist positions on the economy (governed
market model, more active role of the state in economic development) and to rightist
positions in politics, ideology, foreign policy, and ethnic relations (i.e., it supported
authoritarianism, statism, isolationism and nationalism). Obviously, the rightist
positions represented the core values for both liberals and conservatives. Neither
liberals nor conservatives were prepared to compromise on the rightist elements of
their respective discourses. Not accidentally, contemporary discourse is a synthesis of
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rightist elements of the two diseourses (see Table 4).*®^ Original leftist elements of
both liberal and conservative discourses were dropped. This transformation is,
perhaps, a response to demands of more conservative publie opinion - a question that
will be explored in the next chapter.
Changes in discourse appear to reflect the rotation within the group of
govemment-affiliated intellectuals. Table 1 illustrates this point. During the first
period, only liberal intelleetuals were affiliated with the ruling political elite. While
liberals retained their positions during the second, transitional period, the intellectual
elite was increasingly recmited from a conservative pool. Currently, conservatives
are dominant among govemment-affiliated intellectuals. Liberals appear to be
squeezed out. This in itself is indicative of trends among the Russian elite, which is
becoming increasingly conservative.
There is an interesting intra-group conflict characteristic of the contemporary
Russian intellectual elite. The new cohort of conservative intelleetuals who were
recmited to serve the political elite in the mid- to late 1990s represents a clear break
with the first wave of liberal govemment-affiliated intellectuals. The former were
highly successful under the communist system and enjoyed mainstream social
positions and all the trappings that the late Soviet regime had to offer. Almost all
came from Moscow, St. Petersburg, or Yekaterinburg (the largest and most developed
cities in Russia), were educated at Russia’s premier universities, hold advanced
graduate degrees, and had high-ranking research or teaching positions at prestigious

Gleb Pavlovskii, one o f the most important contemporary govemment-afFiliated intellectuals,
agrees: “The new regime is rightist, national-liberal.... Putin must formulate his ideology; obviously, it
is a rightist, national-liberal ideology” (see Appendix E, Gleb Pavlovskii, “T ezis ob ukreplenii vertikali
vlasti dolzhen byt’ skorrektirovan” [“Thesis Concerning Strengthening o f the State Vertical Must Be
Corrected”], http://www.strana.ru, 13 Novem ber 2001).
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universities or think-tanks. They were ideological moderates, neither fully
condemning the communist system, nor virulently supporting it. Working as editorsin-chief of major communist journals (e.g., Gaidar), teaching Marxism-Leninism at
the universities (e.g., Burbulis), or having successful research careers (e.g., Chubais)
prior to the collapse of Communism, intellectuals of the first period were
recognizable, available, and easily recruitable. As ideologues of the new regime, they
continue to enjoy comfortable lifestyles.
The second group, i.e., conservative intellectuals, who is currently dominant
among the Russian intellectual elite, spent the late Soviet years in obscurity, if not in
opposition to the communist regime. Unlike liberals, conservatives came from
Russia’s peripheries (Odessa, Tomsk, Donetsk, Kharkov), went to the second tier
universities, often dropped out, did not hold advanced graduate degrees. They were
more bohemian; many joined the ranks of dissidents (e.g., Pavlovskii). Their
professional careers were stymied. In short, this group was less co-opted by the
Soviet regime, and more marginalized. Conservative intellectuals, who remained in
the margins after the collapse of communism, witnessed how their more opportunistic
colleagues cruised to even higher and more comfortable positions in new Russia.
They suspected that the post-Commimist discourse of liberals was motivated by
pursuit of material benefits and personal advancement. Not surprisingly, /woe’s
critique o f liberalism is highly personal. Its authors charge liberals with a lack of
commitment, pandering to new, fashionable slogans, and betrayal. Changes in
discourse, therefore, are at least partially the result of a frontal attack by the second
wave of conservative intellectuals on the first, more successful one. In this attack.
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liberal elements of discourse did not stand a chance. This attack started even before
Putin’s rise to power.
But the changes in discourse are also a function of the conservative evolution
of the original liberal intellectuals. Although some liberals survived the transition,
their current value orientations bear strong resemblance to conservative positions. For
example, Mau defends political authoritarianism as a protective environment for
nascent market; Chubais advocates the revival of the liberal empire (to incorporate
former republic of the USSR) and promotes a stronger army. One of the
contemporary liberals’ tactics is to limit their discourse agenda to the defense of
economic liberalism, while circumventing other dichotomies altogether. Illarionov is
especially noteworthy for this strategy.
This finding, of course, begs the question of why liberals chose these tactics.
Two explanations are equally plausible. Liberals used these strategies as survival
tactics or, alternatively, their original pro-democratic, ideologically liberal, proWestem, and ethnically tolerant orientations were a disposable veneer. Answering
this question requires certain contextualization of post-Communist history. The postCommunist regime, whose political and intellectual elites were recruited from more
progressive elements of the late Soviet system, was constantly on the verge of
collapse. Reforms that were initiated after the collapse of the Soviet Union (especially
economic decentralization) were contradictory and often self-defeating. They most
certainly did not enjoy public support (as the next chapter will demonstrate).
But even without expert knowledge of public opinion trends, one cannot fail
to notice that the Russian population actively resisted the reforms (especially market
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transformation). As early as 1993 (i.e., the beginning of the transitional period) there
was already popular dissatisfaction and protest. The liberal economic reforms
initiated in the early 1990s brought disastrous results for the general population.
Studies by the World Bank and numerous Western scholars paint a devastating
picture of de-industrialization, widespread poverty, the precipitous fall of GDP,
collapse of many social services, and privatization irregularities.*®^
The 1993 and 1995 Duma elections brought the Communist and nationalist
opposition in control of the parliament and forced serious concessions on the part of
the governing elite (most notably, sacking of liberal Prime Minister Gaidar and
replacing him by centrist Chernomyrdin). In 1996, the original post-Communist elite
barely escaped a certain defeat during the first free presidential elections, when the
Communist candidate, Gennadii Ziuganov, led in the polls up until a month prior to
the elections. Only a strong PR campaign and a compromise with the third finisher,
Aleksandr Lebed', allowed Yeltsin to score a narrow victory.
In 1998, Russia experienced its worst economic crisis in the first decade after
the fall of communism. Unable to repay its international and domestie debt
obligations, Russia defaulted on payments, triggering massive investment and capital
flight. The ruble plummeted and the popular discontent soared. These changes

Pekka Sutela, “Insider Privatization in Russia: Speculation on Systemic Changes,” Europe-Asia
Studies 46, no. 3 (1994); 420-421; Michael McFaul, “State Power, Institutional Change, and the
Politics o f Privatization in Russia,” World Politics 47 (1995): 210-243; World Bank, World
Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Joseph
R. Blasi, Maya Kroumova, and Douglas Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Stephen Cohen, Failed Crusade: America and the
Tragedy o f Post-Communist Russia (New York: Norton, 2001); and Peter Reddaway and Dmitri
Glinski-Vassiliev, The Tragedy o f Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy
(Washington: US Institute o f Peace Press, 2001).

95

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

precipitated the replacement of the reformist Prime Minister, Sergei Kirienko, by
Yevgenii Primakov, a representative of Brezhnev’s elite. Uncertain about the
continuity of the course he initiated, Yeltsin resigned on the New Year’s eve of 2000,
naming Vladimir Putin (a vestige of the late Soviet period) his heir apparent and
boosting the latter’s chances in the 2000 emergency presidential elections.
Thus the conservative evolution of the liberal discourse can be seen as a
conscious strategy that allowed the elite to deflect popular discontent and to minimize
risks to itself and its reforms, especially economic ones. The change in discourse
appears to be a survival tactic on the part of both intellectuals and politicians who
recruit them. But the fact that the liberals’ commitment extended only to liberal
economic ideas, while democratic, ideologically liberal, pro-Westem, and ethnically
tolerant beliefs were easily sacrificed to pacify the dissatisfied population is also
rather suggestive.
It is logical to assume that authoritarian, statist, anti-Westem, and nationalist
elements present in Russian official discourse since 1993/1994 (i.e., during the
transitional period) are borrowed exclusively from the discourse of the Communist
opposition. However, my examination of the evolution of govemment-affiliated
intellectuals’ discourse offers an equally plausible supposition. These elements could
have been appropriated from the conservative lexicon. After all, liberal intellectuals,
who articulated original post-Communist discourse, directed their critique against the
communists, but rarely against the conservatives. Unlike communists, conservatives
were never deliberately excluded from the official discourse articulation. During the
transitional period organic-statist (conservative) ideology could have entered official
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discourse via the programmatic document of the conservatives - anthology Inoe,
published in 1995.

The evolution of official discourse and the elite’s value orientations was
gradual rather than abrupt and total. The period of transition from liberal to organicstatist discourse (1994/1995-1998/1999) was quite lengthy and presents special
analytical value in itself. My analysis did not confirm the original hypothesis
concerning the total replacement of liberal categories by the organic-statist ones.
Liberals succeeded in protecting economic liberalism (free market), the core category
of their discourse, while conservatives were able to defend ideological, political,
foreign policy, and ethnic relations categories (that lie at the core of their discourse)
by sacrificing the governed market model, peripheral for them.
In the next chapter, I will juxtapose the evolution of official discourse and the
elite’s value orientations with the dynamics of public opinion and the evolution of
actual policies. Such a comparison answers several questions: What role do
intellectuals play in post-Communist societies? Do they serve only as elite ideologues
or do they perform a function of intermediate agents between society and its elite?
Does public opinion have a real impact on the actions of the elite and if so, what is
the nature of this linkage (how, under what circumstances, on what issues, to what
extent and by what process does public opinion reach the elite)? Does official
discourse have any implications for policy-making?
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CHAPTER III
THE RUSSIAN CASE: ELITE-PUBLIC CONSENSUS ON ORGANIC-STATIST
VALUES

Outline of Chapter’s Research Agenda
In the previous chapter, I determined that the discourse of Russian governmentaffiliated intellectuals changed from democratic, liberal, ffee-market, pro-Westem, and
ethnically tolerant to authoritarian, conservative, free market, moderately anti-Westem,
and nationalistic. In this chapter, I present a dynamic picture of public attitudes in postCommunist Russia and compare trends in public opinion to trends in official discourse.
Such juxtaposition illuminates the congmenee and ineongmence between the public and
govemment-affiliated intellectuals’ attitudes. I also investigate whether changes in public
attitudes precede, coincide with, or follow corresponding changes in the elite’s discourse.
Another important question addressed in this chapter is the political consequences of the
changes in official discourse. How does official discourse compare to the actual policies?
To answer these questions, I present and analyze data from an extensive review and
statistical analysis of publie opinion surveys as well as event analysis of actions of the
political elite.
I will show that Russian public opinion drifted in the authoritarian, conservative,
economically etatist (i.e., pro-govemed market), anti-Westem, and nationalistic
directions, but retained some original liberal elements, including pro-democratic and proWestem beliefs. I will also demonstrate that public and elite attitudes frequently move in
the same direction, but that there is no absolute congmenee between the two. Where the
elite’s own clan interests, either economic or political, are in conflict with dominant
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public beliefs, the elite relies on its own set of values and ignores public demands.
Importantly, my analysis reveals that the consensus between the elite and the public
emerges only around organic-statist beliefs. In political and foreign policy issue domains,
the public’s liberal attitudes fail to reach the elite, while in the economic sphere, the
elite’s liberalism is not shared by the general population which continues to believe in the
govemed market model.

Procedures for Comparing Public Opinion to Elite Value Orientations and Actions
In Chapter I, I discussed a variety of methods used to analyze relationship
between public opinion and the elite’s value orientations and actions. In my dissertation, I
choose to compare trends in public opinion and the elite’s discourse and actions over time
to see if both move in the same direction. However, unlike historical research of
statements by the members of the elite or interviews with the elite, my methods have
certain limitations. They do not help to answer the more complex question of how public
opinion reaches the elite. I offer anecdotal observations from VTsIOM (Russian Center
for the Study of Public Opinion), with which I was affiliated during my field research.
Even during my short stay in VTsIOM, I witnessed several requests for public opinion
information coming from the presidential administration and think tanks associated with
the executive branch.
For the second phase of my Russian research, I used results of surveys conducted
by VTsIOM from 1992 to 2002. Specifically, 1 used data from the following surveys:
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Table 5
Characteristics of Russian Public Opinion Surveys
Type of Survey
(Year
Conducted)
/Characteristics
of Particular
Survey
Representative
sample
Sample size

Nmnber of
survey points

Omnibus
(1992)

Fact (1992,
1993)

Monitorine
(1993-2001)

Express 119952001)

yes

yes

yes

yes

2,000
respondents

1,600
respondents

1,600
respondents

88 points,
including 64
points in cities
and 24 points
in rural areas in
29 Russian
provinces

N/A

4,000
respondents
(1993), 3,000
(1994) and
2,400(19952001)
102 points,
including 83 in
cities and 29 in
rural areas in
39 Russian
provinces

58 points,
including 42
points in cities
and 16 points
in rural areas,
in 26 Russian
provinces
(1995-1998)
83 points,
including 68
points in cities
and 25 points
in rural areas in
33 Russian
provinces

Although I rely on the secondary data collected by VTsIOM, one of the most
respected and well-established Russian national polling organizations, many of the
survey results have never before been published outside Russia. The sheer volume and
diversity o f the data I present and analyze in this chapter are new to non-Russian
audiences. The introduction of new comprehensive data on Russian public opinion is
valuable in and of itself. More importantly, consistency and breadth of observations
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carried out by VTsIOM as well as the quality of its longitudinal public opinion data make
research of the trends in Russian post-Communist public attitudes not only physically
possible, but methodologically more reliable.
My review o f public opinion data began with identifying the questions that were
both asked repeatedly during the research period and were the closest in meaning to the
textual indicators of the content analysis. Although there is no exact fit between the two
types of data, they are sufficiently similar to allow valid comparisons. The percentage of
people who favored a particular answer option for a given survey question was equivalent
to the value assigned to a textual indicator.
During the second stage of statistical review, I produced graphs of the evolution
of public attitudes along five issue domains (political, ideological, economic, foreign
policy and ethnic relations).

The results are presented in Section “Chronological

Evolution of Russian Public Attitudes According to Individual Issue Domains.”
Next, 1 probed relationships between various public attitudes and social and
demographic parameters and performed statistical and correlation analyses to flesh out
possible relationships between attitudes themselves. Results of the statistical and
correlation analyses are presented in Section “Social and Demographic Determinants of

For instance, in the question “What is the best economic system?” answer “the one based on the
leading role o f the state” was treated as an equivalent o f a positive evaluation o f the textual indicator
“state as the main agent o f development” (governed market category o f the organic-statist discourse),
while response “the one based on the leading role o f the market” was analogous to a positive
evaluation o f the textual indicator “market as the main agent o f economic development” (free market
category o f the liberal discourse).
To simplify figures and improve their readability, I deliberately omitted “I do not know,” “other,”
and similar answer options. This explains why on certain figures, the sum o f values does not add to
100 percent. When applicable, I also combined responses measuring intensity o f a particular attitude
into one category. For instance, on some figures, response option “I am satisfied” consists o f responses
“I am very satisfied,” “I am satisfied,” and “I am rather satisfied,” while response option “I am
dissatisfied” may contain answers “I am rather dissatisfied,” “I am dissatisfied,” and “I am very
dissatisfied.” The same applies to answer option measuring trust or distrust.
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Russian Public Attitudes” and Section “Relationships Between Various Elements of
Russian Public Opinion.”

Chronological Evolution of Russian Public Attitudes According to Individual Issue
Domains
1. Political Issue Domain
The questions selected for this issue domain included:
“Would Russia be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985?’
“Is Russia moving in the right direction?”
“What is your assessment of Russia’s political situation?”
“What is the best political system?”
“What type of a state would you like Russia to be?”
“What political party do you prefer?”
vl06
“Do you support a presidential republic?” (2)‘
“Do you support disbanding the Parliament?”
“Do you support having a political opposition?”
“How many political parties should Russia have?”
“What is your perception of the role of the mass media?”
“Should the mass media reflect an independent opinion?”
“Should Russia be a monarchy?”
“Should the army govern the country?”
“Should we trust the president?”
“Should we trust the Parliament?”
“Should we trust the mass media?”
“Should we trust provincial governments?”

'I disagree that Russia
would be better off if
everything remained as it
was before 1985
-1 agree, Russia would be
better off if everything
remained as it was before
1985

ori bfi

.V .V ..V

Figure 7. Would Russia be Better off if Everything Remained as It Was Before 1985?

1 use two types o f questions gauging popular support for presidentialism. First question includes “I
do not know” answer option (Figure 11), while the second one is more categorical and offers
dichotomous “yes” or “no” answer options (Figure 12).
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Authoritarian Attitudes
Figure 7 demonstrates that during the research period Russians were dissatisfied
with the current, ostensibly democratic, political situation. Yet, it is difficult to argue that
Russians totally reject democracy. The question measures not only the desire for a more
authoritarian political system, but also nostalgia for the socialist economy, superpower
status, and the restoration of the Soviet Union. Whatever the interpretation, there is an
undeniable retreat from more liberal positions to more organic-statist ones (including the
desire for the Soviet political system) that occurred in early 1994.
The dissatisfaction with democracy is also apparent in Figure 8. Although
measuring a complex attitude, which includes not only political, but economic and social
orientations. Figure 8 shows that Russians only recently started to accept the political and
economic changes initiated in the early 1990s. More specifically, the public was
consistently skeptical about the Russian political situation. An overwhelming majority of
Russians viewed the political situation as explosive or tense (Figure 9).

-Russia is moving towards
a dead end
‘Russia is moving in the
right direction

r r r r rr rTrr rTTT’iT n T T

'r i'n 'n 'iTi Tt TTT r n i r'i'i'Ti'TnT

Figure 8. Is Russia Moving in a Right Direction?
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Figures 10-14 gauge public attitudes towards specific political institutions
(presidentialism, parliamentarism, and the mass media). A significant number of
Russians, almost 40 percent, support disbanding the Parliament (Figure 10). Although the
Russian public has conflicting views on the concentration of power in the executive
branch (Figure 11), given more deterministic answer options (“yes” or “no”), it opts for a
presidential republic (Figure 12). The percentage of Russians who think that the mass
media should reflect the official position rather than offer an independent opinion is on
the rise (Figure 13). Russians’ attitudes towards the mass media are consistent with the
popular view that the media’s major role is to inform the audience about events (Figure
14). As such, the mass media should follow official line, rather than provide their own
interpretation.

-1 think that we have an
explosive or tense
poiitical situation
■I think that we have a
cairn or favorable
political situation
f-i7 'T'iTT.|.TT'i''T'T'r T'’r n ' T'r T'T'n ''i'r i'TTTiT T r n T T TT'i’’i’’n ’T r rT ’r r’’rT’T’T’r'T'T’i

Figure 9. What Is Your Assessment o f Russia's Political Situation?
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Figure 10. Do You Support Disbanding the Parliament?

'I oppose a
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Figure 11. Do You Support a Presidential Republic?
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Figure 12. Do You Support a Presidential Republic? (2)
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The mass media
should express their
own, independent
p^oints of view
The mass media
should express an
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Figure 13. Should the Mass Media Express an Independent Opinion?

Mass media spread
chaos
Mass media express
their own opinion
Mass media explain
events

1S30 «25 -

d?5

d?5
V

a

O'

"9^ dates

Figure 14. What Is Your Perception of the Role of the Mass Media In Society?
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Mixed or Democratic Attitudes
Although Figure 16 confirms the shift away from democratic preferences towards
more authoritarian political systems (Soviet, xmiquely Russian or monarchist**^^), Figure
15, depicting answers to a different set of options, reveals that democracy is far from
being discredited. Electoral competition between commimists and democrats reflects the
democratic-authoritarian divide among Russians. Figure 19 shows that both democrats
and commimists have stable support. The strong position of communists (who comprise
the Russian political opposition) explains growing public support for political opposition
(Figure 20). Russians also exhibit a propensity for multipartism (Figure 21). But the
number of people who favor authoritarian options of having one dominant party or
having no parties at all is on the rise. Together, these authoritarian options currently
gamer the support of 41 percent of Russians.

■the current or western
democratic political
system is the best
- the Soviet political system
is the best

Figure 15. What Is the Best Political System?

Yet monarchy remains a stable preference for about 10 percent o f Russians (see Figure 17) and
military dictatorship attracts only 10-15 percent o f popular support (see Figure 18).
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-Russia should
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Figure 16. What Type of a State Would You Like Russia to be?
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Figure 17. Should Russia be a Monarchy?

- th e arm y sh o u ld govern
th e co u n try
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Figure 18. Should the Army Govern the Country?
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Figure 19. What Parties Do You Prefer?
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Figure 20. Do You Support Having a Political Opposition?
A comparison between the levels of trust towards the presidency, which is always
closely associated with a person in office, and the parliament, that represents an
institution, reveals the president to be a winner of this contest (Figures 22 and 23). This
finding is consistent with the American data - US presidents are commonly more trusted
than is the Congress. But, even among the less personified institutions (parliament, mass
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media, provincial govemments), the legislative branch enjoys the lowest degree of
popularity. Russians are also unsympathetic to both the mass media and provincial
authorities (Figures 24 and 25).
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Figure 21. How Many Parties Does Russia Need?
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Figure 22. Should We Trust the President?
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Figure 25. Should We Trust Provincial Govemments?
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Russians, although doubting democracy and its institutions, did not completely
abandon their initial demoeratic beliefs. Demoeraey is less diseredited among the publie
than among the elite. The publie is almost evenly divided between “demoerats’ and
“authoritarians.” One part of the population inereasingly supports demoeratie norms and
orientations, while the other gradually drifts in an authoritarian direction. On the
demoeratie side, Russians prefer a multiparty system to a more authoritarian single
dominant party system. Generally, they favor having a political opposition. But a
majority also supports controlled mass media, coneentration of power in the exeeutive
braneh, and disbanding the parliament. There is a certain demoeratic fatigue, as Russians
increasingly long for the Soviet political model and have reservations about current
political situation.
The elite and the publie’s political attitudes moved in somewhat varying
direetions. The politieal ambiguity of publie opinion, which espouses both authoritarian
and demoeratic orientations, is observed throughout the researeh period. Publie opinion
remains mixed, even though the components of the mix change. Attitudes of governmentaffiliated intellectuals unambiguously drift in the direction of authoritarianism.
Democracy’s growing unpopularity among the Russian elite does not parallel the politieal
ambiguity of publie opinion. Government-affiliated intellectuals pay attention to the
authoritarian tendeneies of publie opinion, but disregard its demoeratie aspirations.
2. Ideological Issue Domain
The ideological issue domain is represented by the following questions:
“Is dictatorship the best solution to all Russia’s problems?”
“What is more important, order or democracy?”
“Whose interests are more important, the state’s or the individual’s?”
“What is the best relationship between the state and society?”
“What idea can rmify Russia?”
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“Should we trust the army?”
“Should we trust state security forces?”
“Should we trust the Orthodox Church?”
“Are you worried about the weakness of the state?”
“Are you worried about corruption and bribery?”
“Are you worried about the growth of crime?”
“Are you worried about the threat o f military dictatorship?”
“Are you worried about the crisis of morality and culture?”
Conservative Attitudes
Russian public opinion is essentially conservative. For my purposes, I define
“conservatism” and “statism” as the following complex of public attitudes: belief in law
and order; support for strengthening the powers of the state (including repressive state
apparatus) to fight crime or to restore the strength of the state vis-a-vis society;
endorsement of traditional values, including conservative religious beliefs designed to
minimize perceived crisis of morality. Russians increasingly perceive dictatorship as the
best solution to Russian problems. By July 2000, nearly 40 percent of Russians approved
of human right restrictions, typically associated with dictatorship, while only 43 percent
opposed it. Moreover, since 1992 the share of people agreeing that dictatorship is the best
solution to Russian problems nearly doubled (Figure 26). Persistent conservatism is
visible in the answers to question: “What is more important, order or democracy?”
(Figure 27). The share of people who favored order remained stable at 75 percent, while
freedoms and human rights, associated with democracy, consistently garnered a low 1011 percent of support.

In this context, democracy is not a political category, but the Russian synonym for the liberal notion
o f personal freedoms.
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Figure 26. Is Dictatorship the Best Solution to All Russia's Problems?
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Figure 27. What Is More Important, Order or Democracy?

Figures 28 and 29 show that the levels of trust for the army and state security
forces (institutions associated with repressive state apparatus) are slightly higher than the
levels of trust for other social and political institutions, including mass media and
provincial govemments, and significantly higher than the trust in parliament. The degree
of tmst towards these institutions increased in early 1998, the period when perceptions of
state weakness, the growth of crime, and rampant cormption reach their peak (Figures 32
- 34). Positive feelings towards the army and state security forces are also illustrated by
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the fact that only 5 percent of Russians worry about the threat of military dictatorship
(see Figure 35).
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Figure 28. Should We Trust the Army?

The level of trust towards the Orthodox Church, although imperfectly, indicates
conservative orientations. Figure 30 suggests that Russians approve of more traditional
values, associated with the Orthodox Church, especially given their concern about the
crisis of morality (Figure 36).
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Figure 29. Should We Trust State Security Forces?
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Finally, Figure 31 shows that Russians favor more conservative values of
stability, strong state, law and order and social protection as unifying national ideas.
Liberal ideals of freedom and joining the “modem world” are significantly less popular.
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Figure 30. Should We Trust the Orthodox Church?
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Figure 32. Are You Worried About the Weakness of the State?
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Figure 33. Are You Worried About Corruption and Bribery?
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Figure 34. Are You Worried About the Growth of Crime?
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Figure 35. Are You Worried About the Threat of Military Dictatorship?

40

am worried about
the crisis of morality
and culture

20

a
.. 1
. . 1.. 1
. . 1.. P"'i "'1.. r '1"1.. 1.. 1
.. 1.. 1
.. r""i.. r ’"i.. i.. t""i.. r""i.. i.. i.. i.. i.. r

t / y

dat,»%<S

' '■ ^ v
'

Figure 36. Are You Worried About the Crisis of Morality and Culture?

Liberal Attitudes
Figures 37 and 38 show that Russians’ conservatism is not absolute and that
liberal values are not completely alien to the general population. In the 1990s, the
percentage of people who believe that personal interests are more important than interests
of the state increased from 50 to 70 percent. Although data concerning the best
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relationship between the state and society is limited, it is, nonetheless, telling. Statist
orientations are not pervasive. A majority of Russians believe that society should control
the state (Figure 38).
Despite some liberal inclinations, the Russian public champions conservative and
statist values. The strongest conservatism can be detected in Russians’ preference for
order (a synonym for the strong state) over democracy (understood as a synonym for civil
rights and liberties), increasing acceptance of dictatorship as the best solution to Russian
problems and mostly positive attitudes towards repressive state institutions and the
conservative Orthodox Church. The public’s conservatism and statism is exemplified by
the pervasive concerns about the weakness of the state, widespread corruption, crime
rate, and the crisis of morality. The strengthening of conservative sentiment occurred in
1993-1994.
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Figure 37. W hat Interests A re M ore Important, the State’s or the Individual's?
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Figure 38. What Is the Best Relationship Between the State and Society?

At present, both government-affiliated intellectuals and the public are
ideologically conservative. If the elite’s unambiguous political authoritarianism is not
matched by the similar levels of the public’s authoritarianism, the former’s current
ideological conservatism may be a response to public opinion. At least, ideological
conservatism can be found on both the elite and the popular level and represents a shared
value in contemporary Russia.

3. Economic Issue Domain
The most useful survey questions for this issue domain include:
“What is the best economic model?”
“How fast should market reforms proceed?”
“What is Russia’s economic situation?”
“What is your assessment of Gaidar’s/liberal reforms?”
“Should the state guarantee a joh to every able person?”
“On whom does prosperity of an individual depends?”
“How much social protection should the state provide?”
“What price policy on food would you prefer?”
“How should the state control prices?”
“Are you worried about potential economic crisis?”
“Are you worried about the price growth?”
“Are you worried about increasing social stratification?”
“Should market reforms be continued?”
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Public Preferences for Govemed Market Model
In general, Russians increasingly prefer economic etatism or belief in the
govemed market (Figure 39). Figure 40 shows that in the last 10 years Russians’
willingness to proceed with quick and radical economic changes diminished.
Simultaneously, a more conservative sentiment favoring slower and more cautious
changes gained momentum. Russians were never satisfied with Gaidar’s liberal reforms
(Figure 41). The number of people who rejected reforms was always much greater than
the number of people supporting the liberal economic course.
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-a state-controlled
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Figure 39. What Is the Best Economic Model?

The negative assessment of Gaidar’s liberal reforms and the market in general is
not surprising, when one looks at the public’s perception of the post-Communist
economic situation. The publie consistently viewed the economic situation as bad or very
bad, a trend that was only recently reversed (Figure 42). The growing rejection of the
market and market reforms is also exemplified to persistent worries about significant
social problems perpetuated by the reforms, including the growth of prices (Figure 48),
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economic crisis and the decline of production (Figure 49), and growing social
stratification (Figure 50).
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Figure 41. What Is Your Assessment of Gaidar's Liberal Reforms?
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Figure 42. What Is Russia's Economic Situation?

Figures 43 - 47 depict Russians’ attitudes towards specific economic policies.
They reveal Russians’ propensity for a strong paternalistic state. Believing that prosperity
of an individual depends on the state (Figure 45), Russians expected the state to
guarantee employment (Figure 43) and provide universal social protection (Figure 44).
Russians overwhelmingly supported state control of prices on all, or, at least, some
products (see Figure 46). Even presented with a choice between a card system (a vestige
of the Soviet distribution system, according to which a person was assigned a strict quota
of limited foodstuffs and consumer goods per month) and subsidies to the
underprivileged, Russians seem to increasingly embrace a card system (Figure 47).
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Figure 43. Should the State Guarantee a Job to Every Able Person?
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Figure 44. How Much Social Protection Should the State Provide?
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Figure 45. On Whom Does Prosperity of an Individual Depend?
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Figure 46. How Should the State Control Prices?
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Figure 47. What Price Policy on Food Would You Prefer?
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Figure 48. Are You Worried About Price Growth?
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Figure 49. Are You Worried About Potential Economic Crisis?
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Figure 50. Are You Worried About Inereasing Soeial Stratifieation?

Publie Preferences for Free-Market Model
Despite strong pro-governed market economic values, Russians want to continue
with market reforms (Figure 51). Only in 1995, amidst the wage arrears crisis, and in the
aftermath of the 1998 economic default, the determination of the Russian public wavered.
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Figure 51. Should Market Reforms be Continued?
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Almost universally, Russians supported economic policies consistent with the
governed market model. Worried about the price increase, intensification of social
stratification and crisis of production, Russians consistently favored a stronger economic
role of the state and more gradual economic change. Yet they generally also endorsed a
continuation of market reforms.
While the public favored the governed market model, government-affiliated
intellectuals supported the liberal economic strategy (see Chapter II). If in the begiiming
of the research period, there was a weak consensus on the desirability of market reforms
between the elite and the public, by the late 1990s, the elite could no longer count on
popular support for its liberal economic reforms. Public opinion had virtually no impact
on the economic attitudes of the elite. But the elite is also incapable of swaying public
opinion with its free market rhetoric. This phenomenon is especially noteworthy, since
economic preferences are the strongest for both the elite and the public.

4. Foreign Relations Issue Domain
Questions selected for this issue domain include;
“What is the goal of Western coimtries in regards to Russia?”
“Should Russia cooperate with the West?”
“Do you consider yourself European?”
“What is your attitude towards the European Union?”
“Should Russia join the European Union?”
“What is your attitude towards the US?”
“Does the US pose a threat to Russia?”
“What is your attitude towards Germany?”
“Should Russia join NATO?”
“Should Russia fear NATO?”

“Should Russia fear former Soviet republics joining NATO?”
“Should Russia fear Poland, Himgary and the Czech Republic joining NATO?”
“What should Russia do in regards to Iran, Iraq, Syria?”
Public opinion literature conclusively demonstrates that the public’s economic attitudes are the
strongest and the most decisive during the elections. In the previous chapter, I also demonstrated that
economic attitudes, and especially economic liberalism, lie at the core o f the elite’s beliefs.
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■‘What is your attitude towards China?”
‘How can Russia retain its status as a superpower?’
‘Do you support union with Belorus?”

While there is a visible increase in anti-Western sentiment among governmentaffiliated intellectuals, there are signs that Russians are not as anti-Western as previously
reported. In fact, their pro-Western orientations are stable or even increasing. Throughout
the research period, Russians appear to be almost evenly split along the anti-Western and
pro-Western divide (see figures below).

Anti-Western Attitudes
A growing number of Russians (almost 70 percent in 2001) thinks that the West is
interested in destabilizing Russia (Figure 52). Kosovo, tensions around UN inspections in
Iraq, and other foreign policy disputes resulted in increased fear of the US (Figure 53).
The number of people who think that the US poses no threat or poses only a minor threat
to Russia declined from 78 percent in 1996 to 32 percent in 2000. The share of people
who believe that the US poses a major or significant threat to Russia rose from 22 percent
in 1996 to 68 percent in 2000.
In general, Russians oppose joining NATO, a logical consequence given the
contentious relationship between the transatlantic alliance and Russia (Figure 54). The
Russian public also increasingly fears NATO. In 1999, 63 percent of the population
expressed negative feelings about the alliance, although in 1997 only 44 percent had this
attitude (Figure 55). Although Russians accept Central European countries’ membership
in NATO, they are less sympathetic to the former Soviet republics joining the alliance. If
in 1996 only 20 percent of Russians feared former Soviet republics joining NATO, in
2001, with an increasing probability of Russia’s immediate neighbors becoming members
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o f the alliance, 50 percent shared this attitude. Simultaneously, the number of people not
opposing potential membership of former Soviet republics in NATO declined from 57
percent (in 1997) to 30 percent (2001) (Figure 56). The shift occurred in 1999, after the
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.
The number of Russians who favor assistance to Syria, Iran, and Iraq, regardless
of the Western opposition, increased from 13 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2001. The
option suggesting an alliance vdth the West against these countries is the least favored
option and is on the decline. However, the majority believes that Russia should pursue its
own interests in regards to these anti-Western countries (Figure 57). Strengthening antiWestern sentiments and growing support for alliance with the non-Westem world are
visible in Figure 58, depicting attitudes towards China. After Kosovo, Russians view
China in an increasingly favorable light. Currently, almost 70 percent of Russians have a
neutral, positive, or very positive attitude toward this country. Between 70 and 80 percent
of Russians consistently supported strengthening political and economic ties with Belorus
(Figure 59).

Western countires
try to destabilize
Russia
Western countries
try to help Russia

dates

Figure 52. What Is the Goal of the Western Countries in Regards to Russia?
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Figure 54. Should Russia Join NATO?
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Figure 55. Should Russia Fear NATO?
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Figure 56. Should Russia Fear Former Soviet Republics Joining NATO?
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Figure 57. What Should Russia Do in Regards to Iran, Iraq, and Syria?
Pro-Western Attitudes
Despite strong anti-Western attitudes, an increasing number of Russians favors
cooperation with the West (Figure 60). After the disappointment of the late 1990s (19981999), when Russia experienced serious frictions with the West (due to the situation in
Iraq, NATO’s expansion to the East, and Kosovo), Russians now strongly support
cooperation with the West (almost 80 percent). Since 1992, the number of people who
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either occasionally or always consider themselves European increased from 38 to 63
percent (Figure 61). Although the share of people with a favorable opinion of the EU
declined (from 67 to 50 percent) and the share of people with negative assessments of the
EU increased from 3 to 12 percent, Russians overwhelmingly have a very positive
attitude towards the European Union (Figure 62). Russians also support joining the
European Union (60 to 65 percent) (Figure 63).
Attitudes towards specific western countries, including the US and Germany, are
predominantly positive and stable. The only bout of anti-Americanism occurred in 1999
during the Kosovo operation (Figure 64).*'° Other disputes between Russia and the US
did not affect Russians’ views of the US. Germany was always viewed positively (Figure
65). Although Russians resent NATO expansion, they do not oppose Central European
countries joining NATO (Figure 66). With the passage of time, increasingly fewer
Russians express fear of these countries being NATO members. Even though during the
post-Communist period, the number of people who believe that Russia should retain its
status as a military superpower increased from 9 to almost 20 percent, the share of people
who believed that Russia can be a superpower only through economic development
remained stable. Overwhelmingly, Russians support economic, not military, strength as a
basis of the superpower status of their country (Figure 67).

It appears that the sudden outburst o f anti-Americanism are a direct public response to the elite’s
and mass media’s “information blows,” in which for a very short time the US is described either as a
source o f all Russia’s recent misfortunes or as a cunning international player interested only in the winlose outcomes. Although my analysis does not extend to the period after 2001, the data collected
around 2002 Winter Olympics organized by the US (where Russian athletes suffered relative defeat),
during the “chicken wars” in the spring o f 2002 or after the launch o f the Operation “Iraqi Freedom”
confirm that the effect o f such “precise targeting” o f the US by the elite is intense, but limited to a very
short time span.
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Figure 58. What Is Your Attitude Towards China?
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Figure 59. Do You Support Union with Belorus?
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Figure 60. Should Russia Cooperate with the West?
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Figure 61. Do You Consider Yourself European?
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Figure 62. What Is Your Attitude Towards the European Union?
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join the EU

Figure 63. Should Russia Join the European Union?
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Figure 64. What Is Your Attitude Towards the US?
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Figure 65. What Is Your Attitude Towards Germany?
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Figure 66. Should Russia Fear Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic Joining NATO?
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Figure 67. How Can Russia Retain Its Status as a Superpower?
It follows that Russians are split between those who favor a moderately proWestern and moderately anti-Western course. The balance between the two conflicting
approaches was disturbed in 1995/1996 (NATO’s eastward expansion, tensions around
UN inspections in Iraq) and in 1999 (NATO’s air strikes against Yugoslavia), when antiWestern attitudes prevailed. However, pro-Western attitudes rebounded by 2000.
In contrast, the anti-Western attitudes of the elite clearly triumphed over more
pro-Western position. If the shift towards stronger anti-Western proclamations in official
discourse that occurred in 1996-1999 parallels the changes in public opinion, the current
anti-Western stance of government-affiliated intellectuals does not reflect public opinion.
In fact, the elite espouses stronger anti-Western views than the population at large. Public
opinion continues to embrace some pro-Western orientations, while the governmentaffiliated intellectuals all but abandoned their original pro-Western stance. Russian public
opinion presents certain disadvantages for pursuing an internationalist and pro-Western
foreign policy. Russian public opinion is prone to abrupt anti-Western bouts, all to
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readily exploited by the nationalist and anti-Western forces. But it also provides a strong
potential for building partnership with the economically developed West. The Russian
elite can count on tentative public support for this foreign policy course, if it is indeed on
the elite’s agenda (which, as shown in the previous chapter, is not the case).

5. Ethnic Relations Issue Domain
Questions in this issue domain can be roughly divided into two parts. The first
group of questions deals with attitudes towards various minorities living in Russia
(Azeris, Armenians, Jews, Muslims, non-Russians in general and migrant workers). The
second group includes questions about Chechnya.

Tolerant Attitudes
Figures 68-70 show an increase in neutral and sympathetic attitudes towards
ethnic minorities, which are traditionally viewed with hostility in Russia. Figure 71,
which documents Russians’ attitudes towards migrant workers (mostly from Slavic
republics of Ukraine and Belorus), reveals a similar dynamic.

I view Armenians
and Azeris either
with distrust and
fear or with caution
and annoyance
I view Armenians
and Azeris either
with indifference or
with sympathy

O- 20

dates

Figure 68. How Do You View Armenians and Azeris?
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■I view Muslims
and Arabs either
with distrust
and fear or with
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■I view Muslims
and Arabs either
with
indifference or
with sympathy
^

dates
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Figure 69. How Do You View Muslims and Arabs?

-I view the Jewish peo|de
either with distrust and
fear or with caution and
annoyance
■Iviewthe Jewish people
either with indifference
or with sympathy

.s'?"

/

^

date^o

Figure 70. How Do You View the Jewish People?

Nationalistic Attitudes
In general, despite the overall neutrality towards some minorities, there is an
increase in xenophobic attitudes towards non-Russians. The number of people who think
that non-Russians pose a substantial or major threat for Russia increased from 30 to 56
percent (Figure 72). The growth of xenophobia translates into increasing popularity of

139

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

the idea of Russia for Russians. By the end of the research period, the number of its
supporters reached 60 percent (Figure 73).

a 30

^

have a neutral,
positive, or very
positive attitude
towards migrant
workers working in
Russia
“ I have a negative or
very negative
attitude towards
migrant workers
working in Russia

/

dates

Figure 71. What Is Your Attitude Towards Migrant Workers Working in Russia?
Nationalism is especially apparent in the questions measuring public attitudes
towards Chechens and the Chechen problem. Figure 74 shows that Russians have
negative attitudes towards Chechens. By 1998 the majority of Russians viewed Chechens
either with fear and distrust or caution and armoyance. The elite definitely had
sympathetic public opinion background in launching the second Chechen war. In fact, by
1999 Russians increasingly favored the military operation in Chechnya. Although after
February 2000 the number of supporters for the military operation declined, it still enjoys
a considerable popularity (Figure 75). The second Chechen war also contributed to the
popular approval of the federal government’s Chechen policy (i.e., the military solution
to a dual challenge o f ethnic secession and separatism). If in 1997 only 50 percent o f

Russians approved of the Kremlin’s handling of Chechnya, by 1999, 90 percent of the
population considered the federal Chechen policy correct or at least partially correct
(Figure 76).

140

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

^■“ Non-Russians living in
Russia do not pose any
threat or pose only a
minor threat to Russia

80
70 ^
60
50 40 30
20

Non-Russians living in
Russia pose some or a
major threat to Russia

10
0

.V
dates

Figure 72. Do Non-Russians Living in Russia Pose a Threat?
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Figure 73. Do You Support the Idea of Russia for Russians?

I view Chechens either
with distrust and fear
or with caution and
annoyance
I view Chechens either

a.

w ith in d iffe re n c e o r

with sympathy

Figure 74. How Do You View Chechens?
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■We should strive for
peace in Chechnia
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Figure 75. What Should be Done in Chechnya?

The federal government's
Chechen policy is wrong

The federal government's
Chechen policy is on the
right track, but its
realization needs
improvement

The federal government's
Cheehen policy is right

Figure 76. Is the Federal Government's Chechen Policy Right?

Although ostensibly sympathetic to minorities with a history of being
discriminated against (Azeris, Armenians, Muslims, and Jews*"), a majority of Russians
is by no means tolerant. Even given the generally acknowledged sensitivity to ethnic

' ‘' One has to be somewhat skeptical analyzing these trends. Invariably, the interviewer and later the
interpreter o f survey results comes across the problem that respondents might have withheld a truthful
response, given official condemnation o f anti-Semitic and anti-Caucasian outbursts. The public may be
more “sincere” in expressing anti-Chechen attitudes, since official discourse also often contains
virulently anti-Chechen statements.
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questions in public opinion surveys and social taboos prohibiting public expressions of
ethnic hatred and bigotry, Russian respondents express strong xenophobic attitudes. The
Russian public grew increasingly less tolerant of Chechens and more supportive of the
idea of “Russia for Russians.” The majority no longer shims the military solutions to
ethnic problems and generally supports the second Chechen war.
There is a degree of consensus between the elite and the public concerning the
treatment of the ethnic problems that confound Russia. In general, however, the elite’s
nationalism is less extreme, which can be explained by the necessity to stand for elections
in a multiethnic state.
**>1'
Public opinion in Russia thus functions as a certain environment in which official
discourse and policies are being articulated and made. It is subject to shifts in some areas
(economic etatism), but more often one observes a lack of consensus (ambiguities in
political, ideological, foreign policy and ethnic relations issue domains). Public opinion
contains both liberal and organic-statist elements (although with the passage of time,
liberal attitudes have a tendency to weaken, and organic-statist attitudes tend to
strengthen). The question for the elite is what types of public attitudes to promote and
champion. The relationship between the elite’s value orientations is not causal; it is more
complex. The Russian case proves Converse’s^^^ observations that there are certain
linkages between the elite’s and the mass public’s attitudes. In Russia, these linkages tend
to form around organic-statist values of political authoritarianism, strong state, order,
defiance of the West and ethnic nationalism. The relationship thus is not unlike game

See Philip E. Converse, “The Nature o f B e lie f Systems in Mass Publics,” in Ideology & Discontent,
ed. David E. Apter (London: Free Press o f Glencoe, 1964).
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theory. The elite is taking cues from the public. But the former only chose to incorporate
those motifs and themes from public opinion that are most congruent with the elite’s
policy aspirations and own interests.
While organic-statist (authoritarian, conservative, anti-Western, and nationalistic)
elements of public opinion can also be found on the elite level, the latter failed to
incorporate surviving democratic and pro-Western public attitudes into its discourse.
Likewise, government-affiliated intellectuals were unable not only to convince the public
of their ideologically more liberal and ethnically more tolerant values, but also to “sell”
their free market ideas (a core concept for the elite).
Russian public opinion presents both advantages and disadvantages for building a
democratic and ethnically tolerant state with liberal ideology, free market economy, and
pro-Western foreign policy (i.e., tbe state which would reflect liberal orientations). Public
opinion constrains the elite in ideological, economic, and ethnic minority policy areas.
But it also has a better potential for building democratic society and for partnership with
the economically developed Western countries.**^ The Russian elite can count on public
support for these policies, if they are indeed on the elite’s agenda.
In addition to taking select cues from the public that satisfy the elite’s own plans
and interests, there is another type of relationship between the elite and public opinion.
The Russian case is a good illustration of Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann “spiral of silence”
thesis.

Noelle-Neumann claims that public opinion cannot be interpreted only as an

aggregation of individual views. Instead, one should look at and analyze the relationship
between the majority’s and minority’s preferences. The prevalence of one view over
I will return to this issue in the concluding, sixth chapter.
’ Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral o f Silence: Public Opinion, Our Social Skin (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1984).
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another is crucial. If, at one point of time, the ratio between two conflicting public views
was 60-40, the minority (40 percent) would be less likely to vocalize and defend its views
(that are perceived as loosing). Logically, at the next point of time, the ratio may change
to 70-30. In the Russian case, pro-democratic, pro-Western, liberal, tolerant minority is
already under pressure to voice its preference in the face of growing organic-statist
majority. But this pressure is compounded by the definite choice of the elite, which
clearly favors organic-statist elements of public opinion. The elite thus can reinforce the
dominant tendencies in public opinion and make expression of dissident views less likely.
Although Russian public opinion contains both liberal and organic-statist factions, the
state support of the latter makes the existence and even survival of liberal public attitudes
very problematic, if not downright impossible.

Social and Demographic Determinants of Russian Public Attitudes
This section briefly discusses the sources of public attitudes.**^ The literature on
the role of public opinion in policy-making suggests that both elite and public attitudes
depend on the symbolic factors (partisanship, ideology), rather than objective (social and
demographic) characteristics. For instance, Wittkopf and Hinckey discovered that both
the elites and the public react to symbolic issues, not domestic conditions.*’^ In other
words, age, education, income, and gender matter less than one’s party identification or
ideological preferences. Although I cannot test for the impact of ideology or partisanship

I tried to see if the relationships between various public attitudes and social and demographical
indexes changed from year to year. Initially, I calculated models for several select variables for every
year the question was asked. However, the difference in predictors from year to year was insignificant
and I opted for the cumulative models.
Eugene R. Wittkopf and Ronald H. Hinckley, “Internationalism at Bay? A Contextual Analysis o f
Americans’ Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Attitudes,” in Decision-Making in Glass House: Mass Media,
Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 2 P ‘ Century, ed. Brigette L. Nacos,
Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
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on the public attitudes, I can outline the extent to which social and demographic factors
are important for the vmderstanding of several public attitudes.''^
Current public opinion literature describes the impact of certain modernization
variables, including education, occupation, and the size of settlement on the individual
views. The following section confirms previous findings with the Russian data. When
performing statistical analysis, I violated several basic assumptions of multivariate linear
regression. I am aware that my dependent variables are not measured on the interval
scale. Strictly speaking, my variables are ordinal, not interval. However, for my project I
treat them as ordinal to show the relationships between soeial and demographic
parameters and individual political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic
relations views. Secondly, I am also aware of the problem of heteroskedastisity, a
problem where a researcher does not know the real distribution of the error term for
various observations on the variables. Since the true distribution of the error term is
unknown, one cannot make accurate predictions and has difficulties with properly testing
the hypothesis. I address this problem by looking at the distribution of the error term
(squared residual) across observations on the independent variables. Although for all
variables the error term (variance) was not identical, the disparity was not great, which
means that heteroskedastisity was not severe. Among all the predictors, education had the
strongest relationship \vith various public attitudes.
In political sphere, education is the strongest predictor of a person’s political
views. Table 6 demonstrates that the more educated the person, the more he/she supports
an independent mass media. Education is also positively correlated with a negative

Only statistically significant relationships are reported. Responses coded “as I do not know” or “no
answer” were omitted.
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assessment of the political situation in the country. The more educated the person, the
less he/she trusts political institutions. Education also influences party preferences.
Finally, the more educated the person, the more he/she rejects authoritarianism (Soviet
system) as a political model. Occupation has an impact on the degree of trust towards the
parliament, i.e., the lower the occupational status of an individual, the more he/she
distrusts the Duma [lower chamber of Russian parliament]. Also, occupation is related to
the preference for the Soviet political system. The higher the person’s occupational
status, the less supportive of this idea a person is. Age has a weak, but statistically
significant, relationship with attitudes towards the mass media (the older the person, the
more he/she perceives the mass media as distorting events) and preferences for type of
political system (the older the person, the more he/she favors the Soviet system).
Gender plays a role in combination with other predictors. Older women tend to be
more hostile to the mass media than older men. Educated men are more supportive of an
independent mass media than are their female counterparts. Compared to educated men,
educated women are more likely to see the political situation as explosive. Educated and
older men feel more distrust towards the Duma than do educated and older women.
Educated men and highly placed women are more likely to oppose the Soviet political
system.
Answers to ideological questions can also be best predicted by education.
Education has a negative relationship with the degree of trust towards state security
forces. The more educated the person, the less he/she trusts state security forces (cf.
levels of trusts towards political institutions). Education is also related to the view on the
relative importance of personal vs. state interests. The more educated the person, the
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more he/she values his/her own interests. Paradoxically, the more education a person has,
the more he/she prefers strong state to an independent society. Gender. Educated women
are less likely to trust state security forces than educated men, but the former are also
more likely to support a strong state (Table 7).

Table 6
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Russian Political Attitudes According to
Gender, Education, Age, and Occupation
Dependent variables
Independe
nt
Variables

Age:
Male
Female
Education:

Positive
attitudes
towards
the mass
media***

Positive
attitude
towards
the mass
media
independe
nee* ^

Positive
assessme
nt of
Russia’s
political
situation

Degree of
trust
towards
the
parliament

Degree of
trust
towards
the
president

121

122

0.003**
(0.001)
0.001
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000

Perceptio
n of the
best
political
19T
system

120
124

0.000
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)

125

126

0.002
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)

127

-0.004**
(0.001)
-0.003**
(0/001)
128

Attitude towards the mass media is measured on a 4-point scale where 1 is “mass media always
objectively reflect events,” 2 - “mass media often objectively reflect events,” 3 - “mass media often
distort events,” 4 - “mass media always distort events.”
Attitude towards the independent mass media is measured on a 5-point descending scale with 1
being total support for mass media independence and 5 being total opposition.
Assessment o f the political situation is measured on a 4-point descending scale where 1 is
“favorable” and 4 is “explosive.”
Degree o f trust towards the parliament is measured on a 3-point descending scale, where 1 is
“ d efin ite tru st,” 2 is “ ra th e r d istru st,” an d 3 is “d e fin ite d istru st.”

Degree o f trust towards the president is measured on a 3-point descending scale, where I is
“definite trust,” 2 is “rather distrust,” and 3 is “definite distrust.”
Perception o f the best political system is measured on a 3-point ascending democratic scale with 1 being preference for the Soviet system, 2 - preference for the current system and 3 - preference for
western democracy.
Age is measured in an 8-point ascending scale where 1 is the youngest age interval (18-29) and 8 is
the oldest (90-99). This applies to all models and all tables.
For this model, education is measured on a 9-point ascending scale with 1 being the lowest level o f
education and 9 being the highest.
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Table 6 continued
Male
Female

-0.056**
(0.006)
0.055**
(0.004)

-0.093**
(0.006)
-0.061**
(0.005)

0.011
(0.033)
0.096**
(0.028)

Female
Constant:
Male
Female
R-squared:
Male
Female

0.015**
(0.003)
0.014**
(0.002)

-0.100**
(0.033)
-0.074**
(0.031)

129

Occupation
Male

0.060**
(0.012)
0.045**
(0.011)

0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)

0.016
(0.009)
0.004
(0.007)

0.010**
(0.004)
0.008**
(0.003)

0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.001)

-0.005
(0.010)
-0.025**
(0.009)

2.770**
(0.060)
2.883**
(0.038)

2.481**
(0.029)
2.315**
(0.024)

3.166**
(0.072)
3.243**
(0.058)

2.619**
(0.033)
2.612**
(0.029)

2.294**
(0.032)
2.292**
(0.020)

2.373**
(0.077)
2.356**
(0.070)

1.6%
1.6%
12,253

4.0%
2.2%
22,170

0.2%
0.4%
160,104

0.8%
0.3%
51,952

0.2%
0.2%
50,693

1.5%
1.7%
12,773

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates obtained from SPSS
**p<.05
*p<.10
In the economic sphere, age is the most important predictor. Older people tend to
view results of liberal reforms as a failure and to favor slowing down economic change.
These results are not surprising, given that older people, especially pensioners, are among
the biggest losers of the liberal economic reforms imdertaken in the early 1990s. It is

For this model, education is measured on a 3-point descending scale with 1 being the highest level
o f education and 3 being the lowest.
For these models, education is measured on an 11-point ascending scale with 1 being the lowest
educational level and 11 being the highest.
For this model, education is measured on a 3-point descending scale with 1 being the highest level
o f education and 3 being the lowest.
For these models, occupation is measured on a 10-point descending scale with 1 being the highest
occupational level (manager) and 10 being the lowest (unemployed).

149

Reproducecl with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

logical to conclude that in this issue domain, age is closely correlated with class and
income in shaping a person’s perception of contemporary economic changes.

Table 7
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Russian Ideological Attitudes According to
Gender, Education, Age, and Occupation

Independent
Variables

Age:
Male
Female
Education:
Male
Female
Occupation:
Male
Female

Depend ent variables
Degree of trust
Views on the
relative importance
towards the
of personal and state
security forces
131
interests
0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
"tj3

-0.010**
(0.004)
-0.014**
(0.003)

Views on the ideal
relationship
between state and
society

-0.001
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
134

0.003
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
135

-0.047**
(0.011)
-0.046**
(0.009)

-0.010**
(0.04)
-0.130**
(0.037)
136

0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)

-0.014
(0.028)
-0.020
(0.023)

Constant:

Degree o f trust towards state security forces is measured on a 3-point descending scale with 1 being
“definite trust,” 2 being “rather distrust” and 3 being “definite distrust.”
Relative importance o f state vs. personal interests is measured on a 4-point scale where 1 is a belief
that personal interests are always more important and 4 is a belief that state interests are always more
important.
Views on the ideal relationship between the state and society are measured on a 4-point scale where
the higher the number, the more the respondent prefers an independent society.
Education is measured on an 11-point ascending scale where 1 is the lowest level o f education and
11 is the lowest.
Education is measured on a 9-point descending scale where 1 is the highest level o f education and 9
is the lowest.
Education is measured on a 6-point ascending scale where 1 is the lowest level o f education and 6 is
the highest.
Occupation is measured on a 10-point descending scale where 1 is the highest occupational level
and 10 is the lowest occupational levels.
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Table 7 continued
Male
Female
R-squared:
Male
Female
N=

2.637**
(0.035)
2.691**
(0.032)

2.029**
(0.093)
1.902**
(0.089)

2,048**
(0.302)
2.481**
(0.252)

0.0%
0.1%
35,058

0.7%
1.0%
5,871

0.2%
1.0%
4,231

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates obtained from SPSS
**p<.05
*p<.10
Education. Although more educated people, who were traditionally employed by
the state sector, did not fare well during the economic transformation, they are supportive
of the free market reforms. The less educated the person, the more he/she favors slow and
cautious economic reforms. Occupation is one of the best predictors of how a person
views economic reforms. The higher the occupational level of a respondent, the more
he/she is in favor of quick radical change. Gender. Older men have less favorable views
on results of liberal economic reforms than do older women. Older and less educated men
are more in favor of slowing down economic reforms than their female counterparts
(Table 8).
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Table 8
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Russian Economic Attitudes According to
Gender, Education, Age, and Occupation

Independent
Variables
Age:
Male
Female
Education:
Male
Female
Occupation:
Male
Female
Constant:
Male
Female
R-squared:
Male
Female
N=

Dependent variab les
Positive assessment of Gaidar’s Views on the desired speed of
economic reforms
(liberal) reforms*^’
0.022**
(0.003)
0.012**
(0.003)

0.039**
(0.012)
0.021**
(0.010)

ijy

-0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.003)

0.043**
(0.006)
0.021**
(0.005)
140

0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

0.011**
(0.003)
0.011**
(0.002)

2.270**
(0.041)
2.343**
(0.039)

1.611**
(0.022)
1.688**
(0.021)

0.3%
0.1%
9,169

0.5%
0.3%
39,070

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates obtained from SPSS
**p<.05
137

Assessment o f the liberal economic reforms is measured on a 4-point descending scale where 1 is
the highest assessment, 4 is the lowest assessment.
Desired speed o f economic reforms is measured on a 2-point scale where 1 is “we need quick
radical change” and 2 - “we need slow cautious change.”
Education is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is the highest level o f education and 3
is the lowest.
Occupation is measured on a 10-point descending scale where 1 is the highest occupational level
and 10 being the lowest.
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*p<.10
Answers to foreign policy questions are influenced by education, age, and
occupation. Education has a positive relationship with the attitudes towards the European
Union, US and China. The more educated a person is, the more positive the attitude
he/she has to these countries and regional organizations. Interestingly, education
contributes to a more positive assessment of not only the Western countries (the EU, the
US), but also of China. Age has a weak, but statistically significant, relationship with
attitudes towards the European Union. The older the person, the more negatively he/she
feels towards this organization. Occupation. Occupation is positively related to the
attitudes towards the United States. The higher the occupational status of a person, the
more he/she views the US positively. Gender. Educated men view the European Union
more favorably than their female counterparts. Older women are more hostile toward the
European Union, while for men there is no statistically significant relationship between
age and attitude towards the European Union. Education is a predictor of the attitudes
towards the United States and China only for women; for men there is no relationship
between education and attitudes towards these countries. Men occupying higher positions
are more pro-American than women at the same occupational level (Table 9).
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Table 9
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Russian Foreign Policy Attitudes According to
Gender, Education, Age, and Occupation

Dependent variables
Independent
Variables
Age:
Male
Female
Education:
Male
Female
Occupation:
Male
Female
Constant:
Male
Female

Positive attitudes
towards the
European Union*'**

Positive attitudes
towards the US*'*^

Positive attitudes
towards China*'*^

0.004
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.002)

-0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)

-0.003
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)

144

0.141**
(0.032)
0.103**
(0.018)

“ 145

0.014
(0.011)
0.031**
(0.010)

-0.028
(0.027)
-0.052**
(0.024)
146

0.035
(0.018)
0.001
(0.016)

0.020**
(0.006)
0.013**
(0.006)

0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.002)

1.405**
(0.179)
1.641**
(0.170)

2.489**
(0.070)
2.446**
(0.062)

3.761**
(0.269)
3.592**
(0.251)

R-squared:
Attitude towards the European Union is measured on a 4-point descending scale where 1 is “I have
a very positive attitude towards the EU,” 2 - “I have a positive attitude towards the EU,” 3 - “I have a
negative attitude towards the EU” and 4 - “I have a very negative attitude towards the EU.”
Attitude towards the US is measured on a 4-point descending scale where 1 is “I have a very
positive attitude towards the US,” 2 - “I have a positive attitude towards the US,” 3 - “I have a
negative attitude towards the US” and 4 - “I have a very negative attitude towards the US.”
Attitude towards China is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “I have a very positive
attitude towards China,” 2 - “I have a positive attitude towards China,” 3 - “ I have a neutral attitude
towards China,” 4 - “I have a negative attitude towards China,” and 5 - “I have a very negative
attitude towards China.”
Education is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is the highest level o f education and 3
is the lowest.
Education is measured on a 9-point ascending scale where 1 is the lowest level o f education and 9 is
the highest.
Occupation is measured on a 10-point descending scale where 1 is the highest occupational level
and 10 is the lowest.
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Table 9 continued
Male
Female
N=

1.3%
0.8%
7,747

0.2%
0.2%
19,834

0.1%
0.3%
3,620

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates obtained from SPSS
**p<.05
*p<.10
Occupation is the most important predictor for responses to questions about
ethnic relations. Interestingly, the lower the occupational status, the more the person
opposes the idea of Russia for Russians. At the same time, the lower the occupational
level, the more favorable the assessment of the federal policies in Chechnya. Education.
Education is a one of the good predictors of how a person views federal policies in
Chechnya. The less educated the person, the more favorably he/she assesses the federal
policies in this republic. Age. The older the person, the more favorably he/she views the
federal government’s Chechen policy. Gender. Less educated men and men with lower
occupational status tend to view federal policies in Chechnya more favorably than their
female counterparts (Table 10).
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Table 10
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Russian Ethnic Relations Attitudes According to
Gender, Education, Age, and Occupation

Dependent variables
Independent
Variables
Age:
Male
Female
Education:
Male
Female
Occupation:
Male
Female
Constant:
Male
Female
R-squared:
Male
Female
N=

Positive attitude towards the
idea of Russia for Russians*'*^

Positive assessment of the federal
government’s Chechen policy*'**

-0.002
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)

-0.004**
(0.001)
-0.004**
(0.001)
149

-0.010
(0.011)
0.004
(0.009)

-0.139**
(0.014)
-0.126**
(0.013)
150

0.011**
(0.005)
0.014**
(0.005)

-0.024**
(0.008)
-0.017**
(0.007)

1.831**
(0.058)
1.693**
(0.050)

2.827**
(0.083)
2.768**
(0.079)

0.5%
0.3%
8,110

3.4%
2.8%
4,376

Notes:
Attitude towards the idea o f “Russia for Russians” is measured on a 3-point scale where 1 is “I
completely support idea o f Russia for Russians,” 2 - “it is a good idea, but we need to be careful
implementing it” and 3 - “it is a bad idea, the idea o f Russia for Russians is no different than a Nazi
statement.”
Attitude to the federal government’s Chechen policy is measured on a 3-point descending scale
where 1 is “policy is absolutely right,” 2 - “policy is right, but badly implemented” and 3 - “policy is
completely wrong.”
Education is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is the highest level o f education and 3
is the lowest.
Occupation is measured on a 10-point descending scale where 1 is the highest occupational level
and 10 is the lowest.
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Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates obtained from SPSS
**p<.05
*p<.10

Relationships Between Various Economic, Political, Ideological, Foreign Policy, and
Ethnic Relations Elements of Russian Public Opinion
In this section I discuss public attitudes that are linked together. First I describe
related attitudes within each issue domain. Next, I show that, just like official discourse
(or the elite’s value orientations) elements of public opinion also form distinct liberal and
organic-statist constellations. Finally, I offer some correlations between select political,
ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations public attitudes and several
composite variables, including assessment of Russia’s post-Communist course, attitudes
to post-1985 developments, the extent of regret about the demise of the USSR, and
evaluations of the current political and economic situation. To explore the larger themes
in public opinion, I performed correlation analysis*^* which confirmed the existence of
the two major divisions (liberal and organic-statist) within Russian public opinion. Only
survey questions that were asked repeatedly in the same type of survey tExpress or
Monitoring! were analyzed. Since all answer-options were normally distributed, I was
able to explore the selected survey questions cumulatively, as part of newly created,
combined databases.

In the course o f the correlation analysis, I deleted the values for answers “I do not know,” “I am not
sure,” and other indeterminate options. The correlation tables reported in this section are based on
“substantive” answer options.
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1■Related Ideological Attitudes
I found that the Russian public’s ideological views fall neatly into
conservative/liberal divide. People who support order over democracy also tend to favor
dictatorship as a means to solve Russia’s problems. Alternatively, a more liberal segment
of the Russian public both prefers democracy (a synonym for civil liberties) and rejects
dictatorship (Table 11). The same correlation is reported in Table 11a (Appendix F).

Table 11
Preference for Order and Support for Dictatorship (Monitoring surveys)
Is dictatorship the
best solution to
contemporary
Russia’s
problems? (1—
yes, 2—no)
274**
1.000
.000
25,305
881
1.000
.000
881
2,040

What is more
important order or
democracy? (1—
order, 2—
democracy)
What is more
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
important order or
N
democracy?
Pearson Correlation
Is dictatorship the
Sig. (2-tailed)
best solution to
contemporary
N
Russia’s problems?
** Correlation is signi leant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

2. Related Economic Attitudes
Tables 12-14 show the existence of economically liberal and economically etatist
combinations of public beliefs. Respondents who favor radical economic reforms (which
in the Russian case is synonymous with the neo-liberal “shock therapy”) also tend to
support a continuation of liberal economic reforms and to evaluate Gaidar’s “shock
therapy” positively. Pro-reform respondents also tend to believe in the free market as the
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best economic system. On the other hand, proponents of the cautious approach to the
economic transformation and believers in the governed market model tend to reject neo
liberal economic course.

Table 12
Preferred Speed of Economic Reform and Support for the Continuation of Liberal
Economic Reforms (Express surveys)
What type of
economic reforms
would you prefer?
(1— speedy, radical
reform; 2 - slow,
cautious change)
Pearson Correlation
What type of
economic reforms Sig. (2-tailed)
would you prefer? N
Should economic Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
reforms be
N
continued?
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Should economic
reforms be
continued? (1 reforms should be
continued, 2—
reforms should be
stopped)
1.000
.155**
.000
3,950
3,146
.155**
1.000
.000
3,146
3,656

Table 13
Support for the Continuation of Liberal Economic Reforms and Preferred Economic
Model (Monitoring surveys)
Should economic
reforms be
continued? (1 reforms should be
continued, 2—
reforms should be

What economic
model is the best?
(1—govemedmarket, 2—free
market)

stopped)

1.000
Should economic Pearson Correlation
.
Sig. (2-tailed)
reforms be
2,327
N
continued?
Pearson Correlation
-.496**
What economic
.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
model is the
3,146
N
best?
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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-.496**
.000
3,146
1.000
.

2.427

Table 14
Preferred Speed of Economie Reform and Assessment of Gaidar’s Reforms tExpress
surveys)
What do you think
about Gaidar’s
reforms (“shock
therapy”)? (1—
Gaidar’s reforms
were necessary and
correct, 2—
Gaidar’s reforms
were necessary, but
badly implemented,
3— Gaidar’s
reforms were
wrong)
.104**
1.000
.000

What type of
economic reforms
would you prefer
(1— speedy, radical
reform; 2 - slow,
cautious change)

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
What do you think
Correlation
about Gaidar’s
Sig. (2-tailed)
reforms (“shock
N
therapy”)?
** Correlation is signi leant at the 0.01 leve (2-tailed).
What type of
economic reforms
would you prefer

5,162
.104**
.000

1,707
1.000

1,707

3,481

.

4. Related Foreign Policy Attitudes
Attitudes to the US, Germany, and perception of the threat emanating from
NATO form distinct pro-Western and anti-Western clusters. On the pro-Western side,
there is a clear relationship between positive attitudes towards several Western countries.
People who view the US positively, also tend to view Germany positively. People who
have positive attitudes towards the US, are also less likely to fear NATO. On the antiWestern side, respondent’s negative attitudes to Western countries tend to translate into
fear of NATO (Tables 15 and 16).
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Table 15
Positive Attitudes to the US and Positive Attitudes to Germany (Express survevs)
Attitude to Germany
(1—^very positive,
2—^rather positive,
3—rather negative,
4— very negative)
Pearson Correlation
.571**
Attitude to the
.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
US
2,655
N
2,766
Pearson Correlation
.571**
1.000
Attitude to
.
Germany
.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
2,763
N
2,655
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Attitude to the US
(1—^very positive,
2—rather positive,
3—^rather negative,
4— ^very negative)
1.000

Table 16
Positive Attitudes to the US and Perception o f NATO’s Threat (Express survevsl
Should Russia fear the
West/NATO? (1—
Russia should
definitely fear NATO,
2—Russia should
rather fear NATO, 3—
Russia should rather
not fear NATO, 4—
Russia should
definitely not fear
NATO)
1.000
.571**
Attitude to the Pearson Correlation
,
.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
US
3,134
2,655
N
1.000
.571**
Should Russia Pearson Correlation
.000
fear the
Sig. (2-tailed)
2,655
N
3,318
West/NATO?
** Correlation is signifieant at the O.C1 level (2-tailed).
Attitude to the US
(1—^very positive,
2—rather positive,
3—rather negative,
4— very negative)

5. Related Ethnic Relations Attitudes
Finally, there are clearly demarcated tolerant and nationalistic groupings within
the Russian public. Respondents who sympathize vdth at least one traditionally
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discriminated minority, tend to embrace all other diseriminated ethnic groups.
Alternatively, if a person is intolerant of one traditionally discriminated ethnic minority,
he/she is more likely to reject all other ethnic groups. Interestingly, the strongest
correlation is between attitudes to Chechens, on the one hand, and attitudes to Azeris
(another Caucasian group) and the Roma, on the other (Table 17).

6. Constellations of Public Attitudes from Different Issue Domains
Is the economic liberalism/etatism reported above linked to any other public
attitudes? Logically, one would expect economically liberal respondents to show greater
degree of ideological liberalism and ethnic tolerance. My analysis confirmed these
expectations. People who espouse liberal ideology (support for civil rights and rejection
of dictatorship) tend to believe in the free market and continuation of liberal economic
reforms, while ideologically conservative respondents (who favor order and dictatorship
over protection of civil rights) are more likely to support the governed market model and
to object to on-going liberal economic reforms as well as the speed and radicalism of
these reforms (Table 18). Supporters of the market reforms are also more tolerant towards
ethnic minorities who have traditionally been discriminated against in Russia. In
particular, people who support the continuation of liberal economic reforms are also more
likely to view Jews and Chechens favorably. More etatist respondents, on the other hand,
are more likely to hold stronger xenophobic attitudes (Table 19).
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Table 17
Positive Attitudes to Jews, Azeris, Chechens, and Roma rMonitoring surveysJ
Attitudes
to Jews
(1 sympathy,
2—
neutrality,
3—
caution,
4— fear,
distrust)

Attitudes
to Azeris
(1 sympathy,
2—
neutrality,
3—
caution,
4— fear,
distrust)

1.000
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
4,813
N
.295**
Attitudes
Pearson Correlation
.000
to Azeris
Sig. (2-tailed)
4,813
N
.241**
Pearson Correlation
Attitudes
.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
to
4,813
N
Chechens
.192**
Attitudes
Pearson Correlation
.000
to Roma
Sig. (2-tailed)
4,813
N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tai ed).

Attitudes
to Jews

Attitudes
to
Chechens
(1 sympathy,
2—
neutrality,
3—
caution,
4— fear,
distrust)
.241**
.295**
.000
.000
4,813
4,813
.542**
1.000
.000
4,813
4,813
.542**
1.000
.000
4,813
4,813
.483**
.576**
.000
.000
4,813
4,813
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Attitudes
to Roma
(1 sympathy,
2—
neutrality,
3—
caution,
4— fear,
distrust)
.192**
.000
4,813
.483**
.000
4,813
.576**
.000
4,813
1.000
4,813

Table 18
Related Ideological and Economic Attitudes of the Russian Population (Monitoring
surveys)
What is more
important
order or
democracy?
(1—order,
2—
democracy)

Is
dictatorship
the best
solution to
contemporary
Russia’s
problems?
(1—yes, 2—
no)

Should
economic
reforms be
continued?
(1 - reforms
should be
continued,
2—reforms
should be
stopped)
-145**
.190**

What
economic
system is
the best?
(1 govemedmarket, 2—
free market)

1.000
Pearson
Correlation
,
.000
.000
Sig. (2tailed)
881
2,511
N
25,305
a
1.000
Pearson
Is
Correlation
dictatorship
.
.000
the best
Sig. (2solution to
tailed)
2,040
0
contemporary N
881
Russia’s
problems?
a
1.000
.190**
Pearson
What
Correlation
economic
.000
.
.
system is the Sig. (2tailed)
best?
7,214
0
2,511
N
-.235**
-.496**
Pearson
-.145**
Should
Correlation
economie
.000
.000
.000
reforms be
Sig. (2tailed)
continued?
5,280
14,507
1,376
N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
®Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.
What is more
important
order or
democracy?
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.000
14,507
-.235**
.000
1,376

-.496**
.000
5,280
1.000

56,040

Table 19
Related Economic and Ethnic Relations Attitudes of the Russian Population (Monitoring
surveys)

Pearson
Should
Correlation
economic
reforms be Sig. (2continued? tailed)
N
Attitudes
to Jews

Attitudes
to Azeris

Attitudes
to
Chechens

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

Should
economic
reforms be
continued?
(1 reforms
should be
continued,
2—reforms
should be
stopped)
1.000

2,807
.136**

Attitudes
to Jews
(1 sympathy,
2—
neutrality,
3—
caution,
4— fear,
distrust)
136**

Attitudes
to
Chechens
(1 sympathy,
2—
neutrality,
3—
caution,
4— fear,
distrust)
.055**
.020

Attitudes
to Roma
(1 sympathy,
2—
neutrality,
3—
caution,
4— fear,
distrust)

Attitudes
to Azeris
(1 sympathy,
2—
neutrality,
3—
caution,
4— fear,
distrust)

.009

.000

.286

.004

.630

2,807
1.000

2,807
.295**

2,807
241**

2,807
192**

.000

.000

.000

4,813
1.000

4,813
.542**

4,813
.483**

.000

.000

4,813
1.000

4,813
.576**

.000
2,807
.020

4
4,813
.295**

.286

.000

2,807
.055**

4,813
.241**

4,813
.542**

.004

.000

.000

2,807

4,813

4,813

.000
4,813
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4,813

Table 19 continued
Attitudes
to Roma

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

.009

.192**

.483**

.576**

1.000

.630

.000

.000

.000

.

4,813

4,813

4,813

4,813
2,807
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 evel (2-tailed).

7. Composite Variables and Select Political. Ideological. Economic. Foreign Policy, and
Ethnic Relations Attitudes
In today’s Russia there is an important general divide, one that cuts across
nostalgic and critical public attitudes, on the one side, and progressive and sympathetic
ones, on the other. Strictly speaking, the first grouping is a good (although not absolute)
approximation to the organic-statist constellation of public attitudes. People who regret
the demise o f the USSR and believe that Russia would be better off if everything
remained as it was before 1985 (beginning of Perestroika) clearly endorse more
authoritarian political system, collective-centered (as opposed to individual-centered)
ideology, state-controlled economy, and revival of Russia as a super-power. The second
grouping is close to the liberal constellation of public attitudes. People who accept the
demise of the USSR and see post-Commimist Russia in relatively positive light are likely
to accept a more decentralized political system, individualistic vision of society, mixed (if
not outright free market) economy, and Russia’s diminished role on the international
arena. Tables 20 and 21 demonstrate that nostalgia for the USSR is strongly correlated
with a rejection of Russia’s post-Communist course, while acceptance of the post-USSR
reality correlates with a positive assessment of Russia’s current development.
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Among political attitudes, the degree of support for multipartism (one of my
democratic indicators) is positively correlated with the acceptance of Russia’s postCommunist development. The more a person accepts the post-Communist order, the
more likely he/she is to favor multipartism (Table 22).

Table 20
Attitudes to the Demise of the USSR According to Assessment of Russia’s PostCommunist Course (Express surveys)
Is Russia moving in a
right direction? (1—
Russia is moving in a
right direction, 2—
Russia is moving
towards a dead-end)
1.000

Is Russia moving Pearson Correlation
,
in a right
Sig. (2-tailed)
2,975
direction?
N
Pearson Correlation -.185**
Do you regret
demise of the
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
2,804
N
USSR?
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Do you regret
demise of the
USSR? (1—yes,
regret, 2—no, do
not regret)
-.185**
.000
2,804
1.000
.

4,827

Table 21
Attitudes to Post-1985 Developments According to Assessment of Russia’s PostCommunist Course (Express surveys)

Is Russia moving
in a right
direction?

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Would Russia be
better off if
everything
remained as it was
before 1985? (1—
yes, 2—no)
-.315**
.000
.
12,760
13,439

Is Russia moving in a
right direction? (1—
Russia is moving in a
right direction, 2—
Russia is moving
towards a dead-end)
1.000
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Table 21 continued
Pearson Correlation
Would Russia be
better off if
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
everything
remained as it was
before 1985?
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

1.000

-.315
.000
12,760

.

16,004

Table 22
Attitudes to Democracy According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course
(Express surveys)
Is Russia moving
in aright
direction? (1—
Russia is moving
in a right
direction, 2—
Russia is moving
towards a dead
end)
1.000

Is Russia moving Pearson Correlation
in a right
Sig. (2-tailed)
direction?
N
2,905
Pearson Correlation
-.071**
How many
parties should
Sig. (2-tailed)
.001
N
Russia have?
2,149
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

How many parties
should Russia have?
(1—Russia should
have one dominant
party, 2—Russia
should have two well
organized parties, 3—
Russia should have
several parties)
-0.071**
.001
2,149
1.000
.

2,597

It is interesting to see what motivates conservatives who favor order over civil
rights and welcome dictatorship as a means to solve Russia’s contemporary problems.
Tables 23 and 23a-c (Appendix F) reveal that dictatorship-oriented respondents are the
people who are dissatisfied with Russia’s current political and economic situation and
who long for a revival of the USSR. Clearly, conservatives are people who did not find
their place in today’s Russia and who are disillusioned with the general direction in
which contemporary Russia is moving.
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Table 23
Preference for Order and Support for Dictatorship According to Attitudes to Post-1985
Developments and Evaluations of the Current Political and Economic Situation
tMonitoring surveys)

What do you
think about
economic
situation in
Russia?
What do you
think about
political
situation in
Russia?
Would
Russia be
better off if
everything
remained as
it was before
1985?
What is more
important
order or
democracy?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

What do
you think
about
economic
situation
in
Russia?
(1—^very
good,
2— good,
3—
average,
4—bad,
5—^very
bad)
1.000

83,818
.338**

What do
you think
about
political
situation
in Russia?
(1 favorable,
2— calm,
3—^tense
4—
explosive)

Would
Russia be
better off
if
everything
remained
as it was
before
1985?
(1—yes,
2—no)

What is
more
important
order or
democracy?
(1—order,
2—
democracy)

Is
dictatorship
the best
solution to
contemporary
Russia’s
problems?
(1—^yes, 2—
no)

.338**

-.094**

-.063**

-.065**

.000

.000

.000

.005

66,208
1.000

3,823
-.151**

21,263
-.155**

1,837
-.128**

.000

.000

.000

2,861
1.000

11,552
.278**

1,722
.350**

.000

.000

.000
66,208
-.094**

71,862
-.151**

.000

.000

3,823

2,861

4,284

1,845

1,786

-.063**

-.155**

.278**

1.000

274**

.000

.000

.000

21,263

11,552

1,845

.000
25,305
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881

Table 23 continued
128**
Pearson
-.065**
Is
Correlation
dictatorship
.005
.000
the best
Sig. (2solution to
tailed)
1,837
1,722
contemporary N
Russia’s
problems?
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
-

.350**

274**

.000

.000

,

1,786

881

2,040

1.000

Similarly, economic attitudes can be explained by respondent’s evaluations of
Russia’s economic and political situation. People who have a positive political and
economic outlook, who consider Russia’s post-Communist course as correct, and who
reject pre-1985 status-quo, tend to support a continuation of liberal economic reforms,
even in its most radical form, as well as Gaidar’s “shock therapy.” They are also more
likely to believe in the free market (Tables 24-27; 24a-b in Appendix F).

Table 24
Preferred Economic Model and Support for Continuation of Liberal Economic Reforms
According to Attitudes to Post-1985 Developments and Evaluations of the Current
Political and Economic Situation tMonitoring surveys)
What do
you think
about
economic
situation
in Russia?
(1—^very

What
Would
What do
you think Russia be economic
better off
model is
about
if
the best?
political
situation
everything ( 1 govemedin Russia? remained
market.
as
it
was
(1 -

good, 2—

favorable.
2 —calm.

good, 3—
average.
4— bad.
5—^very
bad)

before

1985?
(1—yes.
3—^tense
2 —no)
4—
explosive)

2— free

market)
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Should
economic
reforms be
continued?
(1 reforms
should be
continued.
2—

reforms
should be
stopped)

Table 24 continued
What do
you think
about
economic
situation
in Russia?
What do
you think
about
political
situation
in Russia?
Would
Russia be
better off
if
everything
remained
as it was
before
1985?
What
economic
model is
the best?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

.338**

-.094**

-.097**

.198**

.000

.000

.000

.000

83,818

66,208

3,823

5,359

51,085

.338**

1.000

-.151**

-.102**

.233**

.000

.000

.000

1.000

.000
66,208

71,862

2,861

4,114

43,680

-.094**

-.151**

1.000

a

-.481**

.000

.000

•

•

.000

3,823

2,861

4,284

0

2,752

a
-.102**
1.000
Pearson
-.097**
Correlation
.000
.000
Sig. (2•
tailed)
7,214
4,114
0
5,359
N
-.481**
-.496**
Pearson
.198**
.233**
Should
Correlation
economic
.000
.000
.000
.000
reforms be Sig. (2continued? tailed)
2,752
5,280
51,085
43,680
N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 evel (2-tailed).
Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.

-.496**

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
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.000
5,280
1.000
•

56,040

Table 25
Assessment of Gaidar’s Reforms According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist
Course (Express surveys)
Is Russia moving in
a right direction?
(1—^Russia is
moving in a right
direction, 2—Russia
is moving towards a
dead-end)
Is Russia
moving in a
right direction?

What do you think about
Gaidar’s reforms (“shock
therapy”)? (1—Gaidar’s
reforms were necessary and
correct, 2—Gaidar’s reforms
were necessary, but badly
implemented, 3— Gaidar’s
reforms were wrong)
294**
1.000
.000
2,901
7,868

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

J94**
What do you
.000
think about
2,901
Gaidar’s
reforms (“shock
therapy”)?
** Correlation is significant at the ().01 level (2-tailed).

1.000
3,481

Table 26
Preferred Speed of Economic Reform According to Attitudes to Post-1985 Developments
(Express surveys)

Would Russia be
better off if

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

everything

N

Would Russia be
better off if
everything
remained as it was
before 1985? (1—
yes, 2—^no)
1.000
.

2,770

remained as it was
before 1985?
Pearson Correlation
What type of
Sig. (2-tailed)
economic reforms
N
would you prefer
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 leve

-.162**
.000
2,260
(2-tailed).

What type of
economic reforms
would you prefer
(1— speedy, radical
reform; 2 - slow,
cautious change)
-162**
.000
2,260

1.000
2,686
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Table 27
Preferred Speed of Economic Reform According to Assessment of Russia’s PostCommunist Course (Express surveys)

Is Russia
moving in a
right direction?
What type of
economic
reforms would
you prefer
** Correlation is

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Is Russia moving in a
right direction? (1—
Russia is moving in a
right direction, 2—
Russia is moving
towards a dead-end)
1.000

What type of
economic reforms
would you prefer
(1— speedy, radical
reform; 2 - slow,
cautious change)
.042**
.000
.
20,784
17,282
.042**
1.000
.000
.
17,282
20,418

significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The majority of foreign policy public attitudes is correlated with respondent’s
assessment of Russia’s post-Communist course. The more approvingly a respondent
views Russia’s post-Communist period, the more likely he/she is to have positive
attitudes towards the US and NATO, to allow membership of Eastern European countries
and the former Soviet republics in this organization, to support Russia’s EU membership,
to see the West as Russia’s partner, and to reject union with Belorus (the most antiWestern country among the post- Soviet republics). Alternatively, respondents with more
critical assessment of Russia’s post-Communist course tend to be more anti-Western
(Tables 28-33).
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Table 28
Attitudes to the US and Perception of NATO’s Threat According to Assessment of
Russia’s Post-Commimist Course tExpress surveys)
Is Russia
moving in a
right
direction?
(1—^Russia is
moving in a
right
direction, 2—
Russia is
moving
towards a
dead-end)
1.000

Attitude to
the US (1—
very positive,
2—^rather
positive, 3—
rather
negative, 4—
very
negative)

Should Russia fear
the NATO? (1—
Russia should
definitely fear
NATO, 2—Russia
should rather fear
NATO, 3—Russia
should rather not fear
NATO, 4— Russia
should definitely not
fear NATO)

.087**

-.130**

.000
2,656
1.000

.000
2,819
.571**

3,134
.571**

.000
2,655
1.000

.000
2,655

3,318

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
2,996
Pearson
.087**
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
N
2,656
Should Russia Pearson
-.130**
Correlation
fear the
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
NATO?
2,819
N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Is Russia
moving in a
right
direction?
Attitude to the
US

Table 29
Perception of Threat from Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic Joining NATO
According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)
Is Russia moving in
a right direction?
(1—Russia is
moving in a right
direction, 2—
Russia is moving
towards a dead
end)

Does Poland, Slovakia
and the Czech
Republic’s
membership in NATO
resent a threat to
Russia? (1— definite
threat, 2— substantial
threat, 3—minor
threat, 4— no threat)
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Table 29 continued
1.000
Pearson Correlation
Is Russia moving
Sig. (2-tailed)
in a right
5,181
N
direction?
-.050**
Pearson Correlation
Does Poland,
.000
Sig.
(2-tailed)
Slovakia and the
3,320
Czech Republic’s N
membership in
NATO resent a
threat to Russia?
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

-.050**
.000
3,320
1.000
3,933

Table 30
Attitude to the Former Soviet Republics Joining NATO According to Assessment of
Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)
What is your attitude
to former Soviet
republics joining
NATO? (1—definitely
positive, 2—rather
positive, 3—^rather
negative, 4—
definitely negative)
1.000
.072**
.
.000
3,404
2,718
.072**
1.000
,
.000
2,718
3,250

Is Russia moving in
a right direction?
(1—Russia is
moving in a right
direction, 2—^Russia
is moving towards a
dead-end)
Is Russia moving Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
in a right
N
direction?
Pearson Correlation
What is your
attitude to former Sig. (2-tailed)
Soviet republics
N
joining NATO?
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 31
Perception of the Relationship Between Russia and the West According to Assessment of
Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)
What is the
relationship between
Russia and the West?
(1—^they are friends,
should strengthen their
ties, 2—they are
enemies, Russia should
decrease its
dependency on the
West)
.241**
1.000
.000
3,810
4,303
.241**
1.000
.000
.
4,545
3,810

Is Russia moving
in a right
direction? (1—
Russia is moving
in a right
direction, 2—
Russia is moving
towards a dead
end)
Is Russia moving in
a right direction?

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

What is the
relationship
between Russia and
the West?
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 32
Attitudes to Joining the EU According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist
Course (Express surveys)

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 leve (2-tailed).

Is Russia moving
in a right
direction?
Should Russia join
the EU?

Should Russia join
the EU? (1—
definitely yes, 2—
rather yes, 3—
rather no, 4—
definitely no)
.071**
.000
2,872
3,508
1.000
.071**
.000
3,329
2,872

Is Russia moving in a
right direction? (1—
Russia is moving in a
right direction, 2—
Russia is moving
towards a dead-end)
1.000

176

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 33
Support for the Union with Belorus According to Assessment of Russia’s PostCommunist Course (Express surveys)

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Do you support
Union with
Sig. (2-tailed)
Belorus?
N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
Is Russia moving in
a right direction?

Is Russia moving in a
right direction? (1—
Russia is moving in a
right direction, 2—
Russia is moving
towards a dead-end)
1.000
4,710
.148**
.000
4,238
(2-tailed).

Do you support
Union with
Belorus? (1—
yes, support, 2—
no, oppose)
.148**
.000
4,238
1.000
4,831

Finally, there are important correlations between individual ethnic attitudes and a
respondent’s assessment of the current political and economic situation. People who are
dissatisfied with contemporary political and economic developments (i.e., those who do
not like post-Communist semi-democratic political system and the mixed economy) are
more likely to be xenophobic than the people who were able to fit into and ultimately
accept new political and economic realities. The latter are less anti-Semitic and less
intolerant towards Azeris and the Roma (Table 34).
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Table 34

cq'

Attitudes to Jews, Azeris, Chechens, and Roma According to Evaluations of the Current Political and Economic Situation (Monitoring
surveys)

3CD

■D
O
Q.
C
a
o

00

■o

o
CD

Q.

■CDD

What do you
think about
economic
situation in
Russia?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

What do you
think about
political
situation in
Russia?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

C/)
C/)

What do you
think about
economic
situation in
Russia? (1—
very good,
2—good, 3—
average, 4—
bad, 5—very
bad)
1.000

4,454
.386**

What do you
think about
political
situation in
Russia? (1—
favorable, 2—
calm,
3—^tense
4— explosive)

Attitudes to
Jews (1—
sympathy, 2—
neutrality, 3—
caution, 4—
fear, distrust)

Attitudes to
Azeris (1—
sympathy, 2—
neutrality, 3—
caution, 4—
fear, distrust)

Attitudes to
Chechens (1—
sympathy, 2—
neutrality, 3—
caution, 4—
fear, distrust)

Attitudes to
Roma (1—
sympathy, 2—
neutrality, 3—
caution, 4—
fear, distrust)

.386**

.035**

.057**

.015

.031**

.000

.019

.000

.232

.038

4,135
1.000

4,454
.055**

4,454
.064**

4,454
.028

4.454
0.028

.000

.000

.065

.067

4,383

4,383

4,383

4,383

.000
4,135

4,383
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C
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Table 34 continued

C/)
W
o'
o

Attitudes to
Jews

o

3CD
O
■O
D
c q

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.295**

.241**

.192**

.000

.000

.000

4,813
.295**

4,813
1.000

4,813
.542**

4,813
.483**

.000

.000

.

.000

.000

4,454
.015

4,383
.028

4,813
.241**

4,813
.542**

4,813
1.000

4,813
.576**

.232

0.065

0.000

.000

4,454
.031**

4,383
0.028

4,813
.192**

4,813
.483**

4,813
.576**

4,813
1.000

.038

.067

.000

.000

.000

•

4,383

4,813

4,813

4,813

4,813

035**

.055**

.019

.000

4,454
.057**

4,383
.064**

.000

1.000

'

o

Attitudes to
Azeris

Q
o
"n

c
O’
o

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

CD

■D
O
Q .
C
a
o
Q

--j

Attitudes to
Chechens

■o
o

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

CD
Q .

Attitudes to
Roma
■CDD
(/)
(/)

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

4.454
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

.000

The correlation analysis uncovered two groupings of public attitudes —organicstatist and liberal. The divide discernible in Russian public opinion is somewhat different
from the organic-statist —liberal divide found among the Russian elite. If the Russian
elite supports a set of attitudes in which a positive assessment of political
authoritarianism, conservative/statist ideology, anti-Western foreign policy, and ethnic
nationalism coexist with the belief in the principles of the free market, there is stronger
degree of internal consistency in public attitudes. Russians who endorse organie-statist or
liberal attitudes in one area are more likely to approve similar attitudes in all other issue
domains. For instance, people with liberal political attitudes (those who reject political
centralism of the USSR or pre-1985 Russia, approve of Russia’s post-Commimist
political development and support multipartism), are also more likely to hold liberal
attitudes in ideological (rejection of restriction of civil rights and freedoms and
denouncement o f dictatorship as a means to solve Russia’s problem), economic
(endorsement of the free market economic model and acceptance of the mixed economy),
foreign policy (positive attitudes towards the West, NATO, and the EU), and ethnic
relations ( tolerance) issue domains. Conversely, politically authoritarian respondents
tend to hold ideologically conservative, economically etatist, anti-Western and
xenophobic beliefs.

Conclusions About Relationship Between Russian Public Opinion and Elite Value
Orientations According to Individual Issue Domains
To measure the congruence between public opinion and the elite’s attitudes I
compared trends in public opinion to trends in government-affiliated intellectuals’
statements. Politically, Russian public opinion shifted towards greater authoritarianism.
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This shift occurred between 1993 and 1996. However, there is not a complete rejection of
democratic institutions and norms. At the same time, there is a clear break with original
democratic ideas among the elite, a break which occurred in 1998, after the shift in public
opinion. Although the growing authoritarianism of public opinion is replicated on the
elite level, the elite does not share the public’s surviving democratic orientations. At
present, the elite is more authoritarian than the Russian public. The elite’s authoritarian
preferences appear to be not a mere reaction to anti-democratic tendencies of public
opinion, but a sign of personal, perhaps economic, interests. After all, governmentaffiliated intellectuals perceive political decentralization as detrimental to the market (see
Chapter II, Section “Discourse of the Third Period: Qualitative Presentation”). This
concern for the market economy is bom not only out of strong economic convictions.
Both government-affiliated intellectuals and their political patrons are among the few
beneficiaries of Russia’s on-going liberal economic reforms.
Ideologically, unlike government-affiliated intellectuals, Russians were always
conservative and state-oriented. The strengthening of the public’s ideological
conservatism occurred in 1993-1994, while a similar shift in official discourse (elite
attitudes) did not happen until 1999. In this issue domain, official discourse clearly
followed changes in public opinion. There is a degree of consensus between the elite and
the general public, as both came to endorse ideological conservatism by the end of
research period.
Economically, Russian public opinion always favored the governed market model
and rejected the principles of economic liberalism. The elite, however, consistently
preferred the free market model, a preference which stands in marked opposition to an
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increasingly negative public assessment of the market and market reforms. Together with
anti-democratic preferences, economic liberalism, insulated from the impact of public
opinion, appears to be another deep-seated clan interest of the Russian elite. As narrow
strata who benefited from the free market reforms, both intellectual and political elites are
eager to defend the free market ideas.
In the area offoreign policy, Russians are split between those who favor a
moderately pro-Westem direction and a moderately anti-Western course. The balance
between the two conflicting approaches was disturbed in 1995/1996 (NATO’s eastward
expansion, tensions around UN inspections in Iraq) and in 1999 (NATO’s air strikes on
Yugoslavia), when anti-Western attitudes prevailed. However, pro-Westem attitudes
rebounded by 2000. In contrast, anti-Western discourse among government-affiliated
intellectuals clearly triumphed over a more pro-Westem direction. If the shift towards
stronger anti-Westem proclamations in official discourse that occurred in 1996-1999
parallels the changes in public opinion, the current anti-Westem stance of governmentaffiliated intellectuals is not shared by the public at large. It appears that the elite can
count on the support of the public during confrontations with the West, but the former
displays its own anti-Westem bias during more amicable periods.
In the area of ethnic relations, there is a clear-cut increase in nationalistic attitudes
among the Russians. The decline of ethnic tolerance started in 1993. By 1998 Russians
came to espouse strong nationalistic preferences. In 1998, government-affiliated
intellectuals also embraced mild nationalism. The decrease of ethnic tolerance among the
elite parallels the similar process among the general public. Both elite and public attitudes
appear to move in the same direction, with changes in public ethnic beliefs preceding the
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transformation of elite orientations. However, compared to rampant public nationalistic
displays, official discourse is only moderately nationalistic, a possible sign that
nationalism is not an entrenched trait of the Russian elite.
Russian public opinion data conforms to the conventional wisdom concerning the
demographic determinants of public opinion. Not surprisingly, more educated and
younger people and people with better jobs are more in favor of democracy, liberal
ideology, a ffee-market economy, a pro-Westem foreign policy and ethnic tolerance.
Older and less educated people as well as pensioners, the unemployed, and blue-collar
workers support authoritarianism, a conservative ideology, the governed market model,
an independent or even anti-Westem, foreign policy, and nationalism. Many attitudes are
related to each other. Among the most important conclusions of the statistical analysis is
that Russian public opinion is more intemally consistent and is guided by an easily
discemible logic. There is a clear demarcation between liberal and organic-statist public
attitudes.
Changes in official discourse are better understood when compared against the
demands of public opinion. Such comparisons allow to see if the elite has a public
mandate for the transformation in its discourse and action. During the research period,
only free market economic category of the original, liberal, discourse survived intact,
despite consistently hostile public opinion. Although the elite’s market ideas are selfsufficient, changes in other categories of official discourse are congment with changes in
public opinion. The elite’s current rejection of the liberal ideology or ethnic tolerance
appear to be temporary tactical maneuvers to pacify Russian public opinion which
unambiguously endorses ideological conservatism and ethnic nationalism. These attitudes
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may not represent deep-seated elite orientations. There are, however, grounds for concern
about democratic institutions or pro-Westem course in foreign policy, because despite
public opinion favoring both, the Russian elite opted for authoritarian or anti-Westem
positions. Democracy appears to be the most threatened category of the original, liberal,
discourse.
Although my evidence suggests that public opinion and the elite’s attitudes are
related, the exact nature of this relationship is rather complex. In some areas there is
congmence between changes in public opinion and official discourse (political
authoritarianism, ideological conservatism, anti-Westem foreign policy, nationalism),
while in others there is a total disjunction between public opinion and elite response
(democracy, pro-Westem foreign policy, and, especially, the govemed market model).
The analysis up to this point leaves us with one final consideration: What are the
policy implications of changes/continuities in elite and public attitudes? In particular, are
there issue domains in which the political elite sides with public opinion? And do
changes in discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals precede or follow changes in
actual policies? Is discourse used to inspire policy changes or merely to sell it to the
public ex post factol

Political, Ideological, Economic, Foreign Policy, and Ethnic Relations Actions of the
Russian Political Elite: Event Analysis
To investigate the complex relationship between public opinion, official
discourse, and actual policy initiatives, I compared results of event analysis to the
outcomes of both content analysis of discourse and an extensive review of public opinion
surveys.
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1. Sample Selection
Only events involving the top members of the executive branch (president,
Prime-Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Minister of Press, other members of
the Cabinet, and their high ranking staff), such as signing laws and presidential decrees,
annoimcing important economic measures, signing treaties, visits to foreign countries and
hosting foreign delegations in Russia, military maneuvers, statements concerning the
foreign policy problems, executive decisions concerning the future of Chechnya, etc.,
were selected. The descriptions of events were taken from Rossiia-2000 and the archives
of Russian National News Service. A total of 1078 events was analyzed. All events were
assumed to have equal weight.

2. Event Analvsis Procedures and Evaluative Criteria
Selected events were classified according to five issue domains (political,
ideological, economic, foreign and ethnic policy). For instance, signing a Power Sharing
Treaty between the federal center and a province (democratic category). Federation
reform, or attacks on an independent mass media (authoritarian category) were classified
as political events. Reductions of state security forces (event reflecting a liberal ideology)
or empowering the state to listen to private phone conversations (event reflecting
statist/conservative ideology) were classified under ideological issue domain. Price
liberalization (free market category), or a governmental decision to support domestic
agrarian producers (govemed market category) were placed under the economic rubric.

An order to send Russian troops to cooperate with NATO in Bosnia (pro-Westem
category), Yeltsin’s denunciation of NATO for the war in Kosovo, or signing the
Russian-Belorussian Union treaty (independent or anti-Westem category) were classified
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under foreign policy domain. The start of the military operation in Chechnya
(nationalistic category) or peaceful (political and economic) resolution of ethnic conflict
in Karachaevo-Cherkessiia (tolerant category) were classified as ethnic policy events.
Classified events were aggregated by year (see Figures below).

3. Evolution of Actions of the Russian Elite
Politically, the actions of the Russian political elite changed towards greater
authoritarianism in 1999 (Figure 77). The authoritarian shift in official discourse (2000)
followed the shift in the actions of the political elite. It appears that the new authoritarian
agenda of the political elite is endorsed by government-affiliated intellectuals and has a
support of a more authoritarian segment of the general public. At the same time,
surviving democratic attitudes, held by a significant number of Russians, are no longer
found in either official discourse or policies.

'sum of all political
actions

-30

dates

Figure 77. Overall Evolution of the Russian Elite's Political Actions
Figure 78 shows that the actions of the political elite in ideological issue domain
were consistent with the demands of the conservative public. Government-affiliated
intellectuals, whose ideological orientations were originally much more liberal, appear to
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modify their positions in response to the dual conservative demands of their political
patrons and the general public. In this area, official discourse was used to promote
already popular conservative policies of the political elite.

"sum of all ideological actions

o
-10

dates

Figure 78. Overall Evolution of the Russian Elite's Ideological Actions
Figure 79 demonstrates that from the very beginning (early 1994) free market
ideas, relentlessly advocated by government-affiliated intellectuals, had a strong backing
from the political elite. Public economic attitudes appear to matter neither to governmentaffiliated intellectuals, nor to the political elite. Liberal economic policies clearly
represent elite’s agenda and program of action, which is not only fully elaborated in
official discourse, but also implemented through actual policies. But the realization of the
elite’s free market project faces the unsympathetic public which favors the govemed
market option.
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Figure 79. Overall Evolution of the Russian Elite's Economic Actions
Figure 80 indicates that the political elite shifted its foreign policy course in 1995,
the same year the anti-Westem reaction among the public at large reached its peak. The
discourse o f government-affiliated intellectuals also changed around the same time.
Clearly, anti-Westem public attitudes could and were used as a basis for the Russian
response to counter Westem advances, or, at least, as a “smokescreen” for the antiWestem policy tum. There was a public mandate for the anti-Westem resistance carried
out by the Russian intellectual and political elites during NATO’s proposed expansion. In
1999 the political elite responded to the weakening of anti- Westem attitudes among the
general public and its actions became less anti-Westem. Yet, in general, the political
elite’ actions remained anti-Westem long after the public retumed to more balanced and
pro-Westem positions. In this instance, the interests of the public and the political elite
did not coincide. Government-affiliated intellectuals, whose anti-Westem attitudes never
subsided, sided with their political patrons, rather than with society. Both govemment-
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affiliated intellectuals and public opinion drifted toward more nationalistic attitudes to
ethnic relations. Yet, the political elite resisted this shift and remained moderately
tolerant (Figure 81). Government-affiliated intellectuals clearly were more sensitive to
public opinion. However, public opinion itself was xenophobic.
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Figure 80. Overall Evolution of the Russian Elite's Foreign Policy Actions
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Figure 81. Overall Evolution of the Russian Elite's Ethnic Policy Actions
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Figure 82. Overall Evolution of All Types of Actions of the Russian Elite
In general, according to Figure 82, actions of the political elite became more
organic-statist in 1995 - a point that corresponds to the middle, transitional, period in the
evolution of official discourse (1994-1998). Government-affiliated intellectuals’
discourse is clearly related to the actions of the political elite. In fact, the degree of
correlation between the discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals and actual policy
choices of the political elite is much stronger than the correlation between official
discourse and public attitudes. Russian government-affiliated intellectuals seem to be less
of a link between society and the political elite and more of the ideological prop for the
latter. This is not surprising given that government-affiliated intellectuals are closely
affiliated with the state’s executive structures. In the phrase government-affiliated
intellectuals, government-affiliation matters more than the role of the intellectual as an
intermediary between the state and society. In the instances when government-affiliated
intellectuals might have responded to the demands of public opinion, and transmitted it to
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the political elite, public opinion itself was authoritarian, illiberal, anti-Westem, and
xenophobic.
Russian government-affiliated intellectuals’ willingness to heed only the organicstatist elements of public opinion is rather telling. Not only does there exist a permissive
domestic environment, but international constraints, capable of changing behavior of
Russian actors, are conspicuously absent. In post-Communist East European countries,
public opinion is also xenophobic (see Chapter V), but an important incentive of the
imminent joining the European Union, an organization which unambiguously rejects any
type of nationalism, conditioned East European elites to distance themselves from the
public’s nationalism. In the absence of incentives associated with the entry into the EU
and other Westem organizations, the Russian elite can get away with more elements of
organic-statism than their East European counterparts (see Chapter V).
The public’s attitudes occasionally reach the political elite through governmentaffiliated intellectuals. In the post-Communist period, government-affiliated intellectuals
may have served as linkages between anti-Westem, authoritarian, and conservative public
demands and corresponding policies, casting the actions of the political elite as a
response to the domestic pressures. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that
government-affiliated intellectuals requested the results of the public opinion surveys.
The presidential Administration and Council as well as Gaidar’s Research Institute*^^
were and still are among VTsIOM’s frequent clients. Although these observations do not
prove conclusively that the elite responds to demands of public opinion, it hints in the
Elite intellectuals, whose public documents were analyzed in the previous chapter, worked for
either presidential Administration or presidential Council. Gaidar’s Institute for Transitional
Economics is a liberal research institution closely affiliated with Yeltsin’s government, which
continues to be influential in Putin’s era. Gaidar himself was an architect o f Russian liberal economic
reform and a Russian PM in 1992-1994.
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direction of mutually reciprocal relationship between the elite and public opinion. There
are, at least, some indications that public attitudes are not irrelevant for the governing
elites. However, more often, government-affiliated intellectuals and their political patrons
articulated and acted upon their own interests and beliefs.
The reasons for government-affiliated intellectuals’ and their political patrons’
insensitivity to the pro-Westem and pro-democratic sections of public opinion may lie in
the nature of Russian electoral politics. The pro-Westem and pro-democratic faction of
the Russian public already supports the current elite. In order to attract voters from the
opposite, pro-Communist side, goveming elites would rather compromise on the lowsalience foreign policy issues or even on political matters than on their core economic
beliefs of the free market. Anti-Westem and authoritarian discourse may be a reflection
of elite’s rational electoral calculations.
The elite takes its cues from public opinion, but only when it suits its interests.
This may actually be a ground for cautious optimism. Since the anti-Westem course in
foreign policy or authoritarianism is not a function of anti-Westem or authoritarian public
opinion, there are fewer constraints on the Russian elite’s democratic and pro-Westem
aspirations (even if at present there are no such aspirations) than previously
acknowledged. The Russian elite could cormt on the support of the public, which
remained immune to the elite’s anti-Westem and authoritarian discourse, if it embarks on
these paths.
Conclusions
1.

Government-affiliated intellectuals drifted toward more authoritarian,

conservative, moderately anti-Westem and moderately nationalistic positions, but they
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continued to support the free market. The shift started as early as 1994/1995 and was
largely complete by 1999/2000 (the time of Putin’s election).
2. Public opinion is politically mixed and supportive of a dualistic foreign
policy. Russians are also nationalistic, ideologically and economically conservative,
consistently supporting statist ideology and the govemed market economic model.
3. Actions of the political elite show a shift toward more authoritarianism and an
anti-Westem foreign policy. The political elite’s ideological conservatism, belief in the
free market economy and ethnic tolerance remains stable.
4. Government-affiliated intellectuals were sensitive to authoritarian, antiWestem, nationalistic, and, recently, ideologically conservative elements of public
opinion, but not to economically etatist, pro-Westem, and pro-democratic public
orientations. Intellectuals played the role of cultural entrepreneurs in rationalizing the free
market ideas of their political patrons. They also defended their own ideologically liberal
positions against the more conservative stances of both the political elite and the public.
5. Discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals rarely triggers changes in
policies. It is used to explain the policies ex post facto or to convince the public.
6. Public opinion enters policies either directly (e.g., shared conservatism of the
general public and the political elite) or via the discourse of government-affiliated
intellectuals in the political and foreign policy domains (e.g., authoritarian and antiWestem consensus between the elite and he public). Public opinion reaches the elite’s
ethnic policy discourse, but not actual policies. Public opinion has virtually no presence
in either economic discourse or in resulting policies.
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7. The consensus among the post-Communist Russian elite and the general
public emerged exclusively around organic-statist values and principles. During the
research period, the public and elite’s attitudes converged around political
authoritarianism, conservative ideology, and anti-Westem foreign policy (all are elements
of the organic-statist set of beliefs). Elite and public opinion diverged on the issues of
democracy, economic liberalism, pro-Westem foreign policy, and ethnic toleration (all
are elements of the liberal set of beliefs).
8. Russian public opinion is more intemally consistent and logical than the
discourse and value orientations of the elite. Unlike their elite, whose current belief
system combines liberal economic postulates with political authoritarianism, ideological
conservatism, anti-Westem and xenophobic attitudes, Russians tend to either support
exclusively liberal orientations or to go in the organic-statist direction. Importantly,
however, liberal camp among the Russian public is much weaker and less numerous than
its organic-statist altemative.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POLISH CASE: STABILITY OF MODIFIED LIBERAL DISCOURSE
The Polish case was selected for two reasons. First, it illustrates stability of elite
and public orientations. Second, it shows that the instability reported in the Russian case
is not a universal phenomenon, common to all post-Communist societies. As such, the
Polish data added a comparative perspective to my analysis and facilitated a better
understanding of the complex relationship between the elites and the publics in postCommunist societies. Although the Polish and the Russian cases share Communist
legacies and are, therefore, fundamentally comparable, they represent two distinct models
of the relationship between the attitudes of government-affiliated intellectuals and the
preferences of the general public, which 1 call post-Soviet and Eastern European. In this
chapter, 1 present empirical evidence to analyze the evolution of Polish elite attitudes
towards politics, ideology, the economy, foreign policy, and ethnic relations and compare
it to the Russian data.
In Chapter 11,1 showed that, initially, Russian government-affiliated intellectuals
subscribed to an unadulterated version of liberal discourse, a version that, ultimately,
proved unsustainable. In the case of Poland, however, 1 expected to see that the original
discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals, although mostly liberal, also contained
significant organic-statist (conservative) elements, especially in the areas of economic
policy and ethnic r e l a t i o n s . 1 hypothesized that during the post-Communist period.

The labels “liberal” and “conservative” (“organic-statist”) are context dependent, as the Communist
past o f both Poland and Russia greatly affects and alters what it means to be a “liberal” or a
“conservative” in either one o f them today. Also, as discussed in Chapter II, I use the term
“conservative” to denote a uniquely Russian/European phenomenon. Unlike contemporary American
conservatism whose defining features include defense o f the free market capitalism, traditional social
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attitudes of both Polish government-affiliated intellectuals and the public were
moderately liberal and stable, while Russian government-affiliated intellectuals’
preferences shifted from strong liberal to strong organic-statist positions, a change which
was not always accompanied by a parallel shift of public opinion. The short-term changes
in Polish official discourse occurred around the time of the elections and subsequent
rotations within the political elite. In general, however, I anticipated that the preferences
of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals at the end of the research period resembled
those in the beginning of the research period.
More specifically, I hypothesized that, politically, Polish government-affiliated
intellectuals remained loyal to the initial inclusive understanding of democracy. In the
ideological sphere, I expected to find that Polish government-affiliated intellectuals
continued to embrace liberal principles of discourse. I hypothesized that throughout the
research period Polish government-affiliated intellectuals favored both the free market
and the govemed market models. In the area of foreign relations, I expected to find a
strong and stable pro-Westem consensus. Finally, I anticipated to see an enduring
combination of ethnically tolerant and nationalistic attitudes.

My hypotheses were

partially confirmed.

structures and values, minimal role o f the state, religious revival, economic protectionism, and stricter
immigration controls, its European counterpart is organized around authoritarian, statist, etatist,
isolationist, and nationalist principles.
Analysis o f nationalistic/ethnically tolerant attitudes in Poland, a fairly homogeneous country, is
justified on three grounds. First, Poland has the problem o f migrant workers/traders (mostly from
Belorus, Ukraine, and Russia), whose presence often evokes strong xenophobic feelings. Second,
Poland is subject to persistent anti-Semitic and anti-Roma reactions; despite the relatively low numbers
o f these minorities in today’s Poland, their role in the Polish society and history is assessed highly
negatively by the Slavic majority. Finally, Poland is characterized by a strong degree o f “outward”
nationalism, a consequence o f centuries-long foreign domination. As a result, there is an enduring
debate about what it means to be Polish vis-a-vis other nations/cultures. One o f the possible answers is
the vision o f “Pole as Catholic,” a conception which excludes all “others” from the definitions o f
Polishness. O f course, the ethnic problems in Poland do not have the same resonance as the ethnic
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Procedures for Content Analysis of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals’
Discourse
1. Sample Selection
As discussed in Chapter II, I operate with a sample of intellectuals whose public
speeches reflect an official governmental position. As was the case in Russia, when
selecting a sample of discourse communicators, 1 drew upon my own knowledge of the
Polish case as well as insights from published accounts of confidants of the Polish
political elite.

My original sample included 49 intellectual communicators of discourse

who suited my criteria.

Not all of them were simultaneously included in the sample.

The group o f “government-affiliated intellectuals” underwent substantial rotation.

But,

combined, the works of these intellectuals form the core of goverranent-endorsing
intellectual discourse and reflect the official position of Polish post-Communist
governments.*^*
Polish content analytic data was derived from 239 publications by 37
representatives*^® of Polish intellectual elite including Leszek Balcerowicz, deputy Prime

issues in multi-ethnic Russia. Still, the matters described above definitely call for a detailed
examination o f the degree o f nationalism/tolerance among the Polish elite and the general public.
Suffice to mention, Waldemar KuczyAski, Zwierzenia zausznika [Revelations o f the Confidant]
(Warsaw: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1992).
Although initially my sample was even larger and included 81 individuals, many o f them did not fit
my own selection criteria. For instance, it included representatives o f the political elite proper (e.g., L.
Miller, J. Buzek, A. Kwasniewski, etc.), non-mainstream intellectual elite (e.g., father Rydzyk, etc.),
influential intellectuals in their own right, who do not cooperate with or endorse the political elite (J.
Szacki, E. Wnuk-Lipinski, J. Holzer, etc.), or the immigrant intellectual elite residing in Europe or the
US for a significant period o f time (Z. BrzeziAski, J. Gedroyc, L. Kolakowski, A. Walicki, etc.). Upon
more rigorous examination, I restricted the sample to 49 discourse communicators.
For instance, works o f Tadeusz Mazowiecki which appeared between 1994 and 1997, i.e., when he
was in opposition, were excluded. Likewise, works o f Jerzy Wiatr, written during his oppositional
period, were not analyzed. For a more detailed discussion o f the rotations among Polish governmentaffiliated intellectuals, see Table 36.
The validity o f the sample o f discourse communicators was further confirmed by an independent
source. Biala Ksiqga polskiej sceny politycznej [White Book o f Polish Political Scene] (Warsaw: ARS
Print Production, 1997) lists the most important political actors in post-Communist Poland. It
mentioned the majority o f selected communicators.
Russian data included 249 works by 26 communicators.
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Minister and Minister of Finances in the governments of Mazowiecki, Bieiecki, and
Buzek (1989-1991 and 1997-2000); Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, ambassador of the
Republic of Poland in Austria (1990-1995) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1995-1996
and 2000); Marek Belka, economic adviser to president Kwasniewski (1996-1997),
deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finances in the government of Cimoszewicz
(1997); Wieslaw Chrzanowski, Minister of Justice and Procurator General in the
government of Bieiecki (1991), Speaker of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (19911993); Marek D^browski, liberal economist. Secretary of State in the Ministry of
Finances in the governments of Mazowiecki and Bieiecki (1989-1991), ally of the deputy
Prime Minister Balcerowicz, author of budget proposals during Balcerowicz’s tenure as
deputy Prime Minister; Andrzej Drawicz, chief of Polish State Radio and TV in the
government of Mazowiecki (1989-1990); Bronislaw Geremek, adviser to president
Walesa (1988-1991), member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (since 1989),
candidate for a position of Prime Minister (1991), Minister of Foreign Affairs in the
government of Buzek (1997-2000); Adam Glapinski, Minister of Economic Planning in
the government of Bieiecki (1991) and Minister of Economic Cooperation with Foreign
Countries in the government of Olszewski (1991-1992), currently Director of the Institute
of Economic and Political Freedom; Stanistaw Gomulka, Professor of Economics,
adviser of the Ministry of Finances (1989-1991 and 1997-2000), close ally of deputy
Prime Minister Balcerowicz; Aleksander Hall, Minister for Cooperation with Political
Parties in the government of Mazowiecki (1989-1990), member of the Lower Chamber of
Parliament (1991-1993), chairman of the Conservative Party (1992-1997); Jerzy

Hausner, Under-Secretary of State, adviser to Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, responsible
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for reform of social security (1997), chief adviser of the Ministry of Finances in the
governments of Oleksy and Cimoszewicz (1995-1997), Minister of the Economy in the
government of Miller (2001-present); Cezary Jozefiak, influential economist close to
president Walesa, member of the Council of Monetary Policies (since 1998); Jaroslaw

Kaczynski,*®° head of Presidential Administration of president Walesa (1990-1991),
member of the Upper Chamber of Parliament (1989-1991) and the Lower Chamber of
Parliament (1991-1993); Jozef Kaleta, member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament
(since 1991), one of the important economists of the Left; Grzegorz Kolodko, deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Finances in the governments of Oleksy, Cimoszewicz,
Pawlak, and Miller (1994-1997,2001-present); Waldemar Kuczynski, chief adviser to
the government of Mazowiecki, Minister of Privatization in the government of Bielecki
(1990-1991), chief economic adviser to Prime Minister Buzek (1997-2001); Jacek

Kuron, Minister of Labor and Social Protection in the government of Mazowiecki (19891990), member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (since 1989), presidential candidate
(1995); Ryszard Legutko, conservative philosopher, important ideologue, editor-in-chief
o f Arka, cormected to conservative elements of the government of Buzek (1997-2001);

Janusz Lewandowski, Minister of Privatization in the governments of Bielecki and
Suchotska (1991,1993), member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (1991-1993 and
1997-2001); Aleksander Piotr Luczak, member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament
(since 1989), deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Education in the
governments of Pawlak and Oleksy (1993-1995), chairman of the Committee of

One publication by Lech Kaczyhski, Jaroslaw Kaczyhski’s twin brother and close ally, one
publication authored by Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas, close friend and ally o f Jaroslaw Kaczyhski, one
publication by Antoni Macierewicz, Jaroslaw Kaczyhski’s ally and co-founder o f conservative Ruch
dla Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej, were counted as Jaroslaw Kaczyhski’s publications.
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Scientific Research in the governments of Oleksy and Cimoszewicz (1995-1997);

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, first Prime Minister of post-Communist Poland (1989-1990),
member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (since 1991); one of the authors of the
Little Constitution (1992) and the Polish Constitution (1997); Adam Michnik, one of the
most important liberal ideologues, member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (19891991); editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza (since 1989); Karol Modzelewski, honorable
chairman of Unia Pracy (1992-1995), important social-democratic ideologue; Zdzislaw

Najder, adviser to president Walesa (1990-1991), adviser to Prime Minister Olszewski
(1991-1992); Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, publicist, important ideologue and moral
authority; Jan Ferdynand Olszewski, Prime Minister (1991-1992); Witold M.

Orlowski, economic adviser to president Kwasniewski (1995-present); Jan Parys,
director of the Central Planning Commission (1990-1991), Minister of Defense (19911992); Grzegorz Rydlewski, Secretary of the governments of Pawlak, Oleksy, and
Cimoszewicz (1993-1996), head of Prime Minister’s administration in the government of
Cimoszewicz (1997), chief adviser to Prime Minister Miller (2001-present); Krzysztof

Skubiszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the governments of Bielecki, Olszewski,
and Suchotska (1990-1993); Adam Strzembosz, President of the Supreme Court (19901998); Jozef Tischner, professor and chair at Krakow Theological Academy, President
of Vienna Institute of Human Sciences, important liberal Catholic ideologue; Jerzy

Turowicz, journalist, publicist, founder and editor-in-chief of Tygodnik Powszechny,
liberal authority figure; Jerzy Jozef Wiatr, member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament
(since 1991), Minister of Education in the govermnent of Cimoszewicz (1996-1997);

Piotr Winczorek, representative of Suchotska’s government in the Constitutional
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Commission (1992-1993), President of the Council of Permanent Experts of the
Constitutional Commission (1993-1996), one of the authors of the Polish Constitution
(1997); Janina Zakrzewska, judge of the Constitutional Court, member of the State
Election Committee, adviser to president Walesa (1988-1991); and Tadeusz Zielinski,
adviser to president Walesa (1988-1991), Ombudsman (1992 -1996), Minister of Labor
and Social Protection in the government of Cimoszewicz (1997). More detailed
biographies of each of these intellectuals can be found at the end of this dissertation (see
Appendix G).
Many prominent government-affiliated intellectuals who suited my selection
criteria and whom I incorporated into the original content-analytic sample, including
Lech Nikolski, Minister for European Integration in the government of Miller (2001present) and Miller’s adviser and confidant; Michal Jagello, deputy Minister of Culture
(since 1990); and Jan Maria Rokita, senior administrator and shadowy ideologue in the
government of Hanna Suchotska (1992-1993), did not produce publicly accessible
statements. Although my sample is not exhaustive, it is, nonetheless, sufficient for a valid
analysis.’®*
The unit of analysis was one publication. Its size or format did not matter. Only
the content of the statement was important. Regardless of whether the statement was a
newspaper interview, an article, a chapter in a book, or a monograph, what mattered was
the articulation of attitudes with respect to specific textual indicators (see Tables 37 and
38).

See Appendix I for the list o f sources analyzed during the Polish content analytic stage.
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2. Operationalization of Categories for Content-Analvsis
Content analytic data is extracted from the public statements of selected Polish
intellectuals. In the course of Polish content analysis I used five liberal and five organicstatist (conservative) categories, which were paired into five dichotomies/issue domains.
Eaeh dichotomy contained a liberal and an organic-statist (conservative) eategory:*^^ 1)
inclusive democracy —managed democracy*®^ (political dichotomy); 2)
liberalism/secularism/liberal Catholic ideology - conservatism/statist
ideology/conservative Catholic ideology (ideological dichotomy); 3) fi-ee market —
governed market (economic dichotomy); 4) pro-Western foreign policy independent/pro-Eastem foreign policy (foreign policy dichotomy); 5) ethnic tolerance nationalism (ethnic relations dichotomy).
Categories employed during the Polish phase of content analysis differ from
categories used during the Russian phase. This variation reflects the difference in the
menu of options available to Russian and Polish commimicators. For instance, if Russian
government-affiliated intellectuals can openly discuss authoritarianism, their Polish
counterparts avoid this topic altogether. For the latter, political dilemma is reduced to
inclusive vs. managed democracy. In other cases, the categories are identical (see, for
instance, economie categories of the free and the governed market). Regardless of the
labels assigned to the categories describing discourse in a particular country, I try to
I do not attach any normative significance to the terms “liberal,” “organic-statist,” or
“conservative.” They are used simply to denote opposing positions.
“Managed democracy,” unlike its earlier equivalents, “elite democracy” and “delegative
democracy,” which are traditionally reserved for Western and Latin American contexts respectively, is
the term that is often applied to the post-Communist countries. Therefore, I chose to use it and not its
older, context-specific, synonyms. In essence, managed democracy is not very different from the other
two. It presupposes certain limitations on the ability o f the public to exercise its rights in the political
process and includes control o f the opposition and the mass media, highly structured (and often pre
determined) elections, elite autonomy, political centralization, and disdain for political parties as
avenues o f popular interest accumulation.
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capture the spectrum of pro-govemmental intellectual discussion and, ultimately, official
position on politics, ideology, the economy, foreign policy, and ethnic relations.

Choice of Dichotomies
The choice o f liberal - organic-statist (conservative) categories is as essential in
Poland as it was in the Russian case. The Polish database does not contain any other
ideological divide. The categories of socialist discourse^^"^ are missing, since in postCommunist Poland communicators of socialist discourse were excluded from the
positions of power.
I deliberately avoid analysis based on party divisions, an analysis so often
criticized in the Polish literatu re.In stead , I propose to look at the liberal - organicstatist dichotomy. My research question is: irrespective of partisanship, is there a shift
from liberalism to organic-statism in the discourse of Polish government-affiliated
intellectuals?

See footnote 82 describing categories o f the Russian socialist discourse.
Suffice to mention Piotr Ikonowicz o f PPS (Polish Socialist Party).
Many researchers (see, for instance, Janusz Reykowski. “Sp6r mi^dzy prawica a lewic^: o§
konfliktu spoleczno-ekonomicznego” [“Debate Between the Right and the Left: Axis o f Social and
Economic Conflict”], in Narod. Wladza. Spoteczenstwo [People. State. Society], ed. Aleksandra
Jasinska-Kania and Jacek Raciborski (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 1996); Jerzy J6zef
Wiatr. Nie zmarnowalismy tych lat: sejm, rzqd, lewica [We D id Not Waste Those Years: Parliament,
Government, the Left] (Warsaw: Adam Marszalek, 1998) contend that the distinction between the
Right and the Left is not very useful, since many Polish parties espouse hybrid ideologies. My
research, however, measures the attitudes towards various categories o f liberalism and organic-statism
(conservatism) irrespective o f the combinations in which these categories appear in the programs o f
political parties.

203

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

Table 35
Polish Political Scene Divisions

Economic Dimensions
Ideological and Ethnic
Relations Dimensions
Ideological Conservatism
(Conservative Ideology,
Statism, Catholic
Conservatism) and
Nationalism
Ideological Liberalism
(Liberal Ideology,
Secularism, Liberal
Catholic Ideology) and
Tolerance

Economic Conservatism
(Governed Market)

Economic Liberalism
(Free Market)

Populist parties, radical
conservative parties,
Christian/National
Democrats (Samoobrona,
KPN, RdR, PChD, SLCh,
ZChN, PSL, LPR)
Social Democrats, secular
Left (SLD, UP)

Conservative parties
(KLD, PK, PC, AWS,
PiS)

Liberals (UD, UW, PO)

The Polish political scene defies simple liberal - organic-statist division.
According to Table 35, only two types of actors, liberals and populists, can be qualified
as liberal and organic-statist (respectively). Liberals with their belief in inclusive
democracy, liberal ideology, individualism, modernity, free market, pro-Western foreign
policy, and ethnic tolerance are the closest to my definition of the liberal orientation. The
Populists’ program corresponds to my definition of organic-statism which includes the
support for managed democracy, belief in tradition, solidarity, and Christian values,
endorsement of the governed market, a penchant for isolationist foreign policy, and
nationalism.*^’ If liberals were included in the post-Commrmist political elite, pure

This discussion is close to what Pawel spiewak. “Polskie reformy, polski kapitalizm” [“Polish
Reforms, Polish Capitalism”], in Spor o Polskq 1989-1999 [Debates about Poland 1989-1999]
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2000) describes as Polish liberal and conservative
discourses. According to him, the former encompasses a belief in western economic model o f the ffeemarket, democracy, individualistic vision o f society, liberal values o f responsibility, progress,
globalization o f international relations and ethnic tolerance. Radical conservative and populist parties
espouse conservative discourse, in which the governed market elements are merged with categories o f
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organic-statists remained on the margins of Polish politics.*®* However, elements of
organic-statism, to a varying degree, are present in the programs of social democrats and
conservatives, important actors on Polish post-Communist political scene. The former
espouse liberal orientations in all categories except the economy. Conservatives, on the
other hand, combine liberal economic beliefs with organic-statist ideological and ethnic
views. It follows that in post-Communist Poland the political elite included
representatives of liberal, conservative, or social-democratic, but never socialist, camps.
Accordingly, pro-govemmental intellectual discourse contained exclusively liberal and
organic-statist elements.
As in the Russian case, no extant work analyzes Polish discourse both
longitudinally and according to several dichotomies (political, ideological, economic,
foreign policy, and ethnic relations). Several Polish researchers, including Boski (1993);
Reykowski (1993; 1996); and Wiatr (1998), indicate the existence of three cleavages.
Wiatr differentiates between economic, religious, and de-communization divisions.
Reykowski and Boski note that the Polish political elite is divided along economic (free
market vs. govemed market), religious (secular state vs. participation of the Catholic
Church in public life), and national (nationalism vs. universalism) dichotomies. Although
outlining dividing lines, none of these authors provides empirical evidence to support his
contentions. This is the first attempt to study the body of written statements that comprise
the discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals (and, hence, the official
position of Polish post-Communist political elite) both chronologically and according to

managed democracy, conservative (often Catholic) values, isolationist international relations, and
nationalist views.
The only exception is Polish Peasant Party (PSL) which forms a coalition with Social Democrats
(SLD).
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several dichotomous (liberal-conservative) categories. Chronological examination is
valuable since it shows the evolution of liberal and organic-statist attitudes. The
comprehensive analysis of several dichotomies/issue domains is also important, since it
exposes patterns in the overall discourse and reveals the relative importance of specific
dichotomies to the overall structure of discourse.

Extracting Categories from the Text
To extract each category of discourse from the text I use a set of original textual
indicators and their synonyms (see Tables 37 and 38). The indicators were selected from
a pilot reading of several works written by Polish government-affiliated intellectuals.
Having textual indicators helps highlight the meanings that communicators attribute to
specific categories.
In the political dichotomy, the liberal category of inclusive democracv is
measured through positive references to “active citizenry,” “societal control over elites,”
“public opinion,” “local self-government,” “defense of minorities’ political rights,” “free
media,” “multipartism,” “elections are to make social demands evident and translate them
into policies,” “constitutionality,” “parliamentarism,” “political opposition,” while the
organic-statist category of managed democracv refers to “government as a guarantor of
citizen’s well-being,” “government consists of the best people,” “elite autonomy,”
“centralization,” “media are to inform citizens, not to criticize government,” “individuals,
not parties are important in political conflicts,” “elections are for selection o f the best

people,” “political expediency governs political behavior,” “presidentialism,”
“restrictions on political opposition.”
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In the ideological dichotomy, the category of liberalism/secularism/Iiberal
Catholicism is defined through positive references to “negative freedoms,” “separation of
church and state, secular state,” “modernism, progress,” “liberal values,” “weak state,
state for citizens, state as a night-watchman,” “vision of individual as rational and
independent,” “conflict of interests,” “liberal rights,” “reasons for crime are economic
and social,” “society and elite are fundamentally similar, society is self-sufficient,”
whereas the category of statism/conservatism/Conservative Catholicism manifests itself
in the favorable assessments of textual indicators of “positive freedoms,” “church as
foundation of the state, political participation of church in state affairs,” “traditions,”
“Christian values, conservative values,” “strong state, developmental state,” “vision of
individual as part of organic whole,” “societal consensus, common good,” “elite is
responsible for society,” “defense of traditional relations,” “order,” “death penalty.”
In the economic dichotomy, the liberal category of free market engenders beliefs
in “market as main agent of economic development,” “quick privatization,” “selective
social protection,” “economic justice,” “price liberalization,” “liberalization of free
trade,” “low taxes,” “balanced budget,” “rmiversal neo-liberal economic development,”
while the organic-statist category of govemed market refers to the positive evaluations of
the following textual indicators: “state can help market in economic development,” “slow
and selective privatization,” “rmiversal social protection,” “social justice, equality,”
“price control,” “protectionism,” “tax increase,” “deficit spending,” and “national
economic model.”
In the foreign policy dichotomy, the liberal pro-Westem category is defined
through the positive references of textual indicators, including “European integration,”
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“NATO membership,” “globalization,” “relations with the West,” and “idealist
interpretation of foreign relations, internationalism,” whereas the organic-statist
independent or pro-Eastem category manifests itself in the textual indicators of “Poland
outside EU,” “Poland outside NATO,” “isolationism,” “relations with East and South,”
and “realist interpretation of foreign relations.”
Finally, in the ethnic relations dichotomy, the liberal category of ethnic tolerance
is defined as “ethnic equality,” “multiculturalism,” “peaceful solutions to ethnic
problems,” “universal values,” “respect for ethnic minorities,” while the organic-statist
category of nationalism is measured through positive references to “ethnic inequality,”
“preservation of national culture and traditions,” “military solution to ethnic conflicts,”
“national values and ideas,” and “anti-Semitism.”
Analysis of the Polish data faces the standard problem of different meanings
assigned to the textual i n d i c a t o r s . B y simply looking at predetermined or fixed textual
indicators, one carmot make meaningful inferences. The words “rights,” “freedom,”
“ethnicity,” “equality,” “law and order,” “market,” “European integration” and many
others may have significantly different meanings depending on the context in which they
are used.^^° This problem, however, can be alleviated. Synonyms can easily reveal the
spectrum of meanings assigned to a specific textual indicator. The latter attribute of
synonyms is especially important in my analysis because, depending on a
word/combination of words being used, a particular indictor may be placed under
different categories.
See Chapter II, Section “Extracting Categories from the Text,” for a more detailed discussion o f
this issue.
For instance, “European integration” may mean “Eurobureaucracy,” “Poland’s joining the EU,” or
“Europe o f fatherlands.” “Freedom” can mean “freedom to” or “freedom from.” Equality may be
understood as “equality o f opportunity,” “material equality,” “partial equality,” or “total equality.”
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The synonyms, which were refined in the course of content analysis, reflect the
nuances of meanings that can be attributed to textual indicators and help to make content
analytic data more uniform. They homogenize data across communicators and across
time. For instance, although different Polish communicators may praise family, religious
community, or nation as an important social structuring block, one important message
conveyed by all these examples is a positive evaluation of the “organic vision of society,”
irrespective of the “organism” in question. Support for “economic justice” is understood
regardless of whether a communicator endorses the terms “competition,” “efficiency,”
“equality of opportunity,” or “natural character of inequality.” Alternatively, support for
“social justice” is expressed through positive references to “redistribution,” “equality of
material conditions,” or “protection of the weak members of the society.” Discussions
about Poland’s membership in the European structures evolved from the debate between
those who supported “European House” and those who favored “Europe of
Fatherlands/local communities” to “Europeanists” versus “Eurosceptics,” supporters of
quick integration into the EU and proponents of cautious attitudes towards the European
bureaucracy. Regardless of the wording, I measure attitudes to “EU membership” or to
“Poland being outside the European structures.”

3. Coding Criteria
Each occurrence o f a textual indicator was coded according to pre-determined
evaluative criteria. The number o f mentions was not recorded, only the overall attitude

toward a particular textual indicator. The assigned values ranged from

“-1” (“negative

assessment of textual indicator”) to “+1” (“positive assessment of textual indicator”).
Value “0” was assigned if a textual indicator was evaluated neutrally.
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Positive evaluations (“+1”) were recorded if a textual indicator was associated
with a) positive epithets (e.g., “desirable,” “necessary,” “appropriate,” “urgently needed,”
etc.); b) positive verbs used in connection with an indicator (“should be promoted,”
“should be included,” “must be adopted,” “need to be reached,” etc.); and c) goals or
instruments leading to positive outcomes (“partnership with the West leads to investment
and economic growth,” “our goal is to support domestic producers,” etc.).
Conversely, negative evaluations (“-1”) were given if a textual indicator was
associated with: a) negative epithets (e.g., “undesirable,” “baneful,” “terrible,” etc.); b)
negative verbs (“should be eliminated,” “have to be avoided,” “do not include,” etc.); and
c) negative outcomes or mechanisms leading to negative outcomes (“Eastern neighbors
always threatened Polish independence,” “global values will destroy our Polish way of
life,” etc.).
A neutral evaluation (“0”) is a cumulative evaluation that is based on the presence
of both positive and negative attitudes toward a particular indicator. For instance,
phrases, “social protection of the population is ineffective, but unavoidable,” or “although
results of European integration may be destructive for Polish economy, we do not have
an alternative to the multi-million hard currency investment it will bring,” contain both
positive and negative assessments of the textual indicators. The overall evaluations of
such indicators were recorded as neutral. Even if a textual indicator was predominantly
assessed as positive or negative, the mere existence of the opposite evaluation made the
overall value neutral.
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4. Examples of Evaluations
The following citations, taken from the database, illustrate the coding of textual
indicators:
Political Dichotomy. In the phrase, “/ believe that Poland must have strong
presidential power,” textual indicator ''presidentialism” (organic-statist category of
managed democracv) is valued as “+1” (case b, association with positive verbs). The
phrase, "We should create parliamentary mechanisms to protect the minority against the
inevitable arbitrary nature o f the majority,” contains textual indicator "protection o f
minority’s rights” (liberal category of inclusive democracv). It is assigned a positive
value, since it is associated with a positive verb (case b).
Ideological Dichotomy. In the fragment, "There is no well-being o f the state
without well-being o f the citizens. The greatness o f the nation and the state can only be
achieved when the citizens are happy and prosperous,” textual indicator "state is fo r the
citizens” (category of liberalism) is represented by its synonym {"well-being o f the state
is the well-being o f its citizens”), which is evaluated positively (case c, association with
positive goals and outcomes). In the citation, "Our country needs a strong state... which
would realize the common good,” textual indicators "strong state,” "common good”
(category of conservatism! are valued positively (case b, association with positive verbs
and case c, association with positive goals and outcomes).
Economic Dichotomy. The phrase, "The best results are generated by an economy
strongly connected to the international market,” contains a positive evaluation of the
synonym of textual indicator "liberalization o f foreign trade” f'economy connected to the
international market”) (liberal category of free market! (case c, association with positive
goals and outcomes). The phrase, "I believe that the idea o f social justice is a beautiful
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and correct idea'" is an example of a positive value assigned to textual indicator '‘''social
justice” (organic-statist category of govemed markett (case a, association with positive
epithets).
Foreign Policy Dichotomy: The phrase, "It is in our interest that now, when
Poland has relative freedom o f maneuver, it uses its chance andjoins the West as soon as
possible, ” contains a positive evaluation of the textual indicator "partnership with the
West” (liberal category of pro-Westem foreign policv) (case c, association with positive
goals and outcomes). The fragment, "I support a Europe o f local communities.... They
[the liberals] propose the supranational federation. This cannot be accepted, ’’ contains
synonyms of two textual indicators - "European integration ” ("supranational
federation”) (liberal category of pro-Westem foreign policv) and "Poland outside the
EU” ("Europe o f local communities”) (organic-statist category of independent foreign
policy). The first indicator is assigned a negative value (case b, association with negative
verbs). The second one is valued positively (case b, association with positive verbs).
Dichotomy o f Ethnic Relations: In the phrase, "We need to underscore the threat
that other cultures may represent fo r Poland,” synonym of the liberal textual indicator
"multiculturalism” ("other cultures”) is evaluated negatively (case c, association with
negative goals and outcome). The phrase, "In contemporary Poland, anti-Semitism is a
shameful sickness and it should be eradicated using appropriate tools,” contains the
textual indicator "anti-Semitism” (organic-statist category of nationalism). This textual
indicator is valued negatively (cases a and b, association with negative epithets and
verbs).
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5. Stages of Quantitative Content Analysis
The content analytic phase of my research on the Polish case consisted of four
steps. First, I selected a group of government-affiliated intellectuals. Next, I refined four
distinct phases within the Polish post-Communist period that roughly corresponded to
four parliamentary cycles: liberal period (1989-1993), social-democratic period (19931997), mixed liberal period (1997-2001), and mixed social-democratic period (2001present). I then divided the group of government-affiliated intellectuals into four
subgroups; 1) intellectuals associated with the political elite during the first liberal period;
2) intellectuals affiliated with the ruling regime during the second social-democratic
period; 3) intellectuals associated with the political elite during the third mixed liberal
period; and 4) intellectuals affiliated with the governing elite during the fourth mixed
social-democratic period. Such subdivisions ensured that I collected data exclusively
from government-affiliated intellectuals actively cooperating with the government and
that all sub-periods were represented.
Next, I located all publicly accessible statements produced by the governmentaffiliated intellectuals during the research period. I performed a content analysis on these
documents and recorded results in coding tables (see Appendix H). Finally, the values of
individual textual indicators and categories in general were aggregated chronologically
(by year) (see Tables 37 and 38). For each year I calculated the mean for every textual
indicator and category in general (sum of values divided by the number of mentions of a
given textual indicator/category). Figures 83-87 depict the results of content analysis in
the most general way. They trace the evolution of the discourse and value orientations of
Polish government-affiliated intellectuals during the post-Communist period.
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Table 36
Subgroups of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals

GovernmentAffiliated Intellectuals
During the Liberal
Period (1989-1993)

Leszek Balcerotvicz*,
Wieslaw Chrzanowski,
Marek D^browski*,
Andrzej Drawicz,
Bronislaw Geremek*,
Adam Glapinski,
Stanislaw Gomulka*,
Aleksander Hall*,
Cezary Jozefiak*,
Jaroslaw Kaezyhski*,
Waldemar Kuczynski*,
Jacek Kuron*, Ryszard
Legutko*, Janusz
Lewandowski*,
Aleksandr Piotr
Luczak*, Tadeusz
Mazowieeki*, Adam
Miehnik*, Karol
Modzelewski*,
Zdzislaw Najder, Jan
Nowak-Jeziorahski *,
Jan Ferdynand
Olszewski, Jan Parys,
Krzysztof
Skubiszewski, Adam
Strzembosz*, Jozef
Tischner*, Jerzy
Turowicz*, Piotr
Winczorek*, Janina
Zakrzewska, Tadeusz
Zielinski*

171

GovernmentAffiliated
Intellectuals
During the
SocialDemocratic
Period (19931997)
Wladyslaw
Bartoszewski*,
Marek Belka*,
Jerzy Hausner*,
Jozef Kaleta*,
Grzegorz
Kolodko*, Jacek
Kuron, Aleksander
Piotr Luczak,
Adam Michnik,
Karol
Modzelewski, Jan
NowakJezioranski,
Witold M.
Orlowski*,
Grzegorz
Rydlewski*,
Adam Strzembosz,
Jozef Tischner,
Jerzy Jozef
Wiatr*, Piotr
Winczorek,
Tadeusz Zielinski

171

GovernmentAffiliated
Intellectuals
During the Mixed
Liberal Period
(1997-2001)

GovernmentAffiliated
Intellectuals
During the Mixed
Social-Democratic
Period (2001present)

Leszek
Balcerowicz,
Wladyslaw
Bartoszewski,
Marek D^browski,
Bronislaw
Geremek,
Stanislaw
Gomulka, Cezary
Jozefiak,
Aleksander Hall,
Jaroslaw
Kaczynski,
Waldemar
Kuczynski, Jacek
Kuron, Ryszard
Legutko, Janusz
Lewandowski,
Tadeusz
Mazowiecki,
Adam Michnik,
Jan NowakJeziorahski,
Witold M.
Orlowski, Adam
Strzembosz, J6zef
Tisehner, Jerzy
Turowicz, Jerzy
Jozef Wiatr

Leszek
Balcerowicz,
Marek Belka,
Bronislaw
Geremek, Jerzy
Hausner, Jozef
Kaleta, Grzegorz
Kolodko, Adam
Michnik, Jan
Nowak-Jeziorahski,
Witold M.
Orlowski, Grzegorz
Rydlewski, Jerzy
Jozef Wiatr

An asterisk denotes intellectuals present in more than one period.
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Table 37
Summary of the Evaluations of Categories and Textual Indicators of Polish Liberal Discourse
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Category: Textual Indicator
Years
Active Citizenry
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Societal Control Over Political Elites
Public Opinion
Local Self-Government
Defense o f Minorities’ Political Rights
Free Media
Multipartism
Elections Are to Make Social Demands Evident
Constitutionality
Parliamentarism
Political Opposition
Mean for Category
Negative Freedoms
Separation o f Church and State, Secular State
Modernism, Progress
Liberal Values
Weak State, State as a Night-Watchman
Vision o f Individual as Rational and Independent
Conflict o f Interests
Liberal Rights
Reasons for Crime Are Social
Society and Elite are Equal, Society is SelfSufficient

Means (sum o f evaluations divided by the number o f mentions)
97
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
Inclusive Democracy:
1
1
1
0.25
1
1
1
1
1

I
I
I
I

I
I
I
1
1

1
1
I
1

1
I
0.6

1
1
0.75
1
I

1
1
1
0.33
0.75
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
I
0.5
1
1
1
0.5
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.75
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.2
1
1
0.71
0.67
1
0.67 0.5
1
1
0.71
0.94 0.78
0.95 0.77 0.79 0.87
Liberal Ideology/Secularism/Catholic Left:
I
1
1
0.67
0.75 0.6
0
0
0.6
1
1
-1
-1
1
1
0.45
0.67
1
0.63
1
1
1
0.29 0
1
1
0.2
-0.5
1
0.71
1
1
1
0.67
0.56
1
-1
1
0
0
-1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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1

1

00

01

02

1

1

1

1
1

1
-1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
0.67
0.93

0.6
0.7

0.8

1
0
0.7

1

1

1

1

1
0.33
1
0.5
0.33

1
1
0
-0.33
-1

1

1

1

1
-1
-1
0
0
-1
1
-1

1
0.5
0

1
1

1

1

1
1
1

1
0.33
1
1
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Table 37 continued

o

Mean for Category

3
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0.82

0.73

0.43

0.46

0.7

0.8

1
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o

Q
o

Free Market Economic Model:
0.71
0.5
0.59 0.39 0.1

Market as a Main Agent of Economic
Development
Quick Privatization
Selective Social Protection

1

0.75

1

0.75

1

I
1

1
1

0.86
0

1
I

0.54
-0.5

0.83
1

0.8
0

Eeaiomic Justice

1

0.5

0.63

0.33

0.07

0

0.56

0.2

0.17

0.5

0.75

-0.67

0.25

0.6
0.33

0
0

0.6
1

0
-1

-1
-1

0.5

0.33

0.33
-0.8

0.4

0.33

1

0.67
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Price Liberalization
Liberalization o f Foreign Trade

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1
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Low Taxes
Balanced Budget
Utitversal Neo-Liberal Economic Development
Mean for Category

1
1

1
0.67
0.81

1
0.67
0.67

1
1
0.6
0.7

0
0.33
-1
1
0.56
0.03

1
1

0

1

I
0.33

1
1
0.38

0.65

0.5

1
-0.5

1
I

1

1
1

-1

I
1
0.67

1
0

1
1
0.71

-1

0

0
1
-1

0.6

0.11

0.73

0

0.29

-0.38
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0.89
1
1

1
1
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1
1
1
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1
1

1
1
1

1
1
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1
1
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European Integration
NATO Membership
Globalization

1

Relations with the West (Germany, US, etc.)
Idealist Interpretations o f Foreign Relations
Mean for Category

1
1
1

Edinic Equality
Multiculturalism
Peaceful Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts
Universal Values

1

1
1

Pro-W estern Foreign Policy:
1
0.83 0.89 0.9
1
1
1
0.67
1
1
1
-0.5
0.33
1
0.92 0.89
1
1
1
-1
0
0
1
0.85 0.88 0.74 0.62
Ethnic Tolerance:
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0.6
0.2
1
0.75
0.6
1

I
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
I

0

0.67
1
0.33

1

1
I
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I
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1
1
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Respect for Ethnic Minorities
Mean for Category

o
o

1
1

1
0.94

1
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Table 38

CD

Summary of the Evaluations of Categories and Textual Indicators of Polish Organic-Statist (Conservative) Discourse
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Category: Textual Indicator
Years
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Government Is the Guarantor o f Citizens’ Well
Being
Government Consists o f the Best People
Elite Autonomy
Centralization
Media Is to Inform the Citizens, not to Criticize
Government
Individuals, not Parties, Are Important
Elections Are for Selection o f the Best People

Means (sum o f evaluations divided by the number o f mentions)
97
91
92
93
94
95
96
89
90
Managed/Elite Democracy:
-1
-1
-1
-1
0.71
1
0.33
-1
-1
-1
0
-0.33
0.33
-1
-1
-1
-0.5
-1
-1

-1

Political Expediency Governs Behavior
Presidentialism

-1

Restrictions on Political Opposition

-1

Mean for Category

-1

-1

0.25
-1

-1
-0.5
-1

98

99

-1

-1

0.33
-1

0.25

0.25

0.82

0.36

01

-1

0

1
-1
-1

-1

-0.6

-1

02

-1

-1
-I

-1
1

0
0.33

00

-1

-1
-1

0.67

-0.63
-1
0.67 0.67 0.42 0.33
Conservative Ideology/Statism/Catholic Conservatism:

-0.2

-0.5

-0.5
-0.75

-0.33
0.55

-1
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Positive Rights
Ecclesiastical State, Church is a Foundation o f the
State
Traditions
Christian Values, Conservative Values
Strong State, Developmental State
Vision o f Individual as Part o f Organic Whole
Societal Consensus, Common Good
Elite Is Responsible for Society
Death Penalty
Order
Defense o f Traditional Relations
Mean for Category

-1
1
1
-1

1
0.67
-1
-1
-0.5
-1
-1

0
-1
0.14

Market Can Be Helped in Economic Development
Slow Privatization

CD
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Social Justice, Equality

0.33
0.78
-0.6
1
1

-1

00

Universal Social Protection

1
-1

1
1

0.89
1
0.5
-0.6
0
-0.2
-1
1
-0.5
-0.5

0.38

1
0

1
-0.5

0
0

1
1

1
0.5
-1
1
1

1
1
-1
1
1
-1
-1

1
1
1
1
1

-1

1
-0.5
-1
-1
0
-1
-1

-1
0.27

1
0.5

1

-1

-1

1

-1

1

1

1

0.33

1

0

1

1
0.55

1
-1

0
0.71

0.63
0.6
0.22
1
1
-1
-1
1
0.33
0.54

0
0
1
0
0

0
0.67
-1
0
0.67

-1

1
-1
1

1
0
0

0.73 0.17
Governed Market Economic Model;
-0.14
0.67
0.33
0.08 0.09 0.43
-1
-1
0
0
0.67
0.67 0.14
0
0.71
0.25 0.67
-0.2
-0.5
0.67 0.6
0.38
0.33

-0.2

0.36

0
-0.43

-0.2

-0.5

-0.4

0.33

1

1
0.33

0.8

0
0
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0
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-1
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0.33
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0
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-1

-1

-1
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0.67
0.75

-1

-1

0

-1
-1
-0.5

0.5

0
-1
0

1

CD
■D

O
Q.
C
o

CD

Q.

■CDD
C/)

W
o'
o

Table 38 continued

o

3
O
O
■D

Mean for Category

CD

c q

Poland Outside EU
Poland Outside NATO
Isolationism
Relations with East and South (Russia)

'

o

Q
o
"n
c
p.
O
o’
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Ethnic Inequality
Preservation o f Polish Culture, Traditions
Military Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts
National Values, National Ideas
Anti-Semitism
Mean for Category

0.31
0.04 -0.14
0.33 0.22 0.24
Pro-Eastern/Independence Foreign Policy:
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Quantitative Content Analysis of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals’
Discourse
Evolution of Political Dichotomy
As hypothesized, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals exhibit positive
attitudes towards inclusive democracy. Despite some slight variation, the overall trends
are clear. Positive evaluations of inclusive democracy consistently outweigh the negative
evaluations of managed democracy. The latter is viewed in a decidedly negative manner.
The only minor surges in its popularity coincide with the parliamentary elections
(1993/1994 and 1997/1998) and may be a sign of electoral populism. As part of the
election campaign, government-affiliated intellectuals tend to describe their political
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Figure 83. Dynamics of Political Systems' Evaluations by the Polish Elite

patrons, the political elite, as more knowledgeable of and better suited to conduct
political processes than the population at large. Intellectuals’ misgivings about inclusive
democracy also appear to be triggered by a mistrust of the general public who may prefer
political opponents of the ruling elite. As a result, during national elections, inclusive
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democracy, a political system in whieh the general population is given a stronger role,
becomes more suspect, while elite, or managed democracy is viewed more favorably.

Evolution of Ideological Dichotomv
Contrary to my initial hypothesis, the ideological preferences of Polish
government-affiliated intellectuals underwent a transformation. In general, the Polish
intellectual elite drifted in the direction of ideological conservatism. The increasing
popularity of conservatism, whose appeal nearly doubled during the research period,
rather than the firm rejection of liberalism, accounts for this shift.
Figure 84 can be divided into two periods. During the first period (1989-1998),
both liberal and social democratic intellectuals associated with governing political elites
shared a commitment to ideological liberalism (with an exception of conservative periods
in 1993 and 1997). Characteristically, conservative upsurges occur around the time of
parliamentary elections. If the 1997 increase coincides with political strengthening of the
conservatives after the 1997 parliamentary elections,'^^ the 1993 rise is more difficult to
explain, given that the 1993 elections were won by the ideologically liberal, albeit progoverned market. Social Democrats (SLD). Conservative overtures to the general public
around the time of the parliamentary elections could be a sign of SLD’s courting more
conservative voters. 1 will return to this discussion in the next chapter when 1 analyze
relationship between Polish post-Communist public opinion and the elite’s value
orientations.

A coalition o f conservative AWS and liberal UW won the elections this year.
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Figure 84. Dynamics of Ideological Evaluations by the Polish Elite
During the current parliamentary cycle (1999-present), however, intellectual
discourse is heterogeneous, with both ideological options presenting strong alternatives.
This heterogeneity signals acute ideological struggle, the outcome of which is by no
means decided. Importantly, this struggle is not a function of the rotation between the
post-Communist political elites. Both liberal-conservative (1999-2001) and social
democratic (2001 - present) intellectual elites lack a defining ideology.
This ideological conflict might be further reinforced by the clash within the
Catholic Church, a dominant force shaping Polish ideological scene. Polish Catholicism
is not homogeneous. It consists of two distinct wings, each with its own traditions,
spokesmen, media outlets, and, most importantly, ideological program. The left wing of
progressive or humanist Catholicism is characterized by beliefs in human dignity and

rationality, democracy, secular state, more liberal social mores, imiversal values, while
right wing of conservative Catholicism is known for its almost Augustinian mistrust of
the human beings, nationalism and endorsement of Polish uniqueness and messianism.
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espousal of rabid anti-Semitism, and attempts to center public life around religious
principles (including the end of the separation of the church and state, graphic anti
abortion campaigns, etc.). Each camp has a strong presence in the Polish politics and
society. Even the Pope’s ideological positions defy simple characterizations. On the hand,
his proclamations about democracy, European integration, and tolerance place him
squarely in the camp of liberal Catholics. On the other hand, his social stance on
abortions and gays reveal a more conservative agenda.

Evolution of Economic Dichotomv
During the research period Polish government-affiliated intellectuals held mixed
economic attitudes (see Figure 85). Although the free market model was viewed
favorably —in fact, more favorably than the govemed market model —its advantage has
been slipping. The free market altemative lost some of its appeal, while the neutral
evaluations of the govemed market model, despite periodic swings, are stable. Economic
attitudes of the Polish intellectual elite are especially sensitive to parliamentary elections
cycles.
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Figure 85. Dynamics of Economic Models' Evaluations by the Polish Elite
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Figure 85 can be divided into four periods which roughly correspond to the
electoral changes within political (and intellectual) elites. The first period (1989-1992)
coincides with Balcerowicz’ liberal economic reforms. Not surprisingly, the free market
model is evaluated favorably. In 1993-1997 social-democratie elites come to power and
government-affiliated intelleetuals embrace the governed market model. When the Left is
replaced by the center-Right coalition, the free market model is viewed more positively
(1997-2001). Currently, intellectuals affiliated 'with the center-Left governing coalition
favor the governed market model.

Evolution of Foreign Poliev Diehotomv
Visibly, the Polish intellectual elite prefers a pro-Western foreign policy option to
the independent or pro-Eastem course.^’^ Yet, the overwhelmingly pro-Western stance of
Polish government-affiliated intellectuals conceals ambiguous attitudes towards
independent or pro-Eastem policy. A particularly strong conflict between pro-Westem
and pro-Eastem foreign policy orientations occurred in 1995 and 1997, i.e., during the
period when Poland and Russia were engaged in a bitter disagreement over NATO’s
eastward expansion. The revival of independent or pro-Eastem foreign policy course also
took place under social democratic political elites, who are traditionally more
sympathetic to the Eastem option. It appears that only intelleetuals of social-democratic
persuasion seriously consider the Eastem foreign policy direction. But even they view it

Grzegorz PoZarlik confirms stability o f Polish post-Communist foreign policy discourse. “Polish
Political Parties and Discourse on Polish Raison D ‘Etat on the Eve o f the European Union
Membership.” In Between Animosity and Utility: Political Parties and Their Matrix, ed. Hieronim
Kubiak and Jerzy J. Wiatr (Krakdw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2000) who analyzed Polish
political discourse on the eve o f the EU ascension and found the general consensus among all parties
o f Polish political scene regarding the European integration. The differences are insignificant and
concern speed, strategy, and cost-benefit analysis o f Poland’s membership in the EU, not the
fundamental question o f membership itself.
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only as a diplomatic maneuver to offset dangers associated with a frustrated Russia.
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Figure 86. Dynamics of Foreign Policy Alternatives' Evaluations by the Polish Elite

Evolution of Ethnic Relations Diehotomv
Throughout the research period, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals
consistently subscribed to tolerant attitudes. Behind this stability, however, there is an
ambiguity regarding nationalism. The conflict between tolerant and more nationalistic
views is especially pronounced in 1993 and 1996. A nationalistic upsurge during the SLD
term (1993-1997) may be viewed as electoral strategy to win additional votes. Although
the SLD expresses tolerant ethnic views, a nod in a nationalistic direction certainly would
not jeopardize the votes of its core electorate (which identifies with the Social
Democrats’ stand on the economic issues), but could bring additional votes from more
nationalistic constituencies.*’"^However, nationalistic attitudes appear to be a temporary
tactical maneuver and not an inherent feature of Polish government-affiliated
intellectuals. Such apparently populist electoral strategy is significant. A fact that a ruling
elite can employ populist organic-statist slogans and discourse during an election, but

Compare this strategy with my discussion o f the reasons for anti-Western discourse o f Russian
liberal intellectuals in Chapter III and the analysis o f the Polish elite’s political and ideological
preferences in this chapter.
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later distance itself from them indirectly speaks to the overall stability of dominant liberal
discourse. As with managed democracy, which enters the elite’s discussions only during
election years, ethnic nationalism is neither serious nor enduring option.
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Figure 87. Dynamics of Ethnic Relations Alternatives' Evaluations by the Polish Elite

Ultimately, discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals did not change.
If in the beginning of the research period they championed an ethnically tolerant, proWestem, democratic state with liberal ideology and the free market economy, at the end
of the 13-year period covered by my research, their ideal polity looked remarkably
similar (see Table 39). Polish government-affiliated intellectuals not only remained loyal
to their original liberal preferences, but, in some cases, strengthened their convictions
(pro-Westem foreign policy, liberal ideology). Only the free market model lost its appeal.
At the same time, conservative ideology and the govemed market model, two elements of
the organie-statist discourse, reinforced their positions. Ideological and economic issue
domains represent areas of the most acute conflict. However, even in the areas, in which
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the elite leaned more towards the conservative pole of the dichotomy, original liberal
orientations still prevail.

Analvsis of the Relative Importance of Individual Dichotomies in the Overall Discourse
and Periodization of Discourse According to Dominant Dichotomies.
Figures 88 and 89 show the evolution of the relative importance of each
dichotomy, measured as the prevalence of its elements in overall Polish discourse.
Throughout the research period, economic discussions predominated. The importance of
economic issues in overall discourse increased with time and peaked in 1996-1997 and

Table 39
Five Most Preferred Categories in the Beginning (1989-1991) and at the End (2000-2002)
of the Post-Communist Period in Poland

Categories of
Discourse with the
Most Positive
Evaluations During
the First Three Years
(1992-1994)

Sum of Positive
Evaluations for
Three First Years
of Research
Period (19921994) (maximum
3.0)

Ethnic Tolerance

2.85

Pro-Westem Foreign
Policy
Inclusive Democracy

2.73
2.72

Liberal Ideology
Free Market Model

2.60
2.54

Categories of
Discourse with the
Most Positive
Evaluations
During the Last
Three Years of
Research Period
(1999-2001)
Pro-Westem
Foreign Policy
Liberal Ideology

Sum of Positive
Evaluations for
Three Last Years
of Research Period
(1999-2002)
(maximum 3.0)*’*

Inclusive
Democracy
Ethnic Tolerance
Conservative
Ideology

2.69

2.90
2.72

2.00
1.00

As follows from Table 39, the last period lacks the consensus o f the first one. As mentioned in the
text, there is less agreement on contemporary ideology or economic policy.
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2002, around the parliamentary elections and during the important EU negotiations. In
general, the economy is more prominent in the discourse of the social-democratic elites
(1993-1997 and 2001-2002) than in the discourse of their liberal opponents. Political and
ideological issues are inherently interconnected. They represented the dominant themes
of the original intellectual discourse, but their importance decreased with time. The
popularity of the debate about foreign relations, on the contrary, has a tendency to
strengthen. Ethnic relations are the least important reference point in the intellectual
discourse of this period.
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H Ideological
Dichotomy
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■ Economic
Dichotomy

20%

Foreign Policy
Dichotomy

10%
0%

Q Ethnic
Relations
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Figure 88. Frequencies (Relative) of Mentions of Various Dichotomies in the Discourse
of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals

It follows from the analysis summarized above that the structure of Polish elite
intellectuals’ discourse changed. The first period (1989-1992) is characterized by the
domination of political and ideological elements of discourse. In the following period
(1993-1997) discourse became primarily economic. Contemporary discourse (1998-
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present) is organized around two important structuring elements - political-ideological
and economic.
The periodization reflects rotations among Polish government-affiliated
intellectuals. Liberal intellectuals tend to be more concerned 'with the political-ideological
and foreign policy issues, while social democratic intellectuals concentrate on the
economic debate. The structural changes in discourse thus reveal that, despite a general
consensus on the post-Communist priorities, social-democratic and liberal intellectuals
prefer different paths to achieve these goals. For liberals, success comes from a stable
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Figure 89. Trends in Relative Importance of Individual Dichotomies in the Discourse
of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals
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democratic system and partnership with the West, while for social democrats success is
built on the solid foundation of the govemed market. More importantly, the periodization
suggests that after experimenting with discrete (economic or political) elements of
official discourse, the contemporary Polish intellectual elite is increasingly engaged in a
more well-balanced discussion.

Qualitative Content Analysis of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals’
Discourse
Unlike Russian government-affiliated intellectuals, their Polish counterparts
consciously tried to sustain the principles of the original, liberal discourse. “The change
should be limited only to accents, nuances, and instruments. This is the best for our
[Polish] case” (Skubiszewski Rzeczpospolita 29 September 1993). The following
quotations demonstrate the stability of or minor modifications in Polish intellectual
discourse in the post-Communist period. Since there is no appreciable difference between
the original and the current discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals (with
the exception of ideological and economic issue domains), I opted to organize quotations
by dichotomies/issue domains and not according to the sub-periods used in the chapter
discussing the Russian content analytic data.

1. Political Diehotomv
According to my quantitative content analysis, Polish government-affiliated
intellectuals consistently favor inclusive democracy. The following quotations, arranged
in chronological order, support this conclusion. Regardless of their loyalties to liberal,
conservative, or social-democratic political elites, all government-affiliated intellectuals
upheld the principles of inclusive democracy. The greater frequency of quotations during
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the early post-Communist period reflects the dominance of the political and ideological
issues in the structure of overall discourse rather than a decline in support for inclusive
democracy.
“Government must create mechanisms which will allow it to listen to the voice of
public opinion.... We want public opinion to have an influence on the state affairs in
Poland and we will listen to its voice” (Mazowiecki Rzeczpospolita 13 September 1989).
“Society must have an opportunity to observe the process of decision-making, must have
a chance to learn about the arguments, and, finally, must have an opportimity to express
its opinion through the mass media as well as various organizations which articulate
interests and views of diverse social groups” (Geremek 1990,292). “Parliamentary
democracy is ... an important ingredient of our vision of the future” (Najder
Rzeczpospolita 29 Decemberl989-1 January 1990). “The most urgent task now is the
creation of real territorial self-government which means building democracy from below”
(Mazowiecki Trybuna Ludu 19 January1990). “We should create parliamentary
mechanisms to protect the minority against the inevitable arbitrary nature of the majority”
(Zakrzewska Prawo w zmieniajqcym siq spoleczenstwie 1992). “I see the most important
remedy for current, unhealthy situation in the authentic, not merely declarative,
involvement of citizens in the process of governing. It can be done through local selfgovernment, through all cells of social life, in which a vast number of people can realize
themselves” (Strzembosz Powsciqglosc i Praca 4 1993). “Obviously, the future state
must be a parliamentary democracy....” (Zakrzewska Panstwo i Prawo 111993). “It
appears, however, that if a country accepts a strong presidential m odel... its current
difficulties will only deepen and political conflicts will intensify” (Wiatr Mysl
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Socjaldemokratyczna 3-4 1994). “Institutions of parliamentary democracy are essential
elements of democratic system” (Michnik 1995, 127). “It must be a vision of Poland in
which civil society will be an everyday partner of state institutions and will be able to
identify with these institutions” (Michnik 1995,130). “The parliamentary system is safer
than the presidential system, or even a mixed presidential-parliamentary system” (Wiatr
2001,33).

2. Ideological Diehotomv
Polish government-affiliated intellectuals are uncertain about the best ideological
option. During the research period, the balance between liberalism and conservatism
changed in favor of the latter. In recent years (1999 - present), conservative overtones
dominate intellectual discussions. The following quotations, arranged chronologically,
show the mixed ideological leanings of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals and
their increasing interest in conservatism.
Liberal orientations are evident in the statements that reject a religious state,
social/positive freedoms and support the weak definition of the state (state for the
citizens) and liberal values: “There is no well-being of the state without well-being of the
citizens. The greatness of the nation and the state can only be achieved when citizens are
happy and prosperous” (Zakrzewska Krytyka 36 1991). “The postulate of a confessional
state is not acceptable” (J. Kaczyhski 1992a, 159). “The government and state
administration should not teach the citizens about moral values and acceptable lifestyles”

(Hall 1993, 68). “We are convinced that the idea of a secular state does not contain any
alarming elements” (Zakrzewska Wiqz 6 1993). “State is and must be neutral” (Wiatr
1993,112). “I support secular schools, schools without religious instruction” (Zielinski
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1995,274). “To speak about social [positive] freedom is a dangerous rhetoric” (Michnik
1995,606). “The school caimot be an institution which forces a single standpoint” (Wiatr
1998a, 65).
Conservative themes include positive evaluations of morality, Christian values,
common good, strengthening the criminal justice system, and the developmental state:
“One needs a well-defined vision of a common good, a common goal. I think that today
there is no such a vision.... [W]e still need a vision which would be based on basic moral
values and would allow us to incorporate Christian ethics” (Najder Rzeczpospolita 29
December1989-1 January 1990). “I think that today our society must recognize that the
Polish state is the highest value in public life” (Najder Rzeczpospolita 17-18 February
1990). “1 believe that the ban on the death penalty is wrong. It is not only illogical; it is
immoral” (J. Kaczyhski 1992b, 149,152). “Our country needs a strong state ... which
would realize common good and not the interests of particular strata” (Parys 1993a, 79).
“We should relate to the world o f moral values, honesty, hard work ethic. This is an
alternative to the propositions of the liberals, or to what, at least, dominates their vision,
i.e., concern for individual motivation, entrepreneurial abilities, and desire to take charge
of one’s own life. 1 support the Christian inspiration, I support the presence of the Church
in the public life, 1 support serious treatment of fundamental issues, including respect for
the right to life” (Hall 1993,136-137). “1 am concerned first and foremost, about certain
recidivism of pathological features of our national character.... I refer to the overgrowth
of the Polish individualism, which leads to permanent conflict and lack of ability to act
collectively.... Private interests become more important than common good; individual
ambition and group interests outweigh common interest” (Nowak-Jeziorahski 1999, 128).
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“The position that there is no place for Christian values is an anti-intellectual position”
(Bartoszewski 16 November 2000,167).

3. Economic Diehotomv
Polish government-affiliated intellectuals are divided between the free market and
the govemed market models. The rivalry between the two models is primarily a function
of rotations among the Polish political elite in general and government-affiliated
intellectuals in particular. Unlike other areas, intellectual economic attitudes seem to
depend on the differences in economic agenda of mling elites. This time I subdivided the
quotations according to the four electoral cycles during which liberal and socialdemocratic elites altemated. The intensity of the discussion was significantly stronger in
the begirming of the research period. Currently, the fervor of economic debate subsided.
During the first, liberal, period (1989-1993) both liberal and conservative
intellectuals promoted the free market model: “Privatization ... must be started as soon
as possible and on the broadest possible scale” (Mazowiecki Rzeczpospolita 28 May
1990). “A radical program of economic liberalism is imperative for democratization”
(Geremek Tygodnik Powszechny 17 April 1990). “The government must not regulate
prices” (Kuron 1991, 8). “We always imderstood the necessity of protecting the program
of Balcerowicz.... Balcerowicz’ plan was great and we wanted to protect it” (J.
Kaczyhski 1991, 92,122). “I knew for a long time that the very idea of plarmed
transformation o f our economy is erroneous. We must introduce free market

immediately, quickly, which means that we must liberalize prices and freeze wage”
(Kuron 1991,14-15). “The best results are generated by the economy strongly cormected
to the international market” (Balcerowicz 1992,110). “The state budget must be
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balanced, which means that the state should not spend more than it collects” (Kuczynski
1992,100). “We must privatize and privatize quickly” (Balcerowicz Przeglqd Polityczny,
Special Issue 1993).
During the second, social-democratic, period (1993-1997) the free-market model
is criticized, while the govemed market model is viewed positively: “The mistakes of the
economic policy were not simply technical problems, i.e., they were not the partial (or
even main) result of wrong economic analysis. Their fimdamental error was a dogmatic
acceptance of the neo-liberal program and in forcing the changes dictated by neo
liberalism at any cost.... Doctrinaires of neo-liberalism subconsciously followed
communist doctrinaires who govemed Poland during the last forty years and who forced
wrong solutions in the name of the doctrine, even though it was a different doctrine then”
(Wiatr 1993, 35). “All civilized countries whose economy is developing dynamically and
effectively have a social market with a substantial degree of state intervention. There the
share of public financing is steadily increasing.... State economic intervention is
especially imperative in Poland....” (Kaleta 1993,2). “The state cannot move away from
its responsibility for enormous unemployment and increasing pauperization of society. It
has a responsibility to provide social security to the society” (Kaleta 1993,11). “Changes
in the type of property like other changes in economic system must take place during
many years. The distance between socialism and capitalism cannot be passed in one giant
leap” (Modzelewski 1993,45). “Populism is a response to the outcomes of socially
erroneous and often irresponsible and unimaginative neo-liberal economic policy.... It is
exactly neo-liberalism that breeds populism” (Kolodko 1993,129). “I support a social
market, which means that I support a market economy in which some market processes
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are controlled by the state, especially when the market cannot solve its own problems”
(Zielinski 1995, 267). “The state has a vital role in the economy including industrial
development” (Kolodko 1996,19). “Social justice is not only a desirable element of
human behavior or personal relationship, but it is also an important principle of the legal
system” (Winczorek Rzeczpospolita 25 June 1996).
The attractiveness of the free market model returned during the third, liberal,
period (1997-2001)-. “We should relieve the state of some of its responsibilities in the
areas of education, health, social security, job accidents, and old age protection.... The
less the state is involved, the better for the society, which will then form a strong ability
to count on itself and to be thrifty. This is how [initial] capital can be accumulated” (J.
Kaczyhski 1997,145) “The economy must be based on the free market, low and simple
taxes, clear law, good public finances (absence of deficit), and be privatized”
(Balcerowicz 1999b, 179).
During the fourth, social-democratic, period (2001-present) intellectual economic
preferences changed in favor of the govemed market option: “The naiVe faith of some of
politicians and economists that the quick privatization and liberalization of the market
will result in a natural development of the economy, spectacular growth of production,
and national well-being must be corrected” (Kolodko 2001b, 73). “The state is, thus,
efficient, if it corrects market accesses, and helps the market to function better. The state
should fulfill these functions....” (Kolodko 2002a, 79).
4. Foreign Policv
The quotations selected for this dichotomy illustrate the stability of Polish elite
intellectuals’ pro-Westem attitudes. The quoted statements also reveal remarkable
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similarity between the positions of liberal, conservative, and social-democratic elites.
“European and North American directions of our foreign policy have priority”
(Skubiszewski Zycie Warszawy 24 July 1991). “It is in our interest that now, when
Poland has a relative freedom of maneuver, it uses its chance and joins the West as soon
as possible” (Olszewski 1992, 62). “The goal which stood and still stands before Poland
is the issue of real entry into Western structures, both security structures [NATO] and
economic organizations.... The most important road for Poland is integration into
Western European structures” (J. Kaczyhski 1992a, 87, 94). “The thought that we should
isolate ourselves from the European Union means th a t... we will remain in our poverty
and backwardness, which will quickly deepen” (Kuron 1992c, 226). “We already adopted
a correct decision about Poland’s integration into the European Union” (Najder 1993,
267). “Ideas and projects which separate our country ... from Western European or transAtlantic security structures are mere illusions.... Such ideas, if realized, threaten to push
us towards civilizational backwardness and jeopardize our security ” (Skubiszewski
Rzeczpospolita 29 September 1993). “ We see the main guarantee of Polish security in
the European-Atlantic option of foreign policy, including NATO membership” (Wiatr
1998a, 102). “The fact that Poland belongs to the European Union is beyond discussion”
(Bartoszewski October 2,2000). “We now stand in the presence of our historical calling,
our ascension into the European Union” (Nowak-Jeziorahski 2001,206).

5. Ethnic Relations
Despite different political persuasions, government-affiliated intellectuals are able
to reach a consensus on ethnic issues. Selected quotations demonstrate intellectual
support for ethnic tolerance and condemnation of ethnic hatred: “Chauvinism and

237

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

xenophobia bring about intolerance, condemn national culture to be provincial and weak.
Those are deadly threats” (Michnik Gazeta Wyborcza 29 January 1990). “We would like
for other ethnic groups to feel that Poland is their home, that they can cultivate their
language. Their culture enriches our culture” (Mazowiecki Trybuna Ludu 19 January
1990). “It is a known fact that the current manifestations of anti-Semitism in our country
... destroy the image of our young democracy, create obstacles on our road to cultural
and spiritual integration with Europe. But much more important than the image of Poland
abroad is the harm that anti-Semitism inflicts on our national and Christian ethos”
(Turowicz Tygodnik Powszechny 17 February 1991). “Anti-Semitism has an evil
shadow” (Michnik Gazeta Wyborcza 22 April 1991). “Traditions of the state without the
Inquisition stakes, republic of numerous peoples, open and tolerant society are among the
most beautiful Polish traditions” (Michnik Gazeta Wyborcza 22 April 1991). “AntiSemitism is a sickness, which, although it applies to a small fraction of the Polish public
life, has a tendency to grow stronger.... Anti-Semitism is a malignant virus, which first
inserts itself in one cell of the body only to eventually poison and kill the whole
organism” (Michnik Gazeta Wyborcza 22 April 1991). “I feel immediate resentment
when I hear about the uniqueness of the Polish people, their sense of mission” (Michnik
Polityka Polska December 1990 - February 1991). “I ... support a tolerant state, a state
which would have a place for numerous and diverse cultures, different biographies and
points of view. I support a state which will create long-lasting democracy, I support open
society, which is able to protect itself against barbarian invasion of hatred. Anti-Semitism
always speaks the language of this barbaric hatred” (Michnik Gazeta Wyborcza 22 April
1991). “In contemporary Poland anti-Semitism is a shameful sickness and it should be
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eradicated with appropriate tools” (Najder 1993, 96). “I do not approve ... the language
of national discrimination, rejection of certain categories of people based exclusively on
their past, religious, ethnic, or cultural identity” (Michnik 1995, 562). “History teaches us
that attempts to assimilate or discriminate against ethnic groups, to limit their freedom or
use force against them always end up in defeat and threaten the state” (NowakJeziorahski 1999,202).

Importance of Public Opinion for Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals
Initially, the discourse o f Russian government-affiliated intellectuals omitted any
references to public opinion. However, intellectual articulators of contemporary
conservative discourse came to rely on public opinion as a justification for the elite’s
actions. In Poland, on the other hand, public opinion was especially important in the
beginning of the research period: “There is certainly a public opinion consensus
[regarding directions of Polish foreign policy] about which we are now talking”
(Skubiszewski Trybuna 06-07 April 1991). “This is when we created a Department of
Public Opinion Research. That department was, of course, a new undertaking in our post
socialist administrative structures.... The department met once every two weeks and
published its own bulletin, which contained current public opinion trends. It also
conducted its own research. Once a month it asked the respondents a series of identical
questions, mostly concerning assessment of economic situation. Occasionally, additional
questions dealing with the issues, which were o f a particular importance to us [the

government] were asked, e.g., attitude to privatization” (Balcerowicz 1992, 67). “Public
opinion has already been showing negative attitudes towards contemporary economic and
social changes” (Wiatr 1993,11). “When public opinion surveys did not reveal support
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for the program of the Right, the Rightist politicians started to contend that sociologists
were biased and treated survey questionnaires with suspicions” (Najder Rzeczpospolita
16-17 October 1993). “However, society does not consist of the professors of economics
(or sociology) and the popular attitudes may not be identical with the attitudes prevalent
in the academic seminars or governmental offices.... Not accidentally, sociological
research shows that society prefers Sweden as an ideal economic and social model....
Capitalism, which was built in 1989-1993, did not have social support.... Public opinion
was very divided on the issue of de-communization” (Wiatr 1993, 48, 50, 51, 73).
At the end of the research period Polish government-affiliated intellectuals
became somewhat disaffected with public opinion. In fact, they even viewed public
opinion with caution: “This shows the crisis of public opinion and its negative influence”
(Nowak-Jeziorahski 2001,214)

Polish Governmeiit-Afflliated Intellectuals and the Political Elite
The relationship between Polish government-affiliated intellectuals and their
political allies is discussed very sparingly. An ideal relationship is an arrangement in
which intellectuals lead, not follow: “The choice of the examples to follow depends on
the intellectuals engaged in politics” (Wiatr 1993, 98). However, direct references either
to the ability of intellectuals to translate their ideas into actions of the political elite, or to
intellectuals’ willingness to promote preferences of the political elite, characteristic of the
Russian case, are absent in the Polish database.
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Conclusions

Prior to the empirical verification of my research propositions, I hypothesized
that original liberal discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals was not pure;
it also included organic-statist elements. Put slightly differently, in the beginning of the
research period, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals supported inclusive
democracy, liberal ideology, the free-market economic model, pro-Westem foreign
policy, and ethnic tolerance, but also had pro-govemed market and nationalistic
preferences. I expected original attitudes to remain stable throughout the research period.
These hypotheses were partially confirmed.
Indeed, from the veiy beginning, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals
favored inclusive democracy and a pro-Westem foreign policy. The hypothesis about the
coexistence of govemed market attitudes with free market orientations in the original
intellectual discourse was also confirmed. However, I was unable to find a strong
presence of nationalistic attitudes; Polish government-affiliated intellectuals were mostly
tolerant. Instead, elements of organic-statist discourse were found in the ideological
dichotomy. Therefore, the original discourse of the Polish elite intellectuals was
confirmed to be liberal with appreciable organic-statist modifications in the economic
and ideological dichotomies. In general, even in the two most conservative dichotomies,
liberal orientations were dominant. This modification allowed Polish governmentaffiliated intellectuals to sustain the initial, moderately liberal discourse.

The stability hypothesis was also only partially supported. Although political,
foreign policy, and ethnic relations attitudes remained liberal, there was a shift towards
greater ideological conservatism and stronger support for the govemed market model.
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Yet the shift did not bring about the total repiaeement o f original, liberal orientations
even in the two areas which experienced the strongest changes.
It follows that there is a significant degree of conflict in the ideological and
economic issue domains. The conflict in these spheres is attributable to the electoral
competition between liberal and conservative elites (ideological divide) and between
liberal and social-democratic elites (economic disagreements). My findings confirmed the
major cleavages in Polish politics reported by numerous Polish researchers - i.e., the
conflict between the economic alternatives and the competition between liberal and
conservative ideologies.

Interestingly, the economic direction is subject to intense

debate in Poland, while in Russia support for economic liberalism (the free market
model) is an invariant entity despite tremendous public opposition to it. Polish
government-affiliated intellectuals are also less economy-centric than their Russian
counterparts. Political and ideological issues occupy prominent positions in Polish
intellectual debate. From the very start, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals framed
the government’s economic reforms in political terms, not as an exclusively economic
agenda.
Despite the rotations within Polish government-affiliated intellectuals and existing
cleavages, there is consensus in three out of five issue areas. This indicates that regardless
See, for instance, Table 35 as well as Pawet Boski, “O dw6ch wymiarach lewicy 1 prawicy na
scenic politycznej” [“About Two Dimensions o f The Left and the Right on the Political Scene”], in
Wartosci ipostaw ypolakdw a zmiany systemowe: szkice zpsychologiipolitycznej [Values and
Attitudes o f Poles and Systemic Change: Sketches from Political Psychology], ed. Janusz Reykowski
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Psychologii PAN, 1993); Janusz Reykowski, “Zmiany systemowe a
mentalno^d polskiego spoleczehstwa” [“Systemic Change and Mentality o f Polish Society”], in
Wartosci i postaw y polakdw a zmiany systemowe: szkice z psychologii politycznej [Values and
Attitudes o f Poles and Systemic Change: Sketches from Political Psychology], ed. Janusz Reykowski
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Psychologii PAN, 1993), and “Sp6r mi?dzy prawicy a lewicy: o5
konfliktu spoleczno-ekonomicznego” [“Debate Between the Right and the Left: Axis o f Social and
Economic Conflict”], in Narod. Wladza. Spoleczehstwo [People. State. Society], ed. Aleksandra
Jasinska-Kania and Jacek Raciborski (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 1996); and Wiatr,
Nie zmarnowalismy tych lat.
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of the composition of the Polish elite and the differences in ideological and economic
views, inclusive democracy, pro-Westem foreign policy, and tolerant ethnic relations
represent shared values. They are important goals in themselves, not merely the means to
other objectives. These orientations, rather than economic liberalism, as in the Russian
case, represent invariant elements of Polish intellectual discourse. The implications of
such consensus for the consolidation of democracy will be discussed in the concluding
chapter.
Although to date there are no changes in the substance of Polish intellectual
discourse, such a scenario carmot be ruled out. Economic attitudes and ideological
preferences are unstable and can change depending on the outcome of electoral
competition.
Currently, the discourse of Polish elite intellectuals includes appreciable organicstatist elements (religious or statist ideology and pro-govemed market sympathies).
However, unlike in the Russian case, where liberal free-market economic attitudes
coexist with ideologically conservative preferences and belief in an authoritarian state,
the Polish combination o f conservative ideology and the govemed market model is at
least more intemally coherent.
European left-right labels were usefiil in explaining the evolution of attitudes of
Russian government-affiliated intellectuals. These labels are also applicable to the Polish
case. Liberal discourse is predominantly leftist. It consists of the leftist elements in
political, ideological, foreign policy, and ethnic relations areas (i.e., is inclusively
democratic, liberal, pro-Westem, and ethnically tolerant). Support for the free market is
its only rightist element. Organic-statist discourse, on the other hand, is predominantly
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rightist. It includes rightist elements in political, ideological, foreign policy, and ethnic
relations spheres (i.e., support for managed democracy, statism, isolationism, and
nationalism). Its only leftist element is the support for the govemed market model. It
follows that original discourses of Polish and Russian government-affiliated intellectuals
were predominantly leftist. However, Polish and Russian intellectuals subsequently
parted ways.
Currently, the discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals includes
rightist elements in the economic and ideological dichotomies and leftist elements in
political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic issue domains. Both leftist and
rightist elements strengthened their presence in Polish intellectual discourse. However,
the leftist strand is visibly stronger, as it is present in five issue areas, while rightist
elements are discemable only in two issue domains. Such dynamics are in line with
Jaroslaw Kaczyhski’s observation about relative weakness of Polish rightist
intellectuals.*^’
In Russia, the current discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals corresponds
to rightist positions in politics, ideology, economics, foreign policy, and ethnic relations
(i.e., support for authoritarianism, statism, free market, isolationism, and nationalism).
Obviously, the rightist orientations represented the core values. The original leftist
positions of the liberal agenda were dropped, while the leftist elements of organic-statism
were not included. Not accidentally, the contemporary discourse of Russian governmentaffiliated intellectuals is exclusively a synthesis of rightist elements of the two discourses.

“As far as intellectuals are concerned, the Left has a certain advantage. We [the Right], regrettably,
cannot appropriately use the few intellectuals that we have” (Jaroslaw Kaczyhski, Czas na zmiany
[Timefor Change], Conversation with Michal Boniewicz and Piotr M. Rudnicki (Warsaw; Spotkania
Editions, 1992, 99).
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Before turning to external explanations (i.e., public attitudes and priorities of the
political elite) for changes and continuities in intellectual discourse, an examination of
internal reasons is in order. In Russia, the conservative transformation of intellectual
discourse was a function of two processes. First, there was a gradual replacement of the
original liberals by more conservative intellectuals. Second, surviving liberals evolved in
a conservative direction, to the point where the liberal and the conservative discourses
could and did merge together. The relative stability of Polish intellectual discourse, on
the other hand, is an unlikely outcome of continuous rotation among the governmentaffiliated intellectuals. Yet, the alteration of elites did not affect the discourse. All Polish
actors agree on inclusive democracy, pro-Westem foreign policy, and ethnic tolerance
and are uncertain about the best ideology to guide them. The only area in which the
rotation of cadres is felt is the economic area.
The fact that the discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals followed a
strikingly different pattem from that of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals during
the post-Communist period is substantively important for my comparative analysis. But it
is also methodologically significant. It means that content analysis of elite discourse and
attitudes that I devised can and does register these differences. My method has been
proven to be sensitive to country variations.

Compared to the Russian elite, for whom only economic liberalism proved to be
indispensable, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals are more committed to the
principles of liberal discourse. In Poland, liberal orientations survived (albeit in a
modified form). But to what degree has the ability of Polish government-affiliated
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intellectuals to sustain liberal principles been helped by a more favorable public opinion?
And to Avhat degree did the discourse of intellectuals reflect the priorities of the political
elite? The next chapter will compare attitudes of government-affiliated intellectuals to
trends in Polish public opinion and the actions of the political elite proper. Do
government-affiliated intellectuals bring public demands to the attention o f the political
elite? Or do they simply explain and advocate actions of the political elite? In other
words, I intend to see whether the discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals
reflects these intellectuals’ ovra group interests, the political orders of the political elite,
or the state of Polish public opinion. In the final sixth chapter, I will compare my answers
to these questions to the Russian findings. These comparisons are designed to show the
different roles that government-affiliated intelleetuals play in post-Communist Poland
and Russia (as I hypothesized in Chapter I).
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CHAPTER V
THE POLISH CASE: ELITE-PUBLIC CONSENSUS ON MODIFIED LIBERAL
VALUES

Outline of Chapter’s Research Agenda
Content analytic data from the previous chapter demonstrated that Polish postCommunist official discourse was moderately liberal and stable. Despite increasing
support for conservative ideology and the govemed market model, Polish governmentaffiliated intellectuals also continued to endorse important elements of liberal discourse,
including inclusive democracy, liberal ideology, the free market economic model, proWestem foreign policy, and ethnic tolerance. In this chapter, I look at the evolution of
Polish public opinion during the post-Communist period. Juxtaposition of the trends in
official discourse with the dynamics of public attitudes will show to what extent Polish
elite attitudes reflect public opinion and the nature of the relationship between official
discourse and public attitudes. In other words, was Polish post-Communist public opinion
as stable and liberal as the official discourse of the elite? Is the organie-statist shift in
ideological and economic orientations of the elite a nod in the direction of changing
public opinion or an unrelated process? If there is an organic-statist realignment among
the general public, does it precede or follow the changes in elite preferences? To answer
these questions, I present data from an extensive review and statistical analysis of Polish
public opinion data.
The second question addressed in this chapter concems the political implications
of stable official discourse. I look at the degree of congmence between official discourse
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and policy initiatives of the political elite. What is the relationship between elite’s verbal
program of action and its actual realization? Do actions precede, coincide with, or follow
verbal articulation of ideas? Answers to these questions will help determine the
relationship between government-affiliated intellectuals as discourse communicators and
the political elite proper. I will investigate whether government-affiliated intellectuals are
a sub-group of the political elite, or an independent actor representing society. I employ
event analysis to trace the evolution of the political elite’s actions in five areas (political,
ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic relations) and then compare trends in
actual policies to the trends in official discourse.
In this chapter, I will demonstrate that throughout the research period Polish
public opinion was democratic, ideologically and economically mixed, pro-Westem, and
nationalistic. Although Poles supported an organic-statist orientation (in ideological,
economic, and, especially, ethnic relations areas), their attitudes may be characterized as
moderately liberal. I will also show that there is a greater degree of congmence between
Polish public opinion and the elite’s discourse (but not always their actions) than reported
in the Russian case. However, even in Poland, the relationship between public opinion
and the elite’s attitudes is not absolutely congment. The elite is reluctant to incorporate
the public’s nationalism, a preference that is at odds with the elite’s other initiatives and
aspirations (especially, Poland’s membership in the European and trans-Atlantic political,
economic, and military organizations). Finally, I will show that, imlike the Russian case,
where public-elite agreement emerged around organic-statist preferences, in Poland the
social consensus is built around liberal values.
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Procedures for Comparing Public Opinion to Elite Value Orientations and Actions
As already outlined in Chapters I and III, I compare trends in public opinion and
official discourse over time to see if both move in the same direction. Although suitable
for initial exploration of the public-elite relationship, this method has one limitation: it is
less helpful in showing the exact mechanisms and channels by which public opinion
reaches the elite. As in the Russian chapter (Chapter III), I offer anecdotal evidence of
public opinion’s significance to the Polish elite, evidence that I observed during a stay at
CBOS (Center for Public Opinion Research), my affiliation site.

Sample
For the statistical part of my Polish research I used two types of data. First, 1
examined results of PGSS (Polish General Social Surveys) conducted by ISS UW
(Interdisciplinary Institute for Social Studies, Warsaw University). Second, I analyzed the
results of public opinion surveys conducted by CBOS.*’^ The brief descriptions of the
different types of surveys are presented in Table 40.

On one occasion, I also used results o f PGSW (Polish Gener
al Electoral Survey), conducted by CBOS for the Institute o f Political Studies, Polish Academy o f
Sciences in October 2000. PGSW had a random all-Polish sample o f 1,048 respondents.
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Table 40
Characteristics of Polish Public Opinion Surveys

Characteristics
of Particular
Survey/Type of
Survey
PGSS
surveys

Actualnc
problcmy i
wydarzcnia
rCurrent
Problems and
Eventsl
Omnibus

Years
Conducted

Sample Type

Sample Size

1992,1993,
1994, 1995,
1997 (2 sub
samples),
1999 (2 sub
samples)

Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults

1,600(1992-1995)
1,200 (per each sub-sample in
1997 and 1999)

1989-2002

1990-1991,
1995-2000

B,egular CBOS surveys:
Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults

Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults

1,500 (1989-1990)
1.000-1,500 (1991)
1.000-1,200(1992)
1.100-1,400(1993)
1.100-1,200(1994-2002)
1.000-1,500 (1990-1991)
1.000-1,300(1995-1996)
1,000 (1997-2000)

Proportional sample of 1,000(1990-1991,1997Polish adults
2000)
Swiat wokol nas
[World Around
Us1

1990-1997

Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults

Sprawy Polski i
nolakow [Polish
Issues]

1990-1995

Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults

Co 0 tym
myslisz? [What
Do You Think
A bout...?]

1993-1995

Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults

1,500(1990-1991)
1,176 (1992)
1,015 (1993)
1,157(1994)
1,198(1995)
1,154(1996)
1,164 (1997)
1,480-1,498(1990)
1,000(1991)
1,222-1,400(1992)
1,104-1,245 (1993)
1,281 (1995)
1,107(1993)
1,219(1994)
1,173 (1995)
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Table 40 continued

Przemianv w
Polsee 19891991 [Changes
in Poland 198919911
Co mvslisz 0
nrvwatvzaeii
[What Do You
Think About
Privatization?]
Wsehod. Zachod
a Polska [East,
West and
Poland]
Ekonomieznv
wvmiar zvcia
eodziennego
[Economic
Dimension of
Evervdav Life]
Sprawv
miedzvnarodow
e [International
Issues!
Svstemv
partvine [Partv
Svstemsl
Pahstwo a
obvwatel

1991

Individual CBOS surveys:
Representative sample 1,000
of randomly selected
Polish adults

1991

Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults

1,000

1991

Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults

1,500

1992

Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults

1,788

1992

Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults

1,208

1992

Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults
Representative sample
of randomly selected
Polish adults

1,149

1999

1,521

Selection of Survey Questions and Steps of Analysis
During the Russian phase of my analysis, I was faced with a task of eolleeting and
presenting comparable data that would illustrate the trends in both official discourse and
public attitudes. The Polish ease was no different. Content-analytic and statistical data are
not identical. Content analytic data are numerically expressed evaluations of specific
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researcher-deteraiined textual indicators, while the results of public opinion surveys are
aggregated answers to the questions designed by other researchers. However, specific
survey questions are comparable to textual indicators and the percent of people who
favored a particular option for a given survey question is equivalent to the value assigned
to a textual indicator. The task then is to select questions that a) have meanings similar to
textual indicators of content analytic categories and b) are asked repeatedly. The last
criterion constitutes a mechanical limitation on a researcher, as not all suitable survey
questions can be traced chronologically. However, for each of the five issue domains, I
was able to select a number of survey questions that were both similar in meaning to
textual indicators and asked repeatedly.
Next, I performed an extensive statistical review and produced graphs of the
evolution o f public attitudes in five areas (political, ideological, economic, foreign policy,
and ethnic relations).

Results of statistical review are examined in Section

“Chronological Evolution o f Polish Public Attitudes.”
The last two sections of this chapter present a closer look at the social and
demographic determinants of various public attitudes (age, income, gender, education,
degree of religious belief, size of place of residence) and the relationships between public
attitudes themselves. Results o f statistical and correlation analyses are discussed in
Section “Social and Demographic Determinants of Polish Public Attitudes” and Section
“Relationships Between Various Polish Public Attitudes.”

To simplify graphs and improve their readability, I deliberately omitted “I do not know,” “other,” “I
am ambivalent,” and similar answer options. This explains why on certain graphs, the sum o f values
does not add to 100 percent. When applicable, I also combined responses measuring intensity o f a
particular attitude into one category. For instance, on some graphs, response line “I am satisfied”
combines answer-options “I am very satisfied,” “I am satisfied,” and “I am rather satisfied,” while
response line “I am dissatisfied” may contain answers “I am rather dissatisfied,” “I am dissatisfied,”
and “I am very dissatisfied.” The same applies to answer options measuring trust or distrust.
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Chronological Evolution of Polish Public Attitudes According to Individual Issue
Domains
1■Political Issue Domain
The following questions tap into the Polish publie’s political attitudes:
“Is democracy always the best political system?”
“Do you support dictatorship?”
“Does democracy have any alternatives?”
“Are you satisfied with demoeracy?”
“What does democracy mean to you?”
“To what degree do you identify with the democratic system?”
“What political party do you prefer?”
“Would Poland be better off if it did not have the Sejm T
“Are political parties necessary for democracy?”
“What does an independent press mean to you?”
“Should the state control the media?”
“What is the goal of politics?”
“Are anti-democratic forms o f government better than democratic ones?”
“To what degree are you interested in politics?”
“Are you active in the eivil society organizations?”
Among the explanatory variables for Poles’ political views are:
“Did Poland’s political situation improve since 1989?”
“What is your opinion of the current political situation?”
“Are you satisfied with the current political system?”
Democratic Public Attitudes
Figure 90 reveals imqualified public support for democracy. During the research
period Poles never betrayed their original democratic orientations. Moreover, their
support for democracy even strengthened. The same conclusion can be reached after
analyzing Figure 91. Poles soundly reject authoritarian government o f a strong-hand as a
means to eliminate corrupt bureaucracy and political conflict. Even if a question
mentions democracy’s weak points, Polish respondents still prefer an imperfect
democratic system to all other alternatives (Figure 92). Although not as clear-cut. Figure
93 also indicates pro-democratic attitudes. If, initially, Poles were skeptical about
democracy, by 1997 they became satisfied with it.
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Figure 90. Is Democracy Always the Best Political System?

Figures 94 and 95 provide a deeper look into Poles’ attitudes toward democracy.
They also paint a more complex picture of public democratic orientations. Although the
majority of Poles associates democracy with positive notions of freedom and human
rights (Figure 94), the degree of self-identification with the democratic system is
relatively low (Figure 95). Nevertheless, despite a certain democratic skepticism, after
1993 a slightly greater segment of the Polish population identifies with democracy.
Figure 96 indicates that Poles overwhelmingly favor democratic parties. Among
the major political players vdth the strongest societal support are the democratic parties
of the Left (SLD, UP, and PSL) who can count on about 50-60 percent of the electorate.
Post-Solidarity Center-Left (ROAD/UD/UW and PO), Center-Right (AWS) and Right
(PC/PiS and LPR) democratic parties gamer about 30-40 percent of electoral support.
The radical populist (and anti-democratic) party Samoobrona consistently polls at 2-3
percent of popular support, although recently its popularity increased to 10 percent.
According to Figure 97, Poles strongly oppose disbanding of their parliament, the Sejm.
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Figures 98, 99, and 100 show deeply felt democratic commitments. A majority of Poles
perceives political parties as indispensable for the normal functioning of democracy. The
general public also consistently supports the independence of the mass media and
opposes governmental control over them.
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Figure 91. Do You Support Dictatorship?
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Figure 92. Does Democracy Have Any Alternatives?
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Figure 93. Are You Satisfied with Democracy? (PGSS)
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Figure 98. Are Political Parties Necessary for Democracy?
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Figure 99. What Does an Independent Press Mean to You?
Anti-Democratic Attitudes
Although Poles strongly support elements of inclusive democracy, there are
several attitudes that show anti-democratic tendencies. Poles see the main goal of politics
as providing order and security in the country. More democratic priorities (freedom of
speech and ability to influence democratic decisions) are distant second and third choices
(Figure 101). Polish public opinion is consistently divided between those who agree that
anti-democratic forms of government may be preferable to a more democratic one and
those who endorse democracy vmconditionally (Figure 102). However, one carmot label
Poles outright undemocratic; after all, the anti-democratic option is supported by less
than fifty percent of the population.

258

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

-the state should
control the media,
because they often
disorient and
misinform
'the media should be
independent

sV

uI.
V
a

'C’

dates

Figure 100. Should the State Control the Media?
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Figure 101. What Is the Goal of Politics? (PGSS)

Taken together, Figure 103 and 104 reveal that despite an increased interest in
politics, an absolute majority o f Poles is passive in the civil society. Although about 50

percent of Poles have interest in politics, only 20 percent of the public can translate this
interest into active participation in the civil society.
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Figure 102. Are Anti-Democratic Forms of Government Better Than
Democratic Ones?
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Figure 104. Are You Active in the Civil Society Organizations?

Such inconsistent political attitudes can be partly explained by Poles’ attitudes
about the overall political situation. Although the Polish public believes that since the
collapse of Communism the political situation has changed for the better (Figure 105),
the majority is critical of democracy as it exists in Poland today. Poles perceive the
current political situation as far from the ideal and in need of major modifications
(Figures 106 and 107). The last two figures reflect a distinct disjunction between Poles’
desire for a greater democracy and their evaluation of the practical realization of this
ideal.
Polish political attitudes are mostly democratic and remarkably stable. Not only
do Poles support democracy in general, they also favor more inclusive democratic forms
and reject more elitist forms where political parties, opposition, and mass media are
denied an active role in political decision-making. Inclusive democratic attitudes of the
Polish public are congruent with inclusive-democratic principles of official discourse.
However, Poles are visibly dissatisfied with the practical realization of their political

261

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

ideal. As a result, they are unable to identify with democracy and reluctant to participate
in the civil society.
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Figure 105. Did Poland's Political Situation Improve Since 1989?
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Figure 106. What Is Your Opinion About the Current Political Situation?
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Figure 107. Are You Satisfied With the Current Political System?
2. Ideological Issue Domain
The following survey questions measure ideological preferences (i.e., Poles’
views on the ideal state-society and church-state relationships):
“Should the Catholic Church play a stronger role in the Polish politics and state
affairs?”
“What is your opinion of divorce laws?”
“Should euthanasia be legalized?”
“What do you think about pre-marital sex?”
“What do you think about sex education in public schools?”
“Should abortion be allowed?”
“What do you think about homosexuals?”
“Do you support the death penalty?” (2)
“Should the state be legally accountable?”
“Should atheists be allowed to speak publicly?”
“Should atheists be allowed to teach in public schools?”
“Can human rights and freedoms be restricted to fight crime?”
Liberal Attitudes
In the Polish context, attitudes towards the Catholic Church serve as a bellwether
for a larger divide between conservatives and liberals. Conservatives are likely to be
strong proponents of the Catholic Church, while liberals, although practicing Catholics,
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are more eritical regarding the Church’s role in the society and politics. Poles
increasingly favor a separation of the Church and state and a decrease of the role of the
Church in politics and state affairs (Figure 108). Figures 109-112 show that Poles have
liberal views on the issues of divorce, euthanasia, pre-marital sex, and sex education in
public schools. Figure 113 demonstrates the generally liberal perception of the
relationship between the individual and the state among the Poles. It illustrates that Poles
reject the notion of double legal standards applied to the state and prefer that the state be
legally accountable rather than efficient.
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Figure 108. Should the Catholic Church Play a Stronger Role in the Polish Politics
and State Affairs?

45
40
35
30
25

‘ divorce laws should be
relaxed
- divorce laws should be
more strict

20

15
10

5
0

s'?"

dates

Figure 109. What Do You Think About Divorce Laws? (PGSS)
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Figure 110. Should Euthanasia be Legalized? (PGSS)
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Figure 111. What Do You Think About Pre-Marital Sex? (PGSS)
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Figure 112. What Do You Think About Sex Education in Public Schools? (PGSS)
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Figure 113. Should the State be Legally Accountable?

Finally, Poles exhibit a certain degree of tolerance towards atheists (i.e.,
opponents of organized religion). They would allow (although not overwhelmingly)
atheists to speak publicly and to teach in public schools (Figures 114 and 115). However,
these attitudes have weakened.
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Conservative Attitudes
Figures 116-118 demonstrate the strength of law and order sentiments among the
general public. Both the CBOS and PGSS surveys show Poles to be supportive of the
death penalty and willing to sacrifice human rights to fight crime. The number of Poles
who support the death penalty increased from 50 to 75 percent (according to CBOS
surveys) or remained stable around 70 percent (according to PGSS) (Figures 116 and
117). Almost 70 percent of Poles are prepared to forgo their human and civil rights in
exchange for safety (Figure 118). Poles are also conservative in their attitudes towards
abortion. They consistently oppose the more liberal pro-choice position (Figure 119). A
degree of conservatism is also visible in Figure 120 which deals with the attitudes
towards homosexuals. Generally, Poles are reluctant to accept homosexuality as a
legitimate lifestyle.
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Figure 114. Should Atheists be Allowed to Speak Publicly? (PGSS)
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Figure 115. Should Atheists be Allowed to Teach in Public Schools? (PGSS)
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Figure 116. Do You Support the Death Penalty?
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Figure 117. Do You Support the Death Penalty? (PGSS)
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Figure 118. Can Human Rights and Freedoms be Restricted to Fight Crime?
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Figure 119. Should Abortion be Allowed? (PGSS)
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Figure 120. What Do You Think About Homosexuals? (PGSS)
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Polish public opinion appears to be split between conservative and liberal
inclinations. Although tolerant of atheists, secular in their outlook on the church-state
relationship, supportive of divorce and convinced that the state ought to be accountable to
society, Poles also favor the death penalty, reject abortion and alternative lifestyles, and
are ready to sacrifice their civil liberties to combat crime. It is worth mentioning that
while conservative preferences are stable, or even increasing in prominence, the public’s
liberal orientations are weakening. The Polish elite is likewise split between liberal and
conservative ideological options; conservative orientations of the elite have shown a
tendency to strengthen. Comparison of trends in both the elite’s and the public’s attitudes
demonstrates that the mixed ideological preferences of government-affiliated intellectuals
and the general public are congruent. Conservative public opinion appears to compel
even social-democratic and liberal elites, who would otherwise be likely to voice
ideologically liberal discourse, to espouse a more conservative position.

3. Economic Issue Domain
The following questions were selected to illustrate general economic attitudes:
“Is free market capitalism advantageous for Poland?”
“Are you in favor of economic socialism?”
“What do you think about privatization?”
“What do you think about the speed of privatization?”
“Do you trust the private companies?”
“Do you trust state enterprises?”
Answers to these questions reveal the overall public attitudes to the free-market
and interventionist models. To demonstrate Poles’ views on specific economic policies, I
selected the following survey questions:
“Does the state have an obligation to provide free medical care?”
“Does the state have an obligation to guarantee jobs?”
“Should the state use taxes to create new jobs?”
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“Should the state guarantee minimum income?”
“Should the state subsidize agriculture?”
“Should the state raise taxes to create new jobs?”
“Does the state have an obligation to protect private property?”
“Should the state bail out bankrupt enterprises to preserve jobs?”
“Is having extremely rich people natural?”
“Is having extremely rich people advantageous for Polish society?”
“Is having extremely rich people just?”
“Should the state reduce income inequalities?”
“Should the rich pay higher taxes?”
Among the explanatory variables for Poles’ economic attitudes are the following
questions:
“Did the Polish economic situation improve since 1989?”
“What do you think about the current economic situation?”
The economic issue domain presents a picture of highly conflicting public
attitudes. Virtually no preference was held by a large majority. During the research
period, the desirability of free market capitalism has decreased, but socialism, although
not totally discarded, did not replace the market as an acceptable economic alternative
(Figures 121 and 122). Similarly, there is an acute conflict in the public’s evaluation of
privatization. Two types of opinion - a positive view of privatization and a negative one
- are in constant collision with each other (Figure 123). This conflict is also evident in
Poles’ opinions about the speed of privatization. The population is divided between those
who view the privatization process as moving too slowly and those who see it as moving
too fast (Figure 124). Although the majority of Poles feels confident about private
companies, the public is even more confident about state enterprises (Figures 125 and
126). The conflict on the level of general attitudes further translates into a clash regarding
particular aspects of economic policy.
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Governed Market Attitudes
Poles support a strong redistributive welfare state that would provide free medieal
care, tax the rich, guarantee jobs, and protect domestic agriculture (Figures 127-131, 138,
and 139). Whether a product of socialist legacies or a reaction to new market realities, the
public’s governed market preferences are either stable or have a tendency to increase.

Free Market Attitudes
Despite strong etatist preferences, Poles also exhibit propensity for economic
liberalism. A majority rejects tax increases to finance the creation of new jobs (Figure
132), although, evidently, not the use of existing taxes to solve the unemployment
problem (Figure 129). The general public believes that the state should protect private
property (Figure 133). Poles also perceive income inequalities as natural, positive, and
even advantageous for the Polish society and economy (Figures 135-137). Poles are
against financing bankrupt enterprises even if it means saving jobs (Figures 134).
However, the popularity of the free market economic alternative decreased with time.
Conflicting economic attitudes may be a consequence of the Poles’ realization
that although the command economy of socialism is flawed, the free market does not
always bring the desired economic improvement. Even though respondents
overwhelmingly believed that the Polish economic situation improved since 1989, they
perceived it as far from the ideal (see Figures 140 and 141).
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Figure 121. Is Free Market Capitalism Advantageous for Poland?
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Figure 122. Are You in Favor of Economic Socialism? (PGSS)
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Figure 123. What Do You Think About Privatization?
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Figure 124. What Do You Think About the Speed of Privatization?
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Figure 126. Do You Trust State Enterprises? (PGSS)
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Figure 127. Does the State Have an Obligation to Provide Free Medical Care?
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Figure 129. Should the State Use Taxes to Create New Jobs?
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Figure 130. Should the State Guarantee Minimum Income? (PGSS)
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Figure 131. Should the State Subsidize Agriculture?
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Figure 132. Should the State Raise Taxes to Create New Jobs?
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Figure 133. Does the State Have an Obligation to Protect Private Property?
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Figure 134. Should the State Bail Out Bankrupt Enterprises to Preserve Jobs?
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Figure 135. Is Having Extremely Rich People Natural?
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Figure 136. Is Having Extremely Rich People Advantageous for Polish Society?
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Figure 137. Is Having Extremely Rich People Just?
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Figure 138. Should the State Reduce Income Inequalities? (PGSS)
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Figure 139. Should the Rich Pay Higher Taxes? (PGSS)

279

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

■ ^ “ the Polish economic
situation improved
since 1989

70
60 H

sa

w
ab
^20

the Polish economic
situation worsened
since 1989

10

0
rh

.nS

rft

rPl
dates

Figure 140. Did the Polish Economic Situation Improve Since 1989?
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Figure 141. What Do You Think About the Polish Economic Situation?

Like the Polish elite, the general public is divided on the issue of preferred
economic model, but the majority favors greater state intervention and is skeptical about
free market capitalism. In the economic category, public opinion and official discourse
are synchronous. Both the elite and the public struggle to choose the most desirable
economic model. Both, however, gravitate towards the governed market model.
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4. Foreign Policy Issue Domain
The following questions were selected to reflect popular perceptions of desired
directions in foreign relations:
“Can Poland count on the West?”
“With what countries should Poland cooperate politically?”
“With what countries should Poland cooperate economically?”
“What is the best way to guarantee Poland’s security?”
“Do you support Poland’s membership in NATO?”
“Do you support Poland’s membership in the EU?”
“What do you think about the USA?”
“What do you think about France?”
“What do you think about Germany?”
“Is reconciliation with Germany possible?”
“What do you think about Belorus?”
“What do you think about the Ukraine?”
“What do you think about Russia?”
“Is Russia a threat to Poland?”
“Why does Russia oppose Poland’s membership in NATO?”
“Should Russia’s opposition to Poland’s membership in NATO be taken into
account?”
“Did Poland’s relations with other coimtries improve since 1989?”

Pro-Western Foreign Policy Attitudes
The first block of questions deals with the general pro-Western orientation of
Polish public opinion. Although initially suspicious of the Western intentions, by 1995
the majority of Poles believed that their country could count on the help of the West
(Figure 142). Figures 143 and 144**° depict Poles’ preferences for political and economic
foreign partners. In both cases, Poles chose the Western countries. Interestingly, Poles
have trans-Atlantie sympathies when it comes to a preferred political ally and European
leanings when deciding on an ideal economic partner.

For survey questions depicted in Graphs 64 and 65, respondent could select several answer options.
Thus the sum o f answers exceeds 100%.
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Figure 142. Can Poland Count on the West?

Throughout the post-Communist period, Poles overwhelmingly supported their country’s
membership in NATO (Figures 145 and 146). Poles also strongly endorse economic and
political cooperation with the European Union (Figure 147).
The next section confirms Poles’ pro-Western preferences. Analysis of the
attitudes to particular coimtries reveals Poles’ gravitation to the West. Among the most
positively evaluated nations are the US (Figure 148), France (Figure 149), and Germany
(Figure 150). The positive and neutral attitudes towards these countries by far outweigh
negative perceptions. Increasingly, Poles view their old adversaries, the Germans, in a
positive light and believe in the possibility of reconciliation (Figure 151).
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160 -1

‘Poland should cooperate
economically with
European countries (sum
of all countries)

140 120

-

au 100

-

uk.
V
Cl.

80 -

- Poland should
economically cooperate
with Russia, Ukriane, or
Belorus (sum of all
countries)
Poland should cooperate
economically with the US

40 20

-

dates‘

Figure 144. With What Countries Should Poland Cooperate Economically?
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Figure 145. What Is the Best Way to Guarantee Poland's Security?
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Figure 146. Do You Support Poland's Membership in NATO?
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Figure 147. Do You Support Poland's Membership in the EU?
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Figure 148. What Do You Think About the US? (PGSS)
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Figure 149. What Do You Think About France?
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Figure 150. What Do You Think About Germany? (PGSS)
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Figure 151. Is Reconciliation with Germany Possible?
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Figure 152. What Do You Think About Belorus?
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Figure 153. What Do You Think About the Ukraine? (PGSS)
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Figure 154. What Do You Think About Russia? (PGSS)
Independent/Pro-Eastem Foreign Poliev Attitudes
While Poles feel sympathy towards the Western nations, they are deeply
suspieious about their eastern neighbors, including Russia, Ukraine, and Belorus (Figures
152-154). Negative attitudes towards these countries predominate. The Polish public is
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also consistent in its belief that Russia, which in the popular perception did not relinquish
its aspirations in the region, poses a threat to Poland (Figure 155). If in the beginning of
the post-Communist period only 40 percent of the Polish population viewed Russia with
suspicion, currently about two-thirds of Poles suspect that Russia has imperial designs.
These suspicions are further evident in Poles’ perception of the reasons behind Russia’s
opposition to Poland’s NATO membership. Two-thirds of the population believe that
Russia opposed the Polish bid for NATO because of a desire to regain power in the
region (Figure 156). Naturally, Poles are averse to taking alleged Russian imperialism
into consideration, when deciding on whether their coimtry ought to join NATO (Figure
157).
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Figure 155. Is Russia a Threat to Poland?
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Figure 156. Why Does Russia Oppose Poland's Membership in NATO?
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Figure 157. Should Russia's Opposition to Poland's Membership in NATO be Taken
into Account?
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Figure 158. Did Poland's Relations with Other Countries Improve Since 1989?
Figure 158 helps explain overwhelmingly pro-Western foreign policy preferences
of the Polish public. In general, Poles perceive their foreign relations as the most
improved area during the post-Communist period. Taking into consideration that during
the post-Communist era Poland’s foreign policy choice was unambiguously pro-Westem,
such an assessment testifies to the Polish public’s overall satisfaction with and
endorsement of the current, pro-Westem foreign policy direction.
Poles exhibit strong and consistent pro-Westem attitudes. The strength of proWestem preferences is not only stable, it is progressively increasing. The peaks of proWestem attitudes occurred in 1995,1997, and 1999, i.e., at three key moments when
Poland made important decisions to join the Westem world (NATO and EU
memberships). Poles reject pro-Eastem foreign policy directions. The Polish elite, too, is
decidedly pro-European and pro-Atlantic. However, the latter is much less certain about
the Eastem question.
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5. Ethnic Relations Issue Domain
Ethnic relations issue domain is represented by the following questions:

“What do you think about the Jewish people?”
“Who is responsible for anti-Semitism in Poland?”
“Do the Jewish people have a disproportionate influence on the Polish politics?”
“Do the Jewish people have a disproportionate influence on the Polish economy?”
“What do you think about the Roma minority?”
“What do you think about Poles of Ukrainian origins?”
“What do you think about Poles of Russian origins?”
“What should be done with the refuges living in Poland?”
“What should be done with the foreigners working in Poland?”
“What is the religious cormection between the Poles and the Jews?”
“Do the Jewish people have a disproportionate influence on the Polish culture?”
“What do you think about Poles of German origins?”
“What do you think about Poles of Belorussian origins?”
Intolerant Public Attitudes
Figures depicting public attitudes towards Poland’s ethnic minorities, including
Jews, Roma, Ukrainians, and Russians present the Polish population as considerably
intolerant. This is especially noteworthy given the fact that the presence of ethnic
minorities in the Polish society is on the decline. Figure 159 illustrates one of the
strongest ethnic prejudices held by Poles. Almost 50 percent of Poland’s predominantly
Slavic population dislikes the Jewish people, whose presence in contemporary Poland
was drastically reduced following the WWII Holocaust and post-war immigration. AntiSemitism assumes other subtler forms. More than one-third of Poles assigns blame for
their anti-Semitic behavior to the Jews themselves (Figure 160). The Slavic majority also
perceives Jews as playing a disproportionate*** role in the Polish politics and economy
(Figures 161 and 162). Very similar attitudes are depicted in Figure 163, which presents
Poles’ views on the Roma minority. Almost two-thirds of the Polish population have
The explicit wording o f the answer options is noteworthy. There is an undeniably negative
connotation attached to the “the Jewish people have too strong an influence” response.
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reservations about this ethnic group. Although Poles’ attitudes towards Russian and
Ukrainian minorities are improving, they are still essentially negative (Figures 164 and
165).
Poles increasingly oppose assisting the refugees (Figure 166) and are consistently
skeptical about foreigners residing and working in Poland (Figure 167). With official
unemployment at 20-30 percent of working population, Poles appear to be overly
protective of their jobs and citizenship benefits. Behind the xenophobic public positions
are not only traditional ethnic prejudices, but social and economic worries typical of a
society with a highly uncertain economic present and future.
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Figure 159. What Do You Think About the Jewish People? (PGSS)
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Figure 160. Who Is to Blame for Anti-Semitism in Poland?
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Figure 161. Do the Jewish People Have a Disproportionate Influence on
Polish Politics?
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Figure 162. Do the Jewish People Have a Disproportionate Influence on the Polish
Economy?
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Figure 163. What Do You Think About the Roma Minority?
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Figure 164. What Do You Think About Poles of Ukrainian Origins?
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Figure 165. What Do You Think About Poles of Russian Origins?
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Tolerant Attitudes
Despite rampant anti-Semitism, Poles recognize a religious affinity between
Catholicism and Judaism (Figure 168). Poles also do not blame Jewish people for
“corrupting” Polish culture (Figure 169). However, all these attitudes show a very fragile
balance between anti-Semitic and more tolerant attitudes. At best, there is a very tentative
weakening o f virulent anti-Semitism among the Polish public. Besides, if Poles are more
accepting o f their Jewish neighbors on the cultural/religious level, the Slavic majority is
certainly much more intolerant when it perceives the Jews as a threat to its important
economic or political interests (Figures 161 and 162). When judging Poles of German
and Belorussian descent, Poles are slightly more tolerant. Figures 170 and 171
demonstrate either positive or neutral attitudes towards these ethnic groups.
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Figure 166. What Should be Done with the Refugees Living in Poland?
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Figure 167. What Should be Done with Foreigners Working in Poland?
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Figure 168. What Is the Religious Connection Between Poles and the Jews?
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Figure 169. Do the Jewish People Have a Disproportionate Influence on the Polish
Culture?

297

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

35 1

20

'I like Poles of
German origin

-

I dislike Poles of
German origin

D.

dates

Figure 170. What Do You Think About Poles of German Origins?
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Figure 171. What Do You Think About Poles of Belorussian Origins?

The Polish public appears to be much less tolerant than the elite. Although
during the research period, the intensity of intolerant public views subsided,
xenophobic beliefs continue to appeal to the majority of the Polish population. The
public’s tolerant attitudes, although mostly stable, are much weaker. The nationalistic
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shift in public opinion is gradual and constant. Conversely, Polish governmentaffiliated intellectuals are consistently tolerant in their ethnic preferences. The ethnic
relations issue domain thus presents the only case Avhere the Polish elite disregards
nationalistic public opinion in favor of more tolerant positions.

6. General (Explanatorv) Public Attitudes.
Finally, several general questions were selected to explain the overall public
evaluation of the Polish situation since 1989. These questions tap into all five issue
domains and help confirm or reject conclusions drawn from the individual areas. The
following questions were selected for this purpose:
“Is Poland moving in the right direction?”
“Was the initiation of systemic reforms in 1989 worthwhile?”
“Did the general situation in Poland improve since 1989?”
“What do you think about reforms started in 1989?”
“What is your political preference?”
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Figure 172. Is Poland Moving in the Right Direction?
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Answers to general questions reflect an ambiguity in the assessment of the
post-Communist period. Although a majority consistently believed that the reforms
initiated in 1989 were worthwhile (Figure 173), with an exception of the period
between 1995 and 1998, an increasing number of respondents thinks that Poland is
moving in the wrong direction (Figure 172). According to Figure 174, a majority of
Poles sees an improvement in the cormtry’s general situation. Yet Figure 175 paints a
more pessimistic picture. It shows that for the majority of respondents the 1989
reforms brought about more bad than good.
Figure 176 demonstrates the struggle between the leftist and rightist political
orientations in the post-Communist period. If the rightist views enjoyed a minimum
advantage in 1989-1991, they were seriously challenged during 1992-1994 period,
only to return as the public’s preferred political orientation in 1994-1999.
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Figure 173. Was the Initiation of Systemic Reforms in 1989 Worthwhile?
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Poles are divided in their assessment of the post-Communist period. The
absence of social agreement is further reinforced by a constant struggle between
rightist and leftist orientations among the general public. However, compared to
Russians, Poles feel more positively about the changes that took place in their country
since 1989. The popular approval of the direction in which Poland has been moving
during the last thirteen years helps explain why the Polish public is more likely than
its Russian counterpart to accept new democratic norms, pro-Western foreign policy,
and mixed economic and ideological directions.
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Figure 174. Did the General Situation in Poland Improve Since 1989?
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Figure 175. What Do You Think About Reforms Started in 1989?
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Figure 176. What Are Your Political Preferences?
***
There is a remarkable similarity between the Polish elite’s value orientations
and the public’s political, ideological, economic, and foreign policy attitudes. Prodemocratic, conservative, mixed ideological (both conservative and liberal views) and
economic (a combination of the free market and etatist attitudes), and pro-Western
elements of public opinion are also foimd in the discourse of government-affiliated
intellectuals. Consistent support for inclusive democracy and pro-Western foreign
policy orientations as well as the growing popularity of ideological conservatism and
economic etatism in the elite’s discourse can count on popular endorsement. Only
ethnic relations preferences of the public and the elite are incongruent. The elite does
not incorporate the public’s ethnic intolerance into its discourse. Likewise, the public
is immune to the elite’s ethnic tolerance.
The Polish public is much more supportive of liberal orientations than its
Russian counterpart. The modified liberal project of Polish government-affiliated
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intellectuals is not endangered by the organic-statist pressures of public opinion (with
the exception of ethnic relations issue domain). Official discourse is as liberal as
public opinion in the political and foreign policy domains, as mixed as public opinion
in the ideological and economic spheres, and more liberal in the ethnic relations
category. The differences between the public’s and the elite’s ethnic attitudes show
that public opinion is not always perceived as being suitable for incorporation into
official discourse. The Polish elite can isolate decidedly illiberal elements of pubic
opinion and protect official discourse from the impact of nationalistic public
orientations.
Polish public opinion presents visible advantages for building a democratic
state with liberal ideology, free market economy, and pro-Western foreign policy
(i.e., the state which would reflect liberal principles). Public opinion constrains the
elite’s liberalism only in the ethnic policy areas.

Social and Demographic Determinants of Polish Public Attitudes
This section outlines the extent to which social and demographic factors are
important for understanding Polish public attitudes.**^ For this part of my analysis I
used only the results of PGSS surveys (1992-1999). PGSS surveys are more
systematic and thus represent a better database for fleshing out important
relationships between particular public attitudes and social and demographic
determinants as w ell as the relationships between various public attitudes themselves.

I tried to see if the relationships between various public attitudes and social
and demographic indexes changed from year to year. Initially, 1 calculated models for
Only statistically significant relationships were reported and only “meaningful” responses were
used. Answers coded as "I do not know” or “no answer” were omitted.
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several select variables for every year the question was asked. However, the
difference in the predictors was insignificant and I opted for the cumulative models.
Their results are reported in the tables below. When performing statistical analysis, I
violated several basic assumptions of multivariate linear regression. I am aware that
my dependent variables are not measured on the interval scale. Strictly speaking, my
variables are ordinal, not interval. However, for my project I treat them as ordinal to
show the relationships between social and demographic parameters and individual
political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations views.
Income is the strongest predictor of political, foreign policy, and ethnic
relations attitudes. Degree o f religious belief is the most important determinant of
ideological and economic preferences. Education had the strongest impact on the
foreign policy attitudes.

1. Social and Demographic Determinants of Political Attitudes
All social and demographic predictors are important in explaining political
attitudes, but income and degree o f religious belief are the strongest predictors of how
a respondent would view discrete elements of contemporary Polish democracy and
previous political regime. Education, although- an important explanatory variable, is,
in many instances, co-linear with income. Age and size ofplace o f residence are
weaker, but still important, determinants of a respondent’s political views. Gender
also affects relationships between political attitudes and their social and demographic

predictors (Table 41).
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Table 41
CD

Results of Regression Analysis of Select Polish Political Attitudes According to Gender, Size of Place of Residence, Education,
Age, Family Income and Degree of Religious Belief

O
O
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Independent Feelings
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Variables
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as a form of
184
government

3CD

■D
O
Q.
C
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U)

o

Size of place

-0.031**
(0.003)

Dependent Variables
Degree of
Degree Degree Degree
trust in the
of trust of trust of trust
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in the
govemment^^^ in the
jy l8 7
Polish
press
Supreme
Court***
0.006**
0.007** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.002)
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)

Degree
of Trust
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Polish
Sejm‘^^
0.010**
(0.002)

Degree
of trust
in the
Polish
Senate*^®
0.009**
(0.002)

Satisfaction
with the
current
political
situation in
Poland*^*
0.038**
(0.004)

Degree of Interest
satisfaction in
with
politics*^^
democracy
in Poland
192

0.013**
(0.004)

-0.020**
(0.003)
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o
CD
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The variable “feelings towards communism as a form o f government” is measured on a 4 point ascending scale where 1 is “communism is the worst form
of government” and 4 is “communism is the best form o f government.”
“Degree o f trust in the government” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal o f trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
“Degree o f trust in the press” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal o f trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
“Degree o f trust in TV” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal o f trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
“Degree o f trust in the Polish Supreme Court” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal o f trust” and 3 is “hardly any
trust.”
“Degree o f trust in the Polish Sejm” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal o f trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
“Degree o f trust in the Polish Senate” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal o f trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
The variable “degree of satisfaction with the current political situation in Poland” is measured on a 6-point descending scale, where 1 is “very satisfied”
and 6 is “very dissatisfied.”
The variable “degree of satisfaction with democracy” is measured on a 6-point descending scale, where 1 is “very satisfied” and 6 is “very dissatisfied.”
The variable “degree of interest in politics” is measured on 5-point descending scale where 1 is “extreme interest” and 5 is “no interest at all.”
Here and henceforth, the independent variable “size o f place o f residence” is measured on a 8-point ascending scale where 1 is “a small village” and 8 is
“a city o f 500,000 or more.”
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(0.005)
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-0.008
(0.008)
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(0.004)
0.008**
(0.003)
0.027**
(0.006)
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(0.006)
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(0.006)
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(0.005)
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(0.004)
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Family
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0.018**
(0.004)

0.007**
(0.003)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.016**
(0.003)
0.021**
(0.004)

0.002
(0.004)
0.009**
(0.003)
0.013
(0.007)

0.016**
(0.004)
0.003
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0.027**
(0.004)
0.023**
(0.007)
0.026**
(0.004)
0.006
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0.010** 0.015**
(0.004) (0.004)
0.008** 0.006**
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0.018** 0.018**
(0.006) (0.006)

0.020**
(0.007)
0.031**
(0.004)
0.024**
(0.010)

-0.008
(0.007)
0.003
(0.004)
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(0.011)
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(0.005)
-0.066**
(0.003)
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(0.007)

0.001
(0.003)

0.006
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0.003
(0.006)

-0.030**
(0.006)
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(0.004)

0.007**
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0.004
(0.002)
-0.023**
(0.004)

-0.008**
(0.003)
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(0.006)

-0.025**
(0.005)
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(0.002)
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(0.005)

-0.042**
(0.006)

0.009
(0.011)

0.015
(0.012)
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(0.009)
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0.027**
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(0.005)
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(0.007)

-0.075**
(0.005)

0.027**
(0.004)
0.050**
(0.006)

0.024**
(0.004)
0.029**
(0.004)

Here and henceforth the independent variable “education (years o f schooling)” is measured on a 17-point ascending scale, where 1 is “one year o f school
completed” and 17 is “seventeen years or more o f school completed.”
Here and henceforth, the independent variable “age” is measured on a 7-point ascending scale where 1 is “ 18-30 years” and 7 is “81-100 years old.”
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Table 41 continued
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(0.015)

0.029**
(0.004)
-0.019
(0.005)
0.072**
(0.013)

0.004
(0.022)
0.041**
(0.013)
1.903**
(0.039)
1.7%
13,259

0.001
(0.027)
0.006
(0.016)
1.701*8
(0.051)
1.0%
11,688

0.072**
(0.013)
0.100**
(0.014)
2.280**
(0.045)
1.0%
12,344

-0.023**
(0.007)

-0.160**
(0.011)

-0.160**
(0.012)

-0.122**
(0.009)

-0.025**
(0.005)
0.101**
(0.014)

-0.180**
(0.007)
0.104**
(0.020)

-0.168**
(0.008)
0.134**
(0.023)

-0.125**
(0.006)
-0.091**
(0.017)

0.088**
(0.013)
0.128**
(0.025)
2.226**
(0.045)
1.0%
12,242

0.104**
(0.043)
0.062**
(0.025)
4.266
(0.075)
7.2%
13,887

0.050
(0.046)
0.077**
(0.027)
3.741**
(0.081)
4.7%
15,567

-0.064
(0.034)
-0.185**
(0.019)
4.986**
(0.057)
12.6%
17,272

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates from SPSS
** p<0.05
*p<0.10

Here and henceforth, the independent variable “family income” is measured on a 15-point ascending scale where 1 is “0-500 PLN per month per family”
and 15 is “100,000-200,000 PLN per month per family.”
Here and henceforth, the independent variable “degree o f religious belief’ is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a strong believer” and 3
is “a non-believer.”

Income has a strong independent effect on the political views of a respondent,
including 1) satisfaction with the current political situation; 2) satisfaction with
democracy (the higher the income, the stronger the satisfaction with the current
political situation and democracy); 3) interest in politics (the higher the income, the
stronger the interest in politics); 4) feelings towards communism (the higher the
income, the more skeptical a person is towards communism as a form of
government); 5) degree of trust in various political institutions, including the
government, press, Sejm, and Senate (the higher the income, the more trust a
respondent feels towards these political institutions). It appears that income is
strongly related to a respondent’s political efficacy, self-identification, and
satisfaction with the current, democratic political system (Table 41).
Degree o f religious belief has a robust independent effect on 1) interest in
politics (the less a person believes, the more he/she is interested in politics); 2) trust in
the government (the less a person believes, the less he/she trusts the government); 3)
feelings towards commimism (the less the person believes, the better his/her attitude
to communism as a form of government); and 4) satisfaction with the current political
situation in Poland (the less the person believes, the less satisfied he/she is with the
current political situation). Although stronger religious beliefs may distract a person
from politics, religiosity contributes to stronger trust in the government, better
political efficacy, and more imambiguous rejection of communism as a form of
government (Table 41).
Education is clearly related to income and in some cases does not have an
independent effect on political views of a respondent. In general, more educated
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people tend to be more interested in politics, more skeptical about communism, more
satisfied with the current political situation and democracy. However, education has a
different effect on the degree of trust in various political institutions. The higher the
education, the less confident about political institutions a respondent is (Table 41).
Age has a weak, but statistically significant, relationship with almost all
political variables. Older people are less interested in politics, more supportive of
communism, less satisfied with the current political situation and democracy. The
effect of age on trust in various political institutions is not uniform. While older
people are more confident about the government, Sejm, Senate, and TV, they are less
likely to trust the Supreme Court. Similar to age, size ofplace o f residence also has a
weak, but statistically significant, relationship with various political variables. The
bigger the size o f place where a respondent resides, the stronger his/her interest in
politics, the more skeptical he/she is about communism, the less satisfied he/she is
with the current political situation and the less he/she trusts various political
institutions. Urban dwellers tend to doubt both the current, democratic political
system (and its political institutions) and the previous Communist one (Table 41).
Gender plays a role in explaining political attitudes. Female non-believers are
more inclined to accept communism than their male counterparts. Only older women
trust the government and TV and distrust the Supreme Court, are dissatisfied with the
current political situation and democracy, and are less interested in politics, while
there are no statistically significant relationships for men. Conversely, only higher
income men trust the press. Education has an effect on respondent’s satisfaction with
the current political situation only for women (the more educated the woman, the
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more she is satisfied with the current political situation). It appears that female (and
especially older female) respondents tend to feel left out of the current political
system and are more likely to distrust its institutions (Table 41).

2. Social and Demographic Determinants of Ideological Preferences
The most important predictor of ideological preferences is the degree o f
religious belief. Strong believers are more conservative, while non-believers exhibit
more liberal views. Believers are less tolerant and are more likely to oppose pre
marital sex and homosexuality. Strong believers are more likely to see the Catholic
Church as playing an insufficient role in Polish society and to desire a stronger
participation of this institution in the public life. They are also more confident about
the Catholic Church. Conversely, non-believers are more tolerant and endorse the
combination of liberal views (pro-choice, pro-homosexuality, etc.) (Table 42).
Age has a similar, albeit somewhat weaker, effect on the ideological
preferences. Older people tend to be more conservative. Similar to the Catholic
congregation, older people are more likely to oppose pre-marital sex and
homosexuals. They are more likely to favor the Catholic Church’s playing a stronger
role in the Polish life and are more confident about the Church. Younger people, on
the other hand, are more liberal (Table 42).
Education, size ofplace o f residence, income, and gender are considerably
less important in predicting ideological preferences o f a respondent. Education, as

expected, determines a more liberal ideological orientation. More educated people are
more likely to accept homosexuality. Size ofplace o f residence has a similar effect.
Residents of bigger cities are more skeptical about the Catholic Church. Gender
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contributes to stronger religious conservatism of a respondent. Female believers tend
to be less tolerant than their male counterparts. Income has no effect on the
ideological preferences (Table 42).

Table 42
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Polish Ideological Attitudes According to
Gender, Size of Place of Residence, Education, Age, and Degree of Religious Belief

Independent
Variables

Support for
pre-marital
sex 198

Dependent Variables
Positive attitude Perception of the
towards
role of the Catholic
homosexuals*®^
Church in the Polish
society^®®

Size of place
of residence:
Male
Female
Education
(degree)^'^^:
Male
Female
Age:
Male

-0.140**
(0,007)
-0.103**
(0.010)

0.067**
(0.005)
0.064**
(0.008)
0.071**
(0.007)
-0.086**
(0.008)
-0.080**
(0.012)

0.049**
(0.005)
0.056**
(0.008)

Degree of
trust in the
Catholic
Church^®*
0.036**
(0.003)
0.042**
(0.004)
0.033**
(0.003)

-0.074**
(0.004)
-0.075**
(0.007)

The variable “support for pre-marital sex” is measured on a 4-point scale where 1 is “pre-marital
sex is always wrong” and 4 is “pre-marital sex is not wrong at all.”
The variable “attitudes to homosexuals” is measured on a 4-point scale where 1 is “homosexuality
is always wrong” and 4 is “homosexuality is not wrong at all.”
The variable “perception o f the role o f the Catholic Church in the Polish society” is measured on a
5-point scale where 1 is “the Church has far too much power” and 4 is “the Church has far too little
power.”
The variable “degree o f trust in the Catholic Church” is measured on a 3-point scale where 1 is “a
great deal o f trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
Here and henceforth the independent variable “education (degree)” is measured on a 9-point
ascending scale where 1 is “incomplete elementary education” and 9 is “complete higher education.”
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Table 42 continued
Female
Degree of
religious
belief:
Male
Female
Constant

R-squared
N

-0.163**
(0.010)
0.499**
(0.027)

-0.093**
(0.011)
0.310**
(0.030)

0.045**
(0.007)
-0.318**
(0.020)

-0.075**
(0.006)
0.352**
(0.016)

0.415**
(0.038)
0.490**
(0.038)
2.789**
(0.061)

0.345**
(0.046)
0.320**
(0.040)
1.008**
(0.071)

-0.376**
(0.031)
-0.264**
(0.027)
2.650**
(0.046)

0.412**
(0.026)
0.291**
(0.021)
1.104**

10.5%
8,313

2.8%
7,910

4.5%
9,242

(0.037)
13.3%
8,695

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates from SPSS
** p<0.05
* p< 0.10

3. Social and Demographic Determinants of Economic Attitudes
Among social and demographic predictors of economic attitudes, degree o f
religious belief is the strongest. There is a certain Christian (in the Polish case.
Catholic) ethos which accounts for the relationship in which strong believers are more
likely to see existing income inequalities as too drastic and are more likely to support
the state intervention, including income redistribution, job creation, and guarantees of
minimum income. This is not surprising, given that the Polish Catholic Church, in
general, and Pope John Paul II, in particular, are squarely on the side o f market

critics. However, Catholic-endorsed state intervention does not mean support for
socialism. On the contrary, the more religious a person is, the less he/she favors
economic socialism and the more he/she distrusts state enterprises (Table 43).
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Education and income have very similar independent effects on economic
attitudes. People in the highest educational and income brackets are reluctant to see
the state interfere in the economy, especially in the redistributive sphere. The higher
the level of education and income, the weaker the perception of income inequalities,
the less support for the state intervention and socialism, the less trust in state
enterprises and the more trust in the private companies (Table 43). It appears that
educated and richer people unambiguously prefer the market and privatization.
Age, on the other hand, has an opposite effect on the economic preferences.
The older the person, the more clearly he/she sees income inequalities and the more
receptive he/she is towards the state’s intervention to reduce income inequalities,
create jobs and provide minimum income. Older people are also more supportive of
socialism and have more confidence in state enterprises (Table 43). As in many other
post-Communist countries, older people, who draw their income from the state
pension funds, are the clear losers under economic liberalization. My analysis only
confirms their dissatisfaction with the new, market realities.
Size ofplace o f residence, is the weakest predictor. However, it too is useful
in explaining economic preferences. Residents of bigger cities, where unemployment
is lower and the personal income is higher than the national average, are less likely to
agree that income inequalities in Poland are too high and that the state should
interfere in the economy (to reduce inequalities, guarantee jobs and provide minimum
income) than their rural counterparts plagued by unemployment and poverty. Urban
dwellers are also less likely to support economic socialism and tend to distrust state
enterprises (Table 43).
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Table 43
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Polish Economic Attitudes According to Gender, Size of Place of Residence, Education,
Age, Family Income and Degree of Religious Belief
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Dependent Variables
Belief in the
Independent Perception Support for
Support for
Belief in the
Variables
of income
income
income
government’s government’s
inequalities redistribution- redistribution- obligation to obligation to
1205
2206
provide
in
provide
minimum
jobs'°^
Poland^®'*
income^®*
0.007**
0.055**
0.030**
0.019**
0.017**
Size of
(0.003)
place of
(0.007)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
residence:

Degree of
Support for Degree of
trust in state trust in the
economic
socialism^®^ enterprises^^® private
companies^

0.022**
(0.003)

0.007**
(0.002)

0.003
(0.002)

o
CD
Q .

■CDD
(/)
(/)

The variable “perception o f income inequalities in Poland” is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “I strongly agree that income
inequalities are too h i ^ ” and 5 is “I strongly disagree that income inequalities are too high.”
The variable “support for income redistribution-!” is measured on a 7-point descending scale where 1 is “government should reduce income inequalities”
and 7 is “ government should not attempt to reduce income inequalities.”
The variable “support for income redistribution-2” is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “I strongly agree with income redistribution” and
5 is “strongly oppose income redistribution.”
The variable “belief in the government’s obligation to provide jobs” is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “strongly agree” and 5 is
“strongly oppose.”
The variable “belief in the government’s obligation to provide minimum income” is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “strongly agree”
and 5 is “strongly oppose.”
The variable “degree of support for economic socialism” is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “I absolutely support economic socialism”
and 5 is “I categorically oppose economic socialism.”
The variable “degree of trust in state enterprises” is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal o f trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
The variable “degree of trust in the private companies” is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal o f trust” and 3 is “hardly any
trust.”
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Table 43 continued
Female

O
■O
O
c q

Constant

'

R-squared
N

0.095**
(0.021)
1.557**
(0.063)
2.1%
13,261

0.215**
(0.045)
1.773**
(0.032)
6.8%
13,288

O’
Q
CD

■D
O
Q .
C
a
o

■o
o

CD
Q .

■CDD
(/)
(/)

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates from SPSS
** p<0.05
*p< 0.10

0.132**
(0.022)
1.482**
(0.065)
6.7%
14,965

0.094**
(0.017)
1.208**
(0.053)
6.6%
15,380

0.111**
(0.019)
1.350**
(0.057)
3.7%
15,236

-0.172
(0.023)
3.421**
(0.069)
3.4%
13,573

0.017
(0.017)
1.881**
(0.048)

-0.004
(0.016)
2.418**
(0.047)

3.0%
11,180

0.5%
11,068

Finally, gender was found to occasionally influence relationships between
social and demographic predictors and economic attitudes. Only religious women
perceive income inequalities in contemporary Poland as too high and only religious
men show strong opposition to socialism as economic model. Only male residents of
bigger cities are likely to see existing income inequalities as normal. The effect of age
and education on the support for redistribution is much stronger for men. Only
educated women are more likely to oppose the state’s intervention to provide jobs.
Older men are more likely to support the state’s obligation to provide jobs and tend to
endorse economic socialism more often than older women (Table 43).

4. Social and Demographic Determinants of Foreign Policv Attitudes
Among the social and demographic predictors of foreign policy attitudes are
education, income, degree o f religious belief, age, and, to a lesser degree, gender.
Income and education have a very similar effect on the attitudes towards various
countries and the perception of the world as threatening Poland’s independence. The
higher a person’s education and income, the more favorably he/she views Ukraine,
and even Russia (i.e., countries which do not evoke strong positive reactions among
the ordinary Poles) and the less he/she perceives the world as threatening Poland. The
stronger the degree o f religious belief, the better the attitude towards the US. Age has
a different effect on a respondent’s attitudes towards Poland’s western neighbors
(Germany and the US) and on feelings towards eountries to the East (Ukraine). While

younger generations feel more positively towards Germany and the US, they are less
enthusiastic about Ukraine. Conversely, the older generation’s Commimist
socialization is a plausible explanation for this cohort’s more positive outlook on
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Ukraine and greater skepticism in regards to the US and Germany. Richer, younger,
and more educated respondents appear to be more internationalist. Gender influences
popular perceptions of Poland’s eastern neighbors. Only educated females have more
positive feelings towards Ukraine and Russia (Table 44).

Table 44
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Polish Foreign Policy Attitudes According
to Gender, Size of Education, Age, Family Income and Degree of Religious Belief

Independent
Variables

Education
(degree)
Male
Female
Age:
Male
Female
Family income:

Dependent Variables
Positive
Positive Positive
attitude
attitude
attitude
towards towards
towards
the
Germany
Ukraine
211
213
Us2i2
-0.063
(0.033)
-0.127
(0.063)
-0.032
(0.039)
-0.152’^
(0.016)
-0.092’^*
(0.029)
-0.165*“^
(0.019)
0.240**
(0.022)

-0.082**
(0.013)
-0.030
(0.024)
-0.098**
(0.016)

0.088**
(0.029)
-0.042
(0.054)
0.138**
(0.038)
0.113**
(0.014)
-0.090**
(0.025)
-0.123**
(0.017)
0.169**
(0.019)

Positive
attitude
towards
Russia^*^
0.134**
(0.029)
0.111
(0.056)
0.147**
(0.034)

Perception of
the external
threat to
Poland’s
independence^*^
0.011**
(0.002)
0.020**
(0.005)
0.008**
(0.003)

0.042**
(0.019)

0.063**
(0.005)

The variable “attitudes towards Germany” is measured on a 10-point ascending scale where 1 is
“strongly dislike” and 10 is “strongly like.”

The variable “attitudes towards the US” is measured on a 10-point ascending scale where 1 is
“strongly dislike” and 10 is “strongly like.”
The variable “attitudes towards Ukraine” is measured on a 10-point ascending scale where 1 is
“strongly dislike” and 10 is “strongly like.”
The variable “attitudes towards Russia” is measured on a 10-point ascending scale where 1 is
“strongly dislike” and 10 is “strongly like.”
The variable “perception o f the external threat to Poland’s independence” is measured on a 3-point
ascending scale where 1 is “the world seriously threatens Poland’s independence ” and 3 is “the world
does not threaten Poland’s independence at all.”
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Table 44 continued
Male
Female

0.184**
(0.036)
0.258**
(0.027)

Degree of
religious belief:
Male
Female
Constant

R-squared
N

4.618**’
(0.166)
2.4%
11,853

-0.333**
(0.049)
-0.544**
(0.093)
-0.284**
(0.058)
7.912**
(0.014)
0.5%
12,874

0.173**
(0.032)
0.165**
(0.024)

0.032
(0.033)
0.041
(0.0024)

-0.052**
(0.009)
0.065**
(0.006)

4.274**

3.846**
(0.125)

2.039**
(0.013)

0.4%
12,910

1.8%
12,188

(0.173)
1.8%
12,722

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates from SPSS
** p<0.05
*p< 0.10

5. Social and Demographic Determinants of Ethnic Preference
The PGSS database contains only one relevant ethnic variable, the degree of
anti-Semitism. Income has the strongest relationship with the degree of antiSemitism. The higher the income of a respondent, the less anti-Semitic he/she is.
Education has a similar, but weaker impact on the degree of anti-Semitism. Younger
people are slightly less anti-Semitic than their adult counterparts. Gender also has
effect on the degree of anti-Semitism. Only educated men are less anti-Semitic (Table
45).
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Relationships Between Various Polish Publie Attitudes
In this section I discuss important constellations between various public
attitudes. 1 analyze how different political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and
ethnic relations attitudes of the Polish public are linked to each other to form liberal
and organic clusters not unlike the value orientations of the Polish elite. To explore

Table 45
Results of Regression Analysis of Degree of Polish Anti-Semitism According to
Gender, Size of Place of Residence, Education, Age, Family Income and Degree of
Religious Belief
Independent Variables:
Education (degree):
Male
Female
Age:
Male
Female
Family Income:
Male
Female
Constant

Dependent Variable: Degree of Anti-Semitism^*^
0.069**
(0.012)
0.108**
(0.018)
0.036
(0.017)
-0.063**
(0.018)
-0.071**
(0.026)
-0.064**
(0.025)
0.152**
(0.028)
0.154**
(0.027)
0.146**
(0.030)
4.356**
(0.155)

The variable “degree o f anti-Semitism” is measured on a 10-point scale where 1 is “I strongly
dislike the Jewish people” and 10 - “I strongly like the Jewish people.”
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Table 45 continued
R-squared
N

1.4%
7,949

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates from SPSS
** p<0.05
*p<0.10

the larger themes in public opinion, I performed correlation analysis^*^ which
confirmed the existence of the two major divisions (liberal and organic-statist) within
Polish public opinion. Only survey questions that were asked consistently in every
PGSS survey (1992-1999) were analyzed. Since all answer-options were normally
distributed, I was able to explore the selected survey questions cumulatively, as part
of newly created, combined database.
Table 46 shows that pro-democratic respondents (the ones who reject
commimism as a political system and are more satisfied with democracy in Poland)
have mixed ideological leanings. On the one hand, they are more likely to oppose the
death penalty and abortion; on the other, they are more accepting of homosexuals.
However, people who take a stronger interest in politics tend to be more supportive of
all liberal causes. It appears that interest in politics is the factor that best explains a
respondent’s more liberal ideological outlook, while anti-Communist and prodemocratic beliefs tend to result in a split ideological position. The same relationships

In the course o f the correlation analysis, I deleted the values for answers “I do not know,” “I am not
sure,” “no answer,” and other indeterminate options. The correlation tables reported in this section are
based solely on “substantive” answer options.
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are evident in Table 46a (Appendix J). Political attitudes of the Polish public also
form distinct authoritarian and democratic clusters. People who have a positive
attitude towards communism are also more likely to be dissatisfied \vith democracy
and the current political situation and be disinterested in politics, while anti
communists tend to see Polish democracy and the political situation in general in a
more favorable light and to take a greater interest in politics (See Tables 46,47 and
48. Tables 47a and 47b (Appendix J) show a similar picture.
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Table 46
Relationships Between Political and Ideological Attitudes of the Polish Public

oo

■D
c q

Attitudes to
communism
(1—^worst
kind, 4—
good)

'

How
interested
are you in
politics?
(extremely.
5—^not at
all)

Do you
favor or
oppose
death
penalty?
(1—^favor,
2—oppose)

Should
abortion be
up to a
woman?
(1—^yes, 2—
no)

What do you
think pre
marital sex?
(1—always
wrong, 4—
never
wrong)

What do you
think about
homosexual
relations?
(1—always
wrong, 4—
not wrong at
all)

1.000

Are you
satisfied
with
democracy
in Poland?
(1—^very
satisfied,
5—^very
dissatisfied
.129**

.146**

-.094**

-.067**

.019

-.027*

•

.000

.000

.000

.000

.101

.023

7,581
.129**

7,247
1.000

7,556
.049**

7,079
-.061**

6,794
-.084**

7,275
.029*

6,908
-.016

.000

.000

.000

.010

.182

8,088

7,552

7,213

7,744

7,362
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CD

■D
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Q .
C
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o

CD
Q .

■CDD
(/)
(/)

OJ
bO
U)

Attitudes to Pearson
communism Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Are you
satisfied
with
democracy
in Poland?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

.000
7,247

8,104
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How
interested
are you in
politics?

oo

■D
cq'

Do you
favor or
oppose
death
penalty?

3O
CD

■D
O
Q.
C
a
o
o
■O
o

N)

Should
abortion be
up to a
woman?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

CD

Q.

■CDD
(/)
(/)

What do
you think
pre-marital
sex?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

.146**

.049**

.000

.000

7,556
-.094**

8,088
-.061**

8,788
-.048**

.000

.000

.000

7,079
-.067**

7,552
-.084**

7,552
.054**

.000

.000

6,794
.019

1.000

123**

-110**

-.048**

.054**

-

.000

.000

.000

7,552
1.000

7,696
.077**

8,277
-.096**

.049**

.000

.000

.000

8,128
.077**

7,207
1.000

7,712
-.279**

7,359
-.234**

.000

.000

•

.000

.000

7,213
.029*

7,696
-.123**

7,207
-.096**

7,733
-.279**

7,436
1.000

7,082
.260**

.101

.010

.000

.000

.000

■

.000

7,275

7,744

8,277

7,712

7,436

8,312

7,621

.000
7,869
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What do
you think
about
homosexual
relations?

O
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'

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

-.027*

-.016

-.110**

.049**

-.234**

.260**

.023

.182

.000

.000

.000

.000

6,908

7,362

7,869

7,359

7,082

7,621

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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K)

1.000

7,909

Table 47
Relationships Between Political and Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public
Attitud
es to
commu
nism
(1 worst
kind,
4—
good)

.129**

.146**

-.122**

-.158**

-.096**

Do you
favor or
oppose
socialis
m as
econom
ic
system?
(1 very
much
favor.
5—
totally
oppose)
-.379**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

7,247
1.000

7,556
.049**

7,384
-.120**

7,491
-118**

7,446
-.076**

7,176
-113**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

Should Should
Are
How
you
interest govern govern
satisfie ed are
ment
ment
d with
reduce
provide
you in
democr politics income jobs?
differen ( 1 acy in
7 (1 Poland? extreme tials?
strongl
ly,
5—
y
agree.
(1 (1 very
strongl 5—
not at
satisfie all)
y agree. strongl
d ,6 —
5—
y
very
strongl disagre
dissatis
e)
y
fied)
disagre
e)

Attitud Pearson
Correia
es to
comm tion
unism Sig. (2tailed)
N

Pearson
Are
you
Correlat
satisfie ion
d with Sig. (2democ tailed)
racy in N
Poland
?
How
Pearson
interes Correlat
ted are ion
you in Sig. (2politic

s?

tailed)
N

1.000

7,581
.129**

.000

Should
govern
ment
provide
minimu
m
income
?(1 strongl
y agree.
5—
strongl
y

disagre
e)

7,247

8,104

8,088

7,873

8,015

7,956

7,603

.146**

049**

1.000

-.109**

-170**

-.097**

-.099**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

7,556

8,088

8,442

8,654

8,574

7,975

8,788
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Table 47 continued
Should
govern
ment
reduce
incom
e
differe
ntials?
Should
govern
ment
provid
ejobs?

Pearson -.122**
Correlat
ion
Sig. (2- .000
tailed)
N
7,384

-120**

-

.000
7,873

Pearson -.158** -118**
Correlat
ion
.000
Sig. (2- .000
tailed)
8,015
N
7,491
Should Pearson -.096** -.076**
govern Correia
ment
tion
.000
provid Sig. (2- .000
e
tailed)
minim N
7,446
7,956
um
incom
e?
Do
Pearson -.379** -113**
you
Correia
favor
tion
or
.000
.000
Sig.
oppose (2sociali taile
7,603
7,176
sm?
d)
N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01

109**

1.000

.501**

.427**

.152**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

8,442

8,485

8,426

8,366

7,774

-170**

.501**

1.000

.567**

.165**

.000

.000

.000

.000

8,654
-.097**

8,426
.427**

8,794
.567**

8,567
1.000

8,654
.106**

.000

.000

.000

.

.000

8,574

8,366

8,567

8,623

7,856

-.099**

.152**

.165**

.106**

1.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

,

7,975

7,774

8,654

7,856

8,001

level (2-tailed).

Predictably, there are two well established constellations within the public’s
political and economic attitudes: the authoritarian-etatist one (people who support
communism are likely to favor governmental intervention and socialism as an
economic system) and the democratic-economically liberal one (those who are
satisfied with democracy and interested in politics tend to reject government’s
redistributive and interventionist efforts and economic socialism) (see Table 47). A
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very similar conclusion emerges from Tables 47a and 47b (Appendix J). Respondents
dissatisfied with the current economic situation and favoring governmental
intervention tend to be dissatisfied in the current political situation, democracy as it
exists in Poland and estranged from politics. Conversely, those who see the current
economic situation as good and those who reject governmental etatism and economic
socialism are more likely to be satisfied with the current political situation,
democracy and involved in politics.
Table 48 reveals very interesting, albeit not unexpected, relationships. More
pro-Westem respondents are also more pro-democratic, i.e., they tend to reject
communism as a political system, be more satisfied with democracy and be more
interested in politics in general. More pro-Eastem respondents are likely to endorse
communism, but they are also satisfied with democracy and interested in politics.
Respondents with an internationalist outlook on foreign policy tend to reject
communism, be satisfied with democracy, and be interested in politics. More
isolationist respondents, on the other hand, are more likely to support communism, be
skeptical about democracy and apolitical.
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Table 48

O
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c q

Relationships Between Political and Foreign Policy Attitudes of the Polish Public

'

3O’
Q
CD

■D
O
Q .
C
a
o

■o
o

U)
to
'sO
Attitudes to
Germany

CD
Q .

■CDD
(/)
(/)

Attitudes to the
US

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
XT
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

Attitudes
to
Germany
(1 strong
dislike,
10—
strong
liking)
1.000

Attitudes
to the US
(1-strong
dislike,
10strong
liking)

How
interested
are you in
politics?
(1 extremely,
5—^not all)

-.048**

Are you
satisfied
with
democracy
in Poland
(1—^very
satisfied,
6—^very
dissatisfied)
- 084**

.000

.000

000

000

8,267
045**

7,756
.049**

7,409
-.075**

,883
-.094**

8,448
.003

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

8,061

8,165

7,663

Does the world
threaten Polish
independence?
(1—seriously
threatens, 3—
does not
threaten at all)

Attitudes to
commrmism
(1—worst
kind, 4—
good)

197**

.117**

.000

.000

8,163
097**

Attitudes
to Russia
(1 strong
dislike,
10strong
liking)

.325**

Attitudes
to
Ukraine
(1 strong
dislike,
10strong
liking)
.256**

•

.000

8,492
.325**

8,268
1.000

.000
8,268

.793
7,319

8,341

-.084**

7,789
8,300
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Attitudes to
Ukraine

O
o

T3

CQ'

2
O
=
J
CD

Attitudes to
Russia

C
Q.
CD

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

T3

3

Q .

C
o
5'
=j
T3

U)
U)
o

Does the world
threaten Polish
independence?

3

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
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Q .
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CD
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Attitudes to
conununism

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

.588**

.102**

-.012

-.069**

-.063**

.000

.000

.300

.000

.000

8,163
1.000

7,571
.070**

7,255
.074**

7,696
-.038**

8,203
-.054**

.000

.000

.001

.000

7,654
1.000

7,326
-.083**

7,794
-.171**

8,314
-.097**

.000

.000

.000

7,089
1.000

7,522
.129**

7,924
.146**

.000

.000

7,247

7,556

.256**

.097**

.000

.000

8,163
jgy**

8,061
.045**

8,237
.588**

.000

.000

.000

8,267
.117**

8,165
.049**

8,163
.102**

8,353
.070**

.000

.000

.000

.000

7,756
-.048**

7,663
-.075**

7,571
-.012

7,654
.074**

7,956
-.083**

.000

.300

.000

.000

7,319

7,255

7,326

7,089

1.000

.000
7,409
7,581
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Table 48 continued
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satisfied with
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Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

-.084**

Are you
interested in
politics?
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Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

-.069**

-.038**

-.171**

.129**

.000

.000

.001

.000

.000

7,789

7,696

7,794

7,522

7,247

8,104

8,088

.003

-.063**

-.054**

-.097**

.146**

.049**

1.000

.793

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

8,314

7,924

7,556

8,088

1.000

.049**

.000
.000

7,883

o
"
n
c

-.094**

-.084**
.000
8,448

8,300
8,203
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

8,788

According to Table 49, there are two distinct clusters of public attitudes:
ideologically conservative-economically etatist (respondents who support death
penalty and oppose pre-marital sex and homosexuals tend to favor governmental
intervention to provide jobs, redistribute income and provide minimum income) and
ideologically liberal-economically liberal (pro-choice respondents are more likely to
resist governmental intervention). A similar picture is presented in Table 48a
(Appendix J). Finally, there are interesting conservative and liberal constellations of
ideological attitudes. Conservative respondents who favor the death penalty are more
likely to be anti-gay, but they also tend to favor abortion and pre-marital sex. Liberal
attitudes of allowing abortion, homosexual relations, and pre-marital sex tend to go
together (Tables 46, 49, and 50).
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Table 49
Relationships Between Ideological and Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public

oo
■D

Do you
favor or
oppose
death
penalty?

CD

( 1-

■CDD
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o
CD
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■CDD

What do
you think
pre
marital
sex? (1—
always
wrong,
4—never
wrong)

What do
you think
about
homosexual
relations?
(1—always
wrong, 4—
not wrong
at all)

Should
Should
Should
government government government
reduce
provide
provide
income
minimum
jobs? (1—
income?
differentials? strongly
( 1agree, 5—
( 1strongly
strongly
strongly
agree,
agree, 5—
disagree)
strongly
5—
strongly
disagree)
disagree)

.077**

-.096**

.049**

.104**

.092**

.059**

Do you
favor or
oppose
socialism
as
economic
system?
(1—very
much
favor,
5—
totally
oppose)
.090**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

7,207

7,712

7,359

7,844

8,021

7,951

7,436

favor, 2 oppose)
U)
U>
U)

Do you
Pearson
favor or
Correlation
oppose death Sig. (2penalty?
tailed)
N

1.000

8,128
C/)
C/)

Should
abortion
be up to a
woman?
(1—yes,
2—^no)
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.077**
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
.000
N
7,207
-.096**
What do you Pearson
Correlation
think pre
marital sex? Sig.(2tailed)
.000
N
7,712
.049**
What do you Pearson
Correlation
think about
homosexual Sig. (2tailed)
.000
relations?
N
7,359
.104**
Should
Pearson
government Correlation
reduce
Sig. (2income
tailed)
.000
differentials? N
7,844
Should
abortion be
up to a
woman?

o

U)
U)

1.000

7,733
-.279**

-.279**

-.234**

-.054**

-.035**

-.018

.065**

.000

.000

.000

.002

.108

.000

7,436
1.000

7,082
.260**

7,482
.096**

7,633
.064**

7,577
.036**

7,113
-.025*

.000

.000

.000

.001

.028

7,621
1.000

8,027
.166**

8,197

8,130
112**

7,645
.030*

.000

.000

.000

.011

.000
7,436
-.234**

8,312
.260**

.000

.000

7,082
-.054**

7,621
.096**

7,909
.166**

7,637
1.000

7,808
.501**

7,749
.427**

7,275
152**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

7,482

8,027

7,637

8,485

8,426

8,366

7,774
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J44**

.092**

-.035**

.064**

.000

.002

.000

.000

.000

8,021
.059**

7,633
-.018

8,197
.036**

7,808
.112**

8,426
427**

8,794
.567**

.000

.108

.001

.000

.000

.000

7,577
.065**

8,130
-.025*

7,749
.030*

8,366
.152**

8,567
.165**

8,623
.106**

7,856
1.000

.000

.028

.011

.000

.000

.000

.

7,113

7,645

7,275

7,774

8,654

7,856

8,001

Should
government
provide
minimum
income?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

Do you
favor or
oppose
socialism as
economic
system?

7,951
Pearson
.090**
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
.000
N
7,436

CD

■D
O
Q .
C
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Q

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

.501**

1.000

.567**

.165**

.000

.000

8,567
1.000

8,654
.106**

.000

Table 50 shows a significant relationship between a respondent’s ideology and
his/her foreign policy views. More internationalist foreign policy public attitudes
translate into ideological liberalism and tolerance, while more isolationist beliefs are
more likely to be associated with conservative ideological tenets. People who see the
outside world as benign and non-threatening tend to oppose the death penalty, support
abortion at women’s discretion and be more tolerant towards pre-marital sex and
homosexuals. Conversely, respondents who perceive the world as threatening are
more likely to favor the death penalty and oppose abortion, pre-marital sex, and
homosexual relations.
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Table 50
Relationships Between Ideological and Foreign Policy Attitudes of the Polish Public
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strong
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world
threaten
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(1— seriously
threatens,
3— does not
threaten at all)

Do you
favor or
oppose
death
penalty?
( 1-

favor,
2

—

Should
abortion
be up to
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woman?
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2—no)
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What
do
you
think
about
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sex?
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wrong.
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Attitudes to
Germany

Pearson
1.000
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
8,492

What do
you think
about
homo
sexual
relations?
( 1always
wrong,
4—^not
wrong at
all)

.325**

.256**

.197*^

.117**

.021

.005

never
wrong
.047*^

.000

.000

.000

.000

.063

.651
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.010

8,268

8,163

8,267

7,756

7,843
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7,649

.029*
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1.000

.000
7,621
1.000

7,909

Table 51 reveals an interesting relationship between the foreign poliey and the
economic preferences of the Polish public. Although respondents with favorable
views on Germany, Russia, and the Ukraine and respondents with a more benign
view of the outside world in general tend to reject the governed market or soeialistic
forms of the economy, pro-American respondents tend to be more economically
etatist, although not supportive of socialism as an economic system. In general, both
pro-Westem and pro-Eastem respondents are skeptical of economic socialism.
Economic attitudes themselves fall into two neat clusters. People who oppose
one type of governmental intervention into the economy tend to reject all other etatist
or redistributive measures as well as socialism as an economic model. Economically
liberal respondents are also more likely to be satisfied with the current economic
situation. Conversely, supporters of redistributive politics are more likely to expect
the government to provide jobs, secure minimum income, and favor economic
socialism. They tend to see the current state of the eeonomy as unsatisfactory (see
Tables 47,49 and 51 as well as Tables 47a-c and 49a in Appendix J). Finally, there is
also a clear link between how a respondent reacts to foreign countries and his/her
perception of the threat emanating from the world outside. If a person holds a positive
set of beliefs about foreign countries, he/she is imlikely to perceive the world as
threatening Poland’s independence (Tables 49, 50, and 51).
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Conclusions About Relationship Between Polish Public Opinion and Elite Value
Orientations According to Individual Issue Domains
To measure the degree of congruence between Polish public opinion and
official discourse, I compared trends in public attitudes to trends in the elite’s value
orientations. Politically, Poles continued to support democratic principles. Original
democratic ideas among the elite also survived intact. Both the elite’s and the public’s
political attitudes move in the same direction. Democratic commitment appears to be
a shared value for both the elite and the public.
Ideologically, Poles held fairly conservative, but not necessarily more statist,
positions. Official discourse, which is currently divided between liberalism and
conservatism/statism, seems to reflect the mixed ideological attitudes of the public.
This means that, at the very least, elite and public attitudes are congruent.
Economically, Polish public opinion always exhibited strong governed market
preferences, while retaining some free market elements. Poles believe in a strong
social protection and in the state’s obligations to provide the population with social
benefits. But they are also moderately supportive of privatization. The Polish elite is
similarly undecided on the issue of the preferred economic model. The evolution of
elite attitudes towards greater economic etatism may be directly or indirectly
attributed to mixed public attitudes. Even if the changes in the elite’s attitudes are a
function of electoral competition between liberals (who champion the free market
ideas) and social-democrats (supporters of the governed market model), the economic
conflict between the liberal and social-democratic elites itself is similar to the split
electorate.
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In the area offoreign policy, Poles overwhelmingly and consistently support a
pro-Westem option and reject pro-Eastem orientation. The elite is consistent in its
pro-Westem discourse, yet volatile on the issue of pro-Eastem foreign policy.
Clearly, the elite’s and the public’s attitudes move in the same direction.
In the area of ethnic relations, the Polish public exhibits a strong and
consistent degree of nationalism. Ethnic relations is the only area in which the Polish
elite, which remained moderately tolerant, clearly ignores nationalistic public
opinion. This suggests that the Polish elite is selective when incorporating organicstatist public attitudes into official discourse. If Polish government-affiliated
intellectuals are not averse to using conservative ideology or economic etatism, they
are reluctant to uphold ethnic intolerance, even if it comes from the public.
Social and demographic factors have a predictable effect on various Polish
public attitudes. Younger, more educated and higher income respondents tend to be
more democratic, liberal, pro-market, intemationalist, pro-Westem, and tolerant.
Religion (Catholicism) has a complex effect on the public attitudes imder
consideration. In Poland there is a powerful Catholic ethos which is both
ideologically conservative and economically etatist.
Several clear demarcation lines are discemible within individual issue
domains: authoritarian-democratic (political issue domain), conservative-liberal
(ideological issue domain), and govemed market-free market (economic issue
domain). There are no discemible groupings of variables into pro-Westem/antiWestem dichotomy. If a person likes a foreign country, he/she is more likely to like
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all others, irrespective of their geopolitical location. Instead, there is a more
prominent internationalist-isolationist divide.
More interestingly, my analysis reveals the existence of two distinct groupings
of public attitudes: 1) democratic— ideologically split (anti-abortion, but also anti
death penalty and pro-gay)—economically liberal—intemationalist and 2)
authoritarian—ideologically split (pro-abortion, but pro-death penalty and anti-gay)—
economically etatist—isolationist. The ambiguous relationship between political
preferences and ideological inclinations stems from the fact that in the Polish context
democracy and anti-authoritarianism are associated with both conservative and liberal
ideological preferences. In fact, both Polish conservatives and liberals are equally
likely to reject communism (a proxy for political authoritarianism) and support
democracy.
More liberal public opinion in Poland allowed the original, liberal discourse to
survive intact. During the research period, only one category of the original discourse,
i.e., ethnic tolerance, was threatened by nationalistic public opinion. Even when the
elite’s original liberal attitudes weakened (ideology, the economy), they were not
totally replaced by the organic-statist elements.
Although there is a greater degree of congmence between Polish official
discourse and public opinion than reported in the Russian case, this relationship is not
perfectly harmonious. If in some areas there is a near perfect resemblance between
public opinion and official discourse (democratic orientation, mixed ideological
preferences, indeterminate economic views, and pro-Westem foreign policy), in the
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ethnic relations issue domain there is a significant disjunction between public opinion
and the elite’s response.
I conclude this chapter with an analysis of the relationship between Polish
public opinion, official discourse, and actual policies. This discussion is crucial to
answering the questions of policy implications of stable value orientations of the
Polish elite and general population. It also suggests whether important policies in
post-Communist Poland represent dominant trends in public opinion and enjoy
popular support. Finally, it sheds light on the function of discourse as policy
legitimizing mechanism.

Political, Ideological, Economic, Foreign Policy, and Ethnic Relations Actions of
the Polish Political Elite: Event Analysis
To investigate the complex interplay between public opinion, official
discourse, and actual policy initiatives, I compared results of event analysis of the
political elite’s actions to the outcomes of both content analysis of official discourse
and an extensive review of public opinion surveys.

1. Sample Selection
Only events involving the top members of the executive branch (President,
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, other members of the Cabinet,
and their high ranking staff) and representative of the national legislative and
judiciary bodies {Sejm, Senate, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Tribunal),^** such
as adoption of laws and decrees, declarations about constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of legislative actions, announcements of important economic
Here, unlike in the Russian case, I added legislative and judicial elites to the sample. In Poland, a
parliamentary-presidential republic, legislative and judicial branches play an important role.
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measures, ratification of foreign policy treaties, visits to foreign countries and hosting
foreign delegations in Poland, military maneuvers, policy initiatives dealing with
refuges, etc., were selected. Event analysis data came from chronicles of events
collected and published by several Polish authors.^*® A total of 941 events was
analyzed. All events were assumed to have equal weight.

2. Event Analvsis Procedures and Evaluative Criteria
Selected events were classified according to five issue domains (political,
ideological, economic, foreign, and ethnic policy). For instance, the adoption of the
law guaranteeing freedom of the press (inclusive democratic category) or attacks on
the opposition, especially the left, through tightening of the lustration procedures
(elite democratic category) were classified as political events. Liberalization of anti
abortion laws (event reflecting a liberal ideology) or the decision to introduce religion
in school (event reflecting conservative/statist ideology) were classified under the
ideological rubric. Price liberalization (free market category) or the governmental
decision to subsidize gas for domestic agrarian producers (govemed market category)
were placed under the economic issue domain. Negotiations with NATO (pro-

See, for instance, Piotr Najder, Polska i swiat. 1989-1992. Kalqdarium przelomu [Poland and the
World. Calendar o f the Transformation] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1993); Rocznik
Strategiczny 1995-1997, 2000-200l[Strategic Yearbook 1995-1997, 2000-2001] (Warsaw: Scholar,
1996-1998, 2001-2002); Andrzej Andrusiewicz, Polska 1991-1995. Kalqdarz wydarzeh [Poland 19911995. Calendar o f Events] (Rzesz6w; Wydawnictwo wyZszej szkoly pedagogicznej, 1997); Prawie
Biala Ksiqga polskiej sceny politycznej [Almost White Book o f Polish Political Scene] (Warsaw: ARS
Print Production, 1997); Antoni Dudek, Pierwsze lata HI Rzeczypospolitej 1989-1995 [First Years o f
the Third Republic 1989 -1995] (Krak6w: Arcana, 1997), and Pierwsze lata 111 Rzeczypospolitej 19892001 [First Years o f the Third Republic. 1989-2001] (Krak6w: Arcana, 2002); Janusz A. Majcherek,
Pierwsza dekada 111 Rzeczypospolitej. 1989-1999 [First D ecade o f the Third Republic. 1989-1999]
(Warsaw: Presspublica, 1999); Antoni Czubihski, Historia Polski 1864-2001 [History o f Poland. 18642001] (Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossalihskich, 2002); and Wojciech
Roszkowski,//istor/<3 PoM /. 1914-2001 [History o f Poland. 1914-2001] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
Naukowe PWN, 2002).
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Western foreign policy) or trade contracts with Russia (pro-Eastem foreign policy)
were classified as foreign policy events. Anti-Semitic statements by the President
(nationalistic category) or criminal proceedings against anti-Semitic members of the
political elite (tolerant category) were classified under the ethnic policy rubric. Each
event was assigned a numeric value (+1, if event/policy initiative reflected liberal
principles and -1 , if event/policy initiative embodied organic-statist principles).
Classified events were then aggregated by year (see graphs below).

3. Evolution of Actions of the Polish Elite
Political Actions. Figure 177 depicts the Polish political elite as committed to
the principles of inclusive democracy, a commitment, which, surprisingly, diminishes
during the presidential elections years. This fact is attributable to the specifics of the
two latest presidential elections, in which the incumbent president had to campaign
against the background of the opposition-controlled parliament. Incumbent president
Walesa, for instance, insisted on disbanding the SLD-controlled Parliament during the
1995 campaign, while prior to the 2000 elections, the post-Solidarity-controlled
Parliament intensified efforts to introduce lustration and de-communization
mechanisms harmful to the left opposition, in general, and incumbent president
Kwasniewski, in particular. The parliamentary elections years, on the other hand,
restore the democratic balance. This finding confirms the Linz hypothesis —
presidentialism, institutionally a more divisive system, seems less conducive to

inclusive democracy, especially in the context of the newly democratized societies.^^®
The figure also demonstrates that the general political orientation of the Polish post-

See, Juan J. Linz, “The Perils o f Presidentialism,’’ yowrwa/ o f Democracy 1 (Winter 1990): 51-69.

349

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

Communist elite is unaffected by the internal rotations within this group. Both the
Left and the Right are equally supportive of inclusive democracy. The temporary
“lapses” in democratic course are attributable to the institutional factors of Polish
politics, not to political orientations of parties controlling the institutions. There is a
significant degree of congruence among political attitudes of all three of my research
subjects. Throughout the post-Commimist period, the Polish political and intellectual
elite as well as the general public consistently supported substantive democratic ideas.
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Figure 177. Overall Evolution of the Polish Elite's Political Actions
Figure 178 shows that the rotations among the Polish political elite matter for
th is g r o u p ’s g e n e r a l id e o lo g ic a l o u tlo o k . In

1989 —1993, co n se r v a tiv e

rep r esen ta tiv e s

of the political Right controlled both executive and legislative branches. The most
conservative political team (government of Olszewski) came to power in 1992, a fact
reflected in Graph 92. Afterwards, in 1993-1997, a liberal government of Suchotska
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and social-democratic governments^^* of Pawlak, Oleksy, and Cimoszewicz partly
rehabilitated ideologically liberal principles. Then, in 1997, after the electoral victory
of the center-Right coalition, the actions of the Polish political elite took a slightly
more conservative turn. Importantly, this trend was not reversed even after the
election of a leftist (and more liberal) coalition in 2001. Overall, during the research
period, Polish political elites practiced moderately conservative principles. There is a
certain degree of congruence between ideological leanings of the political elite and
the population at large (their constituencies). Both are moderately conservative, but
the political elite is slightly more conservative than the general public. Recently, even
the social democrats came to support a conservative course. There are at least some
indirect signs that the public’s conservatism is important for the Polish elite. From
this perspective, the modification of the ideological agenda of liberal and social
democratic elites is very telling. However, liberal value orientations, relatively strong
among the public and the elite, appear to be less compelling in guiding the actions of
the political elite.

'sum of all ideological
actions

c_ <
o«

dates

Figure 178. Overall Evolution of the Polish Elite's Ideological Actions
Polish social democrats are liberal ideologically (see Chapter IV).
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Figure 179 shows that, in general, the political elite supported the neutral
economic course which combined both the pro-market and etatist elements. This
course is consistent with economic indeterminacy of attitudes among both the general
public and the elite itself. The public’s economically mixed attitudes appear to
compel the political elite to practice (and the intellectual elite to justify) cautious and
balanced economic policies. This equilibrium may be a direct result of public’s
economic pressures or an indirect product of electoral competition between more
economically liberal post-Solidarity political parties and more etatist socialdemocratic parties. Government-affiliated intellectuals can draw on the public’s
economic caution without antagonizing the political elite.
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Figure 179. Overall Evolution of the Polish Political Elite's Economic Actions
Foreign Policy Actions. Figure 180 reveals some unexpected results. The Polish
political elite engaged in pro-Eastem or independent actions in 1993 and 1999, dates
which coincide with important pro-Westem breakthroughs for Polish foreign policy.
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In 1993, Poland became an associated member of the EU. In 1999, it was formally
admitted to NATO. What can explain the pro-Eastem “deviations?”
The answer lies in the efforts to gamer support of Poland’s eastem neighbors
(mostly Russia) for a new, pro-Westem foreign policy direction. Polish diplomacy
sought to appease Russia, Ukraine, and Beloms by frequent visits and promises of
good neighborly relations. The brief pro-Eastem “relapses,” nonetheless, cannot
overshadow the fact that throughout the research period, the Polish political elite
consistently favored the pro-Westem direction. There is a considerable consensus
among all three research subjects on the desirability of pro-Westem foreign policy.
This consensus, however, does not extend to the Eastem direction of Polish foreign
policy. If there is an unambiguous public endorsement o f the pro-Westem foreign
policy and rejection of the pro-Eastem one, both the intellectual and the political elite
face a more difficult choice. Practical considerations of maintaining good relations
with the eastem neighbors explain the differences between public’s clear dismissal of
and elite’s non-committal stance on pro-Eastem foreign policy. The elite (both
political and intellectual) practices the pro-Eastem course at their own risk.
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Figure 180. Overall Evolution of the Polish Political Elite's Foreign Policy Actions
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Figure 181 reveals that the Polish political elite is not very active in the area
of ethnic relations. Poland is, after all, an ethnically and religiously homogeneous
country with an insignificant minority presence. The absence of fundamental ethnic
conflicts accounts for the relative tranquility in this issue domain. All the actions
included in this area deal with the Polish-Jewish relations, by far the most pressing
ethnic problem in contemporary Poland. Although the Jewish minority virtually
disappeared from Poland, attitudes towards Jews continue to dominate official
discourse and Poles’ self-definition as a nation. If the Polish public exhibits strong
nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes, the overall ethnic relations policies of the
political elite are tolerant. Government-affiliated intellectuals also support tolerant
positions. In this area, the elite relies on its own tolerant value orientations, and not on
more nationalistic public opinion.
Overall, the Polish political elite was engaged in actions consistent with
original, liberal principles (Figure 182). The stability of the public’s moderately
liberal attitudes is matched by both the stability of official discourse and the
consistency of the practical political agenda. However, the elite effectively blocks the
nationalism of the general population.
The discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals clearly bears a
stronger resemblance to public opinion than to the orientations of the political elite.
Because official discourse in Poland strongly resembles patterns of public opinion,
Polish intellectuals, unlike their Russian counterparts, appear to be more sensitive to
public pressures and less dependent on their allies and patrons, the political elite. If in
the Russian case, the government affiliation component in the phrase government-
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affiliated intellectual was dominant, in the Polish case, it was the intellectual that
mattered more.^^^ Although there is a significant degree of congruence between
discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals, public opinion, and actions of the
political elite, at least on one occasion, where there was a discrepancy (ideological
liberalism), the discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals resembled public
opinion. At the same time, Polish intellectuals were unable to transmit the political
elite’s message of ethnic tolerance to the public. The argument is weaker in the case
of unstable elite preferences for pro-Eastem foreign policy. Uncertain positions are
rarely persuasive enough to be translated into public opinion.

^ ^ s u m of all ethnic
relations actions

S

9
vx

dates

Figure 181. Overall Evolution of the Polish Political Elite's Ethnic Relations Actions

I will return to this finding in the concluding chapter.
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Figure 182. Overall Evolution of All Types of Actions of the Polish Political Elite
Moderately liberal public attitudes have more chances of being incorporated
into official discourse and, to a lesser degree, into actual policies. Some organicstatist public orientations, including ideologically conservative and economically
etatist views, are also taken into consideration by government-affiliated intellectuals
and their political patrons, while others (ethnic nationalism) are ignored. The
explanation for such selectivity lies in external incentives. Imminent entry into the
EU and long-anticipated NATO membership may account for the Polish elite’s
insularity to the public’s nationalism. The EU will accept a certain degree of
economic etatism and conservative ideology (after all it is comprised of countries
with long historical traditions of the governed market and conservatism), but it will
not stand for ethnic nationalism and chauvinism.
Modified liberal attitudes of the Polish population, including preference for
inclusive democracy, ideological conservatism, mixed economic views, and pro-Westem
foreign policy orientation are also shared and practiced by the Polish political elite. The
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consensus between the elite and the public emerges around modified liberal, not organic-statist,
principles (the latter phenomenon is characteristic of the Russian case).
Conclusions
1. During the research period, the Polish elite continued to favor principles of
inclusive demoeracy, pro-Westem foreign policy and ethnic tolerance, while its
ideological attitudes became increasingly more conservative and its economic views
remained progressively indeterminate. These value orientations, by and large, were
the foundation of the post-Communist policies. However, if ideologically liberal
principles continued to co-exist with more conservative orientations in the discourse
of the Polish elite, its actions did not show this ideological conflict. On the contrary,
the elite always acted conservatively.
2. Polish public opinion retained its original inclusive-democratic,
economically and ideologically mixed, pro-Westem, and nationalist elements.
3. Polish government-affiliated intellectuals clearly served as intermediaries
between the public and the political elite; their discourse bears a remarkable degree of
similarity to the public’s political, ideological, economic, and foreign policy
aspirations. Where public opinion and policy initiatives of the elite did not coincide,
Polish intellectuals appear to have sided with a more liberal party. When public
opinion was more ideologically liberal, discourse of government-affiliated
intellectuals was sensitive to the public’s ideological preferences. However,
intellectuals also supported the more ethnically tolerant political elite in defiance of
openly nationalistic public opinion.
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4. In the areas of congruence between the elite’s discourse and actions
(inclusive democracy, ideological conservatism, pro-Westem foreign policy, and
ethnic tolerance), the question of cause and effect between discourse and policy is
irrelevant. Discourse is used to both inspire and popularize policies. In the case of a
disjunction between surviving ideological liberalism of discourse commimicators and
persistent ideological conservatism of the political elite, discourse has little impact on
policies. Neither does the political elite need intellectual support to sell its
conservative policies to the liberal segment of the public.
5. Policies in the political, ideological, economic, and foreign policy areas
(inclusive democratic, conservative, and pro-Westem influence) can count on popular
support, since they are largely congment with the public sentiments. Public opinion is
important in the formulation of ideologically liberal discourse, but not policies. It has
absolutely no effect on the ethnic relations discourse or resulting policies adopted by
the elite.
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CHAPTER VI

ELITE VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN POSTCOMMUNIST SOCIETIES; A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
This chapter provides a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between
the Russian and Polish post-Communist elites’ value orientations and public opinion.
I examine the political implications of stability and instability in the original liberal
attitudes of the elite and the public. I also present the comparative implications of my
findings and isolate factors that lend stability to post-Communist liberal value
orientations on both the elite and the popular levels.

C hapter Outline
Before I proceed with some final considerations of the relationship between
the elite’s value orientations and public opinion in the post-Communist countries, I
return to my original hypotheses to see which ones were confirmed and which ones
can now be rejected. Then, I outline the differences in the evolution of the Russian
and Polish elite and publics’ value orientations along five issue domains, discuss the
implications of consensus and disagreement among the post-Communist elites,
analyze the consistency and ambiguity of public attitudes and isolate factors that lend
stability to the liberal orientations among the Russian and Polish elites and publics
found at the beginning of the research period. I also reflect on the divergent empirical
results my two case studies produced and offer possible explanations for this
outcome. I move on to discussing the relationship between the elites’ value
orientations and public opinion in post-Communist Russia and Poland and
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commenting on the nature of this relationship. Finally, I discuss the projeet’s
contributions to existing debates in the political science literature and its comparative
implications. Throughout this chapter I also address some of the limitations of my
study.
There are significant differences in the evolution o f both the elite’s value
orientations and public opinion in the post-Soviet and East European countries. The
Russian case is characteristic of the post-Soviet model, while the Polish case
illustrates the East European type of the elite-public relationship. These suppositions
are suggestive rather than definitive; I simply do not have empirical data to prove or
disprove them. I also contend that the differences are attributable to the nature of the
original elite and public attitudes and the areas of consensus that emerged between
the elite and the public. The described differences have important implications for
studies of democratic consolidation, multiple transitions, post-Communist public
opinion and official discourse as well as for empirical democratic theory.

Research Hypotheses Revisited
Hypothesis #1. During the research period, both Russian public opinion and
official discourse (a proxy for the elite’s value orientations) changed from liberal to
organic-statist categories. In Poland, both public opinion and official discourse/the
elite’s value orientations remained liberal. However, the liberalism in this coimtry
was never as extreme as in Russia; it was tempered by the advocacy o f social
protection and nationalism.
Hypothesis 1 was only partially confirmed. The organic-statist evolution of
Russian official discourse and the elite’s value orientations was incomplete; some
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original liberal elements, most notably economic liberalism, survived. Likev^se, the
organic-statist shift in public opinion was not absolute. Although there are strong
signs that the Russian public is ideologically conservative, economically etatist, and
nationalist, there remains considerable popular support for political democracy and
pro-Westem foreign policy. In Poland, modification of liberal discourse and public
opinion did not occur along anticipated issue domains. While economic etatism did
play an important role in tempering the original liberal orientations of both the Polish
elite and the general public, ethnic nationalism was a factor only on the popular level.
However, organic-statist attitudes among the elite were found in another issue
domain, the ideological one. The Polish elite’s ideological liberalism was modified by
a strong support for conservative ideology.
Hypothesis #2. In Russia, a basic societal consensus between the elite and the
general public emerged around certain organic-statist values, while in Poland, the
elite and the public found common ground in modified liberal orientations.
Hypothesis 2 was confirmed. Indeed, the Russian elite and the general
population agree on organic-statist value orientations, as only politically
authoritarian, ideologically conservative, anti-Westem, and nationalistic preferences
are found on both the elite and the popular levels. Smwiving democratic and proWestem public attitudes no longer penetrate to the elite level, while the elite’s strong
commitment to the free market failed to gamer support among the general population.
In Poland, inclusive democratic, ideologically mixed, moderately etatist, and proWestem attitudes (elements of the moderately liberal value orientations) are shared
by both the elite and the population at large. The only public preference not found on
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the elite level is ethnic nationalism (organic-statist element). The Polish elite remains
ethnically tolerant (liberal element).
Hypothesis #3. In Russia, congruence between elite and popular attitudes did
not appear until the 2000 presidential elections. In Poland, official discourse and
public opinion were always congruent.
Hypothesis 3 was subject to major modifications. As I demonstrated in
Chapter III, there is no absolute consensus between the Russian elite and the general
public. The partial organic-statist consensus that I reported in my discussion of
hypothesis 2 started to emerge as early as 1993/1994, not in 2000, as I originally
suspected. However, it is true that by the time Vladimir Putin was elected president
this consensus coalesced firmly. Putin’s election and the political, ideological, foreign
relations, and ethnic relations changes that followed it can be viewed as a logieal
conclusion of the processes which started in the early 1990s, not as an abrupt break
with Yeltsin’s eourse. In Poland, I observed the stability of both the public and the
elite’s moderately liberal attitudes. A liberal consensus between the elite and the
general public that was formed in the beginning of the research period was largely
preserved. Despite the fact that the ethnic tolerance of the Polish elite was not shared
by a more nationalistie general publie, ideological and economic value orientations of
the elite, which originally were more liberal, became more congruent with more
conservative and etatist preferences of the Polish population.
Hypothesis #4. The role of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals in
articulating official discourse and the elite’s value orientations changed from
independent cultural entrepreneurs who created and supported post-Communist
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liberal discourse to a more organic role which incorporated public opinion. The dual
(organic and entrepreneurial) role of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals never
changed.
Hypothesis 4 was also only partially confirmed. Although as the postCommunist period progressed, Russian government-affiliated intellectuals
increasingly voiced value orientations consistent with the general public’s mandate,
they remained insulated from public opinion’s continuous economic etatism and its
surviving democratic and pro-Westem elements. Russian government-affiliated
intellectuals thus were neither fully organic, nor fully independent from the public.
They espoused public attitudes when doing so did not contradict the interests of the
political elite, but ignored the public when the latter’s views conflicted with the
dominant elite’s value orientations. In the situation of convergence between the elite
and the public’s value orientations reported for Poland, government-affiliated
intellectuals were largely spared the necessity to choose sides in the conflict of value
orientations that confounded their Russian coimterparts. Polish government-affiliated
intellectuals could remain loyal both to the society and the political elite.
Hypothesis #5. In Russia, the changes in official discourse (the elite’s value
orientations) and policies do not always correspond, but on several occasions,
changes in discourse were a good indicator for changing policy direction. In Poland,
continuity in official discourse matched continuity of policies.
Hypothesis 5 was confirmed. In Russia, changes in discourse meant
appreciable changes in policies (in political, ideological, and foreign policy areas),
while the stability of economically liberal discourse corresponded to consistently
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liberal economic policies. However, at least in one issue domain (ethnic relations),
the change in discourse did not signify changes in actual policies. The Russian
political elite abstained from openly nationalistic actions, despite the popular mandate
and its own propensity for it (visible in official discourse). Instead, the political elite,
even taking into account two Chechen wars that were conducted during the postCommunist period, publicly condemned instances of ethnic hatred and tried to diffuse
potentially combustible conflicts in Tatarstan, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and North
Ossetia through decidedly peaceful, diplomatic means. In general, in Russia, changes
in policies preceded changes in discourse, a finding that suggests that discourse was
used to justify policies ex post facto rather than to bring them about. In Poland, in the
situation of relative stability of modified liberal discourse, liberal policies were
implemented consistently. Since there is a basic congruence between official
discourse and policy actions, the question of the cause and effect is less relevant in
the Polish case. Discourse is used to both popularize existing policies and inspire new
ones.
Hypothesis #6. Based on my case studies, consistently liberal post-Communist
discourse occurs when a) it is tempered by advocacy of social protection and
nationalism and b) there is a liberal consensus between the elite and the public and
government-affiliated intellectuals, who articulate official discourse, draw upon both
the elite and the public’s preferences, playing a dual (organic and entrepreneurial)
role.
The data support the final sixth hypothesis as it was originally formulated.
Discussions in the previous four chapters demonstrated that the stability of liberal
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discourse is a function of: a) the intensity of discourse itself (that is whether it is
extreme or moderate) and b) liberal consensus between the elite and the public and
therefore the absence of a dilemma for government-affiliated intellectuals who do not
have to choose between being organic representatives of the public or being cultural
entrepreneurs serving the elite.
My findings suggest that the Russian and Polish cases present dramatically
different models of the evolution of the elite’s value orientations and public opinion
in the post-Communist period, models that I call Post-Soviet and Eastem European.
Below I summarize the most important differences in the evolution of elites’ value
orientations and variations in the trends in public opinion in the two countries.

Evolution of the Elite and Publics’ Value Orientations in Post-Communist
Russia and Poland and Factors That Lend Stability to Liberal Orientations
Found at the Beginning of the Research Period
A more detailed examination of the differences in Russian and Polish postCommunist attitudinal trajectories is useful in appreciating the diversity of the elite
and the publics’ political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic relations
preferences in the two coimtries as well as suggesting directions in which the elite and
the popular attitudes are moving. In this section I concentrate on descriptive account
of differences; their possible causes are discussed in the section “Explanations of
Empirical Findings.”
1. Political Issue Domain
In the years since the Soviet Union collapsed, the Russian elite drifted from a
strong commitment to democracy towards a much more favorable evaluation of
authoritarianism, while Russian public opinion was and remains politically mixed.
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There is no eomplete rejection of demoeratie institutions and norms on the popular
level, a rejection which has become so charaeteristie of the Russian elite. On the
democratic side, Russians preferred a multiparty system, favored having a political
opposition and had positive attitudes towards the Western type of democracy. But a
majority also supported government control over the mass media and concentration of
power in the executive branch.
Throughout the research period, the Polish elite continued to believe in the
principles of inclusive democracy. The Polish public likewise retained its original
democratic aspirations. Not only did Poles support democracy in general, they also
favored more inclusive democratic forms and rejected more elitist arrangements
where political parties, the opposition, and the mass media are denied an active role in
the political process.
In this area, the differences between Russia and Poland manifest themselves
on both the elite and the popular levels. The contrast between the Polish and Russian
elites’ political preferences is especially stark, given the similarity of their social and
political status and the degree of their initial support for democracy. It appears that
the Russian elite, who increasingly favors authoritarianism in defiance of mixed
public opinion, is more motivated by its own changing priorities, while the Polish
elite, regardless of the political loyalties of its members, presents a strong democratic
potential. On the popular level, the difference between political preferences of
Russians and Poles, although not as pronounced, is still significant. My findings
suggest that democracy in Russia was never fully embraced by the population at
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large, a trend that continued throughout the research period. In post-Communist
Poland, on the other hand, democracy always enjoyed a strong popular commitment.

2. Ideological Issue Domain
Ideologically, both Russian elite and public opinion drifted towards greater
conservatism. By the end of the 1990s, members of the Russian elite favored a statist
ideology, while ordinary Russians unambiguously preferred order (a synonym for the
strong state) over democracy (a synonym for civil rights and liberties), accepted
dictatorship as the best solution to Russian problems and had positive attitudes
towards repressive state institutions and the conservative Orthodox Church.
Like its Russian counterpart, the Polish elite moved in the direction of greater
conservatism after initial support for ideologically liberal positions. However, the
evolution of the attitudes of the Polish elite took place in one importantly different
way. The Polish elite’s liberalism was always considerably tempered by the presence
of a viable conservative option, while the Russian elite’s position was originally
much more pro-liberal. Polish public opinion was consistently split between
conservative and liberal inclinations. On the one hand, Poles were tolerant of atheists,
secular in their outlook on the church-state relationship, supportive of divorce and
convinced that the state is accountable to society. On the other, they also favored the
death penalty, rejected abortion and alternative lifestyles, and were ready to sacrifice
their civil liberties to combat crime. It is worth mentioning that while conservative

preferences are stable, or even increasing in prominence, the Polish public’s liberal
orientations are weakening. The struggle between different ideological preferences
among the Polish elite is by no means over. Yet a final turning towards conservatism
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would not be out of character, given the Polish elite’s long-standing interest in this
ideology.
In this area, the two cases differ only in the degree of elites’ ideological
commitment. The evolution of the Russian elite’s ideological views is particularly
interesting. Although by 1998 the Russian elite made its choice in favor of ideological
conservatism, such a turn is rather unexpected, given a prolonged dominance of
liberal orientation. The very fact that the elite in Russia resisted the ideological
conservatism of the population for so long, while the Polish elite was comfortable
with incorporating conservative sensibilities popular among the Polish public is
noteworthy. It suggests a stronger adherence to the principles of ideological
liberalism among the Russian elite.^^^

3. Economic Issue Domain
During the research period, the Russian elite consistently favored the free
market model over the governed market option. The Russian public, on the other
hand, exhibited strong etatist preferences, with the exception of a very brief period
immediately after the collapse of the Communist regime, when Russians supported
free market economic reforms. Worried about price increases, intensification of social
stratification and decline of industrial output, Russians consistently favored a stronger
economic role for the state and more gradual economic change.
The economic preferences o f the Polish elite were mixed. Neither the

governed market nor the free market model mustered absolute support. Moreover, the
An argument that the Russian elite was not inherently conservatively- or statist-oriented appears in
A. Baranov et al., Rossiia v poiskakh idei: Analiz pressy [Russia in Search o f an Idea: Analysis o f the
Press]. Working Materials, Issue 1 (Moscow: Consulting Group under the Administration o f the
President o f the Russian Federation, 1997). The authors report that in 1996 Yeltsin appealed to
government-affiliated intellectuals to come up with new, statist ideology.
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Polish elite grew increasingly critical of the liberal economic model, while the
governed market option became as acceptable as the free market model. The Polish
public was likewise divided over its preferred economic model, but the majority
favored greater state intervention and was skeptical about free market capitalism.
Although Poles were strongly etatist, they did not completely reject economic
liberalism, as was the case in Russia. For instance, they viewed the privatization
process favorably.
There are more pronounced differences between the economic value
orientations of the Russian and Polish elites than between the economic preferences
of the Russian and Polish publics. Economic liberalism is the strongest value
orientation of the Russian elite. Moreover, this orientation has so far remained
completely unaffected by public demands. The Polish elite, on the other hand, is more
flexible in its economic views. Although the Russian and Polish publics differ in their
degree of support for economic etatism and acceptance of economic liberalism, it is a
difference of degree, not kind.

4. Foreign Policv Issue Domain
The Russian elite’s foreign policy views changed from moderately proWestem to moderately anti-Westem, while the public’s foreign policy preferences
were ambiguous. Although anti-Westem sentiments, including distmst of NATO and
W estem countries’ intentions regarding Russia and support for clearly anti-Westem

alliances, continued to increase in prominence, pro-Westem orientations, including
positive attitudes towards the US and the EU, also remained strong.

369

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Polish elite sustained its original pro-Westem attitudes. Importantly,
elites of all political persuasions share pro-Westem foreign policy orientations.
Regardless of party membership and economic or ideological views, all actors agree
on a desirability of partnership with the West. Pro-Westem attitudes of the Polish
public, especially support for the cooperation with NATO, the EU and Westem
countries, were always strong and actually increased in strength during the research
period, while pro-Eastem (or independent) preferences, including alliances with
Russia and other Eastem neighbors, were never popular. The peaks of pro-Westem
attitudes occurred in 1995,1997, and 1999, when Poland made important decisions to
join NATO and the EU.
The differences in the evolution of foreign policy official discourse in Russia
and Poland mirror the divergent foreign policy paths taken by the two countries. By
the end of the research period, Russia was firmly entrenched in its role as a challenger
and critic of the US, while Poland became a staunch supporter of the US. The
ambiguous foreign policy attitudes of the Russian public suggest a lack of popular
consensus on Russia’s role in today’s international system. Ordinary Poles, on the
other hand, clearly see themselves as part of the new, unifying Europe.

5. Ethnic Relations Issue Domain
Ethnically tolerant attitudes tended to decrease among the Russian elite. The
Russian public likewise drifted towards a greater degree o f nationalism, as the

population at large grew increasingly less tolerant of non-Slavic ethnic minorities and
more supportive of the idea of “Russia for Russians.” The majority no longer shuns
military solutions to ethnic problems and generally supports the second Chechen war.
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The Polish elite is less nationalistic than its Russian counterpart. Ethnic
tolerance enjoys the stable support of the elite. At the same time, even in Poland,
nationalistic attitudes tended to increase in strength, although the nationalistic
trendline in this country is more gradual than the nationalistic trendline in Russia.
Unlike their elite, the Polish public drifted in a nationalistic direction. Poles exhibited
a strong degree of anti-Semitism, expressed negative attitudes towards the Roma,
Russian, and Ukrainian minorities, and resented refugees and migrant workers.
Differences between the Russian and Polish elites’ ethnic beliefs are
particularly interesting, given the similar degree of the public’s nationalism in both
countries. Clearly, the Polish elite does not accept an ethnically based nationalism,
even if the general population endorses it.

6. Implications of Consensus and Disagreement Among the Post-Communist Elites
In the course of my analysis of elites’ value orientations and official
discourses in the two countries, I discovered that the group of liberals and
statist/conservatives that comprised the Russian elite during the research period can
agree on only one liberal value - the free market economic model. In all other issue
domains, consensus within the Russian post-Communist elite emerged only on the
organic-statist values (authoritarianism, conservative ideology, independent/antiWestem foreign policy, and moderate nationalism). Surviving liberals had to modify
their original positions in response to the growing presence o f statists/conservatives

among the elite.
In Poland, on the other hand, constant rotations between liberal and social
democratic elites had virtually no effect on the popularity of liberal values, including
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inclusive democracy, pro-Westem foreign policy, and ethnic tolerance. There, the
conflict involved ideological and economic orientations, a clear indicator of electoral
competition among the Polish liberal, conservative, and social-democratie elites.
Despite uncertainty regarding Poland’s future economic and ideological direction, all
indicators point to democratic consolidation. Regardless of various political
persuasions, ideological debates and economic disagreements, all Polish actors accept
inclusive democraey as a desirable goal.
In the Russian case, not only is demoeracy not consolidated; it is actually the
most endangered element of the original liberal project. On the other hand, the future
of the free market in Russia is virtually assured.

7. Implications of Consistencv and Ambieuitv of Post-Commxmist Public Opinion
My findings show that during the post-Communist period, there was a certain
degree o f similarity between Russians’ and Poles’ views on desirable ideology, the
economic system and the model of ethnic relations. The differences in these areas are
differences in nuance and degree, not kind. In both coimtries, the majority of the
population believed that ideological conservatism, economic etatism, and nationalism
were legitimate post-Communist options. In the political and foreign policy areas,
however, the differences are very pronounced. Poles’ original democratic and proWestem orientations were consistent and strong, while Russians’ democratic and proWestem views coexisted with the substantial authoritarian and anti-Westem

preferences. The Russian public’s attitudes appear more ambiguous than Polish
public opinion. The only invariable element of Russian public opinion is economic
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etatism. In Poland, there are two stable and definite elements of public opinion support for inclusive democracy and pro-Westem foreign policy.
The latter fact suggests differences in the core popular beliefs in the two
countries. Like their elite, Russians are much more economy-centric, while Poles
seemed to move beyond purely economic concems to politics and foreign policy
domains. The contrast is especially interesting, given the fact that economic hardships
in both countries are equally grave and the contemporary economic situation in
Poland may, in many ways, be even worse than the economic situation in Russia. By
the late 1990s, Poland experienced one of the highest rates of unemployment in the
region and its resource-poor economy grew dependent on the import of energy
resources. The inefficient agrarian sector still makes up a sizeable part of the overall
economy and presents a source of great concern for domestic economists and agrarian
parties as well as European funding agencies, particularly on the eve of Poland’s full
EU membership. Enterprise bankmptcy is widespread, as are corruption and
economic crimes. Yet, despite economic concems, Poles believe in democracy and a
pro-Westem course, while Russians appear to endorse strongly the govemed-market
economic model as the only solution to post-Communist tribulations.

8. Factors That Lend Stabilitv to Liberal Orientations of Russian and Polish Elites and
Publics Found at the Beginning of the Research Period
The research suggests that stability of original post-Communist liberal
orientations of the elite occurs when: a) liberalism is modified and b) liberalism of the
elite is shared by the population at large. If these conditions are satisfied, rotations
within the elite and subsequent changes in the elite’s program of action do not affect
the stability of official liberal discourse.
373
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Stability of the original liberal orientations among the post-Communist publie
occurs when: a) liberalism of public opinion is modified and b) the elite endorses
similar liberal attitudes and does not send strong organic-statist signals to the public.

Explanations of Empirical Findings
I attribute the differences in the value orientations o f the elites in Russia and
Poland to five factors. These explanations are suggestive rather than definite, and
their verification lies outside the scope of this project.
The first concerns the nature of the belief systems of the elite itself. Clearly,
for the Russian elite only economic liberalism proved to be indispensable, while the
Polish elite appears to have always believed in inclusive democracy, a pro-Western
foreign policy course, and ethnic tolerance. Elites’ commitments are quite strong on
their own; they do not always depend on the public opinion climate. For instance, the
Russian elite’s loyalty to the free market economic model exists independently of
public opinion, as does the Polish elite’s commitment to ethnic tolerance. These belief
systems are shaped by immediate self-interest (the Russian elite clearly benefited
from the neo-liberal economic course) or by external factors (the Polish elite is
reluctant to heed nationalistic public opinion in defiance of possible, in fact highly
likely, European and transatlantic sanctions that nationalistic official discourse and
actions would trigger). Where the elite internalized liberal value orientations (either
due to personal convictions, self-interest, or external pressures), it tended to be

consistent and convincing in their articulation. Where the elite paid only lip service to
the liberal principles of democracy, partnership with the West, human rights, and
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ethnic tolerance, these attitudes were easily dropped, even if the public did not
necessarily demand such changes.
Second, the character of post-Communist public opinion clearly plays a role in
shaping the elite’s attitudes. The effect of public opinion on the elite’s value
orientations is neither direct nor causal; rather it serves as an environment that
conditions the elite’s choices and preferences.^^"* Indeed, public opinion can either
reinforce the existing elite’s value orientations or modify them. Public opinion’s
liberalizing effect on the orientations of the elite works only if the elite’s priorities are
liberal to start with and if public opinion itself is unambiguously liberal. More often,
public opinion weakens the elite’s liberal orientations and strengthens its the organicstatist positions. Conceivably, in the Polish case, public opinion both reinforced the
elite’s commitment to inclusive democracy and pro-Western foreign policy and
modified the elite’s ideological and economic views in the organic-statist direction. In
the Russian case, public opinion’s impact on the elite’s value orientations is limited to
making the latter more organic-statist. The liberal effects of Russian public opinion
on the elite are non-existent. The only explanation for this varied effect of public
opinion is that there is more receptivity to liberal views among the Polish elite, while
the Russian elite’s capacity for incorporating liberal public opinion is minimal due to
its members’ lack of personal commitment to liberal principles.
Third, the nature of domestic politics in Russia and Poland is important to
explaining the differences in these cases. Russian elections are increasingly reduced
to a “fixed” competition among the actors who do not offer real alternatives to one

See also Section “Comparison o f the Relations Between the Elite’s Value Orientations and Public
Opinion in Post-Communist Russia and Poland” in this chapter.
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another. All major contenders advocate a strong state, restoration of the national idea,
independent foreign policy, law and order, and statist ideology (i.e., policies
consistent with organic-statist principles). The democratic or liberal opposition, with
its emphasis on human rights, the free market, democratic development, and more
amicable relations with the West, is marginalized and denied access to the mass
media and other electoral resources. As a result, the ruling Russian elite tends to
ignore more liberal principles since their bearers have minimal political weight. In
Poland, there is a real electoral conflict that centers aroimd the economy and, to a
lesser degree, ideology. The liberal and conservative (ideological cleavage) as well as
liberal and social-democratic (economic cleavage) factions of the Polish elite vie for
votes by trying to maximize gains in the context of ideologically and economically
mixed public opinion. The Polish elite, however, is aware that the majority of voters,
regardless of their stance on economic and ideological issues, is in favor of inclusive
democracy and pro-Western foreign policy. The elite adjusts its discourse in order to
maximize return on the votes. In sum, the presence or absence of real electoral
competition plays a role in the degree to which certain principles (both liberal and
organic-statist) are important to the political elite.
Fourth, the nature of larger systems of beliefs in each country also plays a
role. In Poland, Catholicism has always been and remains an important political,
social and cultural institution. The Polish elite’s commitment to Catholicism, a
religion which emphasizes community, social solidarity and family values, is
genuine; it is not a mere nod in the populist direction. This may explain why
ideologically conservative and economically etatist value orientations are not alien to
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the Polish elite and could be fairly easily incorporated into its discourse. In Russia,
however, despite the ostensible recent religious revival and the elite’s obligatory
participation in important Orthodox religious observances, the elite remains secular in
nature. Thus, it is unaffected by the Orthodox ethos with its socially conservative and
redistributive overtones. Not surprisingly, ideological liberalism and individualistic
free market beliefs, both of which are much closer to secularism than to the Orthodox
religious doctrine, find a more receptive soil among the Russian elite.
Another important difference in the overall Zeitgeist in the two countries is the
viability of authoritarianism as a political option. Authoritarianism was never
completely discredited in post-Communist Russia, even on the elite level. On the
contrary, it has always been available and well articulated as an alternative to
democracy. In Poland, there is no serious discussion of the return to authoritarianism.
The different menu of political options in my case studies appears to frame elites’
political attitudes quite differently.
Finally, international ties and priorities are also useful in explaining the
differences between the elites’ attitudes in the two cormtries. The Russian elite can
espouse anti-Western, anti-democratic and nationalistic sentiments precisely because
it would not face the international sanctions or, at very least reprimands, that such
attitudes/discussions usually generate. Russia is removed fi*om Western international
structures, including NATO and the EU, has no real prospects of joining them, and, as
a result, is unaffected by the democratic and tolerant norms and rules promoted by the
West. Conversely, the Polish elite that traditionally aspired to and finally secured
membership in the Western international organizations has to reconcile its attitudes
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and actions with Western standards. The Polish elite is both eager and under pressure
from the EU to conform to Western norms, including ethnic tolerance, even if these
are not always shared by the population at large. It knows that the EU and NATO will
accept a certain degree of economic etatism and conservative ideology (after all, these
organizations include countries like France and Germany with long-standing records
of the governed market model and more statist ideology), but these organizations will
not stand for a slightest hint of ethnic intolerance. This explains why the Polish elite
feels safe in incorporating the ideological conservatism and economic etatism of the
general population, but steers clear of the public’s nationalism.
I attribute the differences in popular attitudes in the two covmtries to four
factors. These explanations are also purely exploratory rather than definite.
First, historical factors clearly are important. In Russia, where the Communist
period was longer and penetrated the society more deeply, there are stronger legacies
of authoritarianism. The Communist period is still viewed with considerable
nostalgia, and its most notorious elements (including purges) are not fully
condemned. Conversely, in Poland, Communism was not only an elite enterprise, it
was superimposed on the nation from the outside, did not enjoy wide-spread social
support, and did not leave a long tradition of fascination vvdth authoritarian political
systems. Communism is irrevocably discredited in Poland, at least in the political
sense, although not necessarily in terms of social protection. The inter-war home
grown brand of non-Communist authoritarianism (presidential dictatorship of
Pilsudski) is likewise interpreted negatively as a deviation from the democratic and
liberal European traditions that Poland is so eager to trace throughout its history.
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In the area of foreign policy, Poland had a well-pronouneed Western
orientation; historically, it tried to strike alliances with France (the Napoleonic wars,
the interwar years of the twentieth century) or the US (First and Second World Wars).
Its Eastern neighbors, on the other hand, were traditionally viewed with suspicion and
contempt. If Poland historically gravitated in the Western direction, Russian foreign
policy was always a balancing act between its Eastern and Western vectors, and the
victory of western-oriented diplomacy was often perceived as a source of Russia’s
international failure and humiliation. The Communist portrayals of the West as a
geopolitical class enemy of the Soviet Union only reinforced an already existing antiWestern bias. Not surprisingly, anti-Western and anti-democratie views, which
historically had much stronger traditions in Russia, are present in today’s Russia to a
larger degree than in Poland.
Second, value orientations of the post-Communist elites also play a role in
explaining why democratic and pro-Westem preferences are much stronger among the
Poles. In Poland, the elite sanctioned democratic, pro-Westem attitudes. Polish public
opinion was not only uninhibited, but actually encouraged in developing these attitudes.
In other words, there existed a favorable environment for the public’s democratic and
pro-Westem preferences. In Russia, the elite endorsed authoritarian and anti-Westem
attitudes as early as the mid 1990s and the public faced significant obstacles in upholding
altemative points of view which were not sanctioned by the regime. The spiral of silence
that 1 discussed in Chapter 111, a process in which dissenting views among the population
decreased, is clearly in play here.
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Closely related to the spiral of silence explanation is the extent of political
control over information. Obviously, a part of the Russian opposition articulates
democratic and pro-Westem positions. Ironically, dming the parliamentary and
presidential elections campaigns of 2003-2004, the Communists became one of the
strongest defenders of freedom of speech, political opposition, meaningful elections,
and non-interference of the state into business affairs. Of course, the democratic
opposition always championed these principles as well as better relations with the
West. But the mass media are currently under almost total political control of the
ruling elite. If there were altemative sources of information, the Russian public could
have access to other, democratic and pro-Westem positions, but these views are not
easily accessible. As a result, the democratic and pro-Westem attitudes of the public
exist in an unfavorable environment, known in Russia as the “information blockade.”
Finally, I argue that the actual experiences with post-Communist political
institutions, the nature of the post-Communist relations with the West, and the elite’s
willingness to modify its radical economic course may account for the differences in
popular democratic, foreign policy, and economic attitudes. In the Polish
parliamentary republic, control over political institutions is subject to intense, but
mostly fair contestation. Democracy is a game with an uncertain outcome in which
yesterday’s losers can become today’s winners. As a result, various actors have a
stake in the uncertain democratic game. In Russia, numerous democratic elections
were tamished by accusations of unfair competition (charges of the illegitimate use of
administrative and information resources go as far back as the 1993 parliamentary
elections) and predictable results. Many democratic institutions (like the Duma) were
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deliberately discredited by the political elite in the executive branch. Consequently,
democracy, as it exists in Russia today, is viewed with suspicion. There is also no
denying that, as Western and Russian strategic interests clashed, the relations between
Russia and the West in the post-Communist period were uneven at best and
tumultuous at worst. Poland’s foreign policy interests were largely congruent with
Western priorities. As a result, their relationship was much more amicable.
Interestingly, despite the similarities and consistency in the application of
shock therapy (the radical neo-liberal economic program) in the two countries, the
neo-liberal economic model was significantly more discredited among the Russian
population than among ordinary Poles. This development carmot be blamed solely on
the economic model itself. Original slogans of shock therapy in Poland were quickly
modified by social democrats who came to power in 1993 and whose economic
priorities included a more socially responsive and gradual govemed-market model,
which was popular among the Polish public. This may account for a more favorable
evaluation of a free market model in Poland. In Russia, the elite’s free market slogans
were not revised until very recently (and this process was quite selective and often
rigged - cf. the Khodarkovskii affair).

Relationship Between Elite Value Orientations and Public Opinion in PostCommnnist Russia and Poland
In Russia, only organic-statist elements of public opinion (political
authoritarianism, ideological conservatism, anti-Westem foreign policy, and ethnic
nationalism) penetrated official discourse and the elite’s value orientations. The
Russian elite recognizes the existence of surviving liberal (pro-democratic and proWestem) public attitudes, but believes it can safely ignore them. Conversely, the
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Russian elite failed to convince the public of the desirability of the free market
economic model, the elite’s core liberal belief. The post-commimist Russian elite and
the public found consensus around organic-statist principles, while liberal values
proved to be divisive. Moreover, in the absence of pressure from Western
organizations on policies and official discourse and given an increasingly uncontested
domestic political arena, the Russian elite has a free hand in adopting organic-statist
elements of public opinion and ignoring more liberal public attitudes.
In Poland, moderately liberal public opinion has better chances of reaching the
elite and being incorporated into official discourse. Likewise, the elite’s liberal
proclamations find a receptive audience in generally more liberal public opinion. The
Polish elite is less accommodating when faced with the organic-statist attitudes of the
public. Although the elite is willing to incorporate popular conservative ideology and
economic etatism, it is reluctant to heed the public’s nationalism. The penetration of
the EU and NATO’s norms into Polish political culture may account for the elite’s
unwillingness to cater to public xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and chauvinism. Liberal
values, and not organic-statist positions, appear to represent common ground for the
Polish elite and the public.
It follows from the previous discussion that public opinion in the two
countries contains both liberal and organic-statist elements. The question for the elite
is what types of public attitudes to promote and champion. The relationship between
the elite’s value orientations and public opinion is not strictly speaking causal; it is
more complex. My case studies support Converse’s^^^ observations that there are

See Philip E. Converse, “The Nature o f Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Ideology & Discontent,
ed. David E. Apter (London; Free Press o f Glencoe, 1964).
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certain linkages between the elite and the mass public’s attitudes. In Russia, these
linkages tend to form around organic-statist values, while in Poland they emerge
aroimd modified liberalism. The relationship thus is similar to game theory. The elite
is taking cues from the public. As part of the game, the elite is very much interested
in what the other player is doing. There is also an element of asymmetry between the
elite and the public. After all, it is the elite who decides what public attitudes it will
represent and encourage. The former only chose to incorporate those motifs and
themes from public opinion that are most congruent with the elite’s policy aspirations
and own interests.
I argue that public opinion was congruent with the elite’s value orientations
when: a) the elite’s concessions to public opinion would gain electoral advantage for
the elite (incorporation of anti-Westem public attitudes in Russia and the Polish
elite’s sensitivity to ideologically conservative and economically etatist public
attitudes); b) public opinion coincided with the elite’s self-interest and beliefs
(incorporation of authoritarian elements of Russian public opinion and inclusion of
Poles’ pro-democratic and pro-Westem orientations); and c) the public
overwhelmingly and consistently opposed the elite’s views and the elite itself lacked
a well-defined self-interest (incorporation of the Russian public’s ethnic nationalism
and conservative ideology).
Altematively, public opinion was ignored when: a) concessions to the public
would not bring any additional votes (rejection of Russian public opinion’s proWestem orientations); b) the public’s demands and the elite’s self-interests and
beliefs were incongment (the case of the Russian public’s economic etatism and the
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Polish public’s nationalism and anti-Semitism); and c) public opinion was ambiguous
and perceived by the elite to be a license to lead, not follow (the elite’s ignoring
democratic preferences of the Russian population).
The elite’s ability to shape public opinion was likewise mitigated. In Russia,
the public is resistant to eeonomie liberalism despite strong signals emanating from
the elite, while in Poland, the population remains nationalistic despite consistent
efforts by the elite to change these attitudes. Perhaps the experience of the public and
the deep-rooted ethnic cliches that run counter to official proclamations explain the
inability of consistent elite attitudes to penetrate to the popular level.

Importance of Consensus Between Post-Communist Elites and General Publics
What happens when the preferences of the elite coincide with the priorities of
the general public? Is this a positive or a negative factor in a post-Communist
society? The question taps into the issue of public opinion’s impact on the political
process - one of the cornerstones of both the public opinion literature and
contemporary democratic theory. Answering this question is important not so much
for its normative aspect as for its empirical value. Do the countries in which the
preferences of the elite and the public coincide have a better record in successfully
completing multiple post-Communist transitions?
Intuitively, if public attitudes penetrate to the level of the elite, the former has
a chance to influence and shape important polieies. Consequently, such policies might

have better chances of being popularly accepted and implemented. Also, congruence
between elite and public attitudes could lead to a more democratic decision-making
processes. Conversely, if the elite does not listen to publie opinion, the reforms.
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designed solely by the elite, may experienee popular resistance or even stall. The
public may feel alienated from the political process.
Another important issue is whether or not congruence between elite and
public attitudes occurs on liberal or organic-statist issues. As we have seen, elitepublic consensus exclusively on liberal issues generates certain tensions. Democratic
principles of strong popular involvement in political processes, political equality, and
the elite’s aeeountability may clash with the free market’s weak social responsibility
and tendency to generate significant economic inequality. Another potential conflict
involves a strong role for the population in domestic politics associated with inclusive
democracy and the relative loss of decision-making autonomy inherent in a proWestem foreign policy course, where solutions affecting domestic issues may be
dictated from the outside. It is easy to see that while democratic consolidation is
helped by meaningful political participation, emphasis on the responsibilities of the
individuals, the sanctity of their rights, outside re-enforcement of democratic mles
and the absence of ethnic cleavages and divisions, it might be hampered by economic
inequalities and the relative lack of control over foreign policy, both of which are at
odds with democratic postulates.
Comprehensive elite-public consensus on organic-statist issues also generates
tensions. While consensus on the logic of the governed market, a system which
decreases the economic inequalities and redistributes economic gains more equitably,
some organic-statist postulates (including social consensus and reciprocity) and the
ability to control foreign policy may have a positive effect on democratic
consolidation and successful economic transition, agreement on other organic-statist
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elements (including authoritarianism and nationalism) is undeniably baneful for a
democratic process as well as for the process of nation-building.
Coming back to the empirical question posed in the begirming of this section,
I argue that multiple post-Communist transitions are more likely to occur successfully
when the elite and the general public reach consensus on a combination of liberal and
organic-statist principles, i.e., on modified liberal principles. While democratic and
ethnically tolerant (i.e., liberal) consensus is important, it is equally important to have
a consensus on mixed ideological, economic, and foreign policy principles. In this
respect, Poland is much closer to fulfilling criteria for a successful completion of
multiple post-Communist transitions. The future of Russian post-Communist reforms,
which are guided exclusively by organic statist consensus, is uncertain. Furthermore,
many of the original goals of the Russian transition have, at the moment, clearly
changed.

Research Contributions to the Existing Theoretical Debates
This work is situated within the literature on the political sociology of
intellectuals, public opinion, and democratic transitions and consolidation. In each of
these sub-fields of political science there are important debates that are still unsettled.
The role that intellectuals play in societies (and especially in Eastern European
societies), the characteristics of public opinion and its impact on the actions of elites,
and variables that account for successful democratic consolidation still require

empirical exploration and verification.
In the area of the political sociology of intellectuals, my research gives
credence to the socio-economic camp. I disagree with the socio-ethical school that
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argues that intellectuals form a unique social class, which is characterized by a
heightened sense of responsibility for the society at large and by an oppositional
stance vis-a-vis the ruling elite. Indeed, I found that intellectuals do cooperate with
the state. But the nature of this cooperation is different in the two countries I
analyzed. Russian government-affiliated intellectuals tend to be more involved with
the state; their responsiveness to the society is rather limited. The value orientations
of Polish intellectuals, on the other hand, often coincide with public opinion.
If in the Russian case, the term government-affiliated intellectual has a
stronger emphasis on the government affiliation, in the Polish case, it is the
intellectual responsiveness to the society that matters more. Obviously, Russian
intellectuals see their function in defending the elite, not in championing the interests
of the population. On one level, Russian government-affiliated intellectuals may be
faced with the more difficult task of understanding the dominant mode of Russian
public opinion; after all, Russians support both democracy and authoritarianism and
favor both pro-Westem and anti-Westem foreign policy. The elite’s preferences in
these areas are much clearer. But this does not explain why Russian intellectuals are
not sensitive to the very pronovmced economic etatism of the public. I offer another
explanation. Russian government-affiliated intellectuals partake in the activities of the
elite, whose clan and electoral interests, as we have seen, do not necessarily include
democracy, redistributive economic policies, and amicable relations with the West.
Elite status and the fear of loosing it (should an intellectual decide to champion the
demands of the public at the expense of the elite) shape Russian intellectuals’
perception of the best economic model, political system, or foreign policy. These
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incentives are mueh more powerful than the publie interests. In Poland, it is easier for
intellectuals to represent society, since public opinion is less ambiguous and more
congruent with the priorities of the elite.
But contemporary elite and public preferences can go only so far in explaining the
differences between post-Communist intellectuals. Commimist legacies and historical
factors are equally important. The differences are clearly a function of divergent
biographies intellectuals discussed in this dissertation. During the Communist period,
Polish intellectuals actively resisted the regime by advising the opposition, being
imprisoned or exiled. In other words, they had experience in championing societal
concerns over the state’s agenda. Russian intellectuals, on the other hand, were never in
opposition to the Communist state (with an exception of a handful rather obseure
oppositional figures, ineluding Pavlovskii and Kordonskii). On the contrary, they actively
cooperated with and promoted the state’s interests, having served as editors-in-chief of
officially sanctioned publications or heads of prestigious academic institutions.
Contemporary Polish intellectuals simply continue to serve society, their ally during the
Communist period. Modern-day Russian intellectuals, who never (with an exception of a
brief period of Perestroika in the late 1980s) antagonized the regime and its elite,
habitually bolster the state.
Closely related to the issue of different intellectual biographies during the
Communist period, is the nature and type of authoritarian regimes that preceded the
democratic transformations in the two coimtries. In Poland, authoritarianism was
softer and punctuated by frequent cycles of liberalization. It tolerated independent
societal structures, including an active Catholic Church and intellectual clubs
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associated with it. Moreover, it allowed intellectual contacts with the West, studies of
public opinion, and even the existence of respected and intellectually robust
sociological schools. The shorter and milder Communist period in Poland
(intellectuals were exiled, but never killed) also permitted a certain intellectual
continuity (many pre-Communist intellectuals were able to mentor new generations
of intellectual cadres). In other words, the ideological erosion of Communism in
Poland clearly led to the emergence of an independent ethos among Polish
intellectuals. The more repressive Communist state in Russia, on the other hand,
prided itself in creating new, Soviet intellectuals - ideological adepts of the regime a process facilitated by decimation of the old intellectual cohorts, intimidation, or co
optation. Thus the nature of preceding authoritarianism also conditioned the actions
and discourse of Russian and Polish intellectuals in the post-Communist period.
Polish intellectuals, who were allowed certain independence, remain today a part of
society. Russian intellectuals, who were forced to actively cooperate with the
Communist regime to give it a veneer of intellectual legitimacy, appear to be more
dependent on the state even after Communism collapsed.
The dissertation answered the questions inspired by the public opinion
literature that I posed in the introductory chapter, namely, what was the evolution of
the Russian and Polish post-Commimist elite and public attitudes and to what extent
did public opinion matter to the elite? The last question can be asked slightly
differently: what values did the post-Communist Russian and Polish elites and publics
have in common? The answers to these questions have important implications (as I
showed above) not only for our knowledge of the elite and the publics’ attitudes in
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the post-Communist countries, the character of the relationship between them and the
trends in their evolution, but also for our understanding of successful democratic
transitions and consolidations. Instead of the traditional analysis that argued that
when assessing democratic process one needs to look at either the political culture^^^
of the population or the elite’s value orientations,^^^ I claim that we need to consider a
more comprehensive picture that includes both the elite and the mass levels of
analysis. The mere examination of the elite or popular commitment to democratic
norms is also not enough in assessing democratic prospects. One needs to look at the
attitudes in ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations areas to see
what other obstacles may interfere with the process of democratization.
The dissertation also advanced our understanding of the post-Communist elite
discourse. I looked at the evolution of several elite value orientations, a task not
undertaken before. In contrast to previous conclusions in the literature,^^* I found that

See, for instance, Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five Nations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989); Ronald Inglehart, Culture
Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990); and Samuel P.
Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University o f
Oklahoma Press, 1991).
Suffice to mention works by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead,
eds.. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Larry
Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds.. Democracy in Developing Countries (London:
Adamantier Press, 1988); Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas o f Democratization in Latin America,”
Comparative Politics 23, no. 1 (October 1990): 1-20; or Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich Klaus
Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Researchers o f post-Communist political discourse usually treat various social actors as a
homogeneous group. According to their interpretations, all Communists, conservatives, democrats, or
liberals articulate a similar set o f values/concepts. See, for example, discussions by A. Temkina and V.
Grigor’ev, “Dinamika interpretativnogo protsessa: transformatsiia v Rossii” [“Dynamics o f
Interpretation Process: Russian Transformation”], in Sotsialnye issledovaniia v Rossii: samopoznaniie
obshchestva {Social Research in Russia: Self-Understanding o f Society] (Moscow: Polis, 1998); B.
Mezhuev, “Kontseptualizatsiia ‘natsionalnogo interesa’ v politicheskikh discussiiakh”
[“Conceptualization o f ‘National Interests’ in Political Discussions”], in Sotsialnye issledovaniia v
Rossii: samopoznaniie obshchestva {Social Research in Russia: Self-Understanding o f Society]
(Moscow: Polis, 1998); Grzegorz Poi:arlik, “Polish Political Parties and Discourse on Polish Raison
D 'Etat on the Eve o f the European Union Membership,” in Between Animosity and Utility: Political

390

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

even the discourse of a relatively homogeneous group, government-affiliated
intellectuals, is not necessarily uniform (it may combine elements of both organicstatist and liberal orientations). It is fluid and has a tendency to evolve. Initial postCommunist discourse rarely survives; instead, it assumes mixed or new forms as a
country progresses beyond the original transition. Interestingly, I also found that
changes in discourse are not necessarily a function of rotations between elites. They
may rather be a function of changing value orientations of the same elite.
Yet, despite additional answers to the questions raised by the public opinion
and democratization/multiple transitions literature, we still do not know how public
opinion reaches the elite. Does it come directly from the public opinion polling
institutions at the request of the elite, or does it filter in through specialized research
institutions, lobbying groups, or political parties? Future in-depth interviews with the
members of the political elite or archival research o f their documents will be helpful
in answering this question.

Larger Empirical Implications of the Dissertation
The first important conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is the
multi-linearity of development even within a relatively homogeneous group of postCommunist case studies. Despite significant similarity between the Russian and
Polish cases, the outcomes of their post-Communist transitions are markedly
different. If the Russian elite and public found consensus on the organic-statist

Parties and Their Matrix, ed. Hieronim Kubiak and Jerzy J. Wiatr (Krakdw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe
Scholar, 2000). However, at least one author (Andreas Bozoki, “The Rhetoric o f Action: The
Language o f Regime Change in Hungary,” in Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe, ed. Andreas
Bozoki. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999) arrives at conclusions similar to mine.
According to Bozoki, the Hungarian political elite articulates both liberal and conservative versions o f
official discourse.
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principles, the Polish situation is eharacterized by a general agreement on modified
liberal values. In both eountries, different sets of attitudes proved to be indispensable
to elites and publies. In Russia, there is a disjunetion between the core beliefs of the
elite and the public. The elite is consistently committed to economic liberalism, while
the public consistently champions governed market ideas. The Russian public, on the
other hand, remains moderately pro-democratic and pro-Westem, while the elite is
increasingly authoritarian and anti-Westem. In Poland, both the elite and the public
tend to believe in inclusive democracy and a pro-Westem foreign policy, and both
have multiple answers to the question of the best ideology and economic model.
Obviously, there is a greater degree of social cohesion in Poland. The role of
government-affiliated intellectuals was also found to vary from country to country.
My work shows that the new democracies of Eastem Europe are not
fundamentally different from other older democracies. The elites in new democracies
are confounded by the same problems as their eormterparts in the West, ineluding the
popularization of policies to the publie (to which it may or may not be sympathetie),
drawing on popular support as a basis for policies, and trying to survive in the
atmosphere of unfavorable public opinion.
One also needs to look beyond the performance of formal institutions when
assessing the status and, more importantly, the prospects of the post-Communist
reforms. Although elites in both cases ostensibly succeeded in creating the formal
post-Communist political, economic, and legal frameworks, there are grave concerns
about the future developments in Russia, where the elite chose to reject its original
priorities, even in the eontext of relatively favorable public opinion. After all, if the
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purpose of elections is to mask the authoritarian preferences of the elite and the
absence of meaningful competition, as seems to be the case in Russia, elections are
obviously not always democratic.
I consider two implications of my study the most important. First, elite
positions in the new democracies are not necessarily shaped by the demands and
pressures of public opinion. In addition to public opinion’s impact, the elite’s own
interests, including its members’ personal beliefs, economic preferences as well as the
external pressures to which they are subject, can be equally effective in structuring
the elite’s values. On one level, the absence of linkages between the elite and the
public violates important assumptions of democratic theory and practice. Elites
seemed to be autonomous. But that does not mean that the elite is not interested in
public opinion or that it does not matter to it. The mere fact that the elite’s and the
public’s attitudes do not coincide implies a certain independence of public opinion. It
also suggests altemative means of information gathering, opinion formation and
political competition. Clearly, even in contemporary Russia, for all the criticisms of
its democratic record, public opinion has some degree of independence and is not
totally controlled by the elite. Despite its tight grip on the mass media, the Russian
elite understands that there are limits to its ability to manipulate public opinion.
But the independence of public opinion and desire of the elite to measure it
are only one side of the continuum. On the other side of this continuum is the desire
of the elite to capitalize on public opinion, which is equally important. Why does the
elite in Russia, which is apparently moving away from a democratic path, still
consider the results of public opinion surveys important? The government’s recent
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crackdown on VTsIOM, the Russian polling organization that until Fall 2003
remained relatively independent of the state’s control, reveals the significance of
public opinion data for the Kremlin?^^ Results of public opinion can be used either
for or against the ruling political elite, another sign that a country has some degree of
political contestation, even if it is moving away from a democratic path. The fact that
public opinion is studied and contested even in the most problematic post-Communist
countries (e.g., Russia) separates them from the countries with zero political
competition (cf. Saudi Arabia or North Korea). Researchers who study Russia and
other post-Soviet states may find grounds for cautious optimism in this finding,
despite otherwise gloomy predictions regarding democratic prospects in these
countries.

In late August 2003, as part o f “privatization” (a process in which the state actually acquired
controlling share o f stakes), the government replaced the management o f VTsIOM, most notably, its
director, former Soviet dissident, Yuri Levada. Prior to August 2003, VTsIOM was a “federal state
enterprise,” a company in which the state had no shares. After the re-organization, it became “state
share-holding company,” which the state dominates. Ostensibly, the struggle for control over the last
independent public opinion polling organization was economic. The state claimed that the new type o f
ownership and management would help VTsIOM to simplify its operations and improve its
profitability. The conflict itself was conveniently labeled “economic” (a phrase that is increasingly
used to describe the crackdown on the political opposition in Russia). Despite fairly sympathetic media
coverage and Levada’s good reputation among the journalistic and scholarly elites, in September 2003
VTsIOM’s director was sacked and replaced by Nikolai Fedorov, a prot6g6 o f the government. De
facto and de jure, the government took control over the last “bastion” o f independent public opinion
data gathering. Since then, VTsIOM re-grouped; all its employees (with the exception o f one) followed
Levada and left the old structures to form a new public opinion polling organization, VTsIOM-A (or
Analytical Service o f VTsIOM). Yet, the crackdovm was not over. During a recent visit and
conversations with VTsIOM-A’s employees (December 2003) the author learned that, although
VTsIOM-A retained the majority o f its clients and partners, it still does not have a permanent office
and is forced to move from one location to another. Moreover, in January 2004, the Anti-Monopoly
Committee o f the government (an equivalent o f the US Anti-Trust Commission) ruled that VTsIOM-A
cannot use the abbreviation o f VTsIOM in its name and would have to change its name completely
(see archives o f an independent radio station “Echo o f Moscow,” www.echo.msk.ru, January 22,
2004). In a situation when the “brand name” (as the decision about the VTsIOM name implies) is vital,
this action is another stab clearly designed to punish VTsIOM-A and make its work almost impossible.
Russian analysts suspect that the government’s dissatisfaction with VTsIOM is caused by the latter’s
survey results showing a decline in the popularity o f the second Chechen war and relatively low
numbers o f electoral support for the pro-Kremlin political party. United Russia, on the eve o f the 2003
parliamentary elections.
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Secondly, my research touches upon another important question - how public
opinion affects the chances for successful post-Communist reforms. Benjamin Page^^°
contends that the elite’s attitudes (or, in his words, policy makers’ attitudes) on a
couple of policy issues in the US history were shaped by public opinion. The mere
introduction of certain problems to the public forum created an outcry, which in turn
resulted in better decisions. Page maintains that opinions of the ordinary people were
right. Moreover, it was ultimately beneficial that the policies on which he focuses
were re-shaped by publie opinion. The question is then whether or not the countries in
which the public has an impact on the policy formation have better policies. In both
questions, the public opinion literature and democratic theory (or an empirical and a
normative issues) intersect.
To make a claim like Page’s requires a lot of evidence. First, one has to prove
that public opinion is stable, rational, well-informed, and structured.^^* Second, one
has to prove that the incorporation of publie opinion results in policies that are
different (and necessarily better) than the decisions that would have been adopted by
the elite on its own. I am not making a categorical claim like Page does. I simply do
not have enough data to prove such a claim, since measures of public opinion in postCommunist countries are not of a long standing. I therefore cannot say that the public
is rational and always knows best. People may not have enough information, or the
information may be (and in fact, in the case of Russia, is) controlled by the elite.
Indeed, my claims are more modest. Post-Communist public opinion appears to be

Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates? Mass Media and Modern Democracy (Chicago: University o f
Chicago Press, 1996).
And indeed, many scholars disagree with such characterizations, see Chapter I, Section
“Characteristics o f Public Opinion.”
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stable and reasonably articulated. During the research period, public opinion either
impacted the discourse and actions of elites, or it was ignored. Where liberal public
opinion was incorporated into policy initiatives and discourse of the elite, postCommunist reforms are visibly more advanced and consistent. Where public opinion
either was overlooked altogether, or only its organic-statist elements deemed
important, the quality and consistency of the reforms suffered.
I can now modify Page’s claim and relate it to post-Communist societies. Not
every type of public opinion necessarily results in better or more consistent reforms.
It follows that liberal public opinion plays a more important role in explaining and
predicting the success of post-Communist reforms. This finding is significant, but not
altogether unexpected. Indeed, the goals of post-Communist transitions, including
democracy, human rights, a market-based economy, cooperation with the West, and
ethnic tolerance, were inspired by a society-centric vision of development more
consistent with liberal principles. Organic-statism, with its emphasis on the statecentered paradigm, was less conducive to successful post-Communist
transformations. This finding also suggests that researchers who study postCommunist countries should look beyond mere institutional design issues or the
impact of previous legacies when assessing prospects for successful reforms. Indeed,
they should also take the nature of public opinion into consideration. Countries with
more liberal public attitudes appear to have an advantage on the path to reforms.
When public opinion was overwhelmingly organic-statist, elites pursuing
liberal reforms achieved more consistent results by ignoring the public, however
undemocratic that might seem. In the Russian case, the elite’s commitment to
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economic liberalism ultimately led to sustainable and relatively high rates of
economic growth, the benefits of which are now begirming to be shared with the
population at large. However, the Russian elite’s compromise on ideological
liberalism, possibly to appease the conservative public, created social and political
conditions (including the strengthening of a repressive state apparatus and an
arbitrary application of law) that proved destructive to free market economic
development. The recent arrests of oppositional businessmen and their lengthy
detention on charges which are not universally applied sent the Russian stock market
tumbling (however temporarily) and jeopardized foreign investment. In the Polish
case, the elite’s decision to ignore the public’s nationalism ultimately paid off and
Poland is now poised to become a full member of the European Union.
It follows that post-Commimist elites may be v^se in shunning the impact of
public opinion. It can be decidedly intolerant and anti-democratic. This finding gives
credence to more elitist accounts of democracy^^^ and skeptical interpretations of
public political participation^^^ (accounts that treat public opinion with suspicion and
mistrust) and not to more benign views on public opinion common in both

Among the classical discussions o f elitist forms o f democracy, in which the public’s input into the
political process is restricted to the elections o f elite, are: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism , Socialism
a n d D em ocracy (New York; Harper and Row, Publishers, 1950); and Giovanni Sartori, The Theory o f
D em ocracy R evisited (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1987).
Realist skeptics in the public opinion research claim that public opinion should not matter in the
political processes, since public attitudes are short-lived, poorly articulated, and ill-informed. For a
complete articulation o f this position, see Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public P hilosophy (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1949); Gabriel Almond, The Am erican P eople an d Foreign P olicy (New York:
Hartcourt Brace, 1950); George F. Kennan, Am erican D iplom acy, 1900-1950 (New York: Mentor
Books, 1951); Philip E. Converse, “The Nature o f B elief Systems In Mass Publics,” in David A.
Apter, ed. Ideology & D iscontent (New York: Free Press, 1964); Hans J. Morgenthau, P olitics Am ong
Nations, 5* ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).
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empirical^^'^ and normative^^^ (deliberative, participatory, discursive, etc.) democratic
literature.

Since I left Russia in the Summer of 2002, several important developments
moved the country further in the organic-statist direction. Both the 2003
parliamentary and the 2004 presidential elections were marred by serious accusations
of electoral fraud. Electoral campaigns were characterized by heavy governmental
control over the media, excessive use of administrative resources, and the arbitrary
nature of candidates’ registration by the State Electoral Commission. During the
actual elections, independent observers cited fi-equent examples of the illegal
propaganda on behalf of the pro-Kremlin candidates and numerous ballot
irregularities. The recent presidential election was particularly problematic. The
incumbent president, Vladimir Putin, enjoyed the unprecedented (at least for postCommunist Russia) advantage of a virtually uneontested race facilitated by obedient
media, silenced political opposition, a pro-incumbent parliament, and an intimidated
business community.
In the Summer of 2003, the last national independent TV charmel (TV-S) was
closed, effectively ending the freedom of information dissemination in Russia. The
only remaining oppositional media are the Moscow-based radio station Echo of
M oscow, the N ew York-based Echo-TV and a handful o f liberal newspapers in
See, for instance, Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What Am ericans Know A bou t P olitics
a n d Why It M atters? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y.
Shapiro, The R ational Public: Fifty Years o f Trends in Am ericans' P olicy Preferences (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1992); Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Studying Substantive
Democracy,” PS: P olitical Science an d P olitics 27 (1994): 9-17.
James S. Fishkin, The Voice o f the P eople: Public Opinion a n d D em ocracy (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1995).
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Moscow and St. Petersburg. Their audiences are rather small, which may explain why
the government still tolerates their presence. In the same summer, the government
launched its next attack on oppositional businessmen. Vladimir Gusinskii and Boris
Berezovskii, who challenged Putin during the first presidential campaign, now live in
exile. Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodarkovskii, who funded and publicly
supported the anti-Putin opposition, were imprisoned in the Summer and Fall of 2003
respectively on charges of tax evasion.
Following numerous terrorist attacks in 2002-2004 (including hostage taking
in a Moscow theater, a Moscow subway bombing, and several commuter trains
explosions in Southern Russia), the functions of repressive state institutions
(including the ability of the police to stop, question and temporarily detain
“suspicious looking” non-Russians) expanded. After a short period of amicable
relations with the US in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Russian
foreign policy again took a strong anti-Western turn. Russia not only opposed the USled invasion of Iraq and resisted US advances in the Trans-Caucasian region, but
lashed out at the EU for its criticism of the second Chechen campaign and Russia’s
electoral irregularities. Nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies also intensified, a
fact all too evident in recent murders of Tajik and Afghani immigrants, fatal beatings
of African students, and the stronger than expected finishes of the populist and
nationalistic LDPR and Motherland parties during the December 2003 parliamentary
elections.
Yet despite a certain strengthening of organic-statist tendencies in Russia,
liberalism did not completely vanish from the scene. In March 2004, Putin appointed
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Russia’s former chief EU negotiator Mikhail Fradkov as Prime Minister; the entire
cabinet was also reshuffled. By and large, new cabinet appointments point towards a
continuation of the liberal economic course. Taken together with my findings, the
most recent developments in Russia suggest that although the future of democracy
and a pro-Western foreign course in Russia is bleak, conditions for successful market
transformation are much more favorable.
In the year since I left Poland, the country continued on the modified liberal
path described in this dissertation. The discovery of an alleged governmental plan to
exert economic pressures on the independent media (the Rywin affair) by Adam
Michnik, editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland’s premier newspaper),
culminated in very public parliamentary hearings. Societal rejection of such
repressive methods remains strong. Poland continues to participate in the US-led
coalition in Iraq. As one of its most steadfast allies, it was entrusted with overseeing
the international military contingent in Southern Iraq. In May 2004, Poland will
become a full-fledged member of the EU.
However, other recent economic and ideological developments are more
ambiguous and reflect the uncertainty of both the elite and of popular preferences. A
new law that would liberalize public utilities and curtail social subsidies to the
underprivileged is being vigorously debated in the Sejm. Poland, together with Spain,
succeeded in blocking the adoption of the European Constitution, arguing that the
document does not go far enough in recognizing the cultural uniqueness of each
member-state and the Christian (read. Catholic) foundations of the European
civilization. In short, the desirability of democracy and integration with the West are
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universally accepted in Poland; the debates about ideology and the country’s
economic course, however, will continue for the foreseeable future.
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APPENDIX A
Categories and Textual Indicators of Liberal and Conservative (Organic-Statist)
Discourses Used in Content Analysis

Liberal Categories: Textual Indicators

Conservative/Organic-Statist
Categories: Textual Indicators

Democracy:

Authoritarianism/Managed Democracy:

Separation of powers and checks and balances

Monopoly of power, no cheeks and
balances

Parliamentarism

Presidentialism
Alternatives to elections

Popular sovereignty
Multipartism

One-party system, structured partysystem

Constitutionality

Political expediency

Political equality of citizens
Civil society
Free media
Federalism

Political inequality of citizens
State-controlled media
Unitary state
Insulation of government

Accoimtability and responsiveness of
government
Liberal Ideology
Rights and freedoms of individuals are natural

Statist/Conservative Ideology:
Rights are given by the community

Civil (negative) liberties
Liberal values
State is for the citizens, rights of the
individuals are supreme

Social (positive) freedoms
Conservative values
State’s interests are superior

Small and effective state apparatus

Strong repressive state apparatus,
law and order
Unity of interests, social harmony,
unity

Respect for difference and conflict of interests

Rule of law, impartiality of law

Selective application of law

Free-Market Economic Model:

Governed Market Economic Model:

Market as principle agent of economic decision
making, absence or small involvement of state
in economy

State to help the market, state
regulates economy
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Weak social protection

Strong social protection

Economic justice

Social justice

Low taxes

Higher taxes

Balanced budget

Possibility of budget deficit

Private property, voucher privatization

Alternative ownership (partially
state or collective)

Strict monetary policy

Soft monetary policy (non
monetary economic leverages)
Protectionism
Price control

Liberalization of foreign trade
Price liberalization
Competition, structural reform as a
consequence of market

Competition can be distorted within
the social pact, social contract
(active structural involvement of
the state in micro-economie policy)

Universal economic development

Unipolarity, mono-centric international
relations
“Idealistic” international relations

Specific economic development
Independent or Anti-Western
Foreign Policy:
Relationship with the East and
South
Multi-polarity, polycentric
international relations
Realist international relations

Decrease in military and defense spending for
foreign protection
Russians abroad are on their own
Future of the USSR - economic (functional)
integration

Increase in military spending for
foreign protection
Protection of Russians abroad
Return to the USSR - based on
political, statist, arguments

Ethnic Tolerance:
Ethnic equality

Ethnic Nationalism:

Pro-Western Foreign Policy:

Relations with the West

Ethnic inequality
Military solutions to ethnic
problems
National values, national ideas

Peaceful solutions to ethnic conflicts
Global values
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APPENDIX B
Selected Economic and Social Indices for Russia and Poland^^^

Index

Poland

GNP per capita, 1999, $
GNP measured at PPP (Purchasing Power Parity)
per capita, 1999, $
GNP's Average Armual Growth Rate 1998-1999, %
GDP's Average Atmual Growth, 1990-1999, %
Urban Population, 1999, %
Population below $1 a day, %
Social Inequality, GINI index, 1996 —Poland, 1998
—Russian Federation
Infant Mortality Rate, 1998, per 1,000 live births
Life Expectancy, male/female, 1998, years

3,960
7,894

Russian
Federation
2,270
6,339

3.4
4.7
65
5.4
32.9

1.3
-6.1
77
7.1
48.7

10
69/77

17
61/73

World Bank, World Development Report 2000-2001: Attacking Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000).
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APPENDIX C
Biographies of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals^^^

Bunin, Igor’ Mikhailovich - bom on Febmary 25,1945 in Moscow, 1970 graduate
of Moscow State University (Department of History). Director General of the Center
for Political Technologies. Doktor of Political Science. In 1973-1982, Bimin worked
as a researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations,
Russian Academy of Sciences. During the next decade (1982-1992), he was
employed as a senior researcher at the Institute of Comparative Political Science.
Since 1993, Bunin became a director of Center of Political Technologies where he
works to this day.
Burhulis, Gennadii Eduardovich - bom on August 5,1945 in Pervoural’sk, 1974
graduate of Urals State University and 1978 Graduate of the Graduate School of the
Urals Polytechnic University (Department of Philosophy). Kandidat of Philosophy.
After graduation Burbulis worked as Associate professor at various universities in
Sverdlovsk. In 1989, he became a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In 19901991, Burbulis was in charge of Yeltsin’s presidential campaign. In 1991-1992,
Burbulis served as State Secretary of RF and First deputy Prime Minister of RF.
Subsequently, he served as a President of the Tsentr Strategiia [Strategy Center - a
liberal think-tank close to Gaidar].
Chernyshov, Sergei Borisovich - bom in 1952 in Kharkov region (Ukraine), 1976
graduate of Moscow Physics Institute. Conservative philosopher, leader of the
organization “Russian University,” inspiration behind Inoe, and close friend and ally
of Gleb Pavlovskii.
Chubais, Anatolii Borisovich - graduate of the Institute of Engineering and
Economics, later professor there. Deputy Prime Minister of RF (1992-1994), first
Deputy Prime Minister of RF (1994-1996,1997-1998), Chief of Presidential
Administration (1996-1997), Chairman of the Board of Directors RAO EES
[Russian United Electric Power Grid, one of Russia’s largest and most important
natural monopolies] (1998-present).
Dugin, Aleksandr Gel’evich - bom on January 7,1962 in Moscow, Dugin was
expelled from Moscow Aviation Institute. Currently, he works as a president of
Historical and Religious Association “Arktogeia,” editor-in-chief of “Elementy.
Evraziiskoe obozrenie” [“Elements. Eurasian Review”]. Dugin is an ultra
conservative philosopher and an adviser to Gennadii Seleznev, Chairman of Duma.
Presently, he is an important unofficial ideologue.

In this Appendix, I use two distinct academic titles common in the Russian context - Kandidat and
Doktor. Both denote advanced graduate degrees. Kandidat is a close equivalent o f the Western Ph.D. The
best approximation to Doktor is a Ph.D. with a post-doc training and a significant record o f publication.
Doktor is the terminal graduate degree in Russia.
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Gaidar, Yegor Timurovich - Deputy Prime Minister of RF responsible for
economie poliey (1991- December 1992), first Deputy Prime Minister of RF
(September 1993- January 1994), between his governmental positions - unofficial
adviser to Yeltsin, member of Russian State Duma [lower house of the Russian
Parliament] (1993-1995). Gaidar’s is a Chairman of “Democratic Choice of Russia”.
Currently, he serves as a Director of the Institute of the Problems of the Transitional
Period.
lasin, Yevgenii Grigor’evieh - bom in 1934 in Odessa, 1963 graduate of Moscow
State University (Economics Department). After graduation lasin worked at the
Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences
(together with Petrakov and Shatalin). In 1989, lasin was invited by L. Abalkin to
head the State Commission for Economic Reform (for Ryzhkov government), where
he worked together with lavlinskii (both co-authored economic program “500 Days”).
In May 1991, lasin left the government to create USSR Expert Institute for Scientific
and Industrial Union (now Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs). In
1992, lasin became representative of Gaidar’s government in Duma (combined this
function with his directorship in the Expert Institute). In 1993, he was appointed the
Head of the Working Group of the Russian Government and was elected President of
Vysshaia Shkola Ekonomiki [Economic Academy]. In 1994, lasin became the Head
of Analytical Center for the Presidential Administration. From November 8, 1994 to
March 17,1997, lasin was the Minister of Economy of the RF. In 1997 lasin was
appointed to a position of a Minister without portfolio for economic issues, intemal,
and foreign investment. Currently, lasin works at the Center fo r Strategic Programs
(he is close to Illarionov, presidential economie adviser). lasin authored more than
200 scholarly publications.
Illarionov, Andrei Nikolaevich - bom in 1961 in Leningrad, 1983 graduate of
Leningrad State University (Department of Economy), 1997 graduate of Leningrad
State University Graduate School (economy of modem capitalism, Kandidat of
Economic Sciences). In 1983-1984 and 1987-1990, Illarionov worked as an Assistant
in the Department of Economics, Leningrad State University. In 1990-1992,
Illarionov was employed as a senior researcher and member of the Laboratory of
Regional Problems, St. Petersburg Financial, and Economic Institute (headed by
Sergei Vasil’ev). After Vasil’ev’s appointment as a Director of the Working Center
for Economie Reform for the Russian Government, Illarionov becomes his deputy
(until April 1993). Together with Vasil'ev, Illarionov took part in the writing of
Chemomyrdin’s [Russian Prime Minister in 1994-1997] economic program. In 1998,
he co-founded ultra-liberal social and political association Severnaia stolitsa. Since
1998, Illarionov is a member of the Governmental Commission for Economic
Reform. Illarionov is a member of the editorial board of Voprosy ekonomiki
[Economic Issues - Russian premier economic journal]. He currently serves as a
Director of the Institute of Economic Analysis, board member for Center o f Strategic
Programs, and, most importantly, as an Economic Adviser to the president of RF
(since 2000).
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Kara-Murza, Aleksei Alekseevich - bom on August 17,1956 in Moscow, 1978
graduate of Moscow State University. Philosopher, Doktor of Political Science,
Doktor of Philosophy; Professor of Political Science of Moscow State University
(since 1995), Director of the Center for Philosophic Analysis of Russian Reform
Movements (Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences), co-President of
Moscow Liberal Foundation, expert of Strategiia [Strategy] Foimdation; adviser to
the government o f the Russian Federation, Yel’tsin’s campaign adviser (1996),
member of the Union of Rightist Forces, important ideologue.
Karaganov, Sergei Aleksandrovich - bom in 1952 in Moscow. 1974 Graduate of
Moscow State University (Department of Economics), 1978 graduate of the Graduate
School of the Institute of the USA and Canada. Received degrees of Kandidat of
Economic Sciences (1979) and Doktor of Historical Sciences (1989). Karaganov
worked in the Institute of the USA and Canada (1978-1988), Institute of Europe
(1988- present), and as an official expert for the Committee for Intemational
Relations, Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Presently, Karaganov serves as a Deputy
Director of the Institute of Europe (since 1989), member of the Foreign Relations
Board, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (since 1991), member of the Presidential
Counseling Board (since 1993), member of the Consulting Board for the Security
Council of RF (since 1993), Chairman of the Committee for Foreign and Defense
Politics of RF (since 1994).
Kaspe, Sviatoslav Igorevich - bom on September 2,1968,1992 graduate of
Moscow State Pedagogical Institute. Kandidat of Political Science, Deputy Director
o f the Institute fo r Development o f Regional Education (1995-1998), chief analyst of
Russian Public Politics Center, Kandidat of Political Sciences. Kaspe is a close ally
and co-author of Salmin.
Kordonskii, Simon Gdal’evich - bom in 1944,1974 graduate of Tomsk State
University, Kandidat of Philosophy, Kordonskii describes himself as social
philosopher, biochemist, sociologist, founder of the “administrative market” theory,
and expert on commercial, state, and intemational stmctures. Permanent contributor
and member of the editorial board of Vek X X i Mir [Twentieth century and the World\
[conservative journal edited by Pavlovskii], Director General of the Center fo r Civil
Society and Private Property (1993-2000), consultant of the Foundation fo r Effective
Politics [think tank associated with Pavlovskii], Head of Presidential Counseling
Board (2000-present). Close ally of Andrei Illarionov and Gleb Pavlovskii. One of the
main contributors to Inoe.
Krasnov, M ikhail, Aleksandrovich - bom in 1949 in Moscow. 1972 graduate of
Moscow State University (Department of Law), 1997 graduate of the Graduate
School of Moscow State University (Department of Law). Doktor of Jurisprudence.
Upon graduation Krasnov worked at luridicheskaia Literatura [Legal Literature^
publishing house, later taught at All-Soviet Legal Institute and worked as a senior
researcher at the Institute of State and Law, Russian Academy o f Sciences. Since
1993, Krasnov worked as an Assistant to presidential advisers and later as
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Presidential Aid for legal issues (1995-1998). Since 1998, Krasnov also serves as a
Vice-President o f INDEM [think-tank founded by Satarov]. Krasnov is an author of
more than 60 articles and books.

Livshits, Aleksandr Yakovlevich - bom on September 6,1946 in Berlin (Germany),
1971 graduate of Moscow Institute of National Economy. Doktor of Economics,
professor. Member of presidential administration, Yeltsin’s assistant and adviser
(1992-1993,1994-1996), Minister of Finances of RF (1996-1997), Deputy Chief of
the Presidential Administration (1997-1998), representative of the government in
RAO Gazprom (the largest state-controlled monopoly) (1997-present), special
Presidential Envoy to intemational financial organizations (1999), adviser to
Stepashin’s and Putin’s governments (1999-2000).
Mau, Vladimir Aleksandrovich -member of Gaidar’s team, retumed to Gaidar’s
Institute after the latter resigned from the post of the acting Prime Minister of RF.
Currently Mau serves as a Director of the Working Center of the Governmental
Commission for Economic Reform and as a member of the Scientific Board of the
Center fo r Strategic Programs.
Nikonov, Viacheslav Alekseevich - bom in 1956 in Moscow (grandson of V. M.
Molotov), graduate of Moscow State (Department of History). Upon graduation,
Nikonov taught at MSU and Caltech. In 1989 he became USSR’s youngest Doktor of
Historical Sciences. In the late Soviet period, Nikonov worked as a senior researcher
in the Central Committee of the CPSU, Assistant to the Chief of the USSR
Presidential Administration, Assistant to Chairman of KGB. In 1993, he became a
deputy of Duma (from the pro-govemmental party PRES [Party of Russian Unity
and Accord]) and Chairman of the Intemational Security and Arms Control
Committee. After his parliamentary career, Nikonov served as a President of Politika
Foundation [conservative think tank], Klub 93, Center fo r Parliamentary Programs,
Vice-President of the Association o f Centers fo r Political Consulting (where Salmin
is a president), member of the Presidential Political Board, Presidential Human Rights
Committee, Presidential anti-Political Extremism Board, and Foreign and Defense
Policy Board. Nikonov is the author of more than 300 publications (including several
books).
Panarin, Aleksandr Sergeevich - bom on December 26,1940 in Donetsk region
(Ukraine), 1966 graduate of Moscow State University (Department of Philosophy).
Doktor of Philosophy, professor of Moscow State University (Department of
Philosophy).
Pavlovskii, Gleb Olegovich - bom in 1951 in Odessa. In 1968-1973 Pavlovskii
attended Odessa University, Department of History, but did not graduate due to
underground activities. In the 1970s, Pavlovskii was associated with Moscow
dissidents (especially Mikhail Gefter), worked as a manual worker and then became
co-editor of Svobodnyi Moskovskii Zhurnal POISKI [Search-A Free Moscow
Journal] (1978-1980). In 1982, Pavlovskii was arrested for his work as an editor of
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POISKI. After imprisonment, Pavlovskii retumed to Moscow and created Club o f
Social Initiatives [one of the first legal oppositional stmctures]. In 1989, Pavlovskii
became editor-in-chief of Vek X X i Mr> joumal and a founder of information agency
Postfactum. Since 1995, Pavlovskii served as one of the directors of the Foundation
fo r Effective Politics, member of the Strategic Programs Center [think tank for the
Government of RF], Adviser to the Presidential Administration (since 1996), and
editor-in-chief of Russkii Zhurnal and Strana.ru.

Salmin, Aleksei Mikhailovich - bom on Febmary 18,1951 in Kazan'. 1973 graduate
of Moscow State Institute of Intemational Relations. Doktor of History, professor and
head of the department in the Institute of Politics, RAN (1992), analyst of Conrad
Adenaer Foundation, member of the Presidential Counseling Board (1994-1997),
President of Russian Public Politics Center, President o f the Association o f Centers
fo r Political Consulting.
Satarov, Georgii Aleksandrovich - bom on August 22,1947 in Moscow; 1972
graduate of Moscow State Pedagogical Institute. Kandidat of Technical Sciences,
presidential assistant and aid for Intemal Issues and Relations with Parliament (19931997). Since 1997, Satarov serves as a President of INDEM exid a Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Russian Credit Bank.
Shakhrai, Sergei Mikhailovich - bom in 1956 in Simferopol, 1978 graduate of
Rostov State University and 1982 graduate of the Graduate school (legal studies) at
Moscow State University. In 1987-1990, Shakhrai worked as a head of Laboratory of
Legal Information, Moscow State University. Shakhrai was deputy of RSFSR
Supreme Soviet (1990-1992), State Adviser of RF for legal issues (1991-1992),
Deputy Prime Minister of RF (1992-1993,1994), member of Duma (1993-1995,
1995-1996), leader of PRES, Minister for National Issues and Regional Politics
(1993-1994), Presidential Representative in Constitutional Court (1996 - 1998).
Shokhin, Aleksandr Nikolaevich - 1974 graduate of Moscow State University
(Department of Economics), Doktor of Economics. Upon graduation Shokhin served
as a Director of the Laboratory at the Central Institute of Eeonomic Mathematics and
Institute for Eeonomic Forecasting, Russian Academy of Sciences (1974-1987),
Assistant to Eduard Shevamadze, USSR Foreign Minister (1987-1991), Deputy
Prime Minister of RF, Minister of Labor and Economy (1991-1994, briefly in 1998),
member of Duma (1993 -1999), leader of the pro-govemmental political party NDR
[Our Home is Russia].
Smirniagin, Leonid Viktorovich - Kandidat of Geographical Sciences, associate
professor of Geography (Department of Geography, Moscow State University),
member of Presidential Counseling Board (1993-1997), specialist on federalism,
political geography o f Russia and the US.
Sobchak, Anatolii Aleksandrovich - bom on August 10, 1937 in Chita, 1959
graduate of Leningrad State University (Law School). Doktor of Jurispmdence,
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lawyer, one of the founders of democratic movement during the late Perestroika
period, Mayor of St. Petersburg (1991-1996), member of the Presidential Counseling
Board (1993).

Uliukaev, Aleksei Alekseevich- graduate of Moscow State University and its
Graduate School (Department of Economy). Doktor of Economic Sciences. From
1982-1988, Uliukaev worked in the Engineering and Construction Institute, then
became a journalist. In 1991-1994, Uliukaev worked as a consultant for the
Government of RF. In 1994-1996, he became Deputy Director of the Institute of the
Problems of the Transitional Period [Gaidar’s Institute]. In 1996, he was elected a
deputy of the Moscow City Council. In 1998, he retumed to Gaidar's Institute as a
Deputy Director. In 1998, Uliukaev foimded Otkrytaia Politika [Open Politics^
journal. Since June of 2000 Uliukaev is Deputy Minister of Finances. Uliukaev
authored more than 300 articles and five books.
Vasil’ev, Sergei Aleksandrovich - bom on June 8,1957 in Leningrad, 1979
graduate of Leningrad Institute of Economy and Finances. Director of the Working
Center of the Governmental Commission for Economic Reform (1991-1994), Deputy
Minister of Economy (1994-1997), deputy chief of government’s administration
(1997-1998).
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APPENDIX D

List of Synonyms of Textual Indicators for the Russian Phase of Content Analysis

Categories
1.
Democracy

Textual
Indicators
Separation of
powers and checks
and balances
Parliamentarism

Popular
sovereignty
Multipartism

Constitutionality
Political equality
of citizens
Civil society

Free media
Federalism

2.
Authoritaria
nism

Accountability and
responsiveness of
government
Monopoly of
power, no checks
and balances
Presidentialism
Alternatives to
elections

Synonyms
Horizontal decentralization, independent
judiciary

Parliamentary republic, parliament elects
government, stronger role of parliament
Meaningful elections, meaningful choice,
competitive representation, possibility to recall
deputies
Presence of [various] parties, active,
uncontrolled opposition, including Communists,
political pluralism, protection of minorities,
political competition
Symmetrical federation (no special treaties with
federal subjects), actions according to legislation

Grassroots, popular participation, popular
control over politicians, volunteer associations,
active citizenry
Ability to criticize the politicians, media can
have a different opinion
Clearly demarcated rights of the Center and
regions, strong regions mean strong center,
independence of regions
Glasnost’, critique of government

Concentration of power, personal dictatorship,
administrative command system, bureaucratic
oligarchy, concentration of power in one branch,
conflicts between branches
Strong executive branch
Descriptive representation, party/experts
know(s) will of people, formal elections, elite
agreement, possibility to buy elections
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One-party system,
structured partysystem

Controlled opposition, two-party system

Political
expediency

There are circumstances when the Constitution
can be superseded, decreeim, asymmetrical
federal relations, federal relations equal personal
relations between center and regions
(clientilism), relations based on political
ideology, political reasons, demonstration
democracy
Some categories should not participate in
politics, economic inequality translates into
political inequality, financial capital decides,
pressure groups
Control over media, information wars,
ideological control, media to inform about the
government
Super-centralization of state, unitarism, absence
of clearly demarcated state and federal
prerogatives, need to create more offices
representing center, increase in Center’s power,
strong center means weak regions, vertical
centralization, vertical power
Inability to publicly criticize the leaders

Political inequality
of citizens

State-controlled
media
Unitary state

3.
Ideological
Liberalism

Insulation of
government
Rights and
freedoms of
individuals are
natural
Civil (negative)
liberties
Liberal values

Right to life, property, happiness, selfrealization, safety, human rights

Freedom of speech, movement, assembly, belief,
choice, freedom from
Modem values, activism, tolerance, legal
resolution of conflict, achievement,
independence, reason, individual responsibility
for individual’s destiny, values of middle class,
personal dignity, rationality, choice
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State is for the
citizens, rights of
the individuals are
supreme

State is to protect citizens, state is a house, state
functions are to provide physical safety (law and
order, defense) and institutional
structures/environment for self-realization of
citizens, state well-being = population well
being, independence of the individual from
society/state, national interests are interests of
the society, democratic stateness, liberal
stateness, presumption of iimocence, state and
society’s interests may be different, minimalist
understanding of the state
Small and
Democratic (social) control over repressive
effective state
apparatus, political independence of repressive
apparatus
apparatus, professional army, to combat crime is
to combat its reasons (economic, legal), decrease
in state apparatus, scaling down
Respect for
Institutionalization of conflict, state cannot
difference and
decide what interest are not worthy, individual
conflict of interests autonomy
Rule of law,
impartiality of law

4.
Ideological
Conservatis
m/Statism

Rights are given
by the community

Social (positive)
freedoms
Conservative
values
State’s interests
are superior

Equality of citizens before the law, respect for
law, contract, private property, universality of
law application, legal means of conflict
resolution.
Group membership and entitlements, belonging
to a specific class, group as basis of identity,
dependence on community for protection, pride
for the community
Right to work, health, protection against sickness
and old age, freedom to, not just rights, but
responsibilities
Traditional values, ascription, solidarity,
undifferentiation, collectivism, faith,
irrationality, spirituality, instinct, feelings
State can violate freedoms and human rights,
raison d’etat, national interests are interests of
the state, stability to strengthen the state and its
government, state power is sacred, moral,
spiritual basis of state, state integrity is more
important than human life, law and order for
empowering the state, maximalist understanding
of the state
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Strong repressive
state apparatus,
law and order

Unity of interests,
social harmony,
unity
Selective
application of law

5. Free
Market
Economie
Model

Market as
principle agent of
economic decision
making, absence
or small
involvement of
state in economy
Weak social
protection

Economic justice

Low taxes

Balanced budget

Support for police, military and secret service,
dictatorship of law, safety, increase in state’s
muscles, repressive state apparatus knows bow
to protect the citizens, to combat crime is to
combat its consequences (tougher punishment),
increase in state apparatus
Common good, social accord, consolidation of
society, national agreement

Rule of force or economic might, force as
method of conflict resolution, privileges of
statesman and politicians, arbitrary application
of law (NTV vs. the other channels), arbitrary
decisions, appellation to power, state, “shadowy”
justice, law, state does not obey its own laws,
elientilism
Economic decentralization, deregulation,
liberalization of the economy, private
investments, state to minimize risks and
uncertainty for market and to provide monetary
policy, weak social protection and control over
monopolies
Marketization of social sphere, paid medicine,
private pensions, payments for utilities, meanstested programs, address support, selective
support, liberal model of welfare, creation of
work places instead of individual social
guarantees, development of private pension
funds, insurance companies, minimization of
state social burden
Aecording to final result, efficiency, state
support of only competitive industries
(technology-intensive, science), bankruptey,
proportional justice, equality of opportunity
Absence of tax exemptions, decrease in state
expenditures, decrease in number of taxes, flat
rate taxes
Revenues not exceed expenditures,
absence/decrease of budget deficit
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Private property,
voucher
privatization

Strict monetary
policy

Liberalization of
foreign trade

Price liberalization
Competition,
structural reform
as a consequence
of market

Universal
economic
development

Privatization by the producers, real people (not
by the state and agents), decrease/elimination of
state share in property, voucher privatization,
free privatization, auctions, privatization
controlled by market, priority of private
property, including private property on land,
high speed of privatization, protection of
ownership rights
No printing of money for social programs or
maintenance of production capacity, antiinflationary measures, no increase in salaries,
real money, real investment, strong currency,
supported by real goods, no indexation, strict
regulation of money mass
Comparative advantage, open borders, low
tariffs, deregulation of foreign trade, free
exchange rate, absence of import quotas,
transparent customs, foreign trade openness,
open economy, gradual reduction of import
tariffs
State is not responsible for prices, price
deregulation
Anti-monopolism, survival of the fittest, equality
of opportunity, leveled paying field, regulation
of monopolies, open competition, demonopolization, state investments only in
objects of social infrastructure, which is
neglected by the market
American/Westem/IMF model, shock therapy,
Russian economy is not imique, legacies do not
matter, or are not serious, economy reacts the
same, liberalization first, then privatization and
de-monopolization (synonym of rapid, shock
reform)
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6. Governed
Market
Economic
Model

State to help the
market, state
regulates economy

Strong social
protection

Social justice

Higher taxes
Possibility of
budget deficit
Alternative
ownership
(partially state or
collective)

Union of bureaucracy and industrialists,
domination of bureaucracy, state-led
industrialization, state capitalism, semi-liberal
economics, state plarming, state regulation, state
control over the structure of economy,
paternalism, reform by state muscles, derigeste,
state interference, social market, preservation of
state sector, mixed economy, active state
regulation of the economy, including price
regulation (on strategic and consumer goods),
state purchases of produced goods, support of
industries and science, tax exemptions, strong
social protection
Social suffering, stratification, poverty, himger,
homelessness, welfare, protection of all who
needs it, Keynesian economics, state protection,
universal benefits, state is responsible for a
certain level of social well-being for everybody,
including pensions, and compensation to bring
income to the living minimum, state pensions
and social security, conservative form of welfare
state
According to labor, inputs, support of ineffective
industries (defense, agriculture, energy sector),
equality of results, equal justice, just
redistribution
State revenues, increase in state expenditures,
increase in number of taxes
Reduction of budgetary deficit is not an end in
itself
Nationalization, state-controlled privatization,
preservation of state property, state’s share in
privatized enterprises, necessity to have state
commissioner to supervise privatization, paid
privatization, where revenues go to the state,
privatization that takes into account interests of
workers (working collectives), mixed types of
property, high share of state ownership,
especially in basic industries, high share of
worker collectives, self-management, limitations
on land ownership, ban on land sales

416

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Soft monetary
policy (non
monetary
economic
leverages)
Protectionism

Price control
Competition can
be distorted within
the social pact,
social contract
(active structural
involvement of the
state in microeconomic policy)

Specific economic
development

7. ProWestern
Foreign
Policy

Possibility to print money, special credits,
subsidies, emission, increase in salaries and
pensions, paper investments, state control over
monetary process, GKOs, inflation
High import tariffs, fixed exchange rate,
protection of domestic producers and market,
support of exporters, application of quotes for
export and import
Price fi-eeze, graduate price liberalization, price
regulation, indexation
Some interests are more important than others,
state decides, natural monopolies, selective
support of priority industries, financial
exemptions to priority industries, industrial and
financial corporations under state patronage,
support of production, corporatism, lobbism,
special conditions for priority industries, state as
a purchaser of production, development of
technology and science-intensive production by
the state, state investments
Russian economic path/model, Russia is unique,
its legacies matter, its previous ideology matters,
third path (Scandinavian model, Prussian
model), gradual reform (privatization first, then
liberalization of prices), nationally specific
reform

Relations with the
West

Part of the West (at least as a raw material
supplier), or part of the modem global order,
need to make alliance with the West, US, all
democratic and economically prosperous states

Uni-polarity,
mono-centric
intemational
relations

Atlantism, Americanism, Russia as a passive
partner of the West
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“Idealistic”
intemational
relations

Decrease in
military and
defense spending
for foreign
protection
Russians abroad
are on their own
Future of the
USSR - economic
(functional)
integration
8.
Independent
or AntiWestern
Foreign
Policy

Relationship with
the East and South

Multi-polarity,
polycentric
intemational
relations
Realist
intemational
relations

Democracies do not go to war with each other,
the only conflict is economic, intemal threats to
sovereignty (economic decline leads to Russia’s
becoming raw materials’ colony, inability to
strengthen border invites economic penetration),
wars are only justified against imdemocratic
regimes or in self-defense, intemational
organizations are for cooperation, there are
larger ideals than national interests (human
rights, democracy), NATO expansion, START
II, integration in the EU, WTO, other westem
organizations, Westem investments

Eeonomic integration with the former republics,
moderate integration: first economie
cooperation, then creation of political
institutions, gradual integration, gradual union
with Beloms
Russia is part of Eurasia, unique, part of the
East, part of the South, alliances with
undemocratic and poor states

Heterogeneous world, plurality of the
polycentricity, Europe-centric vision, Russia as a
pole, Russia as an active partner of the West
Military conflict with the West, conflict over
spheres of interest, Kosovo, Iraq, SDI, protection
and expansion of the territory, extemal threats to
sovereignty, wars are inevitable, contentment,
intemational organizations are to forward
national interests, national interests, balance of
power, export of arms, NATO in its Cold War
form, freeze on arms control treaties, fluid
alliances for national interests, UN’s Security
Council
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Increase in
military spending
for foreign
protection
Protection of
Russians abroad
Return to the
U S S R -based on
political, statist,
arguments
9. Ethnic
Tolerance

Ethnic equality

Peaceful solutions
to ethnic conflicts
Global values

10. Ethnic
Nationalism

Ethnic inequality

Military solutions
to ethnic problems
National values,
national ideas

USSR = prestige, respect, easier life, imperial
foreign policy, radical integration; first political,
then economic integration, military re
incorporation of the former Soviet republics,
quick realization of Russian-Belorussian Union.
All religions, nations are good, ethnic tolerance,
multi-confessionalism, multiethnic state,
extemal reasons for ethnic conflict (not the
characteristics of an ethnic group), civic
nationalism, cooperation and friendship between
different ethnic groups
Khasavyurt, cultural autonomy and
development, economic pressures, negotiations
Consumerism, religion of humanity, democracy
as a value, market as a value, westem values,
human values, universal values, modemization,
patriotism = democracy and freedom
Ethnic groups are different, Islam, Caucasians,
Jews, intemal reasons for ethnic conflict
(characteristics of ethnic group), ethnic
nationalism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, Arian
ideology, domination of one group over another
War in Chechnya/military operations, ethnic
assimilation
Patriotism, Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Russian
uniqueness, Russian pride, Russian values,
Russian cultural path, Russian morality,
traditions, history, religion are the foundation of
Russian state, sobomost', collectivism,
togethemess, monarchy, patriotism = national
revival
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APPENDIX E
Sources Analyzed During the Russian Phase of Content Analysis^^*
Aleksashenko, S., et al. Edinstvo reformy i reformy edinstva [Unity o f Reforms and
Reforms o f Unity]. Moscow: n.p., 1992.
Bunin, I. M. “Rossiia za polgoda do vyborov: rasklad politicheskikh sil” [“Russia
Half a Year Before the Elections: Balance of Political Forces”]. Politiia 2
(1999): 183-213.
________ . “Novye russkie predprinimateli” [“New Russian Entrepreneurs”]. In
Biznesmeny v Rossii: sorok istorii uspekha [Businessmen o f Russia: Forty
Success Stories]. Moscow: n.p., 1994.
Bunin, I. M., and B. I. Makarenko. “Vmesto predisloviia” [“In Place of Foreword”].
In Politicheskie protsessy v regionakh Rossii [Political Processes in Russian
Regions]. Moscow: n.p., 1998a.
________ an d ________ . “Politicheskie partii: ispytanie vyborami” [“Political
Parties: Challenge of Elections”]. In Formirovanie partiino-politicheskoi
systemy v Rossii [Formation o f Party and Political Systems in Russia]. Edited
by Michael MacFaul, Sergei Markov, and Andrei Riabov. Moscow: n.p.,
1998b.
Bunin, I. M., B. I. Makarenko and A. V. Markin. “KremF i gubematory: pervye itogi
federal’noi reformy” [“Kremlin and the Governors: First Assessment of
Federal Reform”]. Politiia 3 (2000): 55-66.
Burbulis, G. E. Stanovlenie novoi rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti: real ’nost ’ i
perspektivy [Development o f New Russian Stateness: Reality and Prospects].
Moscow: URSS, 1996.
________ . Professiia - politik [Profession - Politician]. Moscow: Strategiia, 1999.*
Chernyshov, Sergei. “Porog istorii” [Threshold of History”]. In Inoe: Rossiia kak
predmet [Other: Russia as an Object]. Vol. 1. Moscow: Argus, 1995a.
_______ . “Vek transformatsii vlasti” [“Century of the Power Transformation”]. In
Inoe: Rossiia kak sub ’ekt [Other: Russia as a Subject]. Vol. 2. Moscow:
Argus, 1995b.
Chubais, A. B., et al. Privatizatsiiapo-rossiiski [Privatization: Russian Style].
Moscow: Vagrius, 2000.
Dugin, A. G. “Misterii Yevrazii” [“Mysteries of Eurasia”]. In Absolutnaia rodina
[Absolute Motherland]. Moscow: Arktogeia-Tsentr, 1999a.
________ . “Preodoleniie Zapada: esse o Nikolae Sergeeviche Trubetskom”
[“Resistance of the West: Essay About Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoi”]. In
Nasiedie Chingiz-khana [Legacy o f Genghis-Khan]. Moscow: Agraf, 1999b.
Gaidar,Ye. T. “Vybor. Poslesloviie k knige Mau, Ekonomika i vla st'... [“Choice.
Commentary to V. Man’s Economy and Power...”], V.A. Mau. Ekonomika i
vlast’:politicheskaia istoriia ekonomicheskoi reformy v Rossii v 1985-1994

Some o f the sources contained multiple interviews or articles. In such cases, only the major title is
listed. Works containing multiple sources are delineated by asterisk (*). The total count o f sources
analyzed is 251.
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gg. [Economy and Power: Political History o f Economic Reforms in Russia in
1984-1995]. Introduction. Moscow: Delo Ltd., 1995a.
. Sdelai razumnyi vybor: zapiski iz zala [Make a Rational Choice:
Questions from the Audience]. Moscow: Yevraziia, 1995b.
. Sdielai razumnyi vybor: besedy s izbirateliami [Make a Rational Choice:
Conversations with the Voters]. Moscow: Yevraziia, 1995c.
. Sobranie sochinenii [Collected Works]. 2 volumes. Moscow: Yevraziia,
1997.*
Gaidar, Ye. T. et al. Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda [Economy o f the Transitional
(chapters by Gaidar and Mau). Moscow: n.p., 1998.*
lasin, Ye. G. Kakpodniat ekonomiku Rossiil [How Can We Rebuild the Russian
Economy?] Moscow: Vita-Press, 1996.
lasin, Ye., et al. Regiony Rossii vperekhodnyiperiod [Russian Regions in the
Transitional Period] .Moscow: n.p., 1993a.
________ . Reformy po Gaidaru: 500 dnei spustia [Reforms According to Gaidar: 500
Days Later]. Moscow: n.p., 1993b.
________ . Rossiia i sotsial’noe partnerstvo [Russia and Social Partnership].
Moscow: n.p., 1993c.
Illarionov, A. N. Finansovaia stabilizatsiia v Rossii [Financial Stabilization in
Russia]. Moscow: Progress-Akademiia, 1995.
Kara-Murza, A.A. “Mezhdu Yevraziei i Aziopoi” [“Between Eurasia and Asiope”].
In Inoe: Rossiia kak idea [Other: Russia as an Idea]. Vol. 3. Moscow: Argus,
1995a.
_______ . “Rossiia v treugol’nike ‘etnokratiia - impieriia - natsiia’ ” [“Russia in a
Triangle Ethnocracy -Empire - Nation”]. In Inoe: Rossiia kak sub ’ekt [Other:
Russia as a Subject]. Vol. 2. Moscow: Argus, 1995b.
________ . “Krizis identichnosti v sovremermoi Rossii: vozmozhnosti preodoleniia”
[“Crisis of Identity in Contemporary Russia: Opportunities for Its
Elimination”]. In Reformatorskie tseli sotsial’nogo razvitiia Rossii [Reformist
Goals o f the Social Development o f Russia]. Moscow: n.p., 1998a.
________ . “Rossiiskaia politicheskaia kuTtura i problemy stanovleniia partiinogo
pliuralizma” [“Russian Political Culture and Problems of Party Pluralism”].
In Formirovanie partiino-politicheskoi systemy v Rossii [Formation o f Party
and Political Systems in Russia]. Edited by Michael MacFaul, Sergei Markov,
and Andrei Riahov, Moscow: n.p., 1998b.
Karaganov, S. A. Bezopasnost’ budushchei Yevropy [Securityfo r Future Europe].
Moscow: Nauka, 1993.
________ .“Perspektivy razviitiia federalizma v Rossii” [“Prospects of Federalism in
Russia]. In Strategiia dlia Rossii: povestka dnia dliaprezidenta-2000
[Strategy fo r Russia: Agenda fo r President-2000]. Moscow: Vagrius, 2000.
________ . “Rossiiskaia vneshniaia politika pered vyzyvami XXI veka” [“Russian
Foreign Policy and the Challenges of the 21®* Century”]. In Strategiia dlia
Rossii: povestka dnia dlia prezidenta-2000 [Strategy fo r Russia: Agenda fo r
President-2000]. Moscow: Vagrius, 2000.
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Kaspe, S. I. “Democraticheskie shansy i etnopoliticheskie riski v sovremennoi
Rossii” [“Democratic Chances and Ethno-Political Risks in Contemporary
Russia”]. Polls 2 (1999): 32-43.
________ . “Podvodnye kamni ratsional’nosti” [“Undercurrents of Rationality”].
Politiia 1 (2000): 16-17.
________ . “Konstruirovaf federatsiiu - renovatio imperii kak metod sotsial’noi
inzhenerii” [“To Construct a Federation - Renovatio Emperii As a Method of
Social Engineering”]. Polis 5 (2000): 55-70.
Kaspe, S. I. and A. I. Petrakovskii, “Administrativnye i informatsionnye resursy v
kontekste vyborov-99” [“Administrative and Information Resources in the
Context of the 1999 Elections”]. Politiia 2 (2000): 5-29.
Kaspe, S. I. and A. M. Salmin. “Grazhdane—eliektorat - fraktsii: preobrazovaniia
politicheskikh mnenii na vyborahk v Gosudarstvermuiu Dumu Rossiiskoi
Federatsii V 1993,1995 i 1999 gg.” [“Citizens - Electors—Fractions:
Transformation of Political Opinions During the Elections to the State
Duma”]. Politiia 4 (1999): 123-153.
________ an d ________ _. “Izmereniia svobody: parlamentskii elektoral’nyi protsess
V postsovetskoi Rossii” [“Dimensions of Freedom: Parliamentary Electoral
Process in post-Soviet Russia”]. Politiia 3 (2000): 5-54.
Kordonskii, S. “Postperestroechnoe prostranstvo: Transformatsiia administrativnogo
rynka” [“Post-Perestroika Space: Transformation of Administrative Market”].
In Inoe: Rossiia kakpiedmet [Other: Russia as Object]. Vol. 1. Moscow:
Argus, 1995.
________ . “Eksperty” [“Experts”]. Interview with A. Levkin, http://www/smi.ru, 23
March 2000.
________ . ”1987-1997: ''Per Aspera in Anum: zametki fenologa” [“1987-1997: "Per
Aspera in Anum: Notes of the Phenologist”]. Russkii Zhurnal.
http://www.russ.ru, 25 March 2001.
________ . “V 'real’nosti' i 'na samom dele'” [“In 'Reality' and In 'Actuality'”]. Russkii
Zhurnal. http://www.russ.ru, 12 April 2000.
‘Otryvochnye vpechatleniia ot chteniia statii B. L’vina “O nekotorykh
problemakh rossiiskikh reform v period posle prezidentskikh vyborov"
[“Sketchy Thoughts About ‘Some Reflections On Russian Reforms After
Presidential Elections’ by B. L’vin”]. http://www.sapov.ru/novoe/00-49.htm,
15 Jime 2000.
Kosmarskii, V. A. and A. N. Shokhin. “Nalogovaia systema: istoriia problemy,
perspektivy” [“Tax System: History of the Problem and Prospects”], In
Sotsial ’nye orientiry meniaiushchegosia obshchestva [Social Coordinates o f
the Changing Society]. Moscow: n.p., 1993.
Krasnov, Mikhail. Kletka dla vlasti [Birdcage fo r the State]. Moscow: n.p., 1997.*
Krasnov, M. A., G. A. Satarov, and S.M. Shakhrai. “O Konstitutsiormoi reforme”
[“On Constitutional Reform”]. In Strategiia dlia Rossii: povestka dnia dlia
prezidenta-2000 [Strategy fo r Russia: Agenda fo r President-2000]. Moscow:
Vagrius, 2000.
Kuz’minov, A. la., S. A.Karaganov, et al. “Rossiiskaia ekonomika: strategicheskie
prioritety” [“Russian Economy: Strategic Priorities”]. In Strategiia dlia
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Rossii: povestka dnia dlia prezidenta-2000 {Strategy fo r Russia: Agenda for
President-2000]. Moscow: Vagrius, 2000.
Livshits, A. Ya. Ekonomicheskaia reforma v Rossii i ee tsena [Economic Reform in
Russia and Its Cost]. Moscow: Kul’tura, 1994.
________ . “Ekonomicheskaia stabil’nosf v Rossii: prognozy i real’nost’ ”
[“Economic Stability in Russia: Forecast and Reality”]. In Tsentral’naia
Rossiia na rubezhe XXI veka [Central Russia on the Eve o f the 2E ‘ Century].
Vol. 2. Orel: n.p., 1996.
Mau, V. A. Ekonomika i vlast’: politicheskaia istoriia ekonomicheskoi reformy v
Rossii, 1985-1994 gg. [Economy and Power: Political History o f Economic
Reforms in Russia in 1985-1994]. Moscow: Delo Ltd., 1995.
________ . Ekonomicheskaia reforma: skvoz’prizmu konstitutsii i politiki [Economic
Reform: A View Through The Prism o f Constitution and Politics]. Moscow:
AdMarginem, 1999.
Nikonov, V. A. Epokha peremen: Rossiia 90-yhk glazami konservatora [Epoch o f
Changes: Russia Through the Eyes o f a Conservative]. Moscow: lazyki
russkoi kul’tury, 1999.*
Panarin, A. S. “K rekonstruktsii Vtorogo Mira” [“Toward the Reconstruction of the
Second World”]. In Inoe: Rossiia kak sub ’ekt [Other: Russia as a Subject].
Vol. 2. Moscow: Argus, 1995.
_______ . “Predprinimatiel'stvo na rubezhe kul’tur” [“Entrepreneurship on the Border
of Cultures”]. In K u l’tura rossiiskogo predprinimatel'stva [Culture o f Russian
Entrepreneurship]. Moscow: n.p., 1997a.
_______ . “Rossiiskaia kul’tura kak faktor planetamoi reformatsii’ [“Russian Culture
as a Factor of Planetary Reformation”]. In Kul ’tura i ekologiia: poisk putei
stanovleniia novoi etiki [Culture and Ecology: Search fo r the Direction o f
Development o f New Ethics]. Edited by Ye. R. Melkumova. Moscow:
Intellekt, 1997b.
. “Rossiiskaia politicheskaia kul’tura na poroge XXI veka” [“Russian
Political Culture on the Eve of the 21®* Century”]. In Zapad-Rossiia:
kuTturnaia traditsiia i modelipovedeniia [West-Russia: Cultural Tradition
and Models o f Behavior]. Moscow: n.p., 1998.
. Rossiia v tsiklakh mirovoi istorii [Russia in Cycles o f World History].
Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1999.
Pavlovskii, Gleb. “Slepoe piatno (Svedeniia o belovezhskikh liudiakh)” [“Blind Spot
(Information About Belovezhskaia Pushcha People)”]. In Inoe: Rossiia kak
idea [The Other: Russia as an Idea]. Vol. 3. Moscow: Argus, 1995.
________ . “Do prezidentskikh vyborov - bol'she goda” [“Presidential Elections Will
Take Place in More Than A Year”]. Komsomol'skaia Pravda 110,18 Jime
1999.
________ . “Politologi negativno otsenivaiut reshenie prezidenta” [“Political Pundits
See the President’s Decision Negatively”]. Nezavisimaia Gazeta 145,10
August 1999.
. Interview to FeA: newspaper, 13 August 1999.
. “Elektorat OVR stal rassypatsia” [“OVR Electorate Started to
Disintegrate”]. Vedomosti 50,16 November 1999.

423

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

‘Kto stoit za pobedoi Edinstva - prem’er ili polittekhnologi?” [“Who Is
Behind the Unity’s Victory - Prime Minister or Political Technologists?”].
NTV, Glas Naroda, 21 December 1999.
. “O literature, intemete i budushchem” [“About Literature, Internet and the
Future”]. Russkii Zhurnal, 12 January 2000.
. “Vladimir Putin kak glavnyi pretendent na prezidentskii post” [“Putin As
the Main Candidate for Presidency”]. TV-6, Mesto vstrechi, 14 January 2000.
. “Rossiia liubit voevat’? Vran’e!” [“Does Russia Like to Fight? No, This Is
a Lie!”]. Novaia Gazeta 3, 24-30 January 2000.
. “Tainyi sovetnik Kremlia” [“Secret Adviser to Kremlin”]. Argumenty i
Fakty 5, 02 February 2000.
. “Koldun V Kremle” [“Sorcerer in Kremlin”]. Novoe Vremia 12,26 March
2000 .
. “Oligarkhov razgoniat, a gubematorov ‘postroiat’ ” [“Oligarchs Will Be
Dismissed and Governors Will Be Disciplined”]. Delovye Liudi 109,29 April
2000 .
. “Gotova li rossiiskaia ekonomika k privlecheniiu krupnykh inostrannykh
investitsii? [“Is Russian Economy Ready for Large Investments?”] NGPolitekonomiia 8, 23 May 2000.
. “’la pishu tebe v al’bom....’ Partiia vlasti Borisa Berezovskogo vykhodit
iz bloka s narodnym dvizheniem Vladimira Putina” [“’1 am Writing in Your
Album... ’ Party of Power Led by Berezovskii Leaves the Mass Movement of
Vladimir Putin”]. Nezavisimaia Gazeta 100, 02 Jrme 2000.
. “Esli TsSR ne budet, ego pridetsia sozdavat’ zanovo. Gleb Pavlovskii
predlagaet prevratit’ tsentr v russkuiu korporatsiiu Rand” [“Even If TsSR
(Center for Strategic Development) Did Not Exist, It Should Have Been
Created. Gleb Pavlovskii Proposes to Make the Center Into Russian RAND
Corporation”]. Segodnia 121, 06 Jxme 2000.
. “Putin ishchet ‘instrument’” [“Putin Searches for a Tool”]. Segodnia 128,
16 June 2000.
. “V ch’ikh interesakh zheleznyi poriadok?”[“Who Is Interested in the Iron
Hand?”]. Argumenty i Fakty 26, 28 June 2000.
. “Rossiiu legko rasskrutit’ na revolutsiiu” [“Russia Is Easily Manipulated
Into the Revolution”]. Kommersant-Vlast’ 26, 04 July 2000.
. “Spor o gosudarstvermom ustroistve Rossii” [“Discussion Regarding the
Russian State”]. ORT, Vremia, 09 July 2000.
. “Biznes dachnoi oppozitsii. Tsifry kak pravilo ne instrument” [“Business
of Dacha Opposition. Usually, Numbers Are Not the Tool”]. Nezavisimaia
Gazeta 127, 12 July 2000.
. “Putin d olzh en zn at’ k ogda skom andovat' ‘K n o g e ’” [“Putin N e e d s to

Know When to Say ‘Heel’”]. Sobesednik 28,20 July 2000.
. “Berezovskii - izvestnyi pirat” [“Berezovskii Is a Famous Pirate”].
Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 26 July 2000.
. “Zhertvy uekhavshego tsirka. Segodnia vne igry prakticheski vse
politicheskie lidery” [“Victims of the Traveling Circus. Today Practically All
Political Leaders Are Out of the Game”]. Segodnia 170, 04 August 2000.

424

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. “Neobhodima srochnaia rotatsiia sostava politicheskikh igrokov” [“We
Need the Urgent Rotation of Political Players”]. Russkii Zhurnal, 24 August
2000 .
. “Svoboda slova ostanetsia” [“Freedom of Speech Will Stay”].
Nezavisimaia Gazeta 166, 05 September 2000.
. “Rossiiskaia destruktivnost’, samaia destruktivnaia v mire” [“Russian
Destructiveness Is the Most Destructive in the World”]. Izvestiia 175,16
September 2000.
. “Svoboda slova dlia bol'shikh deneg” [“Freedom of Press for Big
Money”]. Parlamentskaia Gazeta, 29 September 2000.
. “Informatsionnaia doktrina Gleba Pavlovskogo” [“Informational Doctrine
of Gleb Pavlovskii”]. http://www.strana.ru, 24 October 2000.
. “TseF blizka - vosstanovlennaia suverennaia federatsiia” [“The Goal of
Restored Federation Is Near”], http://www.strana.ru, 15 November 2000.
. “Proshchai, Beloviezh’e! KremP vziat' silami bol'shinstva. Grazhdanskaia
voina zakonchena” [“Farewell, Belovezhskaia Pusheha. Kremlin is Taken By
the Majority. Civil War is Over”], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 09 December 2000.
. “Armiia vne konkurentsii” [“Army is Without Competition”]. Granitsa
Rossii 46,21 December 2000.
. "‘VekXX i Mir. Uranovyi mogil'nik russkoi intelligentsii” [''VekXX i Mir:
Uranium Burial Site of Russian Intelligentsiia”]. Russkii Zhurnal, 17 January
2001 .
. “Igra idet na vytesnenie Rossii iz Yevropy” [“The Point of the Game Is To
Push Russia Out of Europe”], http://www.smi.ru, 19 January 2001.
. “Prezident Rossii ne budet ni o chem prosit' Soedinennye Shtaty Ameriki”
[“The President of the Russian Federation Will Not Ask USA For Anything”].
http://www.strana.ru, 19 January 2001.
. “Dolzhnik, no ne prositeP. U Putina net programmy nastupleniia na
zemnoi shar” [“Debtor, But Not a Begger. Putin Does Not Have a Plan for
Global Expansion”]. Segodnia 15, 23 January 2001.
. “Kto ne planiruet politiku, tot proigryvaet” [“He Who Does Not Plan
Politics Always Loses”]. Rossiiskaia Gazeta 29,10 February 2001.
. “Gefter, vlasP i slepye liudi” [Gefter, State, and the Blind People”].
Russkii Zhurnal, 15 February 2001.
. “Rossiia obretaet sebia” [“Russia Acquires Itself’]. Krasnaia Zvezda 43, 6
March 2001.
. “Putin vozvrashchaet natsionalnye interesy Rossii v Yevropu” [“Putin
Returns Russian National Interests to Europe”], http://www.strana.ru, 22
March 2001.
. Interview. RTR, Podrobnosti, 26 March 2001.
. “SSSShA? USSA? Amerika v sovetskom prostranstve ekspansii”
[“USSSA? UASSR? America in the Soviet Expansion Space”]. Nezavisimaia
Gazeta 53, 27 March 2001.
. “V tsentre vnimaniia kadrovye naznacheniia prezidenta” [“President’s
Personnel Changes Are In the Focus of Attention”]. Maiak, 28 March 2001.

425

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. “Meniaetsia kontseptsiia pravitel'stva, integriruetsia ispolnitel'naia vlasf
[“The Concept of Government Is Changing; Executive Branch is
Integrating”], http://www.strana.ru, 29 March 2001.
. “Reorganizatsiia pravitel'stva na etom ne zakanchivaetsia”
[“Reorganization o f Government Will Not Stop Here”]. Rossiia 55, 29 March
2000 .
. “Sistema predstavlena v litsakh” [“The System Is Represented by Its
Personalities”]. Vek 13, 30 March 2001.
. “V rezuTtate sdelki Gusinskii-Tumer u nas voznikaet professionalnyi
amerikanskii kanal veshchiaiushchii na russkom iazyke” [“As a Result of
Gusinskii-Tumer Deal We Will Have Professional American Channel
Broadcasting in Russian”], http://www.strana.ra, 4 April 2001.
. “Tam, gde dolzhno byt’ obshchestvo ziiaiet dyra” [“Instead of Society We
Have a Hole”], http://www.strana.ru, 13 April 2001.
. “Ostanovif liberaTnuiu revolutsiiu” [“Stop the Liberal Revolution”].
Zavtra 19, 8 May 2001.
. “Putin sputal Amerike vse karty” [“Putin Took the US by Surprise”].
Kommiersant-Vlast’ 19,15 May 2001.
. “Putin likvidiroval mekhanizm dorogostoiashchikh politicheskikh shou”
[“Putin Liquidated the Mechanism of Expensive Political Shows”].
Htttp://www.strana.ra, 25 June 2001.
. “Eto pervyi nash god nezavisimosti” [“This Is the First Year of Our
Independence”], http://www.strana.ru, 20 July 2001.
. “Mirovoi poriadok okazalsia bolee uiazvim, chem eto schitalos’
[“World Order Happened To Be More Vulnerable Than Previously
Thought”], http://wvm.strana.ru, 11 September 2001.
. “Akt vozmezdiia so storony SShA vkhodit v plany terroristov”
[“Retaliation by the US Was Calculated by the Terrorists”].
http;//www.strana.ra, 12 September 2001.
. “V Germanii govoriat o ‘rossiiskom perelome’” [“Germany Talks About
‘Russian Breakthrough’”], http://www.strana.ru, 27 September 2001.
. On-line conference. Izvestiia, 04 October 2001.
. “Operatsiia v Afganistane - rasschitannyi po minutam voennyi parad”
[“Operation in Afghanistan is Well Calculated Military Parade”]. Rossiiskaia
Gazeta, 10 October 2001.
. “Gotovy li my zhdat’, kogda vrag zaimetsia nami tak zhe, kak Amerikoi?”
[“Are We Willing to Wait Until the Enemy Will Take On Us, As It Did With
America?”] http://www.strana.ru, 18 October 2001.
. “Vtiukhaf mozhno kogo i komu ugodno” [“One Can Sell Whatever and
T o W h om ever”]. Interview to D m itrii lezh k o v . Sobesednik, 05 N o vem b er
2001 .

. “Tezis ob ukreplenii vertikali vlasti dolzhen byt’ skorrektirovan” [“Thesis
Concerning Strengthening of the State Vertical Must Be Corrected”].
http://www.strana.ru, 13 November 2001.

426

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

“Vozmemsia za ruki, vragi. Normalizatsiia zhizni - samyi opasnyi
moment dlia Rossii” [“Lets Join Hands, Enemies. Normalization of Life Is the
Most Dangerous Moment for Russia”]. Expert 43,19 November 2001.
. “Oni ne iavliaiutsia personazhami nekoego spektaklia” [“They Are Not a
Cast of a Play”]. Gazeta 31,22 November 2001.
_______ . Interview. RTR, Zerkalo, 24 November 2001.
I.
________ . “Nam ne vygodny imperskie proekty, oni nas prosto ne interesuiut” [“We
Do Not Need Imperial Projects, They Simply Do Not Interest Us”].
bttp://www.ukraina.ru, 26 November 2001.
Salmin, A. M. “Rossiiskaia pravoslavnaia tserkov’ i postsovetskaia politiia:
samoopredelenie vo vremeni, prostranstve, kuTture (1988-1998)” [“Russian
Orthodox Cbureb and Post-Soviet Polity: Self-Realization in Time, Space, and
Culture (1988-1998)”]. Politiia 4 (1997): 7-27.
________ . Sovremertnaia demokratiia {Modern Democracy]. Moscow: Ad
Marginem, 1997.
________ .“Legal’nosf, legitimnost’ i pravopriemstvo kak problemy segodniasbnei
rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti” [“Legality, Legitimacy, and Legal Transition as
Problems of Contempoary Russian Statehood”]. Politiia 1 (1998): 59-67.
________ . “Rossiia, Yevropa i novyi mirovoi poriadok” [“Russia, Europe, and the
New World Order”]. Polis 2 (1999): 10-31.
________ . “Rossiia v novom yevropeiskom i mirovom prostranstve” [“Russia in New
Europeanand World Space”]. Po//Y/m 2(2000): 116-33.
. “Rossiia posle vyborov” [“Russia After Elections”]. In Strategiia dla
Rossii: povestka dnia dlia piezidenta-2000 {Strategy fo r Russia: Agenda fo r
President-2000]. Moscow: Vagrius, 2000.
Salmin, A. M. et al. Partiinaia systema v Rossii v 1989-1993: opyt stanovleniia
[Party System in Russia is 1989-1993 {Developmental Experience]. Moscow:
Nacbala-Press, 1993.
Sbakbrai, S. M., and M. G. Deliagin. “Korruptsiia v sisteme gosudarstvennogo
upravleniia Rossii” [“Corruption in Russia’s Governing Structures”]. In
Strategiia dlia Rossii: povestka dnia dlia prezidenta-2000 {Strategy fo r
Russia: Agenda fo r President-2000]. Moscow: Vagrius, 2000.
Sbcbedrovitskii, Piotr. “V poiskakb formy” [“In Search of Form”]. In Inoe: Rossiia
kak sub ’ekt {Other: Russia as a Subject]. Vol. 2. Moscow: Argus, 1995.
Sbokbin, Aleksandr Nikolaevich. Dialog s chetvertoi vlastiiu {Dialogues with the
Mass Media]. Moscow: n.p., 1999.*
Smimiagin, Lieonid Viktorovich. Rossiiskie regiony nakanune vyborov-95:
informatsionnyi biulleten ’ {Russian Regions on the Eve o f the 1995 Elections].
Moscow: luridicbeskaia Literatvna, 1995.
________ . Rossiiskii federalizm: paradoksy, protivorechiia, predrassudki {Russian
Federalism: Paradoxes, Controversies and Biases]. Moscow: n.p., 1998.
________ . “Territorialnaia morfologiia rossiiskogo obsbchestva kak otrazbenie
regionalnogo cbuvstva v russkoi kul’ture” [“Territorial Morphology of
Russian society as a Reflection of Regional Feelings in Russian Culture”]. In
Regionalnoe samosoznanie kak faktor formirovaniia politicheskoi kul ’tury v

427

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.

Rossii [Regional Self-Consciousness as a Factor o f the Formation o f Political
Culture in Russia]. Moscow: n.p., 1999, 108-16.
Sobchak, A. A. “Yeltsin prineset v zhertvu kogo ugodno” [“Yeltsin Will Sacrifice
Anybody”]. Pravda, 12 November 1992.
________ . Interview with Sergei lastrzhembskii. VIP 6 (1992).
________ . Novaia rossiiskaia konstitutsiia: pravovaia osnova postroeniia
demokraticheskogo obshchestva [New Russian Constitution as a Legal Basis
o f Construction o f Democratic Society]. Lecture delivered at St. Petersburg
University of Labor Unions, December 8,1994,
http://www.ffinc.org/sobchak/books.html.
________ . Zhila-byla kommunisticheskaia partiia [Once Upon a Time There Was a
Communist Party]. St. Petersburg: Lenizdat, 1995.
________ . Iz Leningrada v Peterburg: puteshestvie vo vremeni i prostranstve [From
Leningrad to St. Petersburg: A Journey in Time and Space]. St. Petersburg:
Kontrfors, 1999.
Uliukaev, Aleksei. Liberalizm ipolitika perekhodnogo perioda v sovremennoi Rossii
[Liberalism and the Transitional Politics in Contemporary Russia]. Moscow:
Yevraziia, 1995.
________ . Rossiia na puti reform: reformirovanie ekonomiki v period stanovleniia
institutov natsional’noi gosudarstvennosti v Rossii (1991-1995) [Russia on the
Path o f Reforms: Economic Reforms in the Period o f Russian National State
Development]. Moscow: Yevraziia, 1996.
. V ozhidanii krizisa: khod i protivorechiia ekonomicheskikh reform v Rossii
[Waitingfo r Crisis: The Logic and Controversies o f Russian Economic
Reforms]. Moscow: Strelets, 1999.
Uliukaev, A. V., and S. V. Kolesnikov. Ekonomicheskaia politika pravitel’stva
Rossii: dokumenty, kommentarii [Economic Policies o f the Russian
Government: Documents and Commentaries]. Moscow: Respublika, 1992.
Vasil’ev, Sergei. Predposylki i su t’ rossiiskikh ekonomicheskikh reform: ocherki i
razmyshleniia [Preconditions and Essence o f Russian Economic Reforms:
Sketches and Reflections]. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University of
Economics and Finances Press, 1997.
________ . Ekonomika i vlast’ [Economy and Power]. Moscow: Vagrius, 1998.*

428

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX F

Relationships Between Various Russian Public Attitudes
Table 11a
Preference for Order and Support for Dictatorship (Express survevsl
What is more
important order
or democracy?
(1— order, 2—
democracy)
1.000

What is more
important order or
democracy?

Is dictatorship the best
solution to contemporary
Russia’s problems? (1—
yes, 2—no)

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
2,696
N
Is dictatorship the
Pearson
.415**
best solution to
Correlation
.000
contemporary
Sig. (2-tailed)
1,992
Russia’s problems? N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

.415**
.000
1,992
1.000
2,271

Table 23a
Support for Dictatorship According to Attitudes to Post-1985 Developments (Express
surveys)

Would Russia be
better off if
everything
remained as it was
before 1985?
Is dictatorship the
best solution to
contemporary
Russia’s problems?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Would Russia be
better off if
everything
remained as it
was before 1985?
(1—yes, 2—no)
1.000

Is dictatorship the best
solution to contemporary
Russia’s problems? (1—
yes, 2—no)

6,540

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.277**
.000
5,212

429

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

.277**
.000
5,212

1.000
6,174

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 23b
Support for Dictatorship According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist
Course (Express surveys)

Is Russia moving
in a right
direction?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Is Russia
Is dictatorship the
moving in a
best solution to
right
contemporary
direction?
Russia’s problems?
(1—yes, 2—no)
(1—^Russia is
moving in a
right
direction, 2—
Russia is
moving
towards a
dead-end)
187**
1.000
.000
4,754
3,385
-

Is dictatorship the
-.187**
best solution to
.000
contemporary
3,385
Russia’s
problems?
** Correlation is significant at the 0.0 level (2-tailed).

1.000
4,426

Table 23c
Preference for Order According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course
(Express surveys)

Is Russia moving

Pearson

Is Russia moving in
a right direction?
(1—Russia is
moving in a right
direction, 2—
Russia is moving
towards a dead-end)
1.000

What is more
important order or
democracy? (1—
order, 2—democracy)
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- 154**

in a right direction?

Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
8,822
N
What is more
Pearson
-.154**
important order or
Correlation
.000
democracy?
Sig. (2-tailed)
7,822
N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 evel (2-tailed).

.000
7,822
1.000
9,194

Table 24a
Preferred Economic Model According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist
Course (Express surveys)

Is Russia moving
in a right
direction?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
What economic
Pearson
Correlation
model is the best?
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01

Is Russia moving in
a right direction?
(1—^Russia is
moving in a right
direction, 2—
Russia is moving
towards a dead-end)
1.000
20,877
-.277**
.000
17,147

What economic model
is the best? (1—
govemed-market, 2—
free market)

-.277**
.000
17,147
1.000
20,179

level (2-tailed).
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Table 24b
Support for the Continuation of Liberal Economic Reforms According to Evaluations
of the Current Political and Economic Situation fMonitoring surveys)

What do you
think about
economic
situation in
Russia?
What do you
think about
political
situation in
Russia?
Should
economic
reforms be
continued?
** Correlation is

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

What do you
think about
economic
situation in
Russia? (1—
very good, 2—
good, 3—
average, 4—
bad, 5—^very
bad)
1.000

What do you
think about
political
situation in
Russia? (1—
favorable, 2—
calm,
3—^tense, 4—
explosive)

4,454

.386**
.000
4,135

Pearson
. 186**
Correlation
.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
2,661
N
significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Should
economic
reforms be
continued? (1
- reforms
should be
continued, 2—
reforms should
be stopped)

.386**
.000
4,135

.186**
.000
2,661

1.000

.278**
.000
2,653

4,383

.278**
.000
2,653
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1.000
2,807

APPENDIX G
Biographies of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals

Balcerowicz, Leszek - economist; bom in 1947 in Lipno (Wrocla’w), graduate of Central
School of Planning and Statistics (1970); Solidarnosc adviser; researcher at the Institute
of International Economic Relations, Central School of Plarming and Statistics, and the
Institute of Marxism and Leninism (1971-1989); deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finances (governments of Mazowiecki, Bieleeki, and Buzek, 1989-1991 and 1997-2000);
chairman of Unia Wolnosci (since 1995); currently, professor at the Central School of
Trade (Warsaw) and the chairman of Polish National Bank.
Bartoszewski, Wladyslaw - publicist and historian; bom in 1922, graduate of Warsaw
University; imprisoned (1946-1949 and 1981-1982); General Secretary of Polish Pen
Club (1972-1982); editor of Tygodnik Powszechny (since 1982); professor at Lublin
University; ambassador to Austria (1990-1995); Minister of Foreign Affairs
(governments of Oleksy and Buzek, 1995-1996 and 2000).
Belka, M arek - economist; bom in 1952 in Lodz, graduate of Lodz University (1972,
Department of Economics); researcher at Lodz University and the Institute of Economies,
Polish Academy of Sciences (1973-1992), later its director (1993-1996); economic
adviser to the president of Poland (1996-1997); deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finances (government of Cimoszewicz, 1997); currently head of Intemational
Coordination Committee in Iraq.
Chrzanowski, Wieclaw - legal scholar; bom in 1923 in Warsaw, graduate of Warsaw
University (1945, Department of Law); imprisoned (1948-1954); member of Solidarnosc,
its treasurer (1988-1999); researcher at Warsaw University and Central Trade School
(1945-1948) and Lublin Catholic University (1972-1989); head of Catholic Discussion
Club (1956-1957); Minister of Justice and Procurator General (government of Bieleeki,
1991); founder and chairman of Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe; Speaker of the
Lower Chamber of Parliament (Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe, 1991-1993).
Dqbrowski, M arek - economist; bom in 1951 in Bydgoszcz, graduate of Warsaw
University (1974, Department of Economics); researcher at Warsaw University;
Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finances (1989-1990); close ally of deputy Prime
Minister Balcerowicz; author of state budgets during Balcerowicz’s tenure as Prime
Minister (1989-1991).
Drawicz, Andrzej - literary scholar, historian, specialist in Russian literature; 19321997; director of Polish State Radio and TV (government of Mazowiecki, 1989-1990).
Geremek, Bronislaw - historian; bom in 1932, graduate of Warsaw University (1955);
imprisoned (1981-1983); Solidarnosc adviser; participant in the Roundtable Talks;
scholar at Warsaw University; candidate for the post of Prime Minister (1991); Minister
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of Foreign Affairs (1997-2000); member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament
{Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny, Unia Demokratyczna, Unia Wolnosci, since 1989).
Stanistaw Gomulka - economist; professor of Economics at London School of
Economics; adviser to the Minister of Finance and deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz
(1989-1991,1997-2000).
Glapinski, Adam - economist; bom in 1950, graduate of Central School of Trade
(1972); member of Solidarnosc; researcher at Central School of Planning and Statistics;
Minister of Economic Planning (government of Bieleeki, 1991) and Minister of
Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries (government of Olszewski, 1991-1992);
member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Porozumenie Centrum, 1991-1993);
currently Director of the Institute of Economic and Political Freedom.
Hall, Aleksander - historian; bom in 1953, graduate of Gdansk University (1977);
member of Solidarnosc; Minister for Cooperation with Political Parties (government of
Mazowiecki, 1989-1990); chairman of Partia Konserwatywna (1992-1997); member of
the Lower Chamber of Parliament (1991-1993).
Hausner, Jerzy - economist; professor at Krakow Economic Academy; adviser to Prime
Minister (government of Cimoszewicz, 1997); Minister of the Economy (government of
Miller, 2000-present).
Jozefiak, Cezary - economist; bom in 1932 in Lodz, graduate of Warsaw University
(1956, Department of Economics); member of Solidarnosc; participant in the Roundtable
Talks; researcher and chairman at Lodz University; member of Council of Monetary
Policies (since 1998); foimder of the organization “Reforms and Democracy.”
Kaczynski, Jaroslaw Aleksander - political scientist, legal scholar; bom in 1949,
graduate of Warsaw University (Department of Law, 1971); member of Solidarnosc;
participant in the Roundtable Talks; scholar at Warsaw University; editor-in-chief of
Tygodnik Solidarnosci (1989-1991); head of Presidential Administration (1990-1991);
member of the Upper Chamber of Parliament (1989-1991) and the Lower Chamber of
Parliament (Porozumienie Centrum, 1991-1993).
Kaleta, J o z e f- economist; bom in 1925; graduate of Wroclaw University (1954,
Department of Law); researcher at Economic Academy in Wroclaw, its vice-Chancellor
(1979-1990) and Chancellor (1990-1993); economic adviser to mling Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej (1993-1997 and 2000 -present); member of the Lower Chamber of
PziXlidimQnX {Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, since 1991).
Kolodko, Grzegorz - economist; bom in 1949 in Tczew, graduate of Central School of
Planning and Statistics (1972; Department of Economics); participant in the Roundtable
Talks (side of the government); researcher at Central School of Plarming and Statistics
(1973-1988); Director of the Institute of Finances (1989-1994); member of the Economic
Coxmcil, Council of Ministers (1989-1991); deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
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Finances (governments of Oleksy, Cimoszewicz, Pawlak, and Miller, 1994-1997 and
2001-2003).
Kuczynski, W aldem ar - economist; bom in 1939; graduate of Warsaw University
(1966, Department of Political Economy); imprisoned (1968); Solidarnosc adviser,
deputy editor of Tygodnik Solidarnosci (1980-1981); immigrant in France (1982-1989);
researcher at Warsaw University; chief adviser to Prime Minister (government of
Mazowiecki, 1989-1990); Minister of Privatization (government o f Bieleeki, 1990-1991);
chief economic adviser to Prime Minister (government of Buzek, 1997-2001).
Kuroh, Jacek - historian, sociologist; bom in 1934 in Lvov, graduate of Warsaw
University (1957, Department of History); imprisoned (1964-1967,1968-1971, and 19811984); Solidarnosc adviser; participant in the Roundtable Talks; Minister of Labor and
Social Protection (governments of Mazowiecki and Suchotska, 1989-1990 and 19921993); presidential candidate (1995); founder of Unia Demokratyczna (1991-1994);
member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament {Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny, Unia
Demokratyczna, Unia Wolnosci since 1989).
Legutko, Ryszard - philosopher, publicist, bom in 1949; professor at Krakow
Jagellonian University; editor-in-chief of Arka\ important conservative ideologue.
Lewandowski, Janusz - economist; bom in 1951 in Lublin, graduate of Gdansk
University; member of Solidarnosc', researcher at Gdansk University; Minister of
Privatization (governments of Bieleeki and Suchotska, 1991 and 1992-1993); co-founder
of Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny; member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament
{Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny, Unia Wolnosci, 1991-1993 and 1997-2001).
Luczak, Aleksander Piotr - historian; bom in 1943, graduate of Warsaw University
1966, Department of History); scholar and chairman at Warsaw University (1966-1986);
deputy Prime Minister (governments of Pawlak and Oleksy, 1993-1995); Minister of
National Education (1993-1995), chair of the Committee of Scientific Research
(governments of Oleksy and Cimoszewicz, 1995-1997); member of the Lower Chamber
of Parliament (Polskie Stronictwo Ludowe, since 1989).
Mazowiecki, Tadeusz - legal scholar, philosopher, publicist; bom in 1927 in Plock,
graduate of Warsaw University (Department of Law); imprisoned (1981); Solidarnosc
adviser; participant in the Roundtable Talks; editor-in-chief of Slowo Powszechne and
WTK (1951-1955); editor-in-chief of Wiqz (1956-1981); member of the Polish Parliament
(1961-1972); editor-in-chief of Tygodnik Powszechny (1981); first Prime Minister of
post-Communist Poland (1989-1990), one of the authors of the Little Constitution (1992)
and the Polish Constitution (1997); founder and chairman of Unia Wolnosci (19911995); member of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament {Obywatelski Klub
Parlamentarny, Unia Demokratyczna, Unia Wolnosci, since 1991).
Michnik, Adam - historian, publicist; bom in 1946 in Warsaw, graduate of Poznan
University (1975, Department of History); imprisoned (1968-1969,1981-1984, and 1985-
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1986); Solidarnosc adviser; participant in the Roundtable Talks; editor-in-chief of Gazeta
Wyborcza (since 1989); member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament {Obywatelski Klub
Parlamentarny, 1989-1991); confidant of the Polish post-Commxmist political elite.

Modzelewski, Karol - historian; bom in 1937 in Moscow; graduate of Warsaw
University (1959, Department of History); imprisoned (1965-1967, 1968-1971 and 19801984); member of Solidarnosc', researcher at Warsaw University (1959-1964), Polish
Academy of Sciences (1972-1983), and the Institute of Polish History (since 1987);
honorable chairman of Unia Pracy (1992-1995); important social democratic ideologue.
Najder, Zdzislaw - literary scholar; bom in 1930 in Warsaw; graduate of Warsaw
University (1954, Departments of Polish Language and Literature and Philosophy);
immigrant in the US (1981-1989); sentenced to death {in absentia)', researcher at the
Institute of Literary Studies (1952-1981); lecturer at Columbia University, Yale
University, Northem Michigan University, Stanford University, University of Michigan;
Director of the Polish branch of Radio Free Europe (1982-1987); adviser to president of
Poland (1990-1991); adviser to Prime Minister (government of Olszewski, 1991-1992).
Nowak-Jezioranski, Jan - publicist, politician; bom in 1913; immigrated after WWII;
Director of the Polish Branch at BBS (1948-1951) and Radio Free Europe (1952-1976);
important moral authority and confidant of Polish post-Commimist political elite.
Olszewski, Jan Ferdynand - legal scholar, lawyer; bom in 1930 in Warsaw, graduate
of Warsaw University (1953, Department of Law); Solidarnosc adviser; participant in the
Roundtable Talks; employee at the Ministry of Justice; researcher at the Institute of Legal
Sciences, Polish Academy of Sciences; candidate for the post of Prime Minister (1990);
Prime Minister (1991-1992); leader of conservative Ruch Odbudowy Polski (since 1996).
Orlowski, Witold M. - economist; bom in 1962, graduate of Lodz University; Director
of the Research Center for Statistical and Economic Studies; advisor to the Chief
Negotiator for the EU membership; Director of the Center for Economic and Statistical
Studies (since 1997); economic adviser to the president of Poland (1995-present).
Parys, Jan - sociologist; bom in 1950 in Warsaw, graduate of Warsaw University (1974,
Department of Sociology); researcher at the Institute of Sociology, Polish Academy of
Sciences; director of Central Plarming Commission (government of Bieleeki, 1990-1991);
Minister of Defense (government of Olszewski, 1991-1992); leader of conservative Ruch
dla Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej and Ruch Odbudowy Polski.
Rydlewski, Grzegorz - political scientist; bom in 1953 in Warsaw, graduate of Warsaw
University (1978, Department of Political Science); researcher at Warsaw University;
Secretary of the government (governments of Pawlak, Oleksy, and Cimoszewicz, 19931996); chief of Administration of the Prime Minister (1997); chief adviser to Prime
Minister (government of Miller, 2001-now).
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Skubiszewski, Krzysztof - specialist on intemational relations; bom in 1926 in Poznan,
graduate of Poznan University (1949, Department of Law); Solidarnosc adviser (19861989); researcher at Poznan University and Institute of Legal Sciences, Polish Academy
of Sciences; Minister of Foreign Affairs (governments of Bieleeki, Olszewski and
Suchotska, 1989-1993).
Strzembosz, Adam - legal scholar; bom in 1930, graduate of Krakow Jagellonian
University (1952, Department of Law); Solidarnosc adviser (since 1980); participant in
the Roundtable Talks; researcher, later professor at Lublin Catholic University and the
Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences; president of the Supreme
Court (1990-1998).
Tiscbner, Jozef - Catholic philosopher, priest; 1931-2000; professor and chair at
Krakow Theological Academy; president of Vierma Institute of Human Sciences;
important liberal ideologue and moral authority.
Turowicz, Jerzy - joumalist, publicist; 1912-1999; participant in the Roundtable Talks;
founder and editor-in-chief of Tygodnik Powszechny, important liberal ideologue and
moral authority.
W iatr, Jerzy Jozef - sociologist; bom in 1931 in Warsaw, graduate of Warsaw
University (1954, Department o f Philosophy); participant in the Roundtable Talks;
researcher at Warsaw University, Military Political Academy, and the Institute of
Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences; chairman of the Department of
Social Sciences, Warsaw University (1977-1980); Director of Institute of MarxismLeninism (1981-1984); Minister of Education (government of Cimoszewicz, 1996-1997);
member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, since
1991).
Winczorek, Piotr - legal scholar; professor at Warsaw University; governmental
representative in Constitutional Commission (government of Suchotska, 1992-1993);
President of the Council of Permanent Experts of the Constitutional Commission (19921996); author of the Polish Constitution (1997).
Zakrzewska, Janina - lawyer, specialist in Constitutional Law; 1928-1995; Solidarnosc
adviser; participant in the Roundtable talks; professor of Warsaw University (1982-1989)
and the Institute of State and Law (1989-1995); judge of the Constitutional Court;
member of the State Elections Committee.
Zielinski, Tadeusz —legal scholar; bom in 1926 in Krakow, graduate of Krakow
Jagellonian University (1947, Department of Law); Solidarnosc adviser; researcher at
Krakow Jagellonian University and University of Silesia; Polish Ombudsman (1992 1996); Minister of Social Protection and Labor (government of Cimoszewicz, 1997);
member of Unia Demokratyczna.
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APPENDIX H
List of Synonyms of Textual Indicators for the Polish Phase of Content Analysis

Categories
1. Inclusive
Democracy

Textual Indicators
Active citizenry

Societal control over political
elites
Public opinion
Local self-government
Defense of minorities’ political
rights
Free media

Multipartism
Elections are to make social
demands evident

Constitutionality
Parliamentarism

Political opposition

2. Managed
Democracy

Government is the guarantor of
citizens’ well being

Synonyms
Grassroots, popular participation,
volunteer associations, civil
society
Transparency of government,
accountability of politicians
Foundation of political legitimacy
is public opinion, referendum
Decentralization

Media can criticize the
government, private media, media
can have a different opinion
Parties reflect political views of
citizens
Elections are indicator of social
demands, representatives =mirror,
servants of electors, proportional
electoral system
Rule of law, equality before the
law, independent judiciary
Separation of powers, checks and
balances
Former commrmists, national
reconciliation, political pluralism
Government is responsible for
citizens, government is a guardian,
trustee of the public

Government consists of the best
people
Elite autonomy
Centralization

National government

Media is to inform the citizens,

State-controlled media

not to criticize the government
Individuals, not parties, are
important
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Elections are for selection of the
best people

Political expediency governs
behavior
Presidentialism

3. Liberal
Ideology,
Secularism,
Liberal
Catholicism

Restrictions on political
opposition
Negative freedoms

Separation of church and state,
secular state
Modernism, progress
Liberal values

Weak state, state as a nightwatchman
Vision of individual as rational
and independent
Conflict of interests
Liberal rights

Reasons for crime are social

Descriptive representation,
experts/party know(s) will of
people, formal elections, elite
agreement, democracy is strictly
selection of elites, majority
electoral system
Ideological proximity
Strong executive branch,
charismatic leader
Anti-commimism, decommimization
Freedom from, personal freedoms,
human rights, tmalienable rights,
freedom of speech, confession,
movement, civil rights
Laity of the state, neutral state,
state education
Institutions can change person’s
behavior
Equality of all views, activism,
achievement, independence,
individual responsibility, values of
middle class, choice, “jasnogrod”
Minimal role of the state, state is
for the citizens, small and effective
state apparatus
Individualism, autonomy,
humanism, privacy, personal
dignity, rationality, reason
Right to abortion, euthanasia,
same sex marriages, feminism,
equality of sexes
Decrease in the severity of
criminal punishment

Society and elite are equal,
so ciety is self-su fficien t
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4.
Conservativ
e Ideology
Fundamenta
lism,
Catholic
Fundamenta
lism/Integris
m

Positive freedoms

Freedom to, freedom to health, education,
work, rest, social freedoms

Ecclesiastical state, church is a
foundation of the state

Religious instruction in school,
church’s active participation in
social life, politics have religious
dimension
People behave according to
traditions
Compassion, love, sharing,
acceptance of one’s lot, faith,
endurance, “ciemnogrod,” moral
law, moral values
Maximalist role of state, citizens
cannot exist without state, increase
in state power and state apparatus
Stress on family, nation,
organization, religious community,
emotions
Collectivism, social cooperation,
solidarity
Morality of elite

Traditions
Christian values, conservative
values

Strong state, developmental
state
Vision of individual as part of
organic whole
Societal consensus, common
good
Elite is responsible for society
Death penalty
Order
Defense of traditional relations

Sever punishment
Defense of traditional families,
religious hierarchy, value of human life,
rights of the unborn

5. Free
Market,
LaissezFaire
Capitalism

Market as a main agent of
economic development

Absence or small involvement of
state in economy (only in macro
policy, legal framework and
protection of environment),
economic decentralization,
u nlim ited rights o f the market

Quick privatization

Total privatization, re
privatization, private property
Charity, private social protection,
reduction of state’s assistance,
reduction of state expenses

Selective social protection
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Economic justice

Price liberalization
Liberalization of foreign trade

Low taxes
Balanced budget
Universal neo-liberal eeonomie
development

6. Governed
Market
State
proteetionis
m

Market can be helped in
economic development

Slow privatization
Universal social protection

Social justice, equality

Price control
Protectionism

Competition, efficiency, equality
of opportunity, profit, material
inequality
Wage freeze
Reliance on import, open
economy, reliance on foreign
capital, intemational economy

Balcerowicz’s plan, western
advise, shock therapy, rapid
reform (liberalization first, then
privatization and demonopolization)
State intervention, social
democracy, social market, state
conducts micro-economic policy,
welfare state, socialism with
human face, economic democracy,
industrial democracy,
interventionism
Controlled privatization,
state/public property
Strong social protection,
conservative (family-oriented)
social protection
Redistribution, equality of income,
protection of the weak members of
society
Support of domestic producers and
exporters, reliance on domestic
capital
Rigorous, progressive tax policy
for business and the richest part of
society

Tax increases

Deficit spending
National economic model

Scandinavian model, gradual
reform, planned transition
(privatization first, then
liberalization of prices), economic
Polish path, plan of Kolodko,
legacies matter. Third road
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7. ProWestern
Foreign
Foliey
EuroAtlantic
Option

European integration

“Europejczyk,” unification,
membership in the EU, European
identity, Europe as union

NATO membership
Globalization

Global identity, lack of borders,
no-visa policies, transnationalism
Poland is part of the West, can
help the West in regards of Russia
and East
Decrease in defense spending,
world is mowing towards peace
“Eurosceptyk,” “Europe of
fatherlands,” Europe as loose
association

Relations with the West
(Germany, US)

8.
Independent
Foreign
Policy

Idealist interpretations of
foreign relations
Poland outside EU

Poland outside NATO
Isolationism

Relations with East and South
(Russia)
Realist interpretations of
foreign relations

9. Ethnic
Tolerance

Ethnic equality
Multiculturalism
Peaceful solutions to ethnic
conflicts
Universal values

10.
Nationalism
Xenophobia

Respect for ethnic minorities
Ethnic inequality

Anti-imperialism, economic
sovereignty, sovereignty,
including local sovereignty, world
threatens Poland
Poland is imique in its geographic
location, Poland is a leader of
Central Europe, Russia is closer
Increase in defense spending,
military conflict is inevitable,
national interest
All nations and religions are good,
civil nationalism
Jewish traditions, different
biographies, cultures

Patriotism = democracy and
freedom, to be a Pole is to be
European, universalism, open
society
Some nations are better than
others, discrimination
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Preservation of national culture,
traditions
Military solutions to ethnic
conflicts
National values, national ideas

National identity, national legacy,
Polish pride, Polish values, Polish
cultural path

Catholicism as national idea,
Messianism, Polish uniqueness, to
be a Pole is to be Catholic, Poland
is a kingdom of Virgin Mary,
Polish Catholic particularism

Anti-Semitism
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APPENDIX I
Sources Analyzed During the Polish Phase of Content Analysis

Balcerowicz, Leszek. “Albo szybko, albo wcale.. [“Either Quickly or Not at A ll...”].
Polityka, 2 December 1989.
_________ . “Sprawa intuicji” [“The Matter of Intuition”]. Tygodnik Powszechny, 13
February 1990.
_________ . “sredni dystans” [“Mid-Range Distance”]. Wprost, 17 June 1990.
_________ . “Jestem zwolennikiem szybkich zmian” [“1 Support Rapid Changes”].
Przeglqd Techniczny, 12 August 1990.
_. “Warunki zdrowej gospodarki” [“Conditions of Healthy Economy”].
Rzeczpospolita, 08 January 1991.
. “Klocki zostaly rozrzucone” [“Building Blocks Are in Disarray”]. Wprost,
February 1991.
. “Czama robota” [“Dog’s Work”]. Wprost, 30 June 1991.
. “Komora wysokich cisnieh” [“High Pressure Chamber”]. Zarzqdzanie,
June/July 1991.
. “Mam zdj^c okulary?” [“Do 1 Need to Take Off My Glasses?”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, 17 August 1991.
. “Z historii sporu o sprawnosc gospodarcz^ socjalizmu” [“History of the
Debate Regarding Economic Capabilities of Socialism”]. In Pamiqci Edwarda
Lipihskiego: szkice ekonomiczne [In Memory o f Edward Lipinski: Economic
Warsaw: Pahstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1991.
. “Nie zwrot lecz politika otwarta” [“Not a Turn but Open Policy”], zycie
Warszawy, 22 November 1991.
. 800 dni: szok kontrolowany [800 Days: Controlled Shock], Warsaw: Polska
Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1992.
. “Demokracja nie z a s t^ i kapitalizmu” [“Democracy Is Not a Substitute for
Capitalism”]. PrzeglqdPolityczny, Special Issue, 1993.
. Systemy gospodarcze. Elementy analizy porownawczej [Economic Systems.
Elements o f Comparative Analysis], Warsaw: n.p., 1993.
. “Przeksztalcenia gospodarcze w Europie Srodkowej i Wschodniej - proba
bilansu” [“Economic Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe - Attempt to
Look at the Balance”]. In Spoteczne konsekwencje transformacji ustrojowej
[Social Consequences o f Systemic Transformation], Edited by Miroslawa
Grabowska, Krzysztof Pahkowski, and Edmvmd Wnuk-Lipihski. Warsaw: n.p.,
1994.*
. “Troche o nierownosciach’ [“A Little About the Inequalities”]. In Ksiqzka
dlaJacka [A Book fo r Jacek], Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 1995a.*
. Wolnosc i rozwoj: ekonomia wolnego rynku [Freedom and Development:
Economics o f Free Market], Krakow: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1995b. *

Some publications contained reprints o f earlier works. An asterisk denotes such sources.
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. Socjalizm, kapitalizm, transformacja: szkice z przelomu epok [Socialism,
Capitalism, Transformation: Sketches from the Rupture o f Epochs]. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1997.
. “Deyz? do celu, ktory sobie wyznaczyiem” [“I Will Reach the Goal Which I
Set for M yself’]. In Balcerowicz na goracq [Balcerowicz Served Hot]. Edited by
Piotr Gajdzinski. Poznan: Dom Wydawniczy Rebus, 1999a.
. “Mog? obiecac tylko pot i Izy” [“I Can Promise Only Sweat and Tears”]. In
Balcerowicz na goracq [Balcerowicz Served Hot]. Edited by Piotr Gajdzinski.
Poznan: Dom Wydawniczy Rebus, 1999b.
. Pahstwo wprzebudowie [Rebuilding the State]. Krakow: Znak, 1999c.
. “Polityczne wyzwania transformacji” [“Political Tasks of Transformation”].
In Po dziesieciu latach - tranformacja i rozwoj w krajach postkomunistycznych
[After Ten Years - Transformation and Development in the Post-Communist
Countries]. Edited by Jaroslaw Neneman. Warsaw: CASE, 2001.
Bartoszewski, Wladyslaw. Wolnosc, odpowiedzialnosc, sluzba [Freedom, Responsibility,
Service]. Speech on September 10, 2000.
_________ . Przysztosc Europy - rozszerzenie Unii Europe]skiej na Wschod [The Future
o f the European Union Is In Eastward Expansion]. Speech on October 2, 2000.
_________ . Przemowienie wygloszone w ramach cyklu wykladow publicznych
organizowanych przez Polski Instytut Spraw Miqdzynarodowych “Ustrdj pahstwa
a politika zagraniczna” [Speech Given During the Series o f Public Lectures,
Organized by Polish Institute o f International Affairs “State Structures and
Foreign Policy”]. Speech on October 24, 2000.
. Usunqc ja k najwiqcej zla [To Destroy as Much Evil as Possible]. Interview
for Wiadomosci, KAI, 16 November 2000.
. “Nie mozemy pozostawac na ubocze” [“We Can Stay on the Side of the
Road”]. Rzeczpospolita, 27 November 2000.
. Holandia mocnie popiera wstqpienie Polski do Unii Europejskiej [Holland
Strongly Supports Polish Membership in the EU]. Speech on December 18, 2000.
. “Zamiast wstepu” [“In Place of the Foreword”]. In Wspdlna Europe]ska
odpowiedzialnsc [Common European Responsibility]. Warsaw: n.p., 2001.
.“Zamiast wstepu” [“Instead of the Foreword”]. In Ponad podzialami [Above the
Divisions: Selected Speeches and Interviews o f the Minister o f Foreign Affairs].
Warsaw: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 2001.
Belka, Marek. “Przedsi^biorstwa w procesie przeksztalceh” [“Enterprises in the Process of
Transformation”]. In Polska transformacja wperspektywie integracji Europejskiej
[Polish Transformation and the Prospects o f European Integration]. Edited by
Marek Belka, et al. Warsaw: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 1996.
Chrzanowski, Wieslaw. “Przedmowa” [“Foreword ”]. To Od konspiracji do emigracji
[From Underground to Emigration], by Tadeusz Macinski, and Wieczyslaw J.
Wagner. Warsaw: n.p., 1994.
_________ . Wizjaparlamentu w nowej konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskie] [Vision o f
Parliament in New Constitution o f the Republic o f Poland]. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1994.
D^browski, Marek. “Globalizacja i jej wplyw na stabilnosc makroekonomiczn^”
[“Globalization and Its Impact on the Macroeconomic Stability”]. In Po dziesiqciu
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latach - transformacja i rozwoj w krajach postkomunistycznych [After Ten Years Transformation and Development in the Post-Communist Countries]. Edited by
Jaroslaw Neneman. Warsaw; CASE, 2001.
Drawicz, Andrzej. WczasypodLufa [Vacation Under the Gun]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
Philip Wilson, 1997. *
Geremek, Bronislaw. Rok 1989: Geremek opowiada, zakowskipyta [Year o f 1989:
Geremek Narrates, Zakowski Asks Questions]. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza
Plejada, 1990.
_________ . “Polski uklad nadziei” [“Polish Hope”]. Tygodnik Powszechny, 17 April
1990.
_________ . “0 lewicy i prawicy” [“About the Left and the Right”]. In Ksiqzka dla Jacka
[A Book fo r Jacek]. Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 1995a.
. “Wstep” [“Foreword”]. In Francja-Polska: nowe wyzwania [France-Poland:
New Tasks]. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1995b.
. “Polski glos o Europie” [“Polish Voice about Europe”]. In Wizja Polski
[Vision o f Poland]. Edited by Andrjej Targowski, and Stanislaw Dronicz. Warsaw:
Agencja Wydawnicza CB, 2000.
. “Nowe NATO - nowy porz^dek” [“New NATO - New World Order”].
Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 November 2002.
Geremek, Bronislaw, and Georges Duby. Wspolnepasje [Common Passions]. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1995.
Glapinski, Adam. “Od ‘Kapitalu’ do kapitalu” [“From Das Kapital to Capital”]. In Lewy
Czerwcowy: mowiq Kaczynski, Macierewicz, Parys, Glapinski, Kostrzewa-Zorbas
[Lions o f July: Kaczynski, Macierewicz, Parys, Glapinski and Kostrzewa-Zorbas
Speak Out]. Edited by Jacek Kurski, and Piotr Semka. Warsaw: Spotkania
Editions, 1992.
Gomulka, Stanislaw. “Byl najlepszy” [“He Was the Best”]. In Balcerowicz na goracq
[Balcerowicz Served Hot]. Edited by Piotr Gajdzinski. Poznan: Dom Wydawniczy
Rebus, 1999.
Hall, Aleksander. “Klatka chorych na socjalizm” [“Cage for the Socialism Patients”].
Wprost 21 {OcXohex 1991).
_________ . “O wolnosci trzeba zabiegac” [“One Must Fight for Freedom”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, 28 February 1992.
_________ . “Partia taka jak irme?” [“Is This Party the Same as Others?”]. Rzeczpospolita,
4 March 1992.
. “Oboz kontynuacji reform” [“Camp of the Reform Continuation”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, 13 May 1992.
. “Na skrzyzowaniu drog” [“On the Crossroads”]. Rzeczpospolita, 11 January
1993.
. “Rz^d i koalicja” [“Government and Coalition”]. Rzeczpospolita, 22 January
1993.
. “Jaka prawica?” [“What Type of the Right?”]. Rzeczpospolita, 26 April 1993.
. “Jaka przyszlosc dla prawicy?” [“What Is the Future of the Right?”].
Rzeczpospolita, 30 September 1993.
. “Niebezpieczenstwo drogi posredniej” [“Danger of Stopping Half-Way”].
Rzeczpospolita, 20-21 November 1993.

446

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. Spor a Polskq [Debate About Poland]. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm,
1993.
. Wizja parlamentu w nowej konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Vision o f
Parliament in New Constitution o f the Republic o f Poland]. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1994.
. “Polityk na czasy trudne” [“Politieian for the Hard Times”]. In Tadeusz
Mazowiecki: Polityk trudnych czasow [Tadeusz Mazowiecki: Politician o f the
Hard Times]. Warsaw: Presspublika, 1999.
Hausner, Jerzy. “Proba bilansu” [“Attempt to Assess the Balance”]. In Polska 2000:
Strategia dla przyszlosci [Poland 2000: Strategy fo r the Future]. Edited by
Grzegorz W. Kolodko. Warsaw: Poltext, 1996.
_________ . “Rozwoj regionalny - politika regionalna - fundusze unijne” [“Regional
Development - Regional Politics - Union Fxmds”]. In Rozwoj polskiej
gospodarki: perspektywy i uwarkowania [Development o f Polish Economy:
Prospects and Conditions]. Edited by Grzegorz W. Kolodko. Warsaw: n.p., 2002.
Jozefiak, Cezary. “Zaleznosci mi^dzy zmianami systemowymi a politik^ gospodarcze”
[“Relationship between Systemic Change and Eeonomie Policy”]. In Dynamika
transformacji polskiej gospodarki [Dynamics o f the Transformation o f Polish
Economy]. Edited by Marek Belka, and Wotold Trzeciakowski. Warsaw: Poltext,
1997.
Kaczynski, Jaroslaw. Odwrotna strona medalu [The Other Side o f the Medal].
Conversation with Teresa Bochwic. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza MOST, 1991.
_________ . Czas na zmiany [Time fo r Change]. Conversation with Michal Boniewiez and
Piotr M. Rudnicki, Warsaw: Spotkania Editions, 1992a.
■
“Gdzie tkwil bled?” [“What Went Wrong?”]. In Lewy Czerwcowy: mowiq,
Macierewicz, Parys, Glapinski, Kostrzewa-Zorbas [Lions o f July: Kaczynski,
Macierewicz, Parys, Glapinski and Kostrzewa-Zorbas Speak Out]. Edited by Jacek
Kurski, and Piotr Semka. Warsaw: Spotkania Editions, 1992b.
. Wizja parlamentu w nowej konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Vision o f
Parliament in New Constitution o f the Republic o f Poland]. Warsaw:
Wydawnietwo Sejmowe, 1995.*
Kaczynski, Lech. “Rozmowa z Wojciechem Reszczyhskim” [“Conversation with
Wojciech Reszczynski”]. In Wygracprezydenta [To Win Presidency]. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo von Borowski, 1995.
Kaleta, Jozef. Alternatywneprogramy gospodarcze [Alternative Economic Programs].
Warsaw: Kongres Ekonomistow Polskieh, 1993.
Kolodko, Grzegorz. Kwadratura pieciukqtu: od zalamania gospodarczego do trwalego
wzrostu. [Square Pentagon: From Economic Collapse to Sustainable Growth].
Warsaw: Poltext, 1993.
_________ . Polska 2000: Strategia dla przyszlosci [Poland 2000: Strategy fo r the
Future]. Warsaw: Poltext, 1996.
. Od shoku do terapii: ekonomia i politika transformacji [From Shock to
Therapy: Economics and Politics o f Transformation]. Warsaw: Poltext, 1999.*
.“Glos w dyskusje” [“My Voice in a Discussion”]. In Propozycja dla Polski:
Rzqdzenie strategiczne [Proposalfor Poland: Strategic Governing]. Warsaw: n.p.,
2001a.

447

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

‘W poszukiwaniu strategii rozwoju polskiej gospodarki” [“In Search of the
Strategy for the Development of Polish Economy”]. In Propozycja dla Polski:
Rzqdzenie strategiczne [Proposalfor Poland: Strategic Governing]. Warsaw: n.p.,
2001b.
. “2025: dwie historie gospodarczego rozwoju” [“2025: Two Stories of
Economic Development”]. In Rozwoj polskiej gospodarki: perspektywy i
uwarkowania [Development o f Polish Economy: Prospects and Conditions].
Edited by Grzegorz Kolodko. Warsaw: n.p., 2002a.
. Tygrys z ludzkq twarzq [Tiger with Human Face]. Toruh: Dom Organizatora,
2002b.
Kolodko, Grzegorz, and Mario Nuti. Polska alternatywa: stare mity, twarde fakty, nowe
strategie [Polish Alternatives: Old Myths, Firm Facts, and New Strategies].
Warsaw: Poltext, 1997.
Kostrzewa-Zorbas, Grzegorz. “Imperium kontratakuje” [“Empire Counterattacks”]. In
Lewy Czerwcowy: mowiq Kaczynski, Macierewicz, Parys, Glapinski, KostrzewaZorbas [Lions o f July: Kaczynski, Macierewicz, Parys, Glapinski and KostrzewaZorbas Speak Out]. Edited by Jacek Kurski, and Piotr Semka. Warsaw: Spotkania
Editions, 1992.
Kuczynski, Waldemar. Zwierzenia zausznika [Revelations o f the Confidant]. Warsaw:
Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1992.
_________ . “Obok Orla znak pogoni” [“Chasing the Polish Eagle”]. In Tadeusz
Mazowiecki: Polityk trudnych czasow [Tadeusz Mazowiecki: Politician o f the
Hard Times]. Warsaw: Presspublika, 1999.
Kulesza, W. T., and Piotr Winczorek. Demokracja w schylku X X wieku [Democracy on
the Eve o f the Twenty-First Century]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i
Pedogogiczne, 1992.
Kuroh, Jacek. Moja zupa [My Soup]. Warsaw: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1991.
________ . “Czy w Polsce toczy si§ walka o rz^d dusz?” [“Is There a Struggle For Souls in
Poland?”]. Discussion in Wiq^z 5 (1992a).
_________ . “Gdy wali si§ stary lad” [“When the Old System is Collapsing”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, 24 January 1992b.
. Spoko! Czyli kwadratura kola [Chill Out! Or the Square Circle]. Warsaw,
Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1992c.
. “Poslowie” [“Commentary”], la Francja-Polska: nowe wyzwania [FrancePoland: New Tasks]. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1995a.
. “Rozmowa z Wojciechem Reszczyhskim” [“Conversation with Wojciech
Reszczynski”]. In Wygrac prezydenta [To Win Presidency]. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo von Borowski, 1995b.
. Wiara i wina [Faith and Blame]. Wroclaw: Wydavraictwo Dolnosl^skie,
1995c.
. Siedmiolatka czyli kto ukradq Polskql [Seven Years or Who Stole Poland?].
Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Dolnosl^skie, 1997.
. Na krawqdzi: swiat bogatych - swiat biednych. Polacy -samorzqdna
Rzeczpospolita [On the Cliff: A World o f the Rich and A World o f the Poor. Poles
and Self-Government]. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1997.

448

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.

Legutko, Ryszard. “Mi^dzy papugq^ a zakiankiem (polskim liberalom ku przestrodze)”
[“Between the Parrot and the Backwardness (Warning to the Polish Liberals)”].
Znak 1 (1992).
_________ . “Tolerancja” [“Tolerance”]. TygodnikPowszechny, 04 April 1993.
_________ . Etyka absolutna i spoieczenstwo otwarte [Absolute Ethics and Open Society].
Krakow: Arcana, 1997.
_________ . Czasy wielkiej imitacji [Times o f Great Imitation]. Krakow: Arcana, 1998a.
. “Ich baza, ich nadbudowa?” [“Their Infrastructure, Their Superstructure?”].
Zycie, 31 August 1998b.
. “Przedmowa” [“Foreword”]. In Madel, Krzysztof. Szczypta optymizmu [A
Pinch o f Optimism]. Warsaw: Biblioteka Wi^zi, 1998c.
Lewandowski, Janusz. “Czy demokracja lubi rynek?” [“Does Democracy Like the
Market?”]. PrzeglqdPolityczny 26 (1994).
Luczak, Aleksander. Wizja parlamentu w nowej konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
[Vision o f Parliament in New Constitution o f The Republic o f Poland]. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1994.
________ . 33 dni premiera Pawlaka [Thirty-Three Days o f Prime Minister Pawlak].
Warsaw: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1992.
Macierewicz, Antoni. “Gdy politikom brak odwagi, nast?pne pokolenie placi krwi^”
[“When Politicians Lack Courage, the Next Generation Pays with Its Own
Blood”]. InLewy Czerwcowy: mowiq Kaczyhski, Macierewicz, Parys, Glapihski,
Kostrzewa-Zorbas [Lions o f July: Kaczyhski, Macierewicz, Parys, Glapihski and
Kostrzewa-Zorbas Speak Out]. Edited by Jacek Kurski, and Piotr Semka. Warsaw:
Spotkania Editions, 1992.
Mazowiecki, Tadeusz. “Bedzie to rz%d koalicji na rzecz reformy pahstwa” [“This Will Be
a Coalition Government Whose Goal is the Reform of the State”]. Trubyna Ludu,
25 August 1989.
_________ . “Polacy rozpoczynaj^now£i,kart§ swojej historii” [“Poles Start New Page of
Their History”]. Rzeczpospolita, 13 September 1989.
_________ . “Rz^d odchodzi w p61 drogi” [“Government Leaves Half-Way”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, 15 January 1990.
. “Expose premiera” [“Prime Minister’s Speech Before Parliament”]. Trybuna
Ludu, 19 January 1990.
. “Przemowienie na forum Rady Europy” [“Speech at the Forum of the Council
of Europe”]. Rzeczpospolita, 31 January 1990.
. Druga twarz Europy [The Other Face o f Europe]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
Wi?z, 1990.
. “Z formacji walki do formacji pracy” [“From Battle to Work”].
Rzeczpospolita, 27 May 1990.
. “Czas trudnej prdby” [“Time for Difficult Attempt”]. Rzeczpospolita, 1 July
1990.
Miehnik, Adam. “Jakiej Polski pragniemy?” [“What Poland Do We Want?”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, no. 132,10 November 1989.
_________ . “Deeyduj^ce stareie” [“Decisive Battle”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 24,29
January 1990.

449

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. “Pulapka nacjonalizmu” [“Trap of Nationalism”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 35,
10 February 1990.
. “Etyka a politika” [“Ethics and Politics”]. Tygodnik Powszechny, no. 18, 6
May 1990.
. “Akcja Dcmokratyczna: czym nic bcdzic” [“Democratic Action: What It Will
Not Be”]. Poprostu, no. 27,16 August 1990.
. “Polska przcstroga” [“Polish Caution”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 278,29
November 1990.
. “Lewica. Prawica. Dialog” [“The Left. The Right. Dialogue”]. Polityka
Polska, Decemher 1990-February 1991.
. Solidamosc z zydowskim losem” [“Solidarity with the Jewish Fate”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, no. 94, 22 April 1991.
. “Smutek Belgradu” [“Sadness of Belgrade”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 164,16
July 1991.
. “Czekalismy na ten dzieh” [“We Have Been Waiting for This Day”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, no. 198,26 August 1991.
. “Przed przesileniem?” [“Before the Force is Used?”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no.
215,14-15 September 1991.
. “Czy g?si mogq^uratowac miasto?” [“Can the Geese Save the Town?”].
Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 221,21-22 September 1991.
. “O eo idzie w tych wyborach” [“What These Elections Are About”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, no. 250,25 October 1991.
. “Po wyborach prezydenckich” [“After Presidential Elections”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, no. 287,10 Decemher 1991.
. “Trzy fimdamentalizmy” [“Three Fundamentalisms”]. Krytyka 36(1991).
. “Diahel naszego czasu” [“Devil of Our Times”]. Krytyka 37(1991).
. “Czy grozi nam powrot komunizmu?” [“Is There A Danger That Communism
Will Return?”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 258, 31 October - 1 November 1992.
. “Rozmowa z integryst^” [“Conversation with the Catholic Integrist”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, no. 263, 07-08 November 1992.
. “Czy Walesa zagraza demokracji?” [“Does Walesa Threaten Democracy?”].
Gazeta Wyborcza, 14-15 November 1992.
. “Komunizm, kosciol i czarownica” [“Commimism, Church, and the Witch”].
conversation with Leszek Kolakowski. Gazeta Wyborcza, 21-22. November 1992.
. “Cieh Sokratesa” [“Shadow of Socrates”]. Krytyka 38 (1992).
. “Pahstwo wyznaniowe czy wiara czlowieka” [“Confessional State or
Individual Faith?”]. Krytyka 38 (1992).
. “Pieklo kartoteki” [“The Hell of the Card Catalogue”]. Krytyka 39 (1992).
. “Druga wojna na gorze” [“Second War at the Top”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no.
29,4 February 1993.
. “Kosciol—prawica—monolog, albo ludzie podw6jnego wyzwania”
[“Church—^the Right—^Monolog, Or People of Dual Confession”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, 27-28 March 1993.
. “Sofijskie rozmowy” [“Sofia Conversations”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 151, 01
July 1993.
. “Belka i zdzblo” [“Beam and Speck”]. Krytyka 41-42 (1993).

450

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. “Antykomunizm z ludzk^, twarz^” [“Anti-Communism with Human Face”].
Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 213,11-12 September 1993.
. “Im gorzej, tym gorzej” [“The Worse, the Worse”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no.
225,25-26 September 1993.
. “zyrynowski moia milosc” [“My Love Zhirinovskii”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no.
8,11 January 1994.
. “Godnosc i strach” [“Dignity and Fear”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 105, 7-8
May 1994.
. “Polskie kredowe kolo” [“Polish Chalk Circle”]. In Ksiqzka dlaJacka [A
Book fo r Jacek]. Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 1995.
. “Polityka i (nie)moralnosc” [“Politics and (Lack of) Morality”]. Znak 6
1998).
. “Mysli wschodnioeuropejskie” [“Eastern European Thoughts”]. Krytyka
32/33 (1990).
. Kosciol, Lewica, Dialog. [Church, the Left, Dialog]. Warsaw: Mir Ksi^zki,
1998.
Miehnik, Adam, and W16dzimierz Cimoszewicz. “O prawd? i pojednanie” [“About Truth
and Reconciliation”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, 09-10 September 1995.
Miehnik, Adam, and Jerzy Tischner. Miqdzy Panem i Plebanem [Between the Secular and
Religious]. Conversation with Jacek zakowski. Krakow: Znak, 1995.
Modzelewski, Karol. “Mi^dzy autorytoryzmem a demokracja” [“Between Authoritarism
and Democracy”]. Rzeczpospolita, 1 October 1990.
________ . “Kto i CO tworzy wodza?” [“Who and What Creates the Cult of a Leader?”].
zycie Warszawy, 13 Noveber 1990.
_________ . “Bez zlotego rogu” [“Without a Golden Horn”]. Polityka, 16 November 1991.
_. “Wspolnota kombatanska czyli rownaj w prawo!” [“Combat Mentality or
‘March to the Right!’”]. Polityka, 1 August 1992.
. “Dyktatura ciemniakow” [“Dictatorship of the Ignorant”]. Gazeta Wyborcza,
4 September 1992.
. “Czy mozna uniewazniac rewolucj^bolszewick^?” [“Can the Significance of
the Bolshevik Revolution Be Lessened?”]. Polityka, 07 November 1992.
. “Nie palmy mostow” [“Let’s Not Bum the Bridges”]. Gazeta Robotnicza, 22
January 1993.
. “Szwonder, Kuklinski i sprawa polska” [“Szwonder, Kuklinski, and the
Polish Question”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, 27-28 March 1993.
. “Stareie na staropianie” [“Conflict on the Styrofoam”]. Gazeta Robotnicza, 11
June 1993.
. “Co to jest za maska?” [“Who Is Behind This Mask ?”]. Gazeta Robotnicza,
25 June 1993.
. Dokqd od komunizmu? [Where Do We Go from Communism?]. Warsaw:
Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1993.
. “Cztery nogi dobrze, dwie nogi zle?” [“Four Legs Are Good, Two Legs Are
Bad?”]. Gazeta Robotnicza, 02 July 1993.
. “Zasada najslabszych punktow” [“Principle of the Weakest Points”]. In
Ksiqzka dla Jacka [A Book fo r Jacek]. Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 1995.

451

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Najder, Zdzislaw. “Bitwa o umysl” [“Battle for the Mind”]. Przeglqd Powszechny, nos.
11,12(1989).
. “Wspolnota Europe] ska na rozdrozu” [“The European Union at the
Crossroads”]. Rzeczpospolita, 23 November 1989.
. “Potrzeba wizji” [“Need to Have a Vision”]. Rzeczpospolita, 29 December
1989-1 January 1990.
. “Sposoby uzywania demokracji” [“Ways of Using Democracy”].
Rzeczpospolita, 5 February 1990.
. “Nasze pahstwo” [“Our State”]. Rzeczpospolita, 17-18 February 1990.
_________ . “Przedmowa” [“Foreword”]. To Wymiaiy polskich spraw [Dimensions o f the
Polish Issues]. Warsaw: n.p., 1990.
. “Domicyl czyli posmiertna zemsta PRLu” [“Domicile or the Revenge of PRL
from the Grave”]. Rzeczpospolita, no. 250, 25 October 1991.
. Jaka Polska. Co i komu doradzalem. [What Poland. What and Whom Did I
Advise]. Warsaw: Spotkania Editions, 1993.
. “Po wyborach wrzesniowych 1993 czyli Wielkie Rozmazanie” [“After the
September 1993 Elections or the Great Blur”]. Rzeczpospolita, 16-17 October
1993.
. “Miejsce na mapie, moment w historii” [“Place on the Map, Moment in
History”]. Rzeczpospolita, 25 February 1994.
. “Famine narodowa” [“National Memory”]. Rzeczpospolita, 4 March 1994.
. “Polska polityka zagraniczna, 1989-1993: bilans zaniedbah” [“Polish Foreign
Policy, 1989-1993: Balance of the Neglected Issues”]. Arka, no. 3 (1994).
. “Unia daje odrebnosc” [“Membership in the European Union Is an Honor”].
Rzeczpospolita, 29 April 1994.
. “Zagrozenie nacjonalizmami” [“Threats of Nationalisms”]. Rzeczpospolita, 6
May 1994.
. “Niewidzialna r^ka rynku” [“Invisible Hand of the Market”]. Rzeczpospolita,
20 May 1994.
. “Rz^dy i prawo” [“Governments and the Law”]. Rzeczpospolita, 26 August
1994.
. “Zwykly obywatel a polityka zagraniczna” [“Ordinary Citizen and Foreign
Policy”]. Rzeczpospolita, 16 September 1994.
. “Trudno: trzeba wybierac!” [“Although It Is Difficult One Has to Choose!”].
Rzeczpospolita, A'l^owembox 1994.
Nowak-Jeziorahski, Jan. Pokolenie wielkiego dramatu [Generation o f the Great Drama].
Speech after receiving the honorable doctorate of the Poznan University, 6 May
1991.
. “Kryzys tozzamosci” [“Identity Crisis”]. Tygodnik Powszechny, no. 15, 12
April 1992.
. “Nie od razu Krakow zbudowano” [“Krakow Was Not Built In One Day”].
Rzeczpospolita, 24-25 April 1993.
. “Dlugi ciehPRL-u” [“Long Shadow of PRL”]. Tygodnik Powszechny, 12
September 1993.
. “Moje rozrachunki z PRL” [“Settling Personal Accounts with PRL”]. Tygodnik
Powszechny, 18 September 1994; 25 September 1994.

452

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. “Polska strategia obronna” [“Polish Defense Strategy”]. Rzeczpospolita, 11
November 1994; 15 November 1994.
. “Przesziosc uczy” [“The Past Teaches”]. Gtos Niedzielny, 31 July 1994; 11
November 1994.
. “Bakcyle PRL” [“Bacteria of PRL”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, 1 December 1994.
. “Daleki i blizki” [“Close and Far Away”]. In Ksiqzka dla Jacka [A Book fo r
Jacek\. Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 1995.
. “Czy Jalta moze si? powtdrzyc?” [“Can Yalta Happen Again?”]. Tygodnik
Powszechny, 05 February 1995.
. Polska wczoraj, dzis i jutro [Poland Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow].
Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1999.
Fakty, wydarzenia, opinie [Facts, Events, Opinions]. Warsaw: Czytelnik, 2001.
Olszewski, Jan. Przerwana premiera: z Janem Olszewskim rozmawiaj'q Radostaw
Jaszewski, Jerzy Klocihski i Jan Strekowski [Interrupted Prime Minister:
Conversations with Radoslaw Januszewski, Jerzy Klocinski, and Jan Strekowski].
Warsaw: Tygodnik Solidamosci, 1992.
Orlowski, Witold M. Problemy spoleczno-gospodarcze zwiqzane z wejsciem Polski do
Unii Europejskiej [Social and Economic Problems Associated with Polish
Ascension to the European Union]. Warsaw: Glowny Urz^d Statystyczny, 1998.
Parys, Jan. “Naszym celem jest odebranie wladzy lewicy” [“Our Goal Is to Take Power
Away from the Left”], zycie Warszawy, 24 July 1992.
________ . “Bitwa o wojsko” [“Struggle for the Military”]. In Lewy Czerwcowy: mowiq
Kaczyhski, Macierewicz, Parys, Glapihski, Kostrzewa-Zorbas [Lions o f July:
Kaczyhski, Macierewicz, Parys, Glapihski and Kostrzewa-Zorbas Speak Out].
Edited by Jacek Kurski, and Piotr Semka. Warsaw: Spotkania Editions, 1992.
________ . “Reagan, Bush, i c i ^ dalszy...” [“Reagan, Bush, and Further Developments
...”]. Tygodnik Spotkania 10(1992).
________ . “Najwazniejsze bezpeczehstwo” [“Security Is the Most Important Issue”].
Tygodnik Solidamosci, no. 46,16 October 1992.
________ . “Czym byla dla mnie PRL” [“What PRL Meant for Me”]. Tygodnik
Solidamosci, no. 50,11 December 1992.
‘Manifest polityczny” [“Political Manifesto”]. In Prawica dla Polski [Rightist
Party fo r Poland]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Antyk, Marcin Dybowski, 1993a.
. “Ruch Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej” [“Movement of the Third Republic”] in
Prawica dla Polski [Rightist Parties fo r Poland]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Antyk,
Marcin Dybowski, 1993b.
Rydlewski, Grzegorz. Rzqdowy system decyzyjny w Polsce [Decision-Making System o f
the Polish Government]. Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2002.
Skubiszewski, Krzysztof. “Nic o Polsce bez Polski” [“Nothing about Poland without
Poland”]. Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 20, 24 January 1991.
________ . “Prowadz? now^polityk? zagraniczna” [“1 Conduct New Foreign Policy”].
Trybuna, no. 81, 06-07 April 1991.
________ . “Przyczyniamy si? do zjednoczenia Europy” [“We Contribute to the
Unification of Europe”], zycie Warszawy, no. 172, 24 July 1991.

453

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. ‘“Kres Europy’ to tylko literacka przenosnia: dodawanie ulamkow” [“‘The End
of Europe’ Is Only a Literary Metaphor: Sum of Parts”]. Polityka, no. 42, 17
October 1992.
. “Polityka nie musi bye w kolizji z moralnosci^” [“Politics Does Not Have to
Collide with Morality”], zycie Warszawy, no. 137,15 June 1993.
. “Imperatyw ci^lo sci” [“Imperative Nature of Continuity”]. Rzeczpospolita,
no. 228, 29 September 1993.
. “Polska w jednocz^cej si? Europie” [“Poland in Unifying Europe”]. In Tadeusz
Mazowiecki: Polityk trudnych czasow [Tadeusz Mazowiecki: Politician o f the
Hard Times\. Warsaw: Presspublika, 1999.
Strzembosz, Adam. “Pol-wolnosc” [“Half-Freedom”]. Powsciqglosc i Praca 4 (1993).
Tischner, Jozef. “Dok^d prowadzi ta droga?” [“Where Does This Road Lead?”]. Tygodnik
Powszechny, 19 September 1989.
________ . “Solidamosc po latach” [“Solidarity After a Couple of Years”]. Gazeta
Wyborcza, 26 August 1996.
. “Dar strachu i zagubienia” [“Gift of Fear and Destruction”]. Gazeta Wyborcza,
17 October 1998.
Turowicz, Jerzy. “Chrzescijanie, Polacy, Zydzi” [“Christians, Poles, Jews”]. Tygodnik
Powszechny, 17 February 1991.
________ . “Dekomunizacja, ale jaka?” [“De-Communization, But of What Kind?”].
Tygodnik Powszechny, 21 February 1993.
. “Odwaga Jana Pawla 11-ego” [“Bravery of John-Paul 11”]. Tygodnik
Powszechny, August 1994.
. “Chrzescijanie i inni” [“Christians and Others”] in Ksiqzka dla Jacka [A Book
fo r Jacek]. Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 1995.
_.“Na marginesie Jugoslawiahskiej misji” [“On the Margins of the Yugoslavian
Mission”]. In Tadeusz Mazowiecki: Polityk trudnych czasow [Tadeusz
Mazowiecki: Politician o f the Hard Times], Warsaw: Presspublika, 1999.
Wiatr, Jerzy Jozef. “Rewolucja czy restauracja” [“Revolution or Restoration?”]. Dzis 8
(1993): 7-12.
. Wybory parlamentarne 19 wrzesnia 1993: przyczyny i nast^stw a
[Parliamentary Elections o f September 19, 1993: Reasons and Outcomes].
Warsaw: n.p., 1993.
________ . “Socjaldemokracja i socjalizm” [“Social Democracy and Socialism”]. MyH
Socjaldemokratyczna 2 (1994).
________ . “Powrot do historii: nacjonalizmy w erze postkomunistycznej” [“Return to
History: Nationalisms in the Post-Communist Era”]. Sprawy NarodowoscioweSeria Nowa 3(1994).
________ . “Prezydent w systemie demokracji parlamentamej” [“Presidency in the
Parliamentary Democracy”]. Mysl Socjaldemokratyczna 3-4 (1994).
. “Pr6ba prognozy” [“Forecast for the Future”]. Dzis 1 (1994).
. “Dekomunizacja elity czy elita dekomunizacji?” [“De-Communization of the
Elite or the Elite o f De-Communization?”]. Wiadomosci Kulturalne, 02 December
1995.
. “Czas Lewicy” [“Time for the Left”]. MyH Socjaldemokratyczna 2 (1995).

454

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

‘Wojsko w parlamentamej demokracji” [“Army in the Parliamentary
Democracy”]. Dzis 12 (1994).
. “Spor o przesziosc a spor o przyszlosc naszego kraju” [“Debate about the Past
and the Future of Our Country”]. In Co nam zostaio z tych lat? Szkice ipolemiki
[What Is Left fo r Us From These Years? Essays and Polemics], Torun:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszalek, 1996.
. Nie zmarnowalismy tych lat: sejm, rzqd, lewica [We Did Not Waste Those
Years: Parliament, Government, the Left], Warsaw: Adam Marszalek, 1998a.*
. Wladza lokalna w warunkach demokracji [Local Power Under Democratic
Conditions], Warsaw: n.p., 1998b.*
Winczorek, Piotr. “Konstytucja i obywateli” [“Constitution and Citizens”]. Znak 450
(1992).
________ . “Konstytucja? A po co? [“Constitution? What For?”]. Tygodnik Powszechny
39 (1992).
Zakrzewska, Janina. “Spor o Konstytucja” [“Debate About the Constitution”] in
Zakrzewska, Janina. Spor o Konstytucjq [Debate about the Constitution], Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1993.
________ . “Parlament w Konstytucji Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej” [“Parliament in the Third
Republic”]. Pahstwo i Prawo 11 (1993).
________ . “Pahstwo a Kosciol. Obawy rzeczywiste czy urojone?” [“The State and the
Church: Real or Imagined Fears?”]. Wiq^z 6 (1993).
. “Konstytucyjnosc referendum” [“About the Constitutionality of
Referendum”]. Rzeczpospolita, ,29 June 1995.
. “Konstytucyjny ksztalt samorz^du” [“Constitutional Form of SelfGovernment”]. Rzeczpospolita, 18 January 1996.
. “Pozaprawne funkcje konstytucji” [“Extra Functions of the Constitution”].
Rzeczpospolita, 5 April 1996.
. “Sprawiedliwosc spoleczna, co to takiego?” [“Social Justice: What Is It?”].
Rzeczpospolita, 25 June 1996.
. “Nowa konstytucja: problem aksyologii” [“New Constitution: Axiological
Problem”]. In Dyskusje konstytucyjne [Constitutional Discussions], Edited by Piotr
Winczorek. Warsaw: n.p., 1996.
Zakrzewska, Janina. “Konstytucja - prawo czy ozdoba?” [“Constitution - a Right or an
Ornamentation?”]. Tygodnik Powszechny 11 (1989).
________ . “Czas konstytucji” [“Time for the Constitution”]. Krytyka 36 (1991).
________ . “Konstytucyjna zasada pahstwa prawnego w praktyce Trybunalu
Konstytucyjnego” [“Principle of Constitutionality in the Functioning of the
Constitutional Tribunal”]. Pahstwo i Prawo 1 (1992).
________ . “Trybunal Konstytucyjny, Konstytucja, pahstwo prawa” [“Constitutional
Tribunal, Constitution, and the Rule of Law”]. Pahstwo i Prawo 1 (1992).
. “Pahstwo prawa a nowa konstytucja” [“The Rule of Law and the New
Constitution”]. In Prawo w zmieniajqcym si^ spoleczehstwie [Law in the Changing
Society], Krakhw: n.p., 1992.
Zielihski, Tadeusz. “Rozmowa z Wojciechem Reszczyhskim” [“Conversation with
Wojciech Reszczynski”] in Wygracprezydenta [To Win a Presidency], Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo von Borowski, 1995.

455

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX J
Relationships Between Various Polish Public Attitudes
Table 46a
Relationships between Political and Ideological Attitudes of the Polish Public
Attitudes
towards
communism
(1—worst
kind, 4—
good)

Attitudes
towards
communism

Are you
satisfied
with
democracy
in Poland?
(1—very
satisfied,
6—^very
dissatisfied)
.160**

Pearson
1.000
Correlation
.000
Sig. (2tailed)
N
9,197
8,487
Are you satisfied Pearson
.160**
1.000
with democracy
Correlation
in Poland?
.000
Sig. (2•
tailed)
N
8,487
9,872
How interested
Pearson
.143**
.082**
are you in
Correlation
politics?
.000
.000
Sig. (2tailed)
N
9,162
9,851
Do you favor or
Pearson
-.108**
-.068*
oppose death
Correlation
penalty?
.000
.000
Sig. (2tailed)
N
9,143
8,561
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

How
interested
are you in
politics?
(1 extremely,
5—^not at
all)
.143**

Do you
favor or
oppose
death
penalty?
(-1 favor,
2—
oppose)
-.108**

.000

.000

9,162
.082**

8,561
-.068*

.000

.000

9,851
1.000

9,143
-.037**
.000

11,102
-.037**

10,162
1.000

.000

•

10,162

10,220
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Table 47a
Relationships between Political and Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public
What
do you
think
about
current
Polish
econom
y ? (lvery
good,
4—very
had)

Should Should
govern govern
ment
ment
reduce
provide
income johs?
differen ( 1strongl
tials?
y
agree,
( 1strongl 5—
y agree, strongl
5—
y
strongl disagre
e)
y
disagre

Should
govern
ment
provide
minimu
m
income
? ( 1strongly
agree,
5—
strongly
disagre
e)

( 1-

Are you
satisfie
d with
Polish
political
situatio
n ? ( l—
very
satisfie
d ,6 —
very
dissatisf
ied)

Are you
satisfie
d with
democr
acy in
Poland?

How
interest
ed are
you in
politics
?

very
satisfie
d,6—
very
dissatisf
ied)

( 1-

0

extreme
ly, 5—
not at
all)

.453**

.380**

.094*^

-

-.176**

-.168**

-.140**

very
much
favor,
5—
totally
oppose)
-.148**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

2,185

2,128

2,167

2,154

1,778

1,985

2,004

-.176**

1.000

.510**

.466**

.190**

-.181**

-

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

2,255
1.000

2,241
.587*^

1,811
.196*^

2,032

2,043
.135**

2,241
-.132**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

2,292

1,835

2,056

2,072

2,289

e)______

Pears
What
do you on
think
Corre
about
lation
current Sig.
Polish ( 2 econo tailed
my?
)
N
Should Pears
on
govern
Corre
ment
reduce
lation
income Sig.
differen ( 2 tials?
tailed
)
N
Should Pears
govern on
ment
Corre
provid lation
ejobs? Sig.
(2tailed
)
N

Do you
favor or
oppose
socialis
m as
econom
ic
system?

1.000

.000

2,128
-.168**

2,259
.510**

.000

.000

2,167

2,255

2,310
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121* *

2,173
-.061

Should
govern
ment
provid
e
minim
um
incom
e?
Do
you
favor
or
oppose
sociali
sm as
econo
mic
system
?
Are
you
satisfie
d with
Polish
politic
al
situati
on?
Are
you
satisfie
d with
democ
racy in
Poland
?

Pears
on
Corre
lation
Sig.
(2tailed
)
N
Pears
on
Corre
lation
Sig.
(2tailed
)
N

Pears
on
Corre
lation
Sig.
(2tailed
)
N
Pears
on
Corr
elati
on
Sig.
(2taile
d)
N

-.140**

.466**

.587**

1.000

.000

.000

2,154
-.148

2,241
.190**

2,292
196**

2,295
130**

.000

.000

.000

.000

1,778

1,811

1,835

1,829

1,848

.453**

-.181**

-.173**

-.123**

-

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

1,985
.380**

2,032
121**
-

2,056
135**

2,043
107**

1,707
-.241**

2,071
.426**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

2,004

2,043

2,072

2,061

1,724

1,931

107**

-.073**

.130**

-.123**

-

.000

.000

.000

1,829
1.000

2,043
-.219**

2,061
- 241**

2,274
-.079**

.000

.000

.000

1,707

1,724

1,838

1.000

.426**

.036

.000

.105

1,931
1.000

2,060
.101**

.000

.000

-

-

219**

.000

2,090
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2.084

How
interes
ted are
you in
politic
s?

Pears .094**
-.061
-.132** -.073
-.079**
on
Corre
lation
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
Sig.
(2tailed
)
N
2,241
2,173
2,289
2,274
1,838
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

.036

.101

.105

.000

2,060

2.084

1.000

2,314

Table 47b
Relationships between Political and Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public

Are you
satisfie
d with
democr
acy in
Poland?
How
interest
ed are
you in
politics
?
Should
govern
ment
reduce

Pearson
Correlat
ion
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlati
on
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlati
on
Sig. (2-

Are
How
you
intereste
satisfie d are
d with
you in
democr politics?
acy in
(1 Poland? extremel
y, 5—
(1 very
not at
satisfie all)
d ,6 —
very
dissatis
fied)

Should
govemme
nt reduce
income
differenti
als? (1—
strongly
agree.
5—
strongly
disagree)

Should
govemm
ent
provide
jobs? (1—
strongly
agree.
5—
strongly
disagree)

1.000

.082**

-.115**

-

.000

.000

9,851
1.000

9,872
.082**

.000

-.091**

Do you
favor or
oppose
socialis
m as
economi
c
system?
(1 very
much
favor.
5—
totally
oppose)
-142**

.000

.000

.000

9,607
-.094**

9,775
-.160**

9,708
.436**

9,035
.158**

.000

.000

.000

.000

129**

Should
govemme
nt
provide
minimum
income?
(1 strongly
agree.
5—
strongly
disagree)

9,851
-.115**

11,102
- 094**

10,683
1.000

10,943
.503**

10,607
.571**

9,585
.172**

.000

.000

.

.000

.000

.000
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income tailed)
10,683
differen N
9,607
tials?
Should Pearson -.129** -.160**
govern Correlati
on
ment
.000
.000
provide Sig. (2jobs?
tailed)
10,943
N
9,775
Should Pearson -.091** -.089**
govern Correlati
ment
on
.000
.000
provide Sig. (2minimu tailed)
m
9,708
10,848
N
income
?
Do you Pearson -142** -.097**
favor or Correlati
oppose on
.000
.000
socialis Sig. (2m as
tailed)
econom N
9,035
9,813
ic
system?
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01

10,744

10,681

10,859

9,746

.503**

1.000

.571**

.172**

.000

.000

10,859
1.000

9,746
.110**

.000
10,681
.436**

11,014
.571**

.000

.000

10,607

10,859

10,918

9,685

.158**

.172**

.110**

1.000

.000

.000

.000

9,585

9,746

9,685

.000

9,849

level (2-tailed).

Table 47c
Relationships between Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public

What do you
think about
current

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-

What do
you think
about
current
Polish

Should
government
reduce
income
differentials

econ om y?
(1 —very

? (1 —

Should
govemmen
t provide
jobs? (1—
strongly
agree, 5—
strongly
disagree)

Should
govemmen
t provide
minimum
income?
(1 ~

strongly
agree, 5—
strongly
disagree)

good, 5—
very had)

strongly
agree, 5—
strongly
disagree)

1.000

-.2 1 8 * *

-.2 2 2 * *

-1 9 2 * *

.000

.000

.000
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Polish
economy?
Should
government
reduce
income
differentials?
Should
government
provide jobs?

tailed)
N
2,211
2,168
Pearson
-.218**
1.000
Correlation
Sig. (2.000
tailed)
N
2,168
2,284
Pearson
-.222**
.512**
Correlation
.000
Sig. (2.000
tailed)
N
2,195
2,274
-192**
Pearson
Should
.461**
government
Correlation
provide
.000
.000
Sig. (2minimum
tailed)
income?
N
2,184
2,265
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

2,195
.512**

2,184
.461**

.000

.000

2,274
1.000

2,265
.603**
.000

2,323
.603**

2,299
1.000

.000
2,299

2,307

Table 49a
Relationships between Ideological and Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public

Do you
favor or
o p p ose

death
penalty?
Should
govemme
nt reduce
income

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)

Do you
favor or
oppose
death
penalty?
(1 favor,
2—
oppose)

Should
govemm
ent
reduce
income
differenti
als? (1—
strongly
agree,
5—
strongly
disagree)

Should
govemm
ent
provide
jobs?
(1 strongly
agree,
5—
strongly
disagree)

Should
govemm
ent
provide
minimum
income?
(1 strongly
agree,
4—
strongly
disagree)

1.000

.102

.091**

.057**

Do you
favor or
oppose
socialism
as
economic
system?
(1—^very
much
favor,
5—
totally
against)
.104**

.000

.000

.000

.000

9,878
1.000

10,092
.593**

10,009
.439**

9,117
.158**

.000

.000

.000

10,220
.102
.000
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differentia
Is?
Should
govemme
nt provide
jobs?

N

9,878

10,744

10,681

10,607

9,585

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

.091**

.593**

1.000

.571**

.172**

.000

.000

•

.000

.000

10,681
.439**

11,014
.571**

10,859
1.000

9,746
.110**

.000

.000

•

.000

10,607
.158**

10,859
172**

10,918
110**

9,685
1.000

.000

.000

.000

•

9,585

9,746

9,685

9,849

10,092
Should
.057**
govemme
.000
nt provide
minimum
income?
10,009
.104**
Do you
favor or
.000
oppose
socialism
9,117
as
economic
system?
** Correlation is signi leant at the

0.01 level (2-tailed).
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